DocketNumber: No. 05AP-658.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 7108
Judges: SADLER, J.
Filed Date: 5/18/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} Appellant, by and through his next friend and mother, filed an action against Columbus Public Schools and the Columbus Board of Education alleging negligence and failure to protect a child pursuant to R.C.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD IN GRANTING DEFENDANT COLUMBUS PUBLIC SCHOOL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COLUMBUS SCHOOL BOARD'S DECISIONS RELATING TO A SCHOOL BUS ROUTE IS NOT RELATED TO THE "OPERATIONS OF A MOTOR VEHICLE" FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE R.C. §
2744.02 (B)(1) EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY.THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION TO STUDENTS IS NOT A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION SUCH AS TO PROVIDE AN EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY UNDER R.C. §
2744.02 (B)(2).FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ARE INJURIES NOT SUFFICIENTLY TRACEABLE TO A SCHOOL BUS DRIVER'S OPERATION OF A SCHOOL BUS SUCH AS TO INVOKE LIABILITY ON THE PART OF A SCHOOL SYSTEM.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "DIRECT CONSEQUENCES RULE" APPLIES IN THIS CASE TO AVOID LIABILITY ON THE PART OF A SCHOOL SYSTEM WHEN A PERPETRATOR THROWS A ROCK FROM OUTSIDE OF A SCHOOL BUS WHICH IS PROCEEDING ALONG A ROUTE KNOWN TO HAVE EXPERIENCED RECENT SUCH INCIDENTS.
{¶ 3} The assignments of error are related and shall be discussed together. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that, when the evidence is construed most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C); Harless v. WillisDay Warehousing Co. (1978),
{¶ 4} When an appellate court reviews a trial court's disposition of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court applies the same standard as applied by the trial court. Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A. (1992),
{¶ 5} Former R.C.
For the purposes of this chapter, the functions of political subdivisions are hereby classified as governmental functions and proprietary functions. Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.
{¶ 6} School districts are classified as political subdivisions under R.C.
{¶ 7} Appellant contends that the exceptions provided in R.C.
(B) Subject to sections
2744.03 and2744.05 of the Revised Code, a political subdivision is liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or of any of its employees in connection with a governmental or proprietary function, as follows:(1) Except as otherwise provided in this division, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees upon the public roads when they are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority. * * *
* * *
(2) Except as otherwise provided in sections
3314.07 AND3746.24 of the Revised Code, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political subdivisions.
{¶ 8} The determination of whether a political subdivision is immune from tort liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744 involves a three-tiered analysis. Bush v. Beggrow, Franklin App. No. 03AP-1238,
"The first tier is the general rule that a political subdivision is immune from liability incurred in performing either a governmental function or a proprietary function. * * * However, that immunity is not absolute." Colbert, at ¶ 7. "The second tier of the analysis requires a court to determine whether any of the five exceptions to immunity listed in R.C.
2744.02 (B) apply to expose the political subdivision to liability." Id. at ¶ 8,790 N.E.2d 781 . "If any of the exceptions to immunity R.C.2744.02 (B) do apply and no defense in that section protects the political subdivision from liability, then the third tier of the analysis requires a court to determine whether any of the defenses in R.C.2744.03 apply, thereby providing the political subdivision a defense against liability." Id. at ¶ 9,790 N.E.2d 781 .
{¶ 9} Appellant contends that R.C.
{¶ 10} Appellant argues that the court in Groves v. Dayton Pub.Schools (1999),
{¶ 11} However, appellant's injuries in this case did not arise from the operation of the school bus, but, rather, appellant argues as a result of the bus driver refusing to alter the route or report the previous stone-throwing incidents to the authorities. In Sears v.Saul (Feb. 19, 1999), Montgomery App. No. CA17102, a child was killed while trying to cross a street to reach the bus stop. The plaintiff alleged that the school board placed the bus stop at an inherently dangerous location and was negligent in continuing to keep the bus stop at that location. The court found, that because the case was essentially based on the appellees' acts of officially locating, and possibly unofficially changing the bus stop location, "[t]he facts of this case are too narrowly confined, therefore, to embrace the `operation' of a motor vehicle under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)." Id. These facts do not fit within the R.C.
{¶ 12} The trial court found that the direct consequences rule applies to this case because the throwing of the rock was an intervening cause of appellant's injuries and a break in the chain of causation. Appellant argues that the bus driver's breach of duty to keep students safe by not reporting the previous rock-throwing incidents and continuing along the same bus route was a concurrent event with the throwing of the rock to cause appellant's injury.
{¶ 13} In Doe v. Dayton City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1999),
The "direct consequences" rule is grounded in the doctrine of intervening cause. That doctrine relieves a party of liability when a break occurs in the chain of causation. A break will occur when there intervenes between an agency creating a hazard and an injury resulting therefrom another conscious and responsible agency that could or should have eliminated the hazard. Hurt v. Charles J. Rogers Transp. Co. (1955),
164 Ohio St. 323 ,58 O.O. 119 ,130 N.E.2d 824 . However, the intervening cause must be disconnected from the negligence of the first person and must be of itself an efficient, independent, and self-producing cause of the injury. Id. In contrast, a concurrent negligence, that is, one which concurs in point of consequence with the original negligence to produce the harm involved, does not cut off liability. Garbe v. Halloran (1948),150 Ohio St. 476 ,38 O.O. 325 ,83 N.E.2d 217 .
{¶ 14} In this case, the rock flying through the window was an intervening, external force that caused the injury and constituted a break in the chain of causation.
{¶ 15} Appellant also contends that R.C.
{¶ 16} R.C.
{¶ 17} Thus, we find the trial court did not err in finding that appellees were entitled to immunity. For the foregoing reasons, appellant's five assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
PETREE and BROWN, JJ., concur.