DocketNumber: No. 07CA4.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 1956
Judges: HARSHA, J.
Filed Date: 4/18/2008
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} Ms. Elam also contends that the trial court erred by accepting an ex parte letter from Mr. Pierce. After the trial court issued its original order, Ms. Elam filed a motion to cancel the ADD testing, and Mr. Pierce filed a motion to strike her motion. Then Mr. Pierce sent a letter to the court suggesting that their son should be tested for ADD/ADHD immediately due to a drop in his grades. This letter was an improper ex parte communication, and had the court relied upon it to make its decision, the court would have erred. However, there is no evidence in the record that the trial court improperly relied upon the letter. Upon receiving the letter, the court forwarded copies to the parties' counsel and did not issue its enforcement order until Ms. Elam received notice of the letter and was given a reasonable opportunity to respond to it. Thus, Ms. Elam was not prejudiced by the improper communication from Mr. Pierce. Nor did the trial court act improperly upon receiving the letter. Therefore, we overrule Ms. Elam's assignments of error.
{¶ 4} In November 2006, Mr. Pierce sent an ex parte letter to the trial court suggesting that the parties' son be tested for ADD/ADHD immediately due to a drop in his grades.1 Though it's not entirely clear, the record suggests that, upon receiving the letter, the trial court immediately forwarded copies to both parties' counsel.2 Regardless, Ms. Elam's counsel acknowledges that he received notice of the letter on November 14, 2006. On December 26, 2006, the court again issued an entry directing the parties to take their son to counseling. Ms. Elam appeals this order.
1. The Trial Court erred by ordering that the minor child of the parties attend psychological counseling without a motion for such counseling from either party.
2. The Trial Court erred by ordering that the minor child of the parties attend psychological counseling without holding a hearing.
3. The Trial Court erred in accepting ex parte communications from the Plaintiff/Appellee.
{¶ 8} Under Civ.R. 35(A), a trial court has authority to order a psychological evaluation of a party provided that certain procedural safeguards are met.3 Here, the trial court initially ordered psychological counseling and ADD testing in its August 4, 2006 entry regarding the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities. While Ms. Elam does not address the court's original entry, Mr. Pierce contends the December 26, 2006 order merely enforced this original order and that the trial court had in fact followed the proper procedure prior to issuing its original order. He also contends that the court's original entry was a final appealable order and that Ms. Elam's appeal is therefore untimely. However, *Page 6 Ms. Elam does not raise the propriety of the court's original order and the procedure through which it was issued. Furthermore, while we agree arguendo that the original order was a final appealable order, the trial court still retained jurisdiction to enforce it. And, any enforcement action taken by the court would be subject to appeal in its own right.
{¶ 9} Trial courts have inherent power to issue orders throughout the course of proceedings to ensure that litigation progresses toward final resolution. See McCord v. McCord, Franklin App. Nos. 06AP-102 684,
{¶ 10} Here, the trial court had inherent authority to enforce its original order. After Ms. Elam filed her motion to cancel the testing and the court discovered that the parties had failed to comply with its original order, the court had the power to issue its subsequent entry ordering the counseling and ADD testing. In so doing, the court was not required to re-adjudicate the merits of its original order. Rather, the court simply entered a judgment to enforce the prior *Page 7 order, which the parties had failed to follow. Thus, the December 26, 2006 order is simply a valid exercise of the trial court's inherent power to enforce its original order of August 4, 2006.
* * **Page 8(B) Adjudicative Responsibilities.
* * *
(7) A judge shall not initiate, receive, permit, or consider communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their representatives concerning a pending or impending proceeding except:
(a) Where communications require, ex parte communications for scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that do not address substantive matters or issues on the merits are permitted if the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of ex parte communication.
(b) A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.
(c) A judge may consult with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges.
(d) As authorized by law.
* * *
{¶ 12} Initially, we address Mr. Pierce's contention that his letter does not meet the definition of "ex parte" because it was informational only and requested no action. Mr. Pierce sent his letter directly to the court after Ms. Elam filed her motion to strike the testing. In his letter, he suggested that it was imperative that ADD/ADHA testing be completed immediately. The obvious purpose of the letter was to influence the court's decision on whether the son should undergo ADD/ADHA testing. See State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v.Whitmore (1998),
{¶ 13} However, the record fails to support Ms. Elam's contention that the trial court acted inappropriately upon receiving the letter. First, the record suggests that the court forwarded copies of the letter to the parties' counsel immediately upon receiving it. Ms. Elam's counsel received notice of the letter on November 14, 2006. Second, the trial court did not issue its enforcement order until December 26th. Thus, Ms. Elam had over a month upon receiving notice of the letter to file any objections to it. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the trial court relied upon the letter, and during a status conference with the parties, the trial court apparently denied basing its *Page 9 order on any information contained in the letter.4 Finally, because the court had before it the parties' respective motions to cancel the testing and to strike, there was an alternative basis for the court's entry. Therefore, we reject Ms. Elam's contention that the trial court acted improperly upon receiving the letter.
{¶ 14} Having overruled each of the assignments of error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
*Page 10JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Meigs County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Kline, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only as to Assignments of Error I and II; Concurs in Judgment and Opinion as to Assignment of Error III.