DocketNumber: No. 3442
Citation Numbers: 108 N.E.2d 850, 91 Ohio App. 475
Judges: CONN, J.
Filed Date: 11/19/1951
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
Plaintiff brought his action in assumpsit for money had and received under the principle of "unjust enrichment." Although the action is an "action at law" it is equitable in its nature, liberal in form, and is to be determined by the application of equitable principles. Plaintiff contends that the deposit of $1,000 evidenced by the receipt was made on condition that it be returned in the event plaintiff elected not to purchase the property. Defendant contends that the deposit was a down payment — earnest money — upon the purchase of the property and that within a reasonable time thereafter defendant was ready, able and willing to convey the property to plaintiff. In his cross-petition defendant claims damages in the sum of $1,035 by reason of plaintiff's breach of the alleged contract to purchase the property. Although plaintiff was permitted to establish his claim of the deposit of the money incident to negotiations for the purchase of the property, defendant was denied the right to orally establish his cross-petition for damages by reason of the statute of frauds.
The statute does not make a parol contract for the sale of land void. By withholding a right of action upon it, it simply makes it voidable at the will of either of the parties. But neither party can be compelled to ignore considerations of equity, of good faith, and moral obligations which may arise from such parol contract, and to avoid it by pleading the statute of frauds. Lefferson v. Dallas,
Since defendant's claim for damages set forth in his cross-petition arises out of the same transaction set forth in the petition as the foundation of plaintiff's claim, defendant was entitled to have his claim under the cross-petition submitted to the jury for determination, and the court committed error prejudicial to the defendant in dismissing the cross-petition. *Page 483
FESS, CONN and SAVORD, JJ., of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting by designation in the Seventh Appellate District.