Eitel's Towing Serv., Inc. v. D H Trucking, Inc.

[Cite as Eitel's Towing Serv., Inc. v. D H Trucking, Inc., 2022-Ohio-1639.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
EITEL’S TOWING SERVICE, INC., et al.,:
: Case No. 21CA3753
Plaintiffs-Appellants, :
:
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
D H TRUCKING, INC., et al., :
: RELEASED: 05/11/2022
Defendants-Appellees. :
APPEARANCES:
Daniel J. Bennett, Bennett Law Group, LLC, Gahanna, Ohio, for Appellants.
Fridrikh V. Shrayber and Christina Manfredi McKinely, Dentons Cohen & Grigsby
P.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellee, Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} Appellants, Eitel’s Towing Service, Inc., and Harper’s Garage
(“appellants”), appeal the Ross County Court of Common Pleas judgment that
granted appellee, Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC’s (“PGW”) Civ.R. 60(B) motion
for relief from a default judgment. Appellants present a single assignment of
error: “The trial court erred in granting [PGW’s] motion for relief from judgment.”
After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we
overrule appellants’ assignment of error, and affirm the trial court’s judgment
granting PGW relief from the default judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶2} On May 19, 2020, appellants filed a complaint against PGW and
other defendants primarily seeking reimbursement for services they had
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 2
performed cleaning up a damaged trailer, as well as removing and storing cargo
from the trailer. On June 18, 2020, D H Trucking, filed an answer, and on July 8,
2020, P.A.M. Transport filed its answer.
{¶3} On July 16, 2020, appellants filed a Civ.R. 55 motion for default
judgment against Marah Transportation, LLC (“Marah”) and PGW alleging that
neither had answered or otherwise responded within 28 days after the complaint
was served on both. On July 20, 2020, the trial court granted appellants’ motion
for default judgment against Marah and PGW.
{¶4} On July 30, 2020, Marah filed a motion to set aside the default
judgment and requested an extension for it to file an answer.
{¶5} On August 27, 2020, PGW filed a motion to set aside the default
judgment against it pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (5). PGW alleged that it was
unaware of the lawsuit “because, due to the various mitigation orders issued by
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolfe related to the COVID-19 pandemic, PGW’s
entire staff, including its legal department, has been working remotely since
March 2020 and was not physically present in their offices.” PGW alleged that it
was not aware of the appellants’ complaint until after the trial court entered
default judgment against PGW.
{¶6} PGW argued that its failure to file a timely response to the complaint
was due to excusable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect
under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) or “any other reason justifying relief from the judgment”
under (B)(5). PGW also asserted that it had a meritorious defense because it is
not a proper party to appellant’s complaint.
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 3
{¶7} Appellants filed a memorandum contra asserting that PGW’s internal
mishandling of the complaint did not warrant PGW relief from the default
judgment.
{¶8} The trial court held a hearing on PGW’s motion for relief from
judgment. Two witnesses testified.
{¶9} PGW’s first witness was Doug Palumbo, its production manager. He
testified that PGW makes auto glass for “original equipment manufacturers[,]” like
Chrysler, and “flat glass.” He claimed that PGW ships its glass products using
third party shippers. Palumbo testified that he is notified if the shipper is involved
in an accident, and would in turn notify PGW’s in-house counsel “if things
escalated.” With regard to the underlying case, Palumbo never notified PGW’s
in-house counsel of the accident because he “was never made aware of it.”
{¶10} Based upon his examination of a “load confirmation agreement,”
Palumbo maintained that PGW’s product was not involved in the accident that
resulted in appellant’s lawsuit. More specifically, when asked if the load
confirmation agreement indicated who owned “the glass racks at issue in the
accident[,]” he stated, “it looks like PGW Auto Glass.” Palumbo testified that
PGW Auto Glass manufactures “after market” auto glass (e.g., products used to
replace original parts), while PGW manufactures auto glass for original
equipment manufacturers (e.g., products installed in new vehicles).
{¶11} PGW’s next witness was its in-house counsel, Xochitl Sandoval.
Sandoval testified that she is in charge of all legal services pertaining to PGW’s
business in the United States, Canada, Germany, China, and Columbia. She
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 4
indicated that she is the designee who receives notice of service of process on
PGW’s behalf. Sandoval further stated that PGW is made aware of lawsuits in
numerous ways, including by notice from the “business,” their insurance carriers,
counsel for the litigant, and from their statutory agent, CCS.
{¶12} She testified that when CCS is served with notice of a lawsuit
against PGW, it, in turn, sends paper copies of those documents to her office in
Pennsylvania, as well as by e-mail. Upon receiving notice of a lawsuit, she
testified that the first thing she typically does is contact outside counsel.
{¶13} Sandoval testified that in 2020 because the pandemic closed her
Pennsylvania office, she relocated to her home country of Mexico where she had
access to her work e-mail. Sandoval asserted that she was not aware of the
paper copies pertaining to appellant’s lawsuit that CCS had sent to her
Pennsylvania office due to her absence, and was never informed by the business
about the lawsuit. The record shows and Sandoval acknowledged that she
received e-mails from CCS dated April 21 (that contained a demand letter
regarding the lawsuit) and May 22, 2020 (that contained a copy of appellant’s
complaint), and July 16, 2020 (that contained an answer from P.A.M. Transport
Inc.), but she testified that she did not open any of them because:
this was in the middle of a pandemic situation. I was basically
doing pressing matters for the company and trying to be [sic] keep
our people safe. Trying to get the facilities open. With these
different states ruling and changing orders, we need to be like
from day to night like reviewing orders, getting questions from
business, dealing with different situations from the supply chain,
logistic issues. There were, to be honest with you honestly, I
made this mistake of -- but again, it was -- I was trying to keep the
business afloat. It was part of my day and I admit, I made that
mistake.
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 5
However, Sandoval testified that she became aware that PGW was a party to the
lawsuit in question sometime near the “end of July 2020” when she received
appellants’ motion for default judgment. She immediately notified outside
counsel, who filed PGW’s motion for relief from judgment. She also maintained
that “this is the first time that it’s happened in my whole career,” and “made an
internal rule on my book just to forward all these notifications or e-mails to
another in-house counsel.”
{¶14} Sandoval testified that she receives many e-mails from CCS
involving issues other than lawsuits, including orders of garnishment, third-party
subpoenas, and other documents.
{¶15} Finally, Sandoval testified that PGW did not own any of the glass
racks that were involved in the accident that is the basis of appellant’s lawsuit
herein.
{¶16} After the hearing, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting
PGW’s motion for relief from the default judgment finding that PGW filed its
Civ.R. 60(B) motion within a reasonable time, asserted a meritorious defense,
and
that the neglect committed by Defendant PGW was excusable,
and occasioned by an unprecedented global pandemic.
Moreover, “where timely relief is sought from a default judgment
and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should
be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so
that cases may be decided on their merits.” Id., citing GTE
Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. 47 Ohio St.2d 146(1976). [PGW] presented evidence that established it has a
meritorious defense – specifically, that it is not even a proper party
in interest to this case and was improperly sued. To allow a default
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 6
judgment to stand against such a party would effect a gross
miscarriage of justice.
It is this judgment that appellants appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE PITTSBURG GLASS
WORKS, LLC’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
{¶17} Appellants set forth three arguments why the trial court improperly
concluded that PGW’s neglect in responding to appellants’ complaint was not
excusable for purposes of Civ.R. 60(B)(1).
{¶18} Appellants first argue that the trial court erred in granting PGW relief
because the complaint was timely served on CCS, which forwarded notice of the
service to PGW’s in-house counsel, who was specifically designated to handle
service of process. Appellants claim that counsel merely failed to timely respond
“because of a busy workload created by the Covid-19 pandemic” was not
excusable. Appellants maintain that the present case is indistinguishable from
three decisions in which this Court held that the appellant’s negligence in not
filing timely responses was not excusable neglect under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), citing
D.G.M., Inc. v. Cremeans Concrete & Supply Co., 111 Ohio App. 3d 134, 139,
675 N.E.2d 1263 (4th Dist. 1996); Vanest v. Pillsbury Co., 124 Ohio App. 3d 525,
706 N.E.2d 825 (4th Dist. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by State ex rel.
O'Malley v. Russo, 2019-Ohio-1698, 156 Ohio St. 3d 548, 130 N.E.3d 256; and
Keaton v. Purchase Buyers Group, 145 Ohio App.3d 796, 2001-Ohio-2569, 764
N.E.2d 1043 (4th Dist. 2001).
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 7
{¶19} Appellants also argue that “vague references to the effects of the
pandemic that, even if accepted as true, do not demonstrate a causal connection
between the effects of the pandemic and a failure to timely answer a complaint[.]”
Therefore, PGW has failed to submit sufficient operative facts in this case to
support that its neglect herein was excusable under Civ.R. 60(B)(1).
{¶20} Finally, appellants maintain that PGW’s “internal procedure for
handling service of process was negligent and insufficient where the person
designated for handling service of process was too busy to handle service of
process[.]”
{¶21} In response, PGW maintains that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting its Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. PGW
claims that the correct defendant is PGW Auto Glass, LLC, a company that is
unrelated to PGW. PGW also maintains that its failure to timely respond was a
result of the global pandemic. PGW claims that it was not aware that it was a
defendant in appellants’ lawsuit until July 27, 2020 when it received appellants’
default judgment from CCS. PGW asserts it “thereafter immediately engaged
counsel and tried to reach a resolution with opposing counsel.” Because these
efforts were unsuccessful, on August 27, 2020, PGW filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion
for relief from appellants’ default judgment.
{¶22} PGW stresses that we must afford deference to the trial court’s
judgment. PGW claims that the trial court correctly found that the pandemic was
“not some mine-run event that would excuse a party from complying with its legal
obligations; rather, it sowed such chaos and uncertainty that in attempting to
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 8
navigate the uncharted waters of COVID-19 on an hourly basis, it was
excusable–-even if careless---that PGW might fail to comply with its obligations
to respond to a lawsuit[,]” i.e., PGW’s neglect in failing to timely respond to
appellants’ lawsuit was excusable within Civ.R. 60(B)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶23} We review a trial court’s decision granting or denying a Civ.R. 60(B)
motion for relief from a judgment for an abuse of discretion. Whited v. Whited,
4th Dist. Washington No. 19CA26, 2020-Ohio-5067, ¶ 8. This is a very
deferential standard, which limits our review “to determining whether the trial
court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably; in doing so, the
appellate court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”
Id., citing Dunford v. Dunford, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 13CA7, 2014-Ohio-617, ¶ 3. In
an appeal involving the review of a trial court’s decision denying a party’s Civ.R.
60(B) motion, we stated that “in order to establish an abuse of discretion, the
result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact or logic that it evidences
not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but
the defiance of judgment, not the exercise of reason but passion or
bias.” Keaton, 145 Ohio App. 3d at 805., citing Nakoff v. Fairview Gen. Hosp., 75
Ohio St.3d 254, 256, 662 N.E.2d 1 (1996).
{¶24} “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ has been described as including a ruling
that lacks a ‘sound reasoning process.’ ” State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St. 3d 337,
2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 9
597 (1990). “It is not sufficient for an appellate court to determine that a trial
court abused its discretion simply because the appellate court might not have
reached the same conclusion or is, itself, less persuaded by the trial court's
reasoning process than by the countervailing arguments.” Id.
1. Civ.R. 60(B)
{¶25} There are five grounds upon which a party may seek relief from a
judgment under Civ.R. 60(B):
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief
from the judgment.
However, in order to be successful
on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, a movant must demonstrate: (1) a
meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2)
entitlement to relief under one of the grounds stated
in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a
reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief
are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the
judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
Whited, 4th Dist. Washington No. 19CA26, 2020-Ohio-5067, ¶ 10, citing Bank of
Am., N.A., Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1030, ¶ 10-
11, citing GTE Automatic Elec. Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146,
351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus.
“ ‘These [three] requirements are independent and in the conjunctive; thus the
test is not fulfilled if any one of the requirements is not met.’ ” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting
Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174, 637 N.E.2d 914 (1994).
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 10
{¶26} “Civ.R. 60(B) is a remedial rule to be liberally construed with a view
toward effecting a just result.” W. Pub. Co. v. McCrae, 4th Dist. Scioto No.
91CA1971, 1991 WL 260826, *6 (Nov. 21, 1991), citing Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Adams, 36 Ohio St. 3d 17, 21, 520 N.E.2d 564 (1988), see also Whited at ¶ 8
(“Generally, Civ.R. 60(B) strikes a balance between the need for final judgments
and the need for courts to vacate their orders to further justice and fairness.”),
citing Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick, 53 Ohio St.2d 9, 12, 371 N.E.2d 214 (1978).
{¶27} The trial court found: (1) PGW presented a meritorious defense, (2)
PGW’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment was filed in a reasonable
time, and (3) PGW’s neglect in responding to appellant’s lawsuit was excusable
under Civ.R. 60(B)(1). Appellants do not contest the trial court’s first two
determinations. Rather, it maintains that the trial court “erred” in finding that
PGW set forth operative facts that its failure to timely respond to appellants’
complaint was excusable neglect. Therefore, our analysis is focused on the trial
court’s finding of “excusable neglect.”
2. Excusable Neglect
{¶28} “The term ‘excusable neglect’ is an elusive concept which has been
difficult to define and to apply. Nevertheless, [the Supreme Court has] previously
* * * stated that the inaction of a defendant is not ‘excusable neglect’ if it can be
labeled as a ‘complete disregard for the judicial system.’ ” Kay v. Glassman, 76
Ohio St.3d 18, 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996), citing GTE Automatic Elec., 47 Ohio
St.2d 146, 153, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976); Rose, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 21, 520 N.E.2d
564 (1988), fn. 4. “ ‘[T]here is a fine line between excusable and inexcusable
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 11
neglect and the courts, including this court, must defer to the trial court's
determination on whether the neglect is excusable given our abuse of discretion
standard.’ ” Settlers Bank v. Burton, 4th Dist. Washington No. 12CA38, 2014-
Ohio-335, ¶ 41, quoting Norman v. Hanoverton Motor Cars, Inc., 7th Dist.
Hanover No. 11 CO 13, 2012-Ohio-2697, ¶ 27. Excusable neglect must be
construed consistent with the principle that “Civ.R. 60(B)(1) is a remedial rule to
be liberally construed, while bearing in mind that Civ.R. 60(B) constitutes an
attempt to ‘strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation
must be brought to an end and justice should be done.’ ” Colley v. Bazell, 64
Ohio St. 2d 243, 248, 416 N.E.2d 605 (1980), quoting 11 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure 140, Section 2851.
{¶29} “The determination of whether neglect is excusable or inexcusable
must take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances, and
courts must be mindful that cases should be decided on their merits, where
possible, rather than procedural grounds.” Seniah Corp. v. Buckingham, Doolittle
& Burroughs, L.L.P., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016CA00039, 2016-Ohio-7516, ¶ 25,
citing Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 79–81, 514 N.E.2d 1122 (1987); Evans
v. Shapiro, 4th Dist. Ross No. 18CA3670, 2019-Ohio-3209, ¶ 12. “ ‘These
include the amount of time between the last day that an answer would have
timely been filed and the date the default judgment was granted, [and] “the
amount of the judgment awarded[.]” ’ ” Peoples Bank, Natl. Assn. v. McGhee,
4th Dist. Gallia Nos. 12CA11, 13CA4, 2013-Ohio-3859, ¶ 14, quoting State v.
Hulgin, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26719, 2013-Ohio-2794, ¶ 13, quoting Colley at
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 12
249. “[C]ourts must remain mindful of the fact that ‘ “[m]atters involving large
sums should not be determined by default judgments if it can reasonabl[y] be
avoided.” ’ ” [brackets sic.] Id., quoting Colley at 249, fn.5, quoting Tozer v.
Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir.1951).
{¶30} Finally, “ ‘[w]here timely relief is sought from a default judgment and
the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor
of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their
merits.’ ” Id., quoting GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d
113 (1976) at paragraph three of the syllabus.
ANALYSIS
A. Vanest, D.G.M., Keaton
{¶31} Appellants cite three cases that they claim require us to reverse the
trial court’s judgment: Vanest, 124 Ohio App. 3d 525, 528-38, 706 N.E.2d 825(1997) (Being preoccupied with another lawsuit is not excusable neglect for
missing a legal deadline), D.G.M., 111 Ohio App. 3d 134, 136-41, 675 N.E.2d
1263 (1996) (Being preoccupied with the work concerning a political campaign
and had no time to devote to this suit was not excusable neglect), Keaton, 145
Ohio App. 3d 796, 798-806, 2001-Ohio-2569, 764 N.E.2d 1043 (Proof of service
of complaint required reversal of judgment granting a party relief from a judgment
due to excusable neglect and a remand to take additional evidence). Together
these three cases can reasonably be interpreted as standing for the proposition
that a party’s neglect in responding to a legal obligation due to their involvement
with their own personal and/or business obligations is not “excusable” for
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 13
purposes of Civ.R. 60(B). However, we must remember that excusable neglect
must be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case.
{¶32} Regarding the instant case, the trial court found that PGW’s neglect
was excusable because of the problems created by the pandemic. We are just
beginning to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic that has caused as many as
100 million infections and 2.1 million total deaths.1 And it is beyond doubt that it
disrupted our lives in many ways. See e.g. Sw. Ohio Basketball, Inc. v. Himes,
2021-Ohio-415, 167 N.E.3d 1001, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.) (Plaintiffs’ challenged certain
restrictions contained in a health order pertaining to COVID-19 that governed the
resumption of sports and was ordered by the Ohio Department of Health). The
legal profession was not spared from such problems as evidenced by the
Supreme Court’s order tolling “time requirements” regarding numerous court
rules due to the pandemic. See In re Tolling of Time Requirements Imposed by
Rules Promulgated by Supreme Ct. & Use of Tech., 158 Ohio St. 3d 1447, 2020-
Ohio-1166, 141 N.E.3d 974. A claim that a delay in responding to legal deadline
is excusable neglect because of COVID-19 is not an unprecedented argument.
See State ex rel. Chambers v. Adult Parole Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
109750, 2020-Ohio-5435, ¶ 3. Therefore, we find that, unlike Vanest, D.G.M.,
and Keaton where the neglect was purportedly caused by the respective parties’
own voluntarily-accepted obligations, the cause of the neglect here was a result
of a unique pandemic over which PGW had no control and which caused
1 https://www.ncbi.nih.gove/pmc/articles/PMC7866842/.
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 14
significant difficulties on a world-wide scale. Consequently, we find that Vanest,
D.G.M., and Keaton are not controlling in the instant case.
B. The Trial Court’s Discretion
{¶33} Having concluded that Vanest, D.G.M., and Keaton are not
controlling, we now examine whether the trial court abused its discretion in
granting PGW’s motion for relief.
{¶34} The record reveals that Sandoval was required to work remotely
due to the pandemic. Therefore, she did not receive paper copies of appellant’s
complaint, as normally occurs when she is working in her Pennsylvania office.
She also testified that she was not informed of the lawsuit by anyone from the
production facility, as sometimes occurs. Rather, she received three e-mails
from CCS over a three-month period that pertained to appellants’ lawsuit.
Sandoval testified that during this period she was receiving over 100 e-mails
daily due to the pandemic. She testified that she did not notice the e-mails
pertaining to appellants’ lawsuit because the pandemic caused “pressing matters
for [PGW],” including “keep[ing] our people safe” and “facilities open” that
resulted in working “day and night.” Sandoval testified that it was not until the
“end of July” 2020 that she became aware of the lawsuit after receiving a copy of
the motion for default judgment whereupon she immediately notified outside
counsel. Further, she testified that she instituted an internal policy that copied
her e-mails to PGW’s other in-house counsel.
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 15
{¶35} Additionally, the amount of the default judgment in this case
was substantial ($123,266.70) and PGW presented undisputed
testimony at the Civ.R.60(B) hearing from two witnesses (Sandoval and
Palumbo) that Pittsburgh Auto Glass was the proper defendant in the
underlying case, not PGW. Based on this testimony, not relieving PGW
of the default judgment against it would have subjected PGW to a
financial judgement absent liability and with no recourse to challenge the
judgment because it is no longer a party in the case.2 In this respect, the
court’s decision granting PGW’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion appears to “strike a
proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be
brought to an end and justice should be done.” Peoples Bank, Natl.
Assn., 4th Dist. Gallia Nos. 12CA11, 13CA4, 2013-Ohio-3859, ¶ 13. As
the trial court stated, to allow the default judgment to stand “would effect
a gross miscarriage of justice” by imposing a monetary judgment upon a
party that lacks any culpability.”
{¶36} In analyzing the trial court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion, we find a comment made in Vanest particularly pertinent
herein:
“Discretion necessarily connotes a wide latitude of freedom
of action on the part of the trial court, and a broad range of more
or less tangible or quantifiable factors may enter into the trial
court's determination. Simply put, two trial courts could reach
opposite results on roughly similar facts and neither be guilty of
an abuse of discretion.”
2 We recognize that the issue of whether PGW was a proper defendant in the underlying case is
not necessarily resolved by this testimony, but granting the motion for relief at minimum permits
PGW to present this defense, as opposed to attempting to dispute a substantial monetary
judgment for which the company may not be liable without being involved in the lawsuit.
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 16
While the members of this court may have reached a
different result, we cannot say that the trial court's decision
constituted an abuse of its discretion.
Vanest, 124 Ohio App. 3d at 535, quoting McGee v. C & S Lounge, 108
Ohio App.3d 656, 661, 671 N.E.2d 589 (1996).
Under the particular circumstances of this case, we find that the trial
court’s decision was not so palpably and grossly violative of fact or logic
that it evidences a perversity of will and defiance of judgment. Rather,
we find that the court utilized a “sound reasoning process” by considering
the evidence and the law, and resolving any doubt in favor of granting
PGW’s motion for relief from the default judgment consistent with
paragraph three of the syllabus of GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. Morris, 132
Ohio St. 3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, at ¶ 14.
CONCLUSION
{¶37} Consequently, because the trial court’s decision granting PGW’s
Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from the default judgment is not unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly,
we overrule appellants’ assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment
granting PGW’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 21CA3753 17
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall
pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the
date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.