State v. Riggleman

[Cite as State v. Riggleman, 2016-Ohio-5179.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J.
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 16-CA-9
DILLON R. RIGGLEMAN :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Licking County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
15CR727
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 29, 2016
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
BRYAN MOORE ANDREW T. SANDERSON
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Burkett & Sanderson, Inc.
20 South Second Street 73 North Sixth Street
Newark, OH 43055 Newark, OH 43055
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 2
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Dillon R. Riggleman [“Riggleman”] appeals his conviction and
sentence after a negotiated guilty plea in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} The statement of the facts provided by the prosecuting attorney, and
presented during the change of plea hearing is as follows,
As to both counts on February 23rd, 2015, Newark Police Department
officers were summoned to the Speedway Gas Station on East Main Street
in Newark, Ohio. A cashier called after observing a male passed out in a
truck at a pump in the middle of the night. Officers found the defendant,
Dillon R. Riggleman, alone in the vehicle, sleeping with a smoking pipe in
one hand and a lighter in the other. They aroused him and although
exceptionally disoriented at the time and place, he was able to state that he
had been using Methamphetamine. The pipe was tested and found to be
positive for Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. All of
this occurring in Licking County, Ohio.
T. at 9-10. Riggleman agreed with these facts. T. at 10. See, also Bill of Particulars,
filed Dec. 4, 2015.
{¶3} On January 20, 2016, Riggleman pleaded guilty to one count of Aggravated
Possession of Drugs, a felony of the fifth degree, and one count of Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. The trial judge sentenced Riggleman
to 6 months in prison and 30 days in jail on each respective count, those sentences
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 3
running concurrent. Riggleman was credited with days of jail credit towards that
sentence.
Assignment of Error
{¶4} Riggleman raises one assignment of error,
{¶5} “I. THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL.”
Law and Analysis
{¶6} A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong analysis.
The first inquiry is whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's
essential duties to appellant. The second prong is whether the appellant was prejudiced
by counsel's ineffectiveness. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122
L.Ed.2d 180(1993); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674(1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373(1989).
{¶7} In order to warrant a finding that trial counsel was ineffective, the petitioner
must meet both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland and Bradley.
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L.Ed.2d 251(2009).
{¶8} Recently, the United States Supreme Court discussed the prejudice prong
of the Strickland test,
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., at
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 4
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id., at 693, 104 S.Ct.
2052. Counsel’s errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284(2010). An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape
rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so
the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest “intrusive
post-trial inquiry” threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the
right to counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689–690, 104
S.Ct. 2052. Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel’s
representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the
attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the
record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the
judge. It is “all too tempting” to “second-guess counsel’s assistance after
conviction or adverse sentence.” Id., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Bell
v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002);
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180(1993). The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to
incompetence under “prevailing professional norms,” not whether it
deviated from best practices or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S.,
at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 5
Harrington v. Richter, __U.S.__, 131 S.Ct. 770, 777-778, 178 L.Ed.2d 624(2011).
{¶9} Riggleman contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did
not offer mitigating evidence during the change of plea and sentencing hearing.
{¶10} “Failure to present mitigating evidence * * * does not in itself constitute proof
of ineffective assistance[.]” State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 157, 524 N.E.2d 476,
480(1988). Accord Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-796, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d
638(1987); State v. Coleman, 85 Ohio St.3d 129, 138, 1999-Ohio-258, 707 N.E.2d 476;
State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 684 N.E.2d 47(1997).
{¶11} In the case at bar, the trial court stated it had considered the purposes and
principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11. T. at 16. During the colloquy, Riggleman
informed the court that he has felonies pending in another county. T. at 16; 20.
{¶12} In Burger v. Kemp, the Court observed,
We have decided that “strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.”
Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690–691, 104 S.Ct., at 2066. Applying this
standard, we agree with the courts below that counsel’s decision not to
mount an all-out investigation into petitioner’s background in search of
mitigating circumstances was supported by reasonable professional
judgment. It appears that he did interview all potential witnesses who had
been called to his attention and that there was a reasonable basis for his
strategic decision that an explanation of petitioner’s history would not have
minimized the risk of the death penalty. Having made this judgment, he
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 6
reasonably determined that he need not undertake further investigation to
locate witnesses who would make statements about Burger’s past.
483 U.S. at 794-795; 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638.
{¶13} In the case at bar, there has been no showing in the record of this case that
any mitigating evidence was in existence or that there were witnesses available whose
testimony would have assisted the defense. Nothing in the record demonstrates that
more mitigation material, if any existed, would have resulted in a lesser sentence. The
failure to prove either prong is fatal. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 2000–
Ohio–448, 721 N.E.2d 52. Further, at the sentencing hearing and again in the sentencing
entry, the trial court expressly indicated it considered all sentencing factors as required
by law.
{¶14} Riggleman has not established that “in light of all the circumstances, the
identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. He
“has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a
breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel’s assistance.”
Strickland, at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Accord, Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. at
795-796, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638.
{¶15} Riggleman’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-9 7
{¶16} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Gwin, J.,
Farmer, P.J., and
Hoffman, J., concur