State v. VanMeter

[Cite as State v. VanMeter, 2016-Ohio-5191.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 14CA0058-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
CHRISTIAN VANMETER COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 13 CR 0514
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 1, 2016
WHITMORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Christian VanMeter, appeals his convictions by the Medina County
Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I
{¶2} On Friday, June 28, 2013, Mr. VanMeter’s infant son started showing signs that
he was in pain. The baby’s mother found that she could only console him by holding him close
to her body with her arm supporting his legs. Believing that the baby’s hips were out of
alignment, she took him to a chiropractor the following morning, as was their pattern. Over the
course of that weekend, however, the baby displayed signs of increasing distress. The following
Monday, the family returned to the chiropractor, who told them that the baby needed immediate
medical attention.
{¶3} The baby was diagnosed with a spiral fracture of the femur at Akron Children’s
Hospital. Suspecting that the fracture was a result of abuse, the staff performed additional tests
2
and discovered that the baby had two subdural hemorrhages, one recent and one that dated back
several months. The baby was temporarily removed from his parents’ custody, and Mr.
VanMeter was charged with felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and
endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A). A jury found him guilty of both offenses.
The trial court merged Mr. VanMeter’s convictions and sentenced him to four years in prison.
This appeal followed.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE STATE OF OHIO TO SUPPORT THE DEFENDANT’S
CONVICTION OF FELONIOUS ASSAULT AND ENDANGERING
CHILDREN.
{¶4} In his first assignment of error, Mr. VanMeter has argued that there is insufficient
evidence that he is the person who committed the crimes at issue. In the alternative, he has
argued that there is insufficient evidence that he acted with the mental states required to commit
felonious assault or endangering children. We disagree.
{¶5} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law
that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009–Ohio–
6955, ¶ 18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is
whether the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to
sustain a conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). In reviewing the evidence, we do
not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The State’s evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of
fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. Like any other element of an offense, identity may be established through
3
direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Flynn, 9th Dist. Medina No. 06CA0096-M, 2007-
Ohio-6210, ¶ 12, citing State v. Gorgan, 9th Dist. Medina No. 1824, 1990 WL 1771, *1 (Jan. 10,
1990).
{¶6} R.C. 2903.11(A), which prohibits felonious assault, provides that no one “shall
knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to another[.]” Serious physical harm includes:
(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally require
hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment;
(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;
(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, whether partial
or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial incapacity;
(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or that
involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;
(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in
substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.
R.C. 2901.01(A)(5). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware
that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such
circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶7} Endangering children is prohibited by R.C. 2919.22(A), which prohibits any
person who is the parent of a child under eighteen years of age from creating a substantial risk to
the health or safety of the child by violating a duty of care, protection, or support. Endangering
children is a felony of the third degree when it results in serious physical harm to the child. R.C.
2919.22(E)(2)(c). Although R.C. 2919.22(A) does not specify the degree of culpability required
to commit the offense, the Ohio Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]he existence of the
culpable mental state of recklessness is an essential element of the crime of endangering
children[.]” State v. McGee, 79 Ohio St.3d 193 (1997), syllabus.
4
{¶8} Dr. Daryl Steiner, who examined the baby after he was taken to the emergency
room on July 1, 2013, testified that the baby had suffered a spiral fracture to the femur. Dr.
Steiner explained that fractures in very young children generally raise suspicion because, due to
the fact that young children are not mobile, fractures require “a specific traumatic event.” He
also explained that a spiral fracture is caused not by blunt force, but by “twisting around the long
axis of the bone.” In summary, he testified that:
a fracture of the femur is a traumatic event in excess of routine handling. A femur
fracture did not occur with just routine handling and play with the child. There’s
a force more notable, more powerful, more forceful than just routine handling of
children and routine play with children. If routine play caused fractures, we’d see
fractures -- that’s all we’d see. But these are not very common injuries.
According to Dr. Steiner’s testimony, neither parent in this case offered an explanation
consistent with the degree of the baby’s injury.
{¶9} Mother testified that on the morning of Friday, June 28, 2013, the baby was
playing, smiling, and laughing. She put him down for a nap on the bed that she shared with Mr.
VanMeter between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m., leaving Mr. VanMeter alone in the upstairs room with the
baby. Mother testified that after her sister suggested that she go back upstairs, she found Mr.
VanMeter holding the baby and observed that he was the most frustrated she had ever seen him
with the child. She recalled that Mr. VanMeter had the baby in his arms and the baby was
screaming. Mr. VanMeter then handed the baby to Mother, telling her that he could not get him
to stop crying. Mother testified that she noticed afterward that the baby, who was usually easy to
console, seemed to be in pain. According to her recollection, he refused a bottle and only calmed
down when she held him close against her with her arm supporting his legs. She noted that when
she moved, “[h]e would scream. He would scream like he was – you know, something was
hurting him.” She testified that she had “never seen him scream and cry like he did.”
5
{¶10} Mother’s sister also testified. She recalled that on Friday morning, she heard the
baby crying and went upstairs to check on him. She testified that she found Mr. VanMeter
holding the baby and “shaking him kind of hard * * * like he had a good grip on his hands and
seemed like he was really irritated.” She characterized the baby’s crying as “not * * * normal,”
as if he was in pain.
{¶11} Based on this testimony, the jury could reasonably conclude that the baby
sustained a spiral fracture to his femur during the period of time that he was solely in the care of
Mr. VanMeter. In addition, the jury could reasonably conclude that the injury occurred because
of a force exerted upon the baby beyond the limits of normal play and handling and that
VanMeter was aware, regardless of his intent, that the force would probably result in injury to
the infant. Accordingly, the jury’s conclusion that Mr. VanMeter caused the baby’s injury and
the conclusion that he acted knowingly are supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶12} Mr. VanMeter’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Two
THE JURY’S FINDING OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGE[S] OF FELONIOUS
ASSAULT AND ENDANGERING CHILDREN WAS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF [THE] EVIDENCE.
{¶13} Mr. VanMeter’s second assignment of error is that his convictions for felonious
assault and endangering children are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶14} When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, this Court must:
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts
in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.
6
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing
State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶15} Mr. VanMeter has argued that Mother and her sister vacillated
in their testimony and that their credibility was limited because they provided prior inconsistent
statements to the police. For example, Mother’s description of the baby’s behavior immediately
after she took him from Mr. VanMeter varied with respect to the intensity of his crying and
apparent distress. Neither Mother nor her sister testified that they believed the baby’s leg was
broken, and Mother testified that she sought treatment from the family’s chiropractor because
she believed that the baby’s hip was out of alignment.
{¶16} Mother’s testimony about what happened at the chiropractor’s office also differed
from earlier statements. At trial, she testified that during the baby’s appointment on Saturday,
the chiropractor, Dr. Lash, did not remove the baby from his carseat or manipulate his legs. On
cross-examination, Mother acknowledged that she had previously stated that Dr. Lash did
remove the baby from the carseat and had bent his legs. Dr. Lash testified that Mother held the
baby during the visit and that he used “a soft technique” to adjust the baby’s spine. He denied
touching the right leg in any manner, specifically observing that bending and extending the leg
would cause extreme pain to someone with a broken femur. Mother also testified that the baby
was in pain before the visit to Dr. Lash, and any contact with the baby’s legs seemed to
aggravate the pain that was already present. Notably, Mother did not describe any behavior on
Dr. Lash’s part that would rise to the level of force described by Dr. Steiner as necessary to cause
a spiral fracture of the femur.
7
{¶17} Although Mother and her sister did testify about some details differently than the
statements they provided earlier, the testimony at trial was consistent on several points. On the
morning of Friday, June 28, 2013, the baby woke without pain and was not in distress before his
nap. After Mother took the baby from Mr. VanMeter, the baby appeared to be in pain and could
only be consoled by being held close to the body with his legs supported. Witnesses testified
that the baby’s pain continued unabated through the weekend, and when another chiropractor
saw him on Monday morning, he observed that “the leg was red, swollen, and extremely
distended” and advised the family to seek medical treatment quickly.
{¶18} Mr. VanMeter has also argued that the weight of the evidence does not support
the conclusion that Mr. VanMeter violated a duty of care toward the baby for purposes of R.C.
2919.22(A). Specifically, he has argued that the evidence does not support the conclusion that
he failed to obtain medical treatment for the baby because Mother was primarily responsible for
making health care decisions. This argument is misplaced because his conviction for
endangering children is based on evidence that he failed in a duty of care by causing the injury in
the first instance.
{¶19} Mr. VanMeter’s convictions for felonious assault and endangering children are
not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and his second assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶20} Mr. VanMeter’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
8
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
KRISTOPHER K. AUPPERLE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and MATTHEW A. KERN, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.