State v. Boyd

[Cite as State v. Boyd, 2014-Ohio-2640.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Nos. 100350, 100351, 100352
and 100353
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
BRIAN BOYD
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-09-532694, CR-10-534790, CR-10-536138,
and CR-10-538834
BEFORE: Boyle, A.J., Jones, J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 19, 2014
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
BY: John T. Martin
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: James M. Price
Assistant County Prosecutor
1200 Ontario Street
9th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
MARY J. BOYLE, A.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Brian Boyd, appeals from the trial court’s judgment
imposing a total six-year prison term in connection with four separate cases. He argues
that the trial court failed to make the requisite findings to support the imposition of
consecutive sentences under H.B. 86. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
Procedural History and Facts
{¶2} In May 2010, Boyd pleaded guilty in connection with four cases.
Specifically, Boyd pleaded guilty to the following offenses: drug trafficking, a
fourth-degree felony, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-09-532694; drug trafficking, a
second-degree felony, in Case No. CR-10-536138; drug trafficking, a second-degree
felony, in Case No. CR-10-538834; and felonious assault, a second-degree felony, and
weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony, in Case No. CR-10- 534790.
{¶3} On September 9, 2010, the trial court sentenced Boyd to an aggregate term
of six years in prison in connection with the four cases. The trial court imposed one
year in Case No. CR-09-532694, three years in Case No. CR-10-536138, and two years
in Case No. CR-10-538834, all to run consecutive to one another. The trial court
further imposed concurrent terms of two years for the felonious assault count and one
year for the weapons while under disability count in Case No. CR-10-534790, to run
concurrently with the other three cases. At the time of sentencing, the trial court failed
to advise Boyd of his appellate rights.
{¶4} Boyd subsequently filed a pro se motion to file a delayed appeal in our
court, which was denied. He ultimately filed a petition for postconviction relief,
seeking a resentencing on the grounds that he was never advised of his appellate rights at
sentencing pursuant to Crim.R. 32, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
in the pre-appellate process. The state did not oppose the motion. In August 2013, the
trial court granted the motion and re-sentenced Boyd in connection with all four cases,
imposing the exact same sentence entered in September 2010. At the resentencing
hearing, the trial court further informed Boyd of his appellate rights and assigned Boyd
appellate counsel.
{¶5} Boyd now appeals, raising a single assignment of error:
The trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences when it failed to
make findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
Standard of Review
{¶6} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states that when reviewing felony sentences, “[t]he
appellate court’s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion.” Rather, the statute states that if we “clearly and convincingly” find that (1)
“the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under [R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)],” or that (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to law,” then we “may
increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * * * or [we] may vacate the sentence
and remand the matter to the sentencing court for re-sentencing.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
Consecutive Sentences
{¶7} Relying on the amendments made to Ohio’s sentencing statutes in H.B. 86,
Boyd argues that the trial court failed to make the required findings to support
consecutive sentences. The state counters that the trial court did not have to make the
required findings because Boyd was sentenced prior to the effective date of H.B. 86.
{¶8} At the time of Boyd’s original sentencing in 2010, the trial court had full
discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and was not required to
make findings or give reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the
minimum sentences. State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d
470, paragraph seven of the syllabus. On September 30, 2011, the General Assembly,
however, enacted H.B. 86, which, in effect, revived the requirement that trial courts
make findings before imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C). The
General Assembly expressly provided in Section 4 of H.B. 86: “The amendments * * *
apply to a person who commits an offense specified or penalized under those sections on
or after the effective date of this section[.]” (Emphasis added.)
{¶9} Although Boyd was originally sentenced in September 2010, the trial court
later granted his petition for postconviction relief and resentenced Boyd in August 2013.
Boyd is appealing from that sentencing judgment entry. Thus, having been
resentenced in August 2013, the trial court was required to sentence Boyd according to
the revisions implemented in H.B. 86. See State v. Lebron, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
97773, 2012-Ohio-4156, ¶ 7 (recognizing that if defendant is sentenced after September
30, 2011, the trial court is required to sentence defendant according to the revisions
implemented in H.B. 86).
{¶10} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires trial courts to engage in a three-step analysis in
order to impose consecutive sentences. First, the trial court must find that “consecutive
service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender.”
Id. Next, the trial court must find that “consecutive sentences are not disproportionate
to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
public.” Id. Finally, the trial court must find that at least one of the following applies:
(1) the offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while awaiting trial or
sentencing, while under a sanction, or while under postrelease control for a prior offense;
(2) at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses
of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the offenses was so great or unusual
that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct; or (3) the
offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are
necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. Id.{¶11} In each step of this analysis, the statutory language directs that the trial
court must “find” the relevant sentencing factors before imposing consecutive sentences.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). In making these findings, a trial court is not required to recite any
“magic” or “talismanic” words to comply with the guidelines and factors for sentencing.
See State v. Goins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98256, 2013-Ohio-263, ¶ 10; State v.
Adams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-783, 2014-Ohio-1809, ¶ 18. Thus, our focus is
not whether the trial court employs the “magic words”; instead, we review the sentencing
transcript to determine whether the court has engaged in the required analysis and has
selected the appropriate statutory criteria to support the imposition of consecutive
sentences. Id.{¶12} In this case, we find that the trial court has satisfied the requirements of
H.B. 86 in imposing consecutive sentences. While the trial court did not use the exact
phraseology of R.C. 2929.14(C), the trial court did engage in the required analysis and
made the requisite findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences.
Specifically, the trial court found that consecutive sentences were necessary based on (1)
Boyd’s past criminal record, (2) the “nature of the crimes” in the four cases, (3) the need
“to protect the public from future crimes and to punish” Boyd in these cases, and (4) that
consecutive sentences were not “disproportionate.” The trial court further noted that
Boyd committed these offenses “as a series of acts consistent with a pattern of drug
dealing and large amounts of drugs.”
{¶13} Having found that the trial court complied with R.C. 2929.14(C) before
imposing consecutive sentences, we overrule Boyd’s sole assignment of error.
{¶14} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending
appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCURS;
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., DISSENTING:
{¶15} Respectfully, I dissent as to the majority’s judgment affirming the
consecutive sentences.
{¶16} The trial court justified sentencing Boyd to consecutive sentences as
follows:
[B]ased upon your criminal record and nature of the crimes, it was
necessary to protect the public from future crimes and to punish the
offender. They weren’t disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct
and the offenses were committed as a series of acts consistent with a
pattern of drug dealing and a large amount of drugs * * *.
{¶17} I disagree with the majority that the trial court made the required
disproportionality finding. The majority holds that the above statement made by the
trial court established that the court found that consecutive sentences were not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger he poses
to the public. In the past, this court upheld consecutive sentences where statements
made by the trial court could be gleaned as the required statutory findings for such a
sentence. But this court’s current trend has been to hold the trial court responsible for
more than just “substantial compliance” with the requirements. State v. Schmick, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99262, 2013-Ohio-4488, ¶ 13.
{¶18} Thus, in light of this court’s recent decisions regarding consecutive
sentences, I dissent from the majority’s judgment affirming the imposition of
consecutive sentences, and would remand for resentencing on the convictions that the
trial court ran consecutively.