Sivit v. Village Green of Beachwood, L.P.

[Cite as Sivit v. Village Green of Beachwood, L.P., 2016-Ohio-2940.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Nos. 103340 and 103498
CARLOS SIVIT, ET AL.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
vs.
VILLAGE GREEN OF BEACHWOOD, L.P., ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART
AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-08-671776
BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, J., Keough, P.J. and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 12, 2016
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
VILLAGE GREEN OF BEACHWOOD, L.P.
Marvin L. Karp
Lawrence D. Pollack
Ulmer & Berne L.L.P.
Skylight Office Tower, Suite 1100
1660 West 2nd Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1448
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
DAVID GRUHIN AND SYDNEY SIGLER GRUHIN
Michael H. Gruhin
Gruhin & Gruhin, L.L.C.
24100 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 250
Beachwood, Ohio 44122
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES CARLOS SIVIT, SONYA PACE, JASON
EDWARDS, RENEE EDWARDS, NATALIE RUDD, PRATHIBHA MARATHE,
HALLIE GELB, MOHAMMAD MARWALI, SELVY PANGKEY, LUCIANA
ARMAGANIJAN AND MITCHELL ROSENBERG
Joseph W. Diemert, Jr.
Daniel A. Powell
Diemert & Associates Co., L.P.A.
1360 S.O.M. Center Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44124
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, defendant-appellant Village Green of
Beachwood, L.P. (“Village Green”) and plaintiffs-appellants David Gruhin and Sydney
Sigler Gruhin (the “Gruhins”) appeal from orders of the trial court (1) awarding the
Gruhins and plaintiffs-appellees Carlos Sivit, Sonya Pace, Jason Edwards, Renee
Edwards, Natalie Rudd, Prathibha Marathe, Hallie Gelb, Mohammad Marwali, Selvy
Pangkey, Luciana Armaganijan and Mitchell Rosenberg (collectively, the “Sivit
plaintiffs”) 1 a total of $1,537,555.90 in punitive damages and (2) allocating those
punitive damages equally among the Gruhins and nine other groups of individual
plaintiffs (the “individual plaintiff groups”), i.e., allocating $153,755.59 in punitive
damages to each individual plaintiff group.2 Village Green claims that the trial court’s
punitive damages award exceeds the cap on punitive damages set forth in R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a). The Gruhins contend that the trial court’s per capita allocation of the
punitive damages award violates R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) and that, based on the statute,
they should have been allocated a share of the punitive damages award equal to two times
their compensatory damages, i.e., $222,466 instead of $153,755.59. For the reasons that
The Gruhins and the Sivit plaintiffs are collectively referred to herein as the “individual
1
plaintiffs.” All of the individual plaintiffs were initially represented by the Diemert law firm;
however, after an issue arose with respect to the allocation of the punitive damages award, the
Gruhins terminated their relationship with that firm and retained separate counsel.
The 13 individual plaintiffs were grouped into 10 individual plaintiff groups based on the 10
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apartment units they occupied, as follows: Carlos Sivit, Sonya Pace, Jason and Renee Edwards,
Natalie Rudd, Prathibha Marathe, Hallie Gelb, Mohammad Marwali and Selvy Pangkey, Luciana
Armaganijan, Mitchell Rosenberg and the Gruhins.
follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, reverse the trial court’s judgment in
part and remand the case for the trial court to enter an order setting the total amount of
punitive damages awarded to the individual plaintiffs at $1,194,294, to be allocated
equally among the ten individual plaintiff groups, i.e., $119,429.40 to each of the ten
individual plaintiff groups.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶2} Following a 2007 fire in the Village Green apartment complex in
Beachwood, Ohio, the individual plaintiffs — tenants residing in ten apartment units that
sustained property damage in the fire — filed suit against Village Green and Forest City
Residential Management, Inc. (“FCRM”) (collectively, the “defendants”). The
individual plaintiffs alleged that the building had been negligently constructed and
negligently maintained in violation of R.C. Chapter 5321, the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act,
and that this negligence caused the fire. Several subrogated insurers (collectively, the
“insurer plaintiffs”) filed separate lawsuits against the defendants related to the fire, and
these actions were consolidated with the action filed by the individual plaintiffs.3 The
individual plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive damages. The insurer
plaintiffs sought only compensatory damages.
{¶3} The case proceeded to trial, and the trial was bifurcated on issues of
compensatory damages and punitive damages. Following the compensatory damages
phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
The insurer plaintiffs and the individual plaintiffs are collectively referred to herein as the
3
“plaintiffs.”
defendants on their negligence claims. The jury awarded a total of $582,146 in
compensatory damages to seven groups of individual plaintiffs against the defendants as
follows:
Sonya Pace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $214,873.00
David and Sidney [sic] Gruhin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $111,233.00
Carlos Sivit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$107,430.00
Jason and Renee Edwards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $47,484.00
Natalie Rudd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $38,850.00
Prathibha Marathe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $35,020.004
Hallie Gelb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $27,256.00
Total $582,146.00
The jury’s verdict awarded compensatory damages to each of the plaintiff groups in the
full amounts they requested.
{¶4} In addition, pretrial stipulations, contingent upon a finding of liability, were
submitted as to the amount of compensatory damages sustained by three groups of
individual plaintiffs as follows:
Mohammed Marwali/Selvey [sic] Pangkey . . . . .$12,000.00
Luciana Armanijigan [sic] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$3,000.00
Mitchell Rosenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nominal damages ($1)
Total $15,001.00
Accordingly, the total compensatory damages awarded to the individual plaintiffs was
$597,147.
These compensatory damages figures are based on the trial court’s statement, in its May 14,
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2012 final judgment entry, of the compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiffs by the jury. In its
answer to the jury interrogatory specifying the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded to
each individual plaintiff group, the jury actually identified $35,200.00 as the amount of compensatory
damages to be awarded to Marathe, not $35,020.00 as the trial court stated, and ultimately awarded to
Marathe, in its judgment entry. Thus, the total compensatory damages the jury awarded the
individual plaintiff groups (not including the stipulated damages) actually totaled $582,236. As no
issue was raised by the parties regarding this error, we will ignore it in this appeal.
{¶5} Pretrial stipulations, contingent upon a finding of liability, were also
submitted as to the compensatory damages sustained by the four insurer plaintiffs as
follows:
State Farm Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $95,500.00
Nationwide Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $41,026.00
Allstate Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$25,104.95
Safeco Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10,000.00
Total $171,630.95
Accordingly, the total compensatory damages awarded to all plaintiffs was $768,777.95.
{¶6} The trial court then submitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury. In
contrast to the particularized claims the individual plaintiff groups submitted as to their
compensatory damages, the individual plaintiffs requested punitive damages collectively.
In the verdict forms submitted to the jury, the trial court asked the jury to consider
whether the individual plaintiffs as a group were entitled to an award of punitive damages
and, if so, in what amount.
{¶7} The jury awarded punitive damages to the individual plaintiffs against
Village Green in a lump sum of $2,000,000.5 The jury also found that the individual
plaintiffs were entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees from Village Green.
The jury was not asked to determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded to each
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individual plaintiff or individual plaintiff group. Rather, with respect to the amount of punitive
damages to be awarded, the jury was asked, “If you answered yes on either Verdict Form ‘A’ or ‘B,’
please state the amount of punitive damages to be awarded.” The jury’s response was
$2,000,000.00. “Verdict Form A” addressed the liability of Village Green for punitive damages;
“Verdict Form B” addressed the liability of FCRM for punitive damages. The jury found that
FCRM was not liable for punitive damages.
Village Green filed various post-trial motions, including a motion to reduce the punitive
damages award pursuant to R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a). The trial court denied that motion.
{¶8} On May 14, 2012, the trial court issued a final judgment entry setting forth
the separate compensatory damages awards to each of the individual plaintiff groups and
insurer plaintiffs — totaling $768,777.95 in compensatory damages — and collectively
awarding the ten individual plaintiff groups $2,000,000 in punitive damages, $1,040,000
in attorney fees and $51,757.15 in litigation costs against Village Green. On January
17, 2013, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Sivit v. Village Green of
Beachwood, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98401, 2013-Ohio-103.
{¶9} The Gruhins thereafter began to question how the punitive damages award
would be allocated among the plaintiffs. In a series of emails sent to counsel on January
23, 2013, David Gruhin inquired:
Can you please explain your intentions as to the distribution of the punitive
damages award?
Are you distributing the punitive award based on a pro-rata share of the
compensatory awards? If not how do you plan on dividing the award as
there is no language in our engagement letter indicating how this would be
done. There may be some expressed intent in the Jury Interrogatories or
the Verdict Forms, that I am unaware of, and would like you to send me
PDF copies of both of those documents for my review.
Additionally, is the award to be divided by the 13 listed plaintiffs or by the
10 listed parties receiving compensatory awards in the final judgment? If
you are intending on dividing the punitive award by the 13 plaintiffs, I see
that both Jason and Renee are listed as individual plaintiffs, would they
each be entitled to a portion of the award, or would they receive one award
as a single entity? If they were to be given 2 shares of the punitive award,
why was Sydney never made a plaintiff? She was a co-signer on our
original lease, yet she was never added to the class. Also I noticed on the
final judgement that both Sydney and I are listed to receive an award. How
would that be possible if she was not a plaintiff?
He further stated, “If the money is to be divided equally I have an issue with this, and I
would guess both Carlos [Sivit] and Sonya [Pace] would as well. I can only assume the
punitive damage award would not have been as high without our 3 compensatory awards.
As such it would seem fairly unreasonable to divide the money equally when the
remainder of the plaintiff’s loss was significantly less than the 3 of ours.” On January
24, 2013, counsel responded, in relevant part, as follows:
[W]e anticipate dividing the punitives into 10 plaintiff groups equally....
they are NOT compensatory damages, and not linked to the compensatory
damages....they are meant to punish the defendants, so regardless of the
individual losses as tabulated, the purpose for the punitive award was
equally shared. [I] believe the court’s judgement entry will help clarify this
for you....but, as [I] said, once you review them [sic] we will chat again. [I]
believe everyone had other family members, and were not all listed in the
lawsuit for their own individual reasons. * * *
David Gruhin claimed that he never received this response, but, in any event, he did not
raise any further issue with respect to the allocation of the punitive damages award until
April 2015 — more than two years later.
{¶10} In June 2013, the Ohio Supreme Court accepted Village Green’s
discretionary appeal on several issues, including whether the individual plaintiffs’ claims
constituted a “tort action” within the meaning R.C. 2315.21(A) to which the cap on
punitive damages set forth in R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) applied. Sivit v. Village Green of
Beachwood, 136 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2013-Ohio-2645, 989 N.E.2d 1019. Specifically, as it
related to the amount of punitive damages awarded to the individual plaintiffs, the Ohio
Supreme Court agreed to review the issue of whether
[a]n action to recover damages for injury to person or property caused by
negligence or other tortious conduct is a ‘tort action’ within the meaning of
R.C. 2315.21(A) even though the plaintiff’s claim may have arisen from a
breach of duty created by a contractual relationship and even though the
defendant’s conduct may have constituted both tortious conduct and a
breach of contract.
Sivit v. Village Green of Beachwood, L.P., 143 Ohio St.3d 168, 2015-Ohio-1193, 35
N.E.3d 508, ¶ 4.
{¶11} On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed all of the issues related to the
verdict except the award of punitive damages. Id. at ¶ 12. With respect to the award of
punitive damages, the court agreed with Village Green that the action brought by the
plaintiffs was indeed a “tort action” and that the $2,000,000 punitive damages award
exceeded the cap on punitive damages set forth in R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a). As the court
explained in its opinion:
We conclude that this is a tort action and, therefore, that it is subject to R.C.
2315.21.
R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) states that “in a tort action,” a “court shall not enter
judgment for punitive or exemplary damages in excess of two times the
amount of the compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff.” The
compensatory-damages award by the jury totaled $582,146. The judgment
entry of the trial court also included stipulated compensatory damages of
$186,631.95, which were contingent on a finding of liability. The punitive
damages awarded totaled $2,000,000. The $2,000,000 award for punitive
damages is more than twice the total compensatory damages. Accordingly,
it is clear that the award of punitive damages is contrary to the mandate of
R.C. 2315.21(D)(2). * * *
Remittitur of punitive damages is required. * * * [T]he punitive damages *
* * are in excess of the statutory limit. * * * We order reduction of the
amount of punitive damages to twice the amount of compensatory damages
that were awarded in the trial court’s judgment entry, which we deem an
appropriate amount to deter the conduct at issue in this case.
Id. at ¶ 5-6, 8.
{¶12} In the conclusion of its opinion, the court further stated:
In summary, we affirm the court of appeals with respect to all issues related
to the verdict except the award of punitive damages. We agree with Village
Green that the amount of punitive damages allowed exceeds the limit
prescribed by R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a). Therefore, we hold that punitive
damages in the amount of two times the award of compensatory damages is
the appropriate amount and remand to the trial court to set the amount of
damages.
Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶13} The opinion was accompanied by a judgment entry, dated April 2, 2015,
which provided as follows:
This cause, here on appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,
was considered in the manner prescribed by law. On consideration thereof,
the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed with respect to all issues
related to the verdict except the award of punitive damages, consistent with
the opinion rendered herein.
It is further ordered that the court holds that punitive damages in the amount
of two times the award of compensatory damages is the appropriate amount,
and this issue is remanded to the trial court to set the amount of damages.
It is further ordered that mandates be sent to and filed with the clerks of the
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County and the Court of Common Pleas for
Cuyahoga County.
{¶14} Village Green filed a motion for reconsideration on the issue of the
individual plaintiffs’ entitlement to punitive damages, which the Ohio Supreme Court
denied. Sivit v. Village Green of Beachwood, L.P., 142 Ohio St.3d 1479,
2015-Ohio-2104, 31 N.E.3d 656. On June 3, 2015, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its
mandate and sent certified copies of its April 2, 2015 judgment entry to the trial court and
this court.
{¶15} After the punitive damages award was reversed, counsel sent a letter to the
Gruhins advising them of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision and stating that, “[b]ased on
preliminary calculations,” the Gruhins’ punitive damages award was estimated “to be
adjusted from $200,000 to approximately $153,750, not inclusive of interest earned” as a
result of the decision. After receiving the letter, David Gruhin once again sent emails to
counsel inquiring as to how the punitive damage award “is being divided up” and
indicating that he assumed that he and Sydney would receive a 2/13ths share of the
reduced punitive damages award. Counsel responded as follows:
The final judgment entry split the punitive damage award 10 ways, in the
same manner we presented damages to the jury. It was done by unit. * * *
If it is your intent to challenge the divide, you will need to hire separate
legal counsel as any such disputes amongst the clients would present a
conflict of interest for us.
{¶16} Counsel and the Gruhins continued to exchange correspondence related to
the allocation issue. On May 6, 2015, counsel sent a letter to the Sivit plaintiffs advising
them of a potential dispute with the Gruhins relating to the allocation of the punitive
damages award. In June 2015, the Gruhins retained separate counsel, and the Sivit
plaintiffs continued to be represented by their original counsel.
{¶17} After the case was remanded, Village Green filed a motion for application
of the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling capping punitive damages. Village Green argued
that, based on the cap on punitive damages set forth in R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a), the
punitive damages award should be reduced to $1,194,294, i.e., two times the total
compensatory damages awarded to the individual plaintiffs who sought punitive damages.
The Sivit plaintiffs filed a response in which they argued that, pursuant to the mandate
from the Ohio Supreme Court, the trial court was required to consider all of the
compensatory damages, including the stipulated damages awarded to the insurance
plaintiffs, in calculating the cap on punitive damages. They argued that this would result
in a reduction of the punitive damages awarded to the individual plaintiffs from
$2,000,000 to $1,537,555.90.
{¶18} The Gruhins joined in Village Green’s motion to the extent it sought to
apply R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) on an individual basis to the claims of each individual
plaintiff and joined in the response filed by the Sivit plaintiffs to the extent they asserted
that the punitive damages award should be capped at $1,537,555.90 rather than
$1,194,294. With respect to allocation and distribution of the $1,537,555.90, the
Gruhins denied that they had agreed to share the punitive damages award equally with the
other individual plaintiff groups and submitted affidavits to that effect. They argued
that, consistent with R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a), $1,194,294 of the $1,537,555.90 should be
allocated and distributed among the 13 individual plaintiffs in amounts equal to two times
their share of the $597,147 in compensatory damages the trial court had awarded to the
individual plaintiffs and that the remaining $343,261.90 in punitive damages should be
allocated and distributed either (1) to the 13 individual plaintiffs on a pro rata basis, based
on their compensatory damages awards, or (2) to one or more nonprofit public
institutions.
{¶19} The Sivit plaintiffs maintained that the individual plaintiffs had agreed that
each of the ten individual plaintiff groups would receive an equal share of any punitive
damages award regardless of the amount of compensatory damages awarded to that
plaintiff group, i.e., $153,755.59 or 10% of the $1,537,555.90 that they claimed was the
proper calculation of the punitive damages award. In support of their argument, the Sivit
plaintiffs submitted affidavits from Sonya Pace and Carlos Sivit in which they attested, in
relevant part: “With regard to the request for punitive damages, as advised by my
attorneys, I was aware that the punitive damages would be shared equally amongst the 10
groups of plaintiffs represented by my attorneys.” They further attested that although
they were aware of the Gruhins’ position on the allocation of punitive damages and that
such position — were it to be accepted — would result in a larger punitive damages
award to them, they were “not in agreement with the Gruhins’ stated position and do not
join in their motion to change the equal allocation of punitive damages.”
{¶20} Following a hearing on the reduction of the punitive damages award, the
trial court entered an order reducing the jury’s $2,000,000 punitive damages award to
$1,537,555.90, plus statutory interest from the date of the trial court’s original judgment
entry. In its July 10, 2015 order, the trial court explained the reasoning behind its
decision as follows:
It is a rock bed principle of our system of jurisprudence that trial courts are
subordinate to superior courts. In this instance, this Court has been ordered
to re-access [sic] punitive damages at twice the compensatory damages in
the original journal entry — an award which has been affirmed by the entire
Eighth District Court of Appeals and a unanimous Supreme Court. The
defendant now presents an elaborate and somewhat engaging argument to
this Court to reduce the amount of compensatory damages subject to the
statutory multiplier. This Court is not at liberty to do so. A trial court
must obey the mandates of superior courts. If the defendant perceived any
ambiguity in the mandate, the time and place to raise the current theory was
at the Supreme Court in the motion for reconsideration, not here and not
now.
Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of Ohio, punitive damages
are reduced from $2,000,000.00 to $1,537,555.90 plus statutory interest
from May 14, 2012 to date of payment.
{¶21} On July 13, 2015, the trial court ordered Village Green to pay the
$1,537,555.90 in punitive damages plus statutory interest to the Cuyahoga County Clerk
of Courts. The trial court thereafter entered a stipulated amended judgment entry
pursuant to which the parties agreed that Village Green would deposit $1,194,294.00, the
portion of the trial court’s $1,537,555.90 punitive damages award it allegedly did not
dispute, with the Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts and a stay of execution would be
granted as to the remaining $343,261.90 with interest pending appeal upon Village
Green’s posting of a $400,000 supersedeas bond.
{¶22} The trial court then addressed the dispute between the Gruhins and the Sivit
plaintiffs related to the allocation of the punitive damages award. Following additional
briefing and a hearing in which the trial court heard argument from both sides on the
allocation issue,6 on August 31, 2015, the trial court issued an order and opinion in which
it found that “a distribution of punitive damages does not have to be pro rata,” that
“plaintiffs may participate in determining the mode of distribution” and that “the
agreement of the [p]laintiffs was to equally share any award of punitive damages.” The
trial court further found that an equal distribution of the punitive damages award “is fair,
reasonable and equitable.” The trial court, therefore, awarded $153,755.59 in punitive
damages to each of the ten individual plaintiff groups.
{¶23} Village Green appealed the trial court’s July 10, 2015, July 13, 2015 and
August 31, 2015 orders, raising the following two assignments of error for review:
Assignment of Error No. 1:
The Common Pleas Court erred in awarding punitive damages in the
amount of $153,755 to seven of the individual plaintiff
groups.
Assignment of Error No. 2:
The Common Pleas Court erred in issuing preliminary orders reducing
plaintiffs’ total punitive damages from $2,000,000 to $1,537,555 and
ordering defendant to pay that latter amount into court.
The Gruhins appealed the trial court’s August 31, 2015 order, raising the following three
assignments of error for review:
First Assignment of Error:
The lower court abused its discretion in finding in its August 31, 2015
Order and Opinion (the “August 31st Order”) * * * that Plaintiffs had
“banded together” and entered into an “agreement” amongst themselves,
allocating and distributing the $1,537,555.90 punitive damages award in
equal shares to ten “groups” of them — one share to Plaintiffs-Appellants
(consisting of two individuals), and nine shares to Plaintiffs-Appellees
(consisting of eleven individuals).
It does not appear from the record that any request was made for an evidentiary hearing on
6
the allocation issue.
Second Assignment of Error:
The lower court erred when, in contravention of the punitive damages “cap”
set forth in O.R.C. §2315.21 * * *, it failed in the August 31st Order * * *
to find each Plaintiff entitled to punitive damages equal to “two times” his
or her individual compensatory damages awarded by the jury and, instead,
allocated and distributed the punitive damages to Plaintiffs in excess of
“two times” their respective compensatory damages award.
Third Assignment of Error:
The lower court’s misplaced acceptance of and reliance upon material
unsworn and unsubstantiated “facts” proffered by Plaintiffs-Appellees’
counsel during the remand proceedings in lieu of any testimony or other
evidentiary proofs from Plaintiffs-Appellees themselves, resulted in the
inclusion of myriad false findings in the August 31st Order * * *, requiring
its reversal, along with a clarification of the punitive damages award
provision contained in the May 14, 2012 Final Judgment Entry * * * , and
further modification of the October 19, 2015 Judgment Entry.
Law and Analysis
Application of the Cap on Punitive Damages Set Forth in R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a)
{¶24} Village Green’s assignments of error and the Gruhins’ second assignment of
error are interrelated; we, therefore, address them together. All three assignments of
error involve the interpretation and application of the statutory cap on punitive damages
set forth in R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) and the mandate of the Ohio Supreme Court following
Village Green’s appeal of the judgment entered on the jury verdict in this case. Village
Green argues that under R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a), the trial court erred in awarding the
individual plaintiffs more than $1,194,294.00 — two times the total compensatory
damages awarded the individual plaintiffs — in punitive damages. The Gruhins
similarly argue that under R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a), the punitive damages “allocable and
distributable to each of [the individual plaintiffs] must * * * not exceed a maximum of
two times their respective individual, distinct, separate and unique compensatory damages
awards.” The Sivit plaintiffs assert that, consistent with R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) and the
mandate of the Ohio Supreme Court, the trial court properly considered the total amount
of compensatory damages awarded all plaintiffs in the case, including the compensatory
damages awarded the insurer plaintiffs, in reducing the jury’s punitive damages award
from $2,000,000 to $1,537,555.90. Following a careful review of the record and the
applicable authority, we agree with Village Green and the Gruhins that the trial court’s
punitive damages award of $1,537,555.90 exceeds the limit prescribed by R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a) and is contrary to the mandate previously issued in this case by the Ohio
Supreme Court.
{¶25} “Reviewing courts ‘will not disturb a decision of the trial court as to a
determination of damages absent an abuse of discretion.’” Sivit, 143 Ohio St.3d 168,
2015-Ohio-1193, 35 N.E.3d 508, at ¶ 9, quoting Roberts v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 75 Ohio St.3d 630, 634, 665 N.E.2d 664 (1996). A trial court abuses its discretion
where it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5
Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶26} R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) provides: “The court shall not enter judgment for
punitive or exemplary damages in excess of two times the amount of the compensatory
damages awarded to the plaintiff from that defendant, as determined pursuant to division
(B)(2) or (3) of this section.” R.C. 2315.21(B)(2) provides:
In a tort action that is tried to a jury and in which a plaintiff makes a claim
for both compensatory damages and punitive or exemplary damages, the
court shall instruct the jury to return, and the jury shall return, a general
verdict and, if that verdict is in favor of the plaintiff, answers to an
interrogatory that specifies the total compensatory damages recoverable by
the plaintiff from each defendant.
R.C. 2315.21(B)(3) applies to bench trials and, therefore, is not applicable here.
{¶27} R.C. 2315.21(C) further provides:
Subject to division (E) of this section, punitive or exemplary damages are
not recoverable from a defendant in question in a tort action unless both of
the following apply:
(1) The actions or omissions of that defendant demonstrate malice or
aggravated or egregious fraud, or that defendant as principal or master
knowingly authorized, participated in, or ratified actions or omissions of an
agent or servant that so demonstrate.
(2) The trier of fact has returned a verdict or has made a determination
pursuant to division (B)(2) or (3) of this section of the total compensatory
damages recoverable by the plaintiff from that defendant.
{¶28} “The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the legislature.” In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538, 978
N.E.2d 164, ¶ 17, citing State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804
N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11. We examine the plain language of the statute, “read words and
phrases in context[,] and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common
usage.” In re M.W. at ¶ 17, citing R.C. 1.42. In doing so, we attempt to give effect to
“every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute” and to avoid an interpretation that
would “restrict, constrict, qualify, narrow, enlarge, or abridge the General Assembly’s
wording” or that would otherwise render a provision meaningless or superfluous. State
ex rel. Carna v. Texas Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 131 Ohio St.3d 478,
2012-Ohio-1484, 967 N.E.2d 193, ¶ 18-19. Where, as here, a statute is clear on its face,
we must apply the statute as written. The General Assembly is presumed to mean what it
said. San Allen v. Buehrer, 2014-Ohio-2071, 11 N.E.3d 739, ¶ 81 (8th Dist.).
{¶29} Applying these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that under
R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a), the trial court was precluded from entering a judgment for
punitive damages to the individual plaintiffs that exceeded two times the compensatory
damages awarded to those plaintiffs. In other words, in computing the cap on punitive
damages, the trial court could only consider the total compensatory damages awarded to
the individual plaintiffs; it could not also consider the amount of compensatory damages
awarded to other plaintiffs, i.e., the insurer plaintiffs, who were not seeking punitive
damages, who were not involved in the punitive damages proceeding, and as to whom no
determination of entitlement to punitive damages was made by the jury.
{¶30} Under R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a), the cap on punitive damages is computed by
multiplying “the amount of the compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff” times
two. (Emphasis added.) The definite “the plaintiff” referenced in R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a) refers back, by its terms, to (1) the “plaintiff” identified in R.C.
2315.21(B)(2) (jury trials) or (3) (bench trials), as applicable, i.e., “a plaintiff [who]
makes a claim for both compensatory damages and punitive or exemplary damages,” and
(2) the “determin[ation]” made in accordance with that provision, i.e., the jury’s “answers
to an interrogatory that specifies the total compensatory damages recoverable by the
plaintiff from each defendant.” (Emphasis added.) See also R.C. 2315.21(C)(2)
(“punitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable from a defendant in question in a
tort action unless * * * [t]he trier of fact has returned a verdict or has made a
determination pursuant to division (B)(2) or (3) of this section of the total compensatory
damages recoverable by the plaintiff from that defendant.”) (Emphasis added.).
{¶31} The Sivit plaintiffs argue that their interpretation is simply a matter of
reading the singular “the plaintiff” in R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) as the plural “the plaintiffs”;
however, it is much more than that. Although it is an accepted principle of statutory
construction that “(t)he singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular,”
R.C. 1.43(A), this rule does not apply where there is “clear language in [the statute] to the
contrary, or evidence which adequately demonstrates that such a construction is out of
context with the remaining language of that statute or its related provisions.” Wingate v.
Hordge, 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58, 396 N.E.2d 770 (1979).
{¶32} Furthermore, under the Sivit plaintiffs’ interpretation of R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a), we would have to read “the plaintiff” not only as “the plaintiffs” but to
include persons other than “plaintiff[s] [who] make[] a claim for both compensatory
damages and punitive or exemplary damages” as set forth in R.C. 2315.21(B)(2) and (3)
— to which R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) expressly refers. Under the Sivit plaintiffs’
interpretation, we would have to ignore the reference to R.C. 2315.21(B)(2) and (3) and
read “the plaintiff” as encompassing all plaintiffs in the case who are awarded
compensatory damages, regardless of whether they have made a claim for punitive
damages. Such an interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.
Although “the plaintiff” as used in R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a), when read in context, could be
reasonably interpreted as including all plaintiffs who “make[ ] a claim for both
compensatory damages and punitive or exemplary damages” as set forth in R.C.
2315.21(B)(2) and (3), there is nothing in R.C. 2315.21 that permits “the plaintiff” as
used in R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) to be interchangeable with “a plaintiff [who] makes a
claim for both compensatory damages and punitive or exemplary damages” and any other
plaintiff in the case who receives a compensatory damages award — as the Sivit plaintiffs
argue here.
{¶33} Further, when reading R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) in context with the other
provisions of the statute, it is worth noting that it is only where a plaintiff makes a claim
for both compensatory damages and punitive or exemplary damages, that R.C. 2315.21
requires the jury, if a verdict is returned for the plaintiff, to answer an interrogatory that
specifies the total compensatory damages recoverable by the plaintiff from each
defendant. There is no such requirement in R.C. 2315.21 with respect to a plaintiff who
does not make a claim for punitive damages. The reason for this distinction is that where
a plaintiff makes a claim for both compensatory and punitive damages, there must be a
basis upon which the court can calculate the cap on punitive damages set forth in R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a); where there is no claim for punitive damages, no such calculation is
required.
{¶34} Thus, any compensatory damages awarded to plaintiffs who have not
asserted claims for punitive damages are not properly considered in applying the cap on
punitive damages set forth in R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a). See also Freudeman v. Landing of
Canton, 702 F.3d 318, 331-334 (6th Cir.2012) (compensatory damages awarded for
wrongful death claim could not be considered when determining the statutory cap on
punitive damages awarded for survival claims under R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) because
punitive damages are not available for a wrongful death claim and R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a)
instructs the trial court to look at “the amount of the compensatory damages awarded to
the plaintiff”; whereas the “real plaintiff” for a survival claim is the decedent’s estate, the
decedent’s statutory beneficiaries are the “real parties” for a wrongful death claim).
{¶35} The Sivit plaintiffs claim that such an interpretation of R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a) is contrary to the purpose for which punitive damages are awarded.
However, it is not only the purpose of awarding punitive damages, but also the purpose of
having a cap on punitive damages that is relevant here. While the purpose of punitive
damages is “to punish and deter certain conduct,” Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 69
Ohio St.3d 638, 651, 635 N.E.2d 331 (1994), the purpose of the cap on punitive damages
— to which R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) is directed — is to limit the amount of punitive
damages that can be awarded against a defendant to “mak[e] the civil justice system more
predictable.” Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880
N.E.2d 420, ¶ 102.
{¶36} Furthermore, the only reason an issue exists in this case as to whether the
punitive damages cap should be based on the compensatory damages awarded to the
individual plaintiffs or the total compensatory damages awarded to all plaintiffs
(including the insurer plaintiffs who did not assert claims for punitive damages), is
because the action filed by the individual plaintiffs was consolidated, for purposes of
judicial economy, with the actions filed by the insurer plaintiffs who did not assert claims
for punitive damages. If the insurer plaintiffs’ actions had not been consolidated with
the action filed by the individual plaintiffs, there is no basis upon which the individual
plaintiffs could claim that they were entitled, under R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a), to punitive
damages in excess of two times their own awards of compensatory damages. Given the
purpose of the cap on punitive damages, we do not believe the legislature intended that
the amount of punitive damages a trial court may award a plaintiff under R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a) should vary depending upon the number of other plaintiffs (or the
amount of compensatory damages awarded to other plaintiffs) whose claims are tried with
the plaintiff’s claims but who do not themselves seek punitive damages (or as to whom no
determination is made that they are entitled to punitive damages).
{¶37} The Sivit plaintiffs also argue that even if R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) would
have otherwise required the trial court to consider only the compensatory damages
awarded to the individual plaintiffs in calculating the cap on punitive damages, the trial
court was constrained by, and bound to follow, the mandate of the Ohio Supreme Court
and award $1,537,555.90, two times the total compensatory damages awarded all
plaintiffs, in punitive damages.
{¶38} An inferior court generally has “no discretion to disregard the mandate of a
superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.” Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 462
N.E.2d 410 (1984), syllabus. The Sivit plaintiffs assert that the Ohio Supreme Court’s
mandate is found in paragraph 8 of its opinion, which states as follows:
We order reduction of the amount of punitive damages to twice the amount
of compensatory damages that were awarded in the trial court’s judgment
entry, which we deem an appropriate amount to deter the conduct at issue in
this case.
Village Green argues that this language should not be construed as mandating a reduction
in the punitive damages award to $1,537,555, i.e., twice the compensatory damages
awarded to all of the plaintiffs, because the court’s opinion “did not mention — and
certainly did not consider the significance of — the fact that $171,630.95 of the
‘stipulated compensatory damages of $186,671.95’ had been awarded to four subrogated
insurance company plaintiffs who had not been awarded any punitive damages by the
jury” given that that fact had no relevance to the issues then before the court. (Emphasis
omitted.) Village Green also contends that paragraph 8 is inconsistent with paragraph 12
of the opinion that remands the matter to the trial court to “set the amount of damages.”
The Sivit plaintiffs respond that because the court pointed out in its opinion that the
“compensatory-damages awarded by the jury totaled $582,146” and that “[t]he judgment
entry of the trial court also included stipulated compensatory damages of $186,631.95,
which were contingent on a finding of liability,” the court clearly understood that “the
amount of compensatory damages that were awarded in the trial court’s judgment entry”
included the compensatory damages awarded to the insurer plaintiffs who had not
requested punitive damages.
{¶39} We need not resolve the issue of whether the Ohio Supreme Court, in
rendering its decision, understood and considered the fact that the total compensatory
damages awarded in this case included compensatory damages to plaintiffs who did not
seek punitive damages or precisely what the Ohio Supreme Court intended by its
reference to “the amount of compensatory damages that were awarded in the trial court’s
judgment entry” in paragraph 8 of its opinion because paragraph 8 is not the mandate of
the Ohio Supreme Court in this case. S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.04(C) provides: “A certified copy
of the judgment entry shall constitute the mandate.” In this case, the Ohio Supreme
Court’s mandate, i.e., a certified copy of its April 2, 2015 judgment entry, stated, in
relevant part, as follows:
This cause * * * is affirmed with respect to all issues related to the verdict
except the award of punitive damages, consistent with the opinion rendered
herein.
It is further ordered that the court holds that punitive damages in the amount
of two times the award of compensatory damages is the appropriate amount,
and this issue is remanded to the trial court to set the amount of damages.
{¶40} Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court
“to set the amount of damages.” For the reasons explained above, properly “set[ting] the
amount of [punitive] damages,” in accordance with R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a), required the
trial court to award a total of $1,194,294 in punitive damages, not $1,537,555.90 in
punitive damages, as the trial court did here. We do not find that applying R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a) as written, i.e., limiting the punitive damages award to two times the
total compensatory damages awarded to the individual plaintiffs, would violate the
mandate of the Ohio Supreme Court.
{¶41} Although we agree with Village Green that the trial court erred in setting the
amount of the punitive damages award at $1,537,555.90, rather than $1,194,294, we
also agree with the Sivit plaintiffs that the punitive damages award must be reversed in
total — not just, as Village Green suggests, as to the punitive damages allocated to the
seven individual plaintiff groups — Jason and Renee Edwards, Natalie Rudd, Prathibha
Marathe, Hallie Gelb, Mohammad Marwali and Selvy Pangkey, Luciana Armaganijan
and Mitchell Rosenberg — who would receive more than two times their compensatory
damages under the trial court’s per capita allocation of the punitive damages award.
Accordingly, we sustain Village Green’s first assignment of error in part and the Gruhins’
second assignment of error in part and overrule them in part. We also sustain Village
Green’s second assignment of error. We reverse the trial court’s punitive damage award
and remand the matter to the trial court to reset the total amount of punitive damages
awarded to the individual plaintiffs at $1,194,294.
The Trial Court’s Allocation of the Punitive Damages Award
{¶42} In their first and third assignments of error, the Gruhins argue that they are
entitled to punitive damages equal to twice their compensatory damages award —
$222,466 in punitive damages — and that the trial court abused its discretion in allocating
the punitive damages equally, on a per capita basis, among the ten individual plaintiff
groups.
{¶43} The Gruhins do not dispute that the individual plaintiffs could have entered
into an agreement specifying how any punitive damages award they received was to be
allocated among them, and that, if such an agreement had been made, the trial court could
have enforced that agreement and ordered the allocation and distribution of the punitive
damages award consistent with that agreement. The Gruhins assert, however, that no
such agreement existed among the individual plaintiffs. The Gruhins contend that the
trial court’s findings that the individual plaintiffs had “banded together” and agreed to
equally share any punitive damages award among the ten individual plaintiff groups “are
patently false and erroneous,” that “no testimony or other evidentiary proofs supportive of
such findings exist,” and that the trial court “inexplicably allowed itself to be swayed” by
“unsworn, unsubstantiated, untrue, wholly gratuitous and self-serving statements
improperly proffered as ‘fact’” by the Diemert law firm.
{¶44} We disagree with the Gruhins that there was “no evidence” in the record to
support the trial court’s finding that the individual plaintiffs had agreed to equally share
any award of punitive damages. In addition to the affidavits from Sivit and Pace setting
forth their understanding that the punitive damages award would be shared equally among
the ten individual plaintiff groups,7 the verdict forms submitted to the jury on the issue of
punitive damages reflect an intent or understanding on the part of the individual plaintiffs
to share in any punitive damages award (particularly when compared with the
interrogatory submitted on the issue of compensatory damages, which required the jury to
specify the amount of compensatory damages awarded to each of the individual plaintiff
groups). Furthermore, after counsel advised David Gruhin in January 2013 that,
consistent with the trial court’s judgment entry, he “anticipate[d] dividing the punitives
into 10 plaintiff groups equally” because “the purpose for the punitive award was equally
shared,” the Gruhins did not raise any further issue with respect to proposed allocation of
the punitive damages award until April 2015 — more than two years later — and, then,
only after counsel sent a letter advising the Gruhins that their share of the punitive
damages award would likely be reduced from $200,000 to $153,750 as a result of the
Sivit and Pace would have each received a much larger share of the punitive
7
damages award if the award had been allocated on a pro rata basis, based on the
compensatory damages they were awarded, rather than a per capita basis, shared
equally among the ten individual plaintiff groups.
decision by the Ohio Supreme Court. Although David Gruhin claims he never received
counsel’s January 24, 2013 email, it strains credulity to believe that he would have waited
more than two years for a response to his January 2013 emails without following up,
particularly given that, due to his “hectic” work schedule, he had requested “a written
response detailing your intentions in regard to the punitive damages, sent within 7 days.”
{¶45} Although the Gruhins dispute that an agreement existed among the plaintiffs
to share any punitive damages award equally, they do not claim that there was some other
agreement among the plaintiffs as to how the lump sum punitive damages award would
be allocated. Nor do they indicate how they thought the award would be allocated when
the jury was asked to award punitive damages to the plaintiffs collectively.8
{¶46} We need not decide the issue of whether sufficient evidence existed to
support the trial court’s finding that an agreement existed among the individual plaintiffs
to equally share any award of punitive damages because even if the trial court erred in
concluding that such an agreement existed, we would still affirm the trial court’s decision
to distribute the punitive damages award equally among the ten individual plaintiff groups
based on the particular facts and circumstances in this case.
{¶47} The Gruhins argue that R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) controls the allocation of the
punitive damages award in this case and that the trial court’s failure to allocate punitive
damages to each of the plaintiff groups in an amount equal to two times their
As discussed below, at that time, there had been no determination that plaintiffs’ action was a
8
“tort action” within the meaning of R.C. 2315.21. Accordingly, the Gruhins could not have then
expected that R.C. 2315.21 applied to the plaintiffs’ claims or that they would receive a pro rata share
of the total punitive damages awarded, as they now claim, based on R.C. 2315.21(D)(1)(a).
compensatory damages violates R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a). The Gruhins contend that R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a) requires the court to (1) “look to the ‘groups’ of Plaintiffs who made
claims for both compensatory and punitive damages,” (2) “take into account the varying
amounts of compensatory damages awarded to each individual ‘group’ of Plaintiffs” and
(3) multiply “each of these ten individual amounts * * * by two * * * to determine the
amount of punitive damages to which each Plaintiff is entitled pursuant to the Statute.”
(Emphasis omitted.) The Gruhins contend that because certain plaintiff groups will
receive more than two times their awarded compensatory damages and other plaintiff
groups will receive less than two times their awarded compensatory damages under the
trial court’s allocation of the punitive damages award, the trial court’s allocation of
punitive damages must be reversed. Once again, we disagree.
{¶48} The purpose of R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) is to limit the damages awarded
against a defendant, not to ensure that a particular plaintiff gets a particular punitive
damage award (or a particular share of a punitive damages award). Thus, R.C.
2315.21(D)(2)(a) does not, as the Gruhins contend, “entitle” a plaintiff to a particular
amount of punitive damages.
{¶49} Significantly, in this case, the jury was not asked to make (and, therefore,
did not make) separate determinations, as to each individual plaintiff or plaintiff group (1)
whether the plaintiff or plaintiff group was entitled to punitive damages from Village
Green and (2) if so, in what amount. There was no ruling that R.C. 2315.21 — and
specifically, the cap on punitive damages set forth in R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)(a) — applied to
the individual plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages prior to the jury’s verdicts on
punitive damages. Thus, for strategic reasons, no doubt with an eye toward (1)
convincing the jury to award punitive damages to the plaintiffs in the first instance and
(2) maximizing any punitive damages award ultimately awarded by the jury, the
individual plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages were presented collectively to the jury
and the jury was asked to consider an award of punitive damages to the plaintiffs as a
group.
{¶50} Consistent with that approach, two verdict forms were submitted to the jury
in the punitive damages phase of the trial. The jury was asked to consider (1) whether
the individual plaintiffs as a group should be awarded punitive damages against Village
Green and (2) if so, in what amount. No objection was raised to the trial court’s
submission of these verdict forms to the jury. Likewise, no objection was made after the
jury awarded punitive damages to the individual plaintiffs in a lump sum. Nor was any
claim made on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to submit jury interrogatories
asking the jury to independently consider the punitive damages claim of each individual
plaintiff or in permitting the jury to make a lump sum punitive damages award. The only
objection that was made and the only error that was raised on appeal related to the verdict
forms was Village Green’s objection to the total amount of punitive damages awarded
against it. Accordingly, any error allegedly associated with the trial court’s failure to
request separate determinations from the jury on the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims
or the jury’s lump sum punitive damages award has been waived and any claim based on
any such alleged error would be barred by res judicata. See also Faieta v. World Harvest
Church, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-527, 2008-Ohio-6959, ¶ 80-85 (trial court did not
commit plain error by submitting to the jury general verdict forms and interrogatories that
did not require the jury to specify the amount of punitive damages awarded to each
individual plaintiff where defendants, who on appeal claimed the submission of the
verdict forms and interrogatories was plain error, not only failed to object to the verdict
forms and interrogatories, but invited the alleged error by submitting draft verdict forms
and interrogatories to the trial court that asked the jury to determine the amount of
damages awarded to the plaintiffs collectively, not individually).
{¶51} Although we agree, reading the statute as a whole, that R.C. 2315.21 seems
to contemplates that the trier of fact will make individualized determinations of both the
compensatory damages to be awarded to a particular plaintiff (or a plaintiff group where,
as here, the claims of individual plaintiffs such as a husband and wife are presented
together) and whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages, there
is nothing in R.C. 2315.21 that expressly requires the trial court, in a multi-plaintiff case,
to submit an interrogatory to the jury that specifies the amount of punitive damages
recoverable by each plaintiff from a defendant. Compare R.C. 2315.21(B)(2) (“In a tort
action that is tried to a jury and in which a plaintiff makes a claim for both compensatory
damages and punitive or exemplary damages, the court shall instruct the jury to return,
and the jury shall return, a general verdict and, if that verdict is in favor of the plaintiff,
answers to an interrogatory that specifies the total compensatory damages recoverable by
the plaintiff from each defendant.”) with R.C. 2315.21(B)(1)(b) (“If the jury determines in
the initial stage of the trial that the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages
for the injury or loss to person or property from the defendant, evidence may be presented
in the second stage of the trial, and a determination by that jury shall be made, with
respect to whether the plaintiff additionally is entitled to recover punitive or exemplary
damages for the injury or loss to person or property from the defendant.”) and R.C.
2315.21(D)(1)(“In a tort action, the trier of fact shall determine the liability of any
defendant for punitive or exemplary damages and the amount of those damages.”).
Further, R.C. 2315.21 does not address the allocation of a lump sum punitive damages
award where, as here, the trier of fact was not asked to make an individualized
determination of the amount of punitive damages to be awarded to each plaintiff
determined to be entitled to recover punitive damages.
{¶52} Given that the jury was not asked to make separate determinations of the
amount of punitive damages each individual plaintiff was entitled to recover, the
allocation of the punitive damages the jury awarded to the individual plaintiffs as a group
was properly left to the discretion of the trial court.
{¶53} As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St.3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 781 N.E.2d 121, courts have “a central
role to play” in determining how punitive damage awards should be distributed:
[A] punitive damages award is about the defendant’s actions. “The
purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff but to punish
the guilty, deter future misconduct, and to demonstrate society’s
disapproval.” * * * At the punitive-damages level, it is the societal element
that is most important. The plaintiff remains a party, but the de facto party is
our society, and the jury is determining whether and to what extent we as a
society should punish the defendant.
There is a philosophical void between the reasons we award punitive
damages and how the damages are distributed. The community makes the
statement, while the plaintiff reaps the monetary award. * * * In Ohio,
punitive damages are an outgrowth of the common law. * * * Therefore,
Ohio’s courts have a central role to play in the distribution of punitive
damages. Punitive damages awards should not be subject to bright-line
division but instead should be considered on a case-by-case basis, with
those awards making the most significant societal statements being the most
likely candidates for alternative distribution.
Clearly, we do not want to dissuade plaintiffs from moving forward with
important societal undertakings. The distribution of the jury’s award must
recognize the effort the plaintiff undertook in bringing about the award and
the important role a plaintiff plays in bringing about necessary changes that
society agrees need be made. Plaintiffs themselves might get involved in
how the award is distributed. * * *
Id. at ¶ 187-189.
{¶54} The Gruhins claim that the trial court’s allocation of the punitive damages
award in ten equal shares is a case of “robbing Peter to pay Paul” and that the Gruhins are
entitled to have the punitive damages award “allocated and distributed in line with their
respective, distinct, separate and unique individually awarded compensatory damages”
just as would have occurred “[h]ad each [p]laintiff filed a separate action.” The Gruhins’
argument assumes that if they had brought their claims separately from those of the other
plaintiffs (1) the jury would have still awarded them punitive damages and (2) the
punitive damages the jury awarded them would not have been less than the statutory cap
of two times their compensatory damages. There is, however, no guarantee that that
would have been the case.
{¶55} While the Gruhins are correct that they and each of the other individual
plaintiffs could have filed separate actions asserting their claims for compensatory and
punitive damages on a “wholly separate and independent basis,” it is not necessarily true
if they had done so, that they would have received the punitive damages award to which
they now claim they are entitled. Two times compensatory damages was simply the
maximum amount the Gruhins could have recovered in punitive damages had their claims
been tried separately. Had the Gruhins’ claims been tried separately (or if separate
interrogatories had been submitted to the jury on their punitive damages claim), they
could have received the same punitive damages award, a lower punitive damages award
or even no punitive damages at all. As the Ohio Supreme Court recently stated in
Whetstone v. Binner, Slip Opinion. No. 2016-Ohio-1006, ¶ 20, “[A]n award of punitive
damages is not automatic. Even when a plaintiff can establish entitlement to punitive
damages, whether to impose punitive damages, and in what amount, is left to the trier of
fact.”
{¶56} No doubt the reason the individual plaintiffs joined their claims together in a
single lawsuit and submitted their punitive damages claims to the jury collectively was
because they saw potential advantages to doing so, including an increased likelihood of
receiving a substantial punitive damages award. The fact that ten plaintiff groups (some
of whom were elderly, some of whom had children) all suffered significant losses as a
result of the defendant’s malicious conduct may have very well increased the punitive
damages award to the individual plaintiffs beyond what they would have received had
their claims been tried independently. Likewise, the fact certain plaintiffs, such as
Rosenberg and Armaganijan, were clearly harmed by Village Green’s conduct but Village
Green was required to pay only “nominal” “agreed upon” compensatory damages for their
losses may have led the jury to increase the amount of punitive damages awarded to the
individual plaintiffs as a group.
{¶57} Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court acted
arbitrarily, unreasonably or unconscionably in ordering the lump sum punitive damages
award to be shared equally among the ten individual plaintiff groups. In determining
what a “fair, reasonable and equitable” allocation of the punitive damages should be, the
trial court considered the relevant facts and equities of the situation, including the verdict
forms and interrogatories submitted to the jury, the manner in which the plaintiffs’ claims
were presented at trial, i.e., as ten plaintiff groups representing the ten apartment units the
individual plaintiffs occupied at the time of the fire, the role and purpose of the
stipulations that had been entered as to the compensatory damages sustained by certain of
the individual plaintiffs and the nature of the claims asserted.
{¶58} As the trial court observed, every plaintiff was a victim of the same
malicious conduct that justified the award of punitive damages against Village Green.
Some of the plaintiffs, such as Rosenberg, were subject to such conduct for a much longer
period of time than the Gruhins. Every plaintiff lost items that were of great personal
value for which the law may not have provided adequate compensation. Every plaintiff
was displaced from his or her home due to the damage caused by the fire. To the extent
that some individual plaintiff groups suffered higher compensable losses than others,
those differences were already accounted for in the compensatory damages awards the
plaintiff groups received and need not have been considered by the trial court in
allocating the punitive damages award.
{¶59} Accordingly, we overrule the Gruhins’ first and third assignments of error.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, reverse the trial court’s judgment in part, and
remand the matter for the trial court to enter an order setting the total amount of punitive
damages awarded to the individual plaintiffs at $1,194,294, to be distributed equally
among the ten individual plaintiff groups, i.e., $119,429.40 to each of the ten individual
plaintiff groups.
{¶60} This cause is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that the Gruhins and Village Green share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_____________________________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR