State v. McGee

[Cite as State v. McGee, 2013-Ohio-4926.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99704
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
LARRY L. McGEE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-566887
BEFORE: McCormack, J., Jones, P.J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 7, 2013
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Brian R. McGraw
1370 Ontario Street
Suite 2000
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Adam M. Chaloupka
Assistant County Prosecutor
8th Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
TIM McCORMACK, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Larry McGee, appeals the trial court’s imposition of
the consecutive maximum sentence of 12 months for breaking and entering in Count 1
and 18 months for the vandalism in Count 3. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
Procedural History and Substantive Facts
{¶2} On September 26, 2012, Larry McGee and codefendant, Kenneth Hunter,
were indicted as follows: (1) Count 1 — breaking and entering in violation of R.C.
2911.13(B); (2) Count 2 — grand theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); and (3) Count
3 — vandalism in violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(1)(a). McGee and Hunter entered into a
plea agreement, wherein McGee pleaded guilty to breaking and entering and vandalism.
The grand theft charge in Count 2 was dismissed.
{¶3} On December 3, 2012, the trial court sentenced McGee to 12 months on
Count 1 and 18 months on Count 3, to be served consecutively. The court also ordered
restitution in the amount of $29,800.
{¶4} McGee and Hunter, on or about July 6, 2012, dismantled three air
conditioning units from the roof of Federated Equipment Company in Cleveland, Ohio
and removed the copper and aluminum parts from the units. Edward “Lucky” Nehez, a
representative of Federated Equipment Company, testified at the sentencing hearing as to
the damage to the property. During the hearing, defense counsel noted that McGee had
violated several drug tests and was previously sentenced to a community based
correctional facility. In response, the prosecutor submitted that he pleaded McGee out in
2011 for the same charges presently at issue and, in fact, most of McGee’s 22 prior cases
relate to breaking and entering charges.
{¶5} Before sentencing McGee to the maximum sentences for both the breaking
and entering and vandalism charges, the trial court stated that it considered the purposes
of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors
under R.C. 2929.12. The court also noted McGee’s “longstanding prior history of
criminal convictions.” In noting McGee’s “continuing” and “repeating” pattern of
criminal conduct, the trial court stated that “the only thing the court can do is basically
remove [McGee] from the community and hope the time imposed is going to at least
make an impression that this is not the best choice of life for [McGee] as far as making
ends meet at the expense of other people.” The court then found that a prison sentence
is necessary in order to protect the public and not demean the seriousness of the offense.
{¶6} Prior to ordering the sentences to run consecutively, the court stated, “I’m
going to run this time consecutive * * * because the criminal history does require
consecutive sentences and also is necessary to fulfill the purposes and principles of felony
sentencing which is to punish the offender and not demean the seriousness of these
offenses.”
Assignment of Error
{¶7} The trial court erred and abused its discretion in imposing a maximum
consecutive sentence.
Law and Analysis
{¶8} McGee contends that the trial court erred with respect to the imposition of a
“maximum consecutive sentence.” While McGee includes the word “maximum” in his
assignment of error, he provides no argument advancing the claim that the court erred in
imposing a maximum sentence. We therefore limit our review to consecutive sentences.
{¶9} McGee claims that the trial court failed to make the statutory findings
before imposing consecutive sentences. The state concedes that the trial court did not
make the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); however, it contends that the
record supports such findings.
{¶10} We review consecutive sentences using the standard set forth in R.C.
2953.08. State v. Venes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98682, 2013-Ohio-1891, ¶ 8-10. That
statute provides two grounds for an appellate court to overturn the imposition of
consecutive sentences: (1) the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law”; or (2) the appellate
court, upon its review, clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the
sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Venes at ¶ 11; R.C.
2953.08(G)(2).
{¶11} H.B. 86, effective on September 30, 2011, revived the requirement that trial
courts make certain findings before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Graves, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98559, 2013-Ohio-2197, ¶ 11.
{¶12} Under current R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), when imposing consecutive sentences,
the trial court must first find the sentence is “necessary to protect the public from future
crime or to punish the offender.” Next, the trial court must find that consecutive
sentences are “not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the
danger the offender poses to the public.” Finally, the trial court must find the existence
of one of the three statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c):
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
by the offender.
{¶13} Compliance with this statute “requires separate and distinct findings in
addition to any findings relating to purposes and goals of criminal sentencing.” Venes,
8th Dist. No. 98682, 2013-Ohio-1891, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Jones, 93 Ohio St.3d 391,
399, 2001-Ohio-1341, 754 N.E.2d 1252. “By stating the findings on the record, the
reviewing court will not have to guess as to the trial court’s thought process or impose its
own. This helps the reviewing court to understand whether the trial court made the
appropriate analysis.” State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 97689, 97691, and 97692,
2012-Ohio-3951, ¶ 16 (Blackmon, J., concurring). The failure to make these findings is
contrary to law. Venes at ¶ 12.
{¶14} In this case, a review of the record reveals, and the state concedes, that the
trial court did not clearly demonstrate compliance with the requirements of R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) prior to the imposition of consecutive sentences.
{¶15} At the hearing, the trial court discussed McGee’s “longstanding prior history
of criminal convictions” and it noted McGee’s “continuing” and “repeating” pattern of
criminal conduct. It further stated the need to remove McGee from the community in
order to prevent him from “making ends meet at the expense of other people.” The
court then found that a prison sentence is necessary in order to protect the public and not
demean the seriousness of the offense. The only specific finding the trial court arguably
made with respect to consecutive sentences, however, was that the “criminal history does
require consecutive sentences * * * and to punish the offender * * *.” The trial court
failed to find that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of
McGee’s conduct and to the danger he poses to the public as required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). Graves, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98559, 2013-Ohio-2197, at ¶ 15.
Nor does the record demonstrate that the trial court engaged in an analysis to support such
a finding of proportionality.
{¶16} The court’s statements, therefore, along with the record in this case, are
devoid of the statutorily mandated findings required by the second prong of the statute as
outlined above. As such, the consecutive sentence the trial court imposed is clearly and
convincingly contrary to law.
{¶17} We recognize that the trial court worked diligently to identify the reasons
why McGee should receive the more punitive consecutive sentences. Trial courts,
however, are clearly bound by the stricter standard for the imposition of consecutive
sentences created by the General Assembly in H.B. 86. The revived consecutive
sentencing statute requires that the trial court make separate and distinct findings before
imposing consecutive sentences. The legislation envisions and prescribes a clear
delineation, a preface to the act of imposing the greater term of imprisonment that is
effectuated by consecutive sentences. The law mandates an introduction, by way of
findings, to the act of imposing the consecutive sentences so that the trial court’s intent
and purpose are clear. “If the word ‘findings’ is to have any meaning at all, it means
nothing less than the court must ‘engage[ ] in the required analysis and select[ ] the
appropriate statutory criteria’ before ordering sentences to be served consecutively.”
Venes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98682, 2013-Ohio-1891, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Edmonson,
86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 1999-Ohio-110, 715 N.E.2d 131.
{¶18} Accordingly, we sustain McGee’s assignment of error and remand this case
to the trial court for the limited purposes of resentencing consistent with R.C. 2929.14(C).
See State v. Huber, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98206, 2012-Ohio-6139, ¶ 17.
{¶19} This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________________
TIM McCORMACK, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR