State v. Adkins

[Cite as State v. Adkins, 2011-Ohio-2819.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: Appellate Case No. 2010-CA-69
Plaintiff-Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 02-CR-326
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from
RONDAL ADKINS : (Common Pleas Court)
:
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 10th day of June, 2011.
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STEPHEN K. HALLER, by CHERI L. STOUT, Atty. Reg. #0073725, Greene County
Prosecutor’s Office, 61 Greene Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
PETER GALYARDT, Atty. Reg. #0085439, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, 250 East
Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Rondal Adkins appeals from the trial court’s judgment entry overruling his
motion to vacate a void sentence and terminate post-release control. Adkins contends the trial
court improperly imposed post-release control when it re-sentenced him in 2003, rendering
the post-release control portion of his sentence void. Therefore, he claims, the Adult Parole
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Authority lacked the power to impose post-release control following his release from prison in
2010 and the trial court should have terminated his post-release control.
{¶ 2} The record reflects that Adkins pled guilty to multiple counts of rape in 2002.
He received concurrent ten-year prison sentences. The trial court did not mention post-release
control during the sentencing hearing. The sentencing entry states that post-release control is
“mandatory in this case up to a maximum of 5 years[.]” Adkins appealed on grounds unrelated
to post-release control. This Court reversed and remanded for re-sentencing. In 2003, the trial
court re-sentenced Adkins to concurrent eight-year prison terms. At the re-sentencing hearing,
the trial court advised him that he was subject to mandatory post-release control “up to a
maximum of five years.” The re-sentencing judgment entry similarly provides that
post-release control is “mandatory in this case up to a maximum of 5 years.”
{¶ 3} Adkins completed his prison term and was released in May 2010. Upon his
release, the Adult Parole Authority placed him on five years of post-release control. In August
2010, Adkins moved to vacate a void sentence and terminate post-release control. He argued
that the trial court’s imposition of mandatory post-release control “up to” five years was
erroneous, rendering that portion of his sentence void. Moreover, because he had completed
his prison term, Adkins asserted that the trial court could not re-sentence him to correct the
error. The trial court overruled Adkins’s motion. The trial court, relying on State v.
Harrington, Greene App. No. 06 CA 29, 2007-Ohio-1335, and State v. Sulek, Greene App.
No. 09 CA 75, 2010-Ohio-3919, held that the language it had used when imposing
post-release control was sufficient. This appeal followed.
{¶ 4} In his two assignments of error, Adkins contends the “up to” language the trial
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court used was not adequate to impose post-release control, that the error rendered the
post-release control portion of his sentence void, and that his completion of his prison term
precludes the trial court from correcting the error. As a result, he asserts that he is not subject
to any post-release control. Upon review, we find Adkins’s argument to be persuasive.
{¶ 5} In late 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court narrowed its prior holdings about the
effect of mistakes in the imposition of post-release control, but left intact the holding that an
incorrect post-release control requirement renders the post-release control portion of a
sentence void. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238. Subsequent to Fischer,
this Court decided State v. Conway, Clark App. No. 2010-CA-50, 2011-Ohio-24, where the
Court stated at ¶25 n.1: “In the case before us, there is a discrete part of the sentencing entry
that is ‘void’—the part that provides for post-release control for ‘up to’ three years.” The
State, in its brief, has asked that we reconsider Conway. Additionally, as late as April 29,
2011, this court decided State v. Blackshear, Montgomery App. No. 24302, 2011-Ohio-2059,
wherein it was recognized that “[w]hen a trial court does not impose post-release control in
accordance with statutorily mandated terms, that portion of the sentence is void.“ Id. at ¶12.
More specifically, “[l]anguage that ‘appears to allow the parole board discretion to impose
less than [the mandatory term] of post-release control’ does not conform to the statutory
mandates, rendering that portion of the sentence void.” Id. (citations omitted).
{¶ 6} In the present case, the trial court advised Adkins orally, and in its
re-sentencing entry, that he was subject to mandatory post-release control for “up to” five
years. The parties agree that, in reality, Adkins was subject to mandatory post-release control
for the entire five years. Logically, “up to” five years also includes five years and could not
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conceivably prejudice the defendant. But, the case law is to the contrary. Therefore, the
post-release control portion of Adkins’s sentence is void. Id.; see, also, State v. Pearson,
Montgomery App. No. 23974, 2011-Ohio-245, ¶3 and 9 (implicitly recognizing that the
post-release control portion of the defendant’s sentence was void where the trial court
incorrectly imposed “up to” five years rather than exactly five years).
{¶ 7} Other appellate districts similarly have found that using “up to” language when
imposing post-release control is error—and renders the post-release control portion of the
sentence void—where mandatory post-release control for a specific number of years is
required. See, e.g., State v. Bregen, Clermont App. No. 2010-06-039, 2011-Ohio-1872, ¶25;
State v. Jones, Wayne App. No. 10 CA 0022, 2011-Ohio-1450, ¶11-13; State v. Gaut,
Trumbull App. No. 2010-T-0059, 2011-Ohio-1300, ¶20-24; State ex rel. Hazel v. Bender,
Franklin App. No. 10AP-435, 2011-Ohio-1027, ¶5; State v. Cottrill, Pickaway App. No. 10
CA 38, 2011-Ohio-2122, ¶9; State v. Green, Stark App. No. 2010 CA 00198,
2011-Ohio-1636, ¶16; State v. Jones, Cuyahoga App. No. 94216, 2010-Ohio-4136, ¶4-5.
{¶ 8} In reaching its conclusion below, the trial court cited State v. Harrington,
Greene App. No. 06 CA 29, 2007-Ohio-1335, and State v. Sulek, Greene App. No. 09 CA 75,
2010-Ohio-3919. As in the present case, the defendant in Harrington argued on appeal that the
trial court had erred in imposing “up to” five years of post-release control when a full five
years was required. This court cursorily disposed of the defendant’s argument, stating: “We do
not presently decide what effect, if any, the above-quoted statement in the termination entry
may have on the period of Harrington‘s post release control. We note that this error, if it is an
error, cannot possibly prejudice Harrington. If the error has any legal effect at all, it would be
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to shorten Harrington‘s period of post release control, which would be to his advantage, not to
his detriment.” Thus, not only was Harrington decided before the Supreme Court’s latest
pronouncement in Fischer, Harrington also specifically did not decide the effect of an
incorrect post-release control statement. The body of case law set forth above, decided after
Harrington, establishes that the post-release control portion of the defendant’s sentence is
void.
{¶ 9} Likewise, Sulek was decided before Fischer. Additionally, in Sulek, this court
cited Harrington while holding that the trial court had committed reversible error by
misinforming the defendant convicted of a second-degree felony that he was subject to five
years of post-release control rather than three. Sulek was remanded for resentencing.
Accordingly, Sulek does not support the State’s position in this case.
{¶ 10} An unfortunate result of the Fischer “void” analysis is that defendants such as
Adkins, who by the facts underlying his conviction should be under supervision, avoid the
statutorily intended consequence. Because he has completed his sentence without the error
being corrected, Adkins cannot now be subjected to a period of post-release control. See, e.g.,
State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, ¶8-9; State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio
St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, ¶70-72. In Fischer, the Supreme Court majority was of the
opinion that “[i]n light of the General Assembly‘s enactment of R.C. 2929.191[resentencing
procedure for post July 2006 inadequate post-release control sentences], it is likely that our
work in this regard is drawing to a close, at least for purposes of void sentences.” Actually,
these problems will fester for years to come. Because voidness can be raised at any time,
Fischer‘s “void” analysis encourages defendants not to challenge technically incorrect
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post-release control orders until after they are released because the problem cannot then be
rectified.
{¶ 11} Uncertainty about uncorrected, technically inaccurate post-release control will
be evident in at least three distinct kinds of cases. The first, as here, is where a defendant is
released from prison and placed on post-release control. He then raises the technical
inadequacy issue which, based on the “void” analysis, will end the post-release control
supervision. The second scenario is where a released prisoner is placed under supervision on
technically incorrect post-release control and fails to raise the issue until he is charged, or even
convicted and sentenced, for a new offense of escape for failure to comply with the terms of
supervision. The “void” post-release control analysis now extends to evaporate the new
charge. See, e.g., State v. Renner, Montgomery App. No. 24019, 2011-Ohio-502; State v.
Pointer, Montgomery App. No. 24210, 2011-Ohio-1419. Finally, a third line of cases will
arise where a released prisoner is placed on technically incorrect post-release control and then
has his premises searched under the APA’s supervisory authority. If felony contraband is
found, the “void” post-release control analysis vitiates the APA’s supervision, and the
agency’s authority to search, which may result in the suppression of evidence, even if obtained
in good faith pursuit of its duties. See Blackshear.
{¶ 12} Unless and until the Ohio Supreme Court changes its “void” post-release
control analysis or the legislature changes the statutory implementation of supervision, the
State should be on notice that every sentencing entry should be reviewed for accuracy before
imposition of post-release control.
{¶ 13} Based on the reasoning set forth above, we conclude that the trial court erred in
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making Adkins’s post-release control mandatory for “up to a maximum of 5 years.” This error
rendered the post-release control portion of his sentence void. Because he completed his
sentence without the error being corrected, Adkins cannot now be subjected to a period of
post-release control. See, e.g., Simpkins, ¶8-9; Bloomer, ¶70-72. Accordingly, we sustain his
two assignments of error.
{¶ 14} The portion of the trial court’s sentencing entry imposing post-release control is
vacated. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court to
notify the APA about the vacation of post-release control.
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FAIN and FROELICH, JJ., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Stephen K. Haller
Cheri L. Stout
Peter Galyardt
Hon. Stephen Wolaver