Zimpfer v. Roach

[Cite as Zimpfer v. Roach, 2016-Ohio-5176.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
BLAKE ZIMPFER, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS/
CROSS-APPELLEES, CASE NO. 17-16-03
v.
SANDRA S. ROACH, ET AL., OPINION
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLANTS.
Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court
Probate Division
Trial Court No. 2015CVA0001
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 1, 2016
APPEARANCES:
Susan D. Solle for Appellants
James L. Thieman for Appellees
Case No. 17-16-03
ROGERS, J.
{¶1} Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Blake Zimpfer (“Blake”) and
Jody Keith (“Jody”), as legal guardian for Courtney Zimpfer (“Courtney”)
(collectively “Appellants”), appeal the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
Shelby County, Probate Division, denying, in part, their motion to quash a
subpoena issued by Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Sandra Roach and
Peggy Hall, individually and as co-executrixes of the estate of Robert Zimpfer
(“the Decedent”) (collectively “Appellees”). For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} On February 11, 2015, Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees
in the Court of Common Pleas of Shelby County, Probate Division, contesting the
validity of the Decedent’s Last Will and Testament (“the will”).1 Specifically,
Appellants alleged that (1) the will failed to comply with the formal requirements
of a will; (2) the Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to make a will; and (3) the
will was a product of undue influence.
{¶3} Appellees later filed their answer in which they denied the allegations.
{¶4} In late 2015, Appellees issued a subpoena duces tecum to Dr. Kreg
Huffer, Appellants’ uncle, pursuant to Civ.R. 45. The subpoena requested
production and inspection of the following items:
1
The complaint also named Bradley Hall, Heather Hall, Rebecca Hall, and Andrea Roach as “Nominal
Defendants/Interested Parties.” (Docket No. 1, p. 1-2).
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1. All letters, cards, notes, email correspondence, memoranda, or
other forms of communication with one or more of the
following individuals: 1) [Blake] 2) [Courtney] 3) [Jody] 4)
employees of the law firm of Dinsmore and Shohl, LLP2,
regarding anything whatsoever to do with [the Decedent]. (This
specifically includes all email correspondence in deleted files,
and whether such email correspondence has been printed or is
in electronic form).
2. All papers and other records of every kind and description in
any way related to litigation, pending in the Common Pleas
Court of Shelby County, Ohio and pertaining to the Estate of
[the Decedent], including anything pertaining to the mediation
of the case.
(Docket No. 48, Ex. 1).
{¶5} On January 15, 2016, Appellants filed a motion to quash the
subpoena, claiming that Dr. Huffer’s communications with Appellants’ counsel
were protected under the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.
{¶6} First, Appellants argued that Dr. Huffer was a “client” within the
meaning of the attorney-client privilege insofar as he was Blake and Courtney’s
“agent” and “representative.” Appellants explained, “Because [Blake and
Courtney] are in the Army and at college, respectively, neither of [them are]
readily available for litigation strategy and preparation discussion. Dr. Huffer is
therefore acting as their agent and representative in those discussions * * *.”
(Docket No. 48, p. 3).
2
Since the case’s inception, Appellants have been represented by Dinsmore and Shohl, LLP.
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{¶7} Second, Appellants argued that communications between Dr. Huffer
and Appellants’ counsel were protected under the work-product doctrine because
they were “prepared specifically and exclusively in anticipation of litigation and
trial * * * .” (Id. at p. 4).
{¶8} Attached to Appellants’ motion was a copy of the subpoena and Dr.
Huffer’s affidavit. The affidavit stated:
1. I made the statements in this affidavit upon my own personal
knowledge, am of the requisite age and capacity to testify as to
all matters stated, am under no legal disability which would
preclude me from testifying, and, if called upon to do so, would
testify as set forth in this affidavit.
2. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and am of sound mind
and body.
3. I am the uncle of [Blake and Courtney].
4. I have assumed the role of representative and agent for [Blake
and Courtney] for purposes of this litigation.
5. All communications between myself and any attorneys at
Dinsmore & Shohl are directly related to litigation issues in my
role as representative of [Blake and Courtney].
6. I do not waive the attorney-client privilege that applies to these
communications.
(Docket No. 48, Ex. 2, p.1).
{¶9} On January 19, 2016, Appellees filed their response, arguing that the
affidavit was insufficient to show that Dr. Huffer was Appellants’ “agent” and
“representative.”
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{¶10} First, they argued that Dr. Huffer’s statement that he “assumed the
role as personal representative and agent for [Appellants] for purposes of this
litigation” was an unsupported legal conclusion. (Id.)
{¶11} Second, they argued that even if Dr. Huffer was Appellants’ “agent”
and “representative,” there was insufficient evidence to show that Appellants were
the source of the communications between Dr. Huffer and Appellants’ counsel.
{¶12} Third, they argued that while the work-product doctrine arguably
applied to communications made by Appellants’ counsel to Dr. Huffer, “there
ha[d] been no showing by affidavit or otherwise that [the] communications were
made in anticipation of litigation, rather than keeping a family member of the
clients informed”, and Appellants’ counsel had waived any protection by
communicating with a non-party. (Docket No. 49, at p. 4).
{¶13} On January 21, 2016, Appellants filed their reply.
{¶14} First, they argued that the relevant inquiry in determining whether
one is an agent or representative of a client is whether the purported
agent/representative acted more as someone conveying information rather than a
consultant. Appellants maintained that Dr. Huffer “served no purpose other than
to communicate with counsel on his niece’s and nephew’s behalf” because “Blake
is serving in the Army and Courtney is in college.” (Docket No. 51, p. 2).
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{¶15} Second, they argued that Appellees were only entitled to their
counsel’s work-product upon a showing of “good cause” and no “good cause”
existed.
{¶16} On January 29, 2016, the trial court granted, in part, and denied, in
part, Appellants’ motion to quash. Its Entry stated, in part:
Regarding the first document request set forth in the subpoena,
[Appellees] seek discovery of documents regarding any
communications of [Blake and Courtney] regarding the [D]ecedent
in the possession of Dr. Huffer. As to [Blake and Courntey’s]
communications with the [D]ecedent or with Dr. Huffer concerning
this lawsuit, [Appellees] seek discovery from Blake [] and Courtney
[], parties to this action. In that regard Civ.R. 45(A) provides that ‘a
subpoena may not be used to obtain . . . the production of documents
by a party in discovery. Rather, . . . documents or electronically
stored information may be obtained from a party in discovery only
pursuant to Civ.R. 34.’ Thus, the subpoena of the [Appellees] for
communications between [Blake and Courtney] to anyone about [the
Decedent’s] case must be made under Civ.R. 34 to them.
Accordingly, the motion to quash as to communications of [Blake
and Courtney] concerning the [D]ecedent is WELL TAKEN.
Addressing the subpoena as it relates to Dr. Huffer’s communication
with [Jody] and employees of the law firm of Disnmore and Shohl,
LLP regarding the [D]ecedent, that matter is not subject to any
privilege or work product exception. Accordingly, the subpoena
commanding Dr. Huffer to produce his communications with [Jody]
and the employees of the law firm of Dinsmore and Shohl, LLP is
subject to production.
(Docket No. 54, p. 2-3).
{¶17} It is from this judgment that both parties appeal, presenting the
following assignments of error for our review.
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Appellants’ Assignments of Error
Assignment of Error No. I
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO
QUASH SUBPOENA.
Assignment of Error No. II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
PROTECTED BY THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE.
Appellees’ Cross-Assignment of Error
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT CIV.R. 45(A) PREVENTS THE ISSUING OF
A SUBPOENA TO A NON-PARTY FOR THE PRODUCTION
OF COMMUNICATIONS INVOLVING THE OPPOSING
PARTY.
{¶18} Due to the nature of Appellants’ assignments of error, we elect to
address them together.
Appellants’ Assignments of Error Nos. I & II
{¶19} In their first and second assignments of error, Appellants argue that
the trial court erred in denying their motion to quash insofar as it ordered Dr.
Huffer to turn over his communications with their counsel. Specifically,
Appellants argue that the communications are protected under the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine. We disagree.
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Standard of Review
{¶20} “Ordinarily, a discovery dispute is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.” Ward v. Summa Health Sys., 128 Ohio St. 3d 212, 2010-
Ohio-6275, ¶ 13 (2010). But “if the discovery issue involves an alleged privilege
* * * it is a question of law that must be reviewed de novo.” Id.; see also Roe v.
Planned Parenthood S.W. Ohio Region, 122 Ohio St. 3d 399, 2009-Ohio-2973, ¶
29.
{¶21} We note, however, that the Ohio Supreme Court has previously
expressed that “[t]he existence of a Civ.R. 26(B)(1) ‘privilege’ as well as Civ.R.
26(B)(3) ‘good cause’ are discretionary determinations to be made by the trial
court.” State ex rel. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. v. Guzzo, 6 Ohio
St.3d 270, 271 (1983). A trial court will be found to have abused its discretion
when its decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by the evidence,
or grossly unsound. State v. Boles, 187 Ohio App. 3d 345, 2010-Ohio-278, ¶ 16-18
(2d Dist.). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may
not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶22} Under either standard of review, we reach the same result.
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Civ.R. 26(B) and 45(C)
{¶23} The Rules of Civil Procedure provide liberal discovery provisions.
The scope of discovery includes “any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party
* * *.” (Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 26(B)(1).
{¶24} One available means of discovery is a Civ.R. 45 subpoena, which
allows a party to command a non-party to:
***
(iv) produce and permit inspection and copying of any designated
documents or electronically stored information that are in the
possession, custody, or control of the person;
***
Civ.R. 45(A)(1)(b). Compare Civ.R. 34(A) (governing requests for production and
inspection of documents between parties.)
{¶25} However, “[o]n a timely motion, the court from which the subpoena
was issued shall quash or modify the subpoena, or order appearance or production
only under specified conditions, if the subpoena * * * [r]equires disclosure of
privileged or otherwise protected matter and no exception or waiver applies * * *.”
Civ.R. 45(C)(3)(b).
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{¶26} “When information subject to discovery is withheld on a claim that it
is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, the claim shall
be made expressly and shall be supported by a description of the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced that is sufficient to enable the
demanding party to contest the claim.” Civ.R. 26(B)(6)(a).
{¶27} “The burden to show that testimony or documents are confidential or
privileged is on the party seeking to exclude the material.” Grace v. Mastruserio,
182 Ohio App. 3d 243, 2007-Ohio-3942, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6
Ohio St. 3d 258, 263-264 (1983); see also Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St. 2d
176, 178 (1976) (“[T]he burden of showing that testimony sought to be excluded
under the doctrine of privileged attorney-client communications rests upon the
party seeking to exclude it.”); Giusti v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 178 Ohio App. 3d
53, 2008-Ohio-4333, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.) (“The party claiming the privilege has the
burden of proving that the privilege applies to the requested information.”).
Attorney-Client Privilege
{¶28} “The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized
privileges for confidential communications.” State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous.
Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St. 3d 261, 2005-Ohio-1508, ¶ 19, quoting Swidler & Berlin
v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 141 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1998). It
“is the cornerstone upon which the attorney-client relationship is formed.” G.
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Rand Smith Co., L.P.A. v. Footbridge Capital, LLC, 3rd Dist. Union No. 14-01-39,
2002-Ohio-2189, ¶ 7. “Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981).
{¶29} In Ohio, the attorney-client privilege is governed by both R.C.
2317.02(A)(1) and common law. R.C. 2317.02(A)(1) provides that an attorney
shall not testify “concerning a communication made to the attorney by a client in
that relation or the attorney's advice to a client”. The common-law privilege “
‘reaches far beyond a proscription against testimonial speech [and] protects
against any dissemination of information obtained in the confidential relationship.’
” MA Equip. Leasing I, L.L.C. v. Tilton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-564, 2012-
Ohio-4668, ¶ 19, quoting Leslie at ¶ 26.
{¶30} Whether the communications between Dr. Huffer and Appellants’
counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege depends on whether Dr.
Huffer is a “client” within the meaning of the privilege. Although this matter falls
outside the scope of R.C. 2317.02(A)(1), we are still guided by the Revised
Code’s definition of “client.”
R.C. 2317.021(A) defines “client” as
a person * * * that, directly or through any representative, consults
an attorney for the purpose of retaining the attorney or securing legal
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service or advice from the attorney in the attorney's professional
capacity, or consults an attorney employee for legal service or
advice, and who communicates, either directly or through an agent *
* * or other representative, with such attorney * * *.
{¶31} Here, the only piece of evidence supporting the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between Dr. Huffer and Appellants’ counsel is Dr.
Huffer’s sworn statement that he “assumed the role of representative and agent for
Blake and Courtney for purposes of this litigation.” (Docket No. 48, Ex. 2, p.1).
The record contains no evidence from which one could conclude that Blake and/or
Courtney designated, appointed, or otherwise requested Dr. Huffer to act as their
agent and representative for purposes of this litigation. For example, Dr. Huffer’s
affidavit did not explain how he came to “assume” this role, and neither Blake nor
Country submitted an affidavit supporting Dr. Huffer’s statement.
{¶32} While Appellants argue that Dr. Huffer “assumed” this role due to
the fact that Blake was in the Army and Courtney was in college, this evidence is
not contained in Dr. Huffer’s affidavit, and even if it were, it is not evidence that
Appellants’ counsel’s clients—Blake and Courtney—designated, appointed, or
otherwise requested Dr. Huffer to act as their agent or representative within the
meaning of the privilege.
{¶33} Importantly, Appellants never requested an evidentiary hearing
during which they could have presented additional evidence supporting the
existence of an attorney-client relationship between Dr. Huffer and Appellants’
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counsel, and Civ.R. 45(C) does not require the trial court to hold an evidentiary
hearing prior to ruling on a motion to quash. Bickel v. Cochran, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 14AP-439, 2014-Ohio-5862, ¶ 12 (“There is no requirement that the
trial court hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to quash a subpoena brought
pursuant to Civ.R. 45(C).”).
{¶34} For these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying
Appellants’ motion to quash on the grounds that the communications were not
protected under the attorney-client privilege because Appellants did not meet their
burden of proving that the privilege applied to the requested information.
Work-Product Doctrine
{¶35} Civ.R. 26(B)(3) codifies what is often referred to as the work-
product doctrine. It states: “[A] party may obtain discovery of documents,
electronically stored information and tangible things prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including his attorney * * * or agent) only upon a showing of good
cause therefor.” Civ.R. 26(B)(3). The work-product doctrine protects the
“attorney's mental processes in preparation of litigation, establishing ‘a zone of
privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client's case free from
scrutiny or interference by an adversary.’ ” Squire, Sanders, & Dempsey, L.L.P. v.
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Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St. 3d 161, 2010–Ohio–4469, ¶ 55, citing
Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir.2006).
{¶36} Appellants argue that the communications between Dr. Huffer and
Appellants’ counsel are privileged under the work-product doctrine because Dr.
Huffer stated in his affidavit that “[a]ll communications between [himself] and any
attorneys at Dinsmore & Shohl are directly related to litigation issues in [his] role
as representative of [Blake and Courtney].” (Docket No. 48, Ex. 2, p. 1).
However, this argument rests on the premise that the communications fall within
the scope of the work-product doctrine because Dr. Huffer is a “client” within the
meaning of the attorney-client privilege. But, as explained above, it cannot be
established that Dr. Huffer is a “client” within the meaning of the privilege, and
therefore, this argument necessarily fails.
{¶37} In the alternative, Appellants ask that the matter be remanded so that
the trial court can hold an in camera review of the documents. Presumably, these
documents reflect communications between Dr. Huffer and Appellants’ counsel.
But, again, Appellants never requested an in camera review during which they
could have presented the documents to the trial court for review, and Civ.R. 45(C)
does not require the trial court to hold an in camera review prior to ruling on a
motion to quash.
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{¶38} For these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying
Appellants’ motion to quash on the grounds that the documents were not protected
under the work-product doctrine because Appellants did not meet their burden of
proving that the doctrine applied to the requested information.
{¶39} Accordingly, we overrule Appellants’ first and second assignments
of error.
Appellees’ Cross-Assignment of Error
{¶40} In their cross-assignment of error, Appellees argue that the trial court
erred in finding that the subpoena for communications between Appellants and Dr.
Huffer must be made under Civ.R. 34 instead of Civ.R. 45. However, at oral
argument, Appellees withdrew this assignment of error as moot, citing that Dr.
Huffer did not have in his possession any documents responsive to this portion of
Appellees’ subpoena.
{¶41} Accordingly, Appellees’ cross-assignment of error is rendered moot.
App.R. 12.
{¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants, in the particulars
assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/jlr
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