State v. Roper

[Cite as State v. Roper, 2013-Ohio-2176.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. Nos. 26631
26632
Appellant
v.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
DARNELL LYNN ROPER ENTERED IN THE
KOTY HARRIS KEENER COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellees CASE Nos. CR 11 11 3219 (A)
CR 11 11 3219 (C)
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 29, 2013
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant the State of Ohio appeals from the sentencing entries issued by
the Summit County Court of Common Pleas concerning Defendant-Appellee Darnell Lynn
Roper (case number 26631) and Defendant-Appellee Koty Harris Keener (case number 26632).
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand the matters for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Keener and Mr. Roper were separately indicted based upon allegations
arising from the same incident.1 Both Mr. Keener and Mr. Roper were indicted on one count of
aggravated robbery with an attendant firearm specification and an attendant specification for
participating in a criminal gang, one count of aggravated burglary with an attendant firearm
1
Mr. Keener was a juvenile at the time of the incident at issue but was bound over from
juvenile court.
2
specification and an attendant specification for participating in a criminal gang, and one count of
participating in a criminal gang. Ultimately, both Mr. Keener and Mr. Roper pleaded guilty to
the charges listed above and were each sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years in prison.
Both Mr. Keener and Mr. Roper received a three-year sentence for each firearm specification;
however, the firearm specifications were run concurrently to each other. The matters were
consolidated for purposes of appeal, and the State has raised a single assignment of error for our
review.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES ON THE SEPARATE FIREARM SPECIFICATIONS.
{¶3} The State asserts in its sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in failing
to impose the two firearm specifications consecutively instead of concurrently. We do not agree
with the State’s contention, but do agree that the trial court’s sentence is erroneous.
{¶4} We begin by noting, and as the State has correctly pointed out, that Mr. Keener’s
sentencing entry contains a clerical omission. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court
determined that the offenses of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery were allied and
should merge, and it was determined at the hearing that the aggravated burglary charge would
merge into the aggravated robbery charge. However, the sentencing entry does not reflect this
merger. Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court shall enter, nunc pro tunc, an entry reflecting
what occurred at the sentencing hearing with respect to merger. See State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio
St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, ¶ 13.
{¶5} Appellate courts apply a two-step approach in reviewing the sentence that a trial
court has imposed upon a defendant. State v. Evans, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0049-M, 2010-Ohio-
3545, ¶ 32, quoting State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, ¶ 4. “First, they must
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examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the
sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this
first prong is satisfied, the trial court’s decision shall be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Kalish at ¶ 4.
{¶6} In the instant matter, the State asserts that R.C. 2929.14 required the trial court to
impose the three-year term for each of the two firearm specifications attendant to the aggravated
burglary and aggravated robbery charges consecutively to each other, and the trial court erred by
imposing them concurrently over the State’s objection. Both the specifications for each
individual were charged as violations of R.C. 2941.145.
{¶7} R.C. 2941.145(A) states that
[i]mposition of a three-year mandatory prison term upon an offender under
division (B)(1)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code is precluded unless the
indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense specifies
that the offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the
offender’s control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm,
brandished the firearm, indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used
it to facilitate the offense.
{¶8} At the time Mr. Roper and Mr. Keener were sentenced, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii)
(comparable to former R.C. 2929.14(D)(1)(a)(ii)) provided that, “[e]xcept as provided in division
(B)(1)(e) of this section, if an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony also is
convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in section * * * 2941.145 of
the Revised Code, the court shall impose on the offender * * * [a] prison term of three years * *
*.”
{¶9} At the time of sentencing, the trial court merged Mr. Roper’s and Mr. Keener’s
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary offenses. The transcript of the sentencing hearing
indicates that, for Mr. Keener, the offense of aggravated burglary was to merge into the offense
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of aggravated robbery, whereas Mr. Roper’s sentencing entry indicates that the offense of
aggravated robbery merged into the offense of aggravated burglary. Neither side disputes that
Mr. Roper and Mr. Keener could only be sentenced for one of the allied offenses – either
aggravated robbery or aggravated burglary, depending on the election. See State v. Whitfield,
124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, ¶ 17. Nonetheless, the State maintains that, despite the fact
that Mr. Roper and Mr. Keener could each only be sentenced on one of the offenses, both Mr.
Roper and Mr. Keener should be sentenced on both firearm specifications that accompanied the
two offenses, and that the sentences on those specifications should be served consecutively. The
State’s argument defies logic and goes against sound principles established in Ohio precedent.
{¶10} The issue in this case is whether a court can sentence a defendant on
specifications, either concurrently or consecutively, when the underlying offense that is the basis
for the specifications merges into another offense. In order to address that question, we first
observe that a specification is not a separate offense but is an enhanced penalty attendant to a
criminal offense. See State v. Ford, 128 Ohio St.3d 398, 2011-Ohio-765, ¶ 19. In examining
whether an offense and a firearm specification were allied offenses of similar import pursuant to
R.C. 2941.25, the Supreme Court of Ohio has examined former R.C. 2929.14(D)(1)(a), which is
comparable to the version of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) in effect at the time of sentencing, and R.C.
2941.145 to determine whether the firearm specification at issue was an offense. Ford at ¶ 9-16.
In concluding that the firearm specification was not an offense subject to R.C. 2941.25, the
Supreme Court stated that, “the language in these provisions indicates that the firearm
specification is contingent upon an underlying felony conviction.” (Emphasis added.) Ford at ¶
16. Normally, a conviction consists of both a finding of guilt and a sentence. Whitfield, 124
Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, at ¶ 13. In other words, “these provisions indicate that if a
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defendant is convicted of a felony offense and, during the commission of that offense, if the
defendant displays, indicates possession of, or uses a firearm to facilitate the offense, the
defendant’s underlying felony sentence will be increased by three years.” (Emphasis sic.) Ford
at ¶ 16. Thus, a firearm specification is merely a sentencing provision that requires an enhanced
penalty upon certain findings. See id. at ¶ 19.
{¶11} Here Mr. Roper and Mr. Keener could not be sentenced for both aggravated
robbery and aggravated burglary because the trial court found them to be allied offenses of
similar import, and, thus, they could only be convicted of one of the two offenses. See Whitfield
at ¶ 13, 17. The firearm specifications were contingent on there being a conviction (i.e. finding
of guilt and sentence) for the underlying offense and attach to the predicate offense. See Ford at
¶ 16. Moreover, the classification of a firearm specification as “penalty enhancement” inherently
implies that there is an underlying penalty to enhance. Ford at ¶ 19. Thus, because one of the
underlying offenses at issue merged into the other underlying offense, the merged offense could
not be penalized. See Whitfield at ¶ 17. Unlike Ford, there is no dispute that the underlying
offenses at issue in these cases were allied, and R.C. 2941.25 prohibits penalizing the defendants
for the offense that merged. In Mr. Roper’s case, he could be sentenced for aggravated burglary
but not aggravated robbery. In Mr. Keener’s case, he could be sentenced for the aggravated
robbery but not the aggravated burglary. To allow sentences on their respective aggravated
robbery and burglary firearm specifications, either concurrently or consecutively, would
impermissibly impose an enhanced penalty based upon offenses for which they could not be
sentenced. This is not to say that the firearm specification “merges” into the underlying offense,
as such is not possible. See Ford at paragraph two of the syllabus. Instead, we simply hold that
it is impermissible to sentence an offender for a specification when the underlying offense upon
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which the specification is predicated has merged with another allied offense. To hold otherwise
would result in improperly imposing a penalty enhancement under circumstances where there
can be no sentence imposed for the underlying predicate offense. Thus, the trial court’s act of
sentencing Mr. Roper and Mr. Keener on specifications that were predicated on offenses that
were merged is contrary to law.
{¶12} Pursuant to Kalish, having concluded that the sentences are clearly and
convincingly contrary to law, this Court must reverse the trial court’s sentence and remand for
the trial court to resentence Mr. Roper and Mr. Keener. See Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-
Ohio-4912, at ¶ 15.
III.
{¶13} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common
Pleas is reversed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
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instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellees.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant.
LAWRENCE J. WHITNEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
NICHOLAS JACK MARINO, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.