Wolf v. Interstate Wrecker Serv., Inc.

[Cite as Wolf v. Interstate Wrecker Serv., Inc., 2012-Ohio-1744.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97144
GREGORY J. WOLF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
INTERSTATE WRECKER SERVICE, INC., ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CV-697658
BEFORE: Boyle, P.J., Jones, J., and E. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 19, 2012
2
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
Jan L. Roller
Davis & Young
1200 Fifth Third Center
600 Superior Avenue, East
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Stephen G. Thomas
Stephen G. Thomas & Associates Co., LPA
100 North Main Street
Suite 235
Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44022
For Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
Andrew P. Cooke
Andrew Cooke & Associates, LLC
243 North Fifth Street, 3rd Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
3
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:
{¶1} Defendants-appellants, Interstate Wrecker Service, Inc. (“Interstate”), and
Randy Montgomery, appeal the trial court’s decision ordering a new trial for
plaintiff-appellee, Gregory Wolf. Finding merit to this appeal, we reverse the trial
court’s decision and reinstate the jury’s verdict.
Procedural History and Facts
{¶2} The underlying case stems from an automobile collision, wherein
Montgomery, who was driving his employer’s tow truck, rear-ended Wolf’s vehicle that
was stopped in traffic on Route 91 in Hudson. Wolf subsequently filed suit against
Montgomery and Interstate, seeking to recover damages for the injuries that he allegedly
sustained as a result of the accident.
{¶3} Although the defendants admitted that Montgomery was negligent and
was in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, they denied that
Montgomery’s negligence caused Wolf’s alleged injuries.1 Interstate further denied
that it was negligent to entrust Montgomery with its vehicle. The matter proceeded to
a jury trial on these issues where the following evidence was presented.
1
Wolf asserted a respondeat superior claim against Interstate, seeking to impose liability
upon Interstate for Montgomery’s negligence as a result of Montgomery being in the course and
scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
4
{¶4} Wolf testified that on May 5, 2005, he was en route to a Hudson grocery
store, accompanied by his boss, when he was rear-ended by Montgomery. According
to Wolf, he felt an immediate sharp pain in his right leg and a numbness upon impact.
Wolf did not seek immediate treatment because he did not want to interfere with the
prearranged sales call with his boss. Later in the day, after dropping his boss off at the
airport, Wolf sought treatment in the emergency room of Cleveland MetroHealth
Hospital.
{¶5} Wolf subsequently followed up with his primary physician, Dr. Thomas
Mandat, who referred him to physical therapy and later to Dr. Peter Fragatos, a
neurosurgeon. According to Wolf, his condition did not improve following the
physical therapy and nerve injections; instead, the pain persisted. Upon
recommendation of Dr. Fragatos, Wolf ultimately had surgery on his lumbar spine in
2008. Wolf testified that prior to surgery, his “pain was 24/7” and that his pain level
was a “10” on a scale of one to ten. Following the surgery, Wolf indicated that he
continues to experience pain at a level between “7 and 10.”
{¶6} Wolf was 53 years old at the time of the accident and working as a food
broker and salesman in the food industry. The job required him to handle food
products weighing up to 100 pounds, including shelving the food items and discarding
them. Following the accident, Wolf continued to work until November 2005. He
5
ultimately stopped working, testifying that the injuries from the accident physically
prevented him from doing “a normal day’s work.”
{¶7} Kimberly Togliatti-Trickett, a physician who is board certified in physical
medicine, rehabilitation, and internal medicine, testified on behalf of Wolf. Dr.
Trickett stated that in October 2005 and then again in October 2008, she performed an
electromyography (“EMG”) — a diagnostic test to identify any “nerve root” irritation
— on Wolf. According to Dr. Trickett, the October 2005 EMG results revealed that
Wolf suffered an acute nerve root injury (the S1 radiculopathy) that was proximately
caused by the May 2005 accident. The 2008 EMG results further revealed that Wolf
no longer had an acute injury; instead, the results revealed signs of a chronic injury that
was starting to heal. Based on a review of Wolf’s medical records and her
examination of him, Dr. Trickett also opined that Wolf would not be able to return to
his same line of work as a result of the accident.
{¶8} Wolf submitted medical bills, prescription costs, and other miscellaneous
out-of-pocket expenses, totaling approximately $46,200, that he claimed to have
incurred as a result of Montgomery’s negligence. Wolf further presented evidence of
lost wages — past and future — that equaled approximately $732,000.
{¶9} Conversely, defendants disputed that Wolf’s injuries were proximately
caused by Montgomery’s negligence. Montgomery testified that he was driving only
five miles per hour when he rear-ended Wolf, who was stationary in bumper-to-bumper
6
traffic in a construction zone. Defendants emphasized that it was a low-impact
collision, evidenced by the fact that Wolf’s vehicle did not hit the vehicle in front of
him. Defendants further maintained at trial that Wolf’s surgery and other treatments
were not necessary as a result of the accident. In support of their defense, defendants
presented the testimony of Dr. Timothy Gordon.
{¶10} Dr. Gordon, who is board certified in orthopedic surgery, testified that he
examined Wolf on June 12, 2007 — two years after the accident but prior to Wolf’s
surgery. Dr. Gordon also reviewed all of Wolf’s past medical records, including his
MRI scans and two EMG results. According to Dr. Gordon, Wolf’s MRI revealed that
he suffers from “canal stenosis” in his lumbar spine, which means that the canal has
“narrowed.” Dr. Gordon explained that Wolf’s condition “is a combination of a
congenital preexisting condition of a small tunnel and that then the arthritic change of
the facet hypertrophy, the arthritis in the spine over time has made it smaller.” Dr.
Gordon stated that the MRI, taken a month after the accident, confirms that this
condition existed prior to the accident because “these findings take years to form.” He
opined that Wolf had “progressive spinal stenosis over the years.”
{¶11} Dr. Gordon further testified that Wolf’s injury from the 2005 car accident
was “a soft tissue strain of the muscles, neck, and low back area.” He indicated that
this would cause pain but that the injury would have healed in six to eight weeks
7
following the accident. Dr. Gordon opined that the treatment of such injury would
cost “in the area of two to three thousand dollars.”
{¶12} Through cross-examination of Wolf’s witnesses, the defense also
established that Wolf had provided inconsistent information regarding his past medical
treatment and injuries. For example, in connection with first seeing Dr. Fragatos,
Wolf had indicated that he never had symptoms of pain in his lower back prior to the
May 2005 accident. The record revealed, however, that Wolf had repeatedly
complained of pain in his lower back, starting in 1997 following a car accident, and
had complained of other symptoms, such as leg pain, that he was now asserting were
solely caused by the underlying accident. Wolf had also reported to Dr. Trickett that
he was hit by a tow truck going “30 to 35 miles per hour” despite the fact that Wolf had
no basis for such an assertion and the evidence revealed that he was in “stop and go”
traffic with approximately 10 to 15 cars in front of him.
{¶13} Following deliberations, the jury returned its verdict, finding that
Montgomery’s negligence caused injury to Wolf and awarded him $2,435.14 in total
compensatory damages. The jury specified that this amount represents damages for
economic loss only, thereby awarding zero for non-economic loss, i.e., pain and
suffering. The jury further found in favor of Interstate on Wolf’s negligent
entrustment claim. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court ordered that
the jury deliberate further, instructing the jury to “recalculate [the compensatory
8
damages] so that there is a portion of compensatory damages that represents damages
for non-economical loss.” The jury then deliberated further, increasing their award of
total compensatory damages to $2,685.14, awarding $2,435.14 for economic loss and
$250 for non-economic loss.
{¶14} Wolf subsequently filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages
under Civ.R. 59(A). Fourteen months later, the trial court granted Wolf’s motion
under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) on the grounds that “the judgment is not sustained by the weight
of the evidence.”
{¶15} From that decision, defendants appeal, raising a single assignment of error:
{¶16} “The trial court’s decision to grant a new trial was an abuse of discretion
and is not supported by competent, credible evidence.”
Standard of Review
{¶17} The decision whether to grant a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) — the
weight of the evidence — rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. “Where a trial court is authorized to grant a
new trial for a reason which requires the exercise of sound discretion, the order granting
a new trial may be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Rohde v. Farmer, 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 262 N.E.2d 685 (1970), paragraph one of
the syllabus. As always, an abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude was
9
“unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶18} This deferential standard of review requires this court to view the evidence
favorably to the trial court’s action rather than the jury’s verdict. Indeed, “[i]t is not
the place of this court to weigh the evidence in these cases.” Mannion v. Sandel, 91
Ohio St.3d 318, 322, 744 N.E.2d 759 (2001).
{¶19} But if the trial court’s stated rationale for granting a motion for a new trial
under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) is contradicted by the record, such a decision implies an attitude
that is unreasonable and must be reversed. See Proctor v. Cydrus, 4th Dist. No.
04CA2758, 2004-Ohio-5901 (reversing trial court’s decision to grant a new trial when
the trial court’s reasoning was not supported by the record.) The trial court’s
discretion is not so great that it can grant a motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59(A)(6)
simply because it disagrees with the jury’s verdict. See Santoli v. Marbuery, 8th Dist.
No. 72110, 1998 WL 241990 (May 14, 1998).
{¶20} With this standard of review in mind, we turn to the crux of the appeal:
whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Wolf’s motion for a new trial
based on the weight of the evidence.
Weight of the Evidence
{¶21} Under Civ.R. 59(A)(6), a trial court may grant a new trial when a
judgment is not supported by the weight of the evidence. In granting a new trial for
10
this reason, a trial court must weigh the evidence and pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses, “not in the substantially unlimited sense that such weight and credibility are
passed on originally by the jury but in the more restricted sense of whether it appears to
the trial court that manifest injustice has been done and that the verdict is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.” Rohde, 23 Ohio St.2d 82, paragraph three of the
syllabus. As stated above, the trial court may not set aside the jury’s verdict under
Civ.R. 59(A)(6) due to a “mere difference of opinion.” Id. at 92. “[R]ather, the relief
should be granted only when the trial court is persuaded that there is insufficient
credible evidence to sustain the verdict in light of the other evidence presented.”
Green v. Bailey, 1st Dist. No. C-070221, 2008-Ohio-3569, ¶ 13.
Negligence Claim
{¶22} Before turning to the grounds in which the trial court granted a new trial,
we first set forth the elements of Wolf’s claim for negligence — the sole claim that the
trial court awarded a new trial. The elements of a negligence claim are (1) the
existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) the breach of duty, (3)
causation, and (4) damages. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 77 Ohio
St.3d 82, 84, 671 N.E.2d 225 (1996). At trial, defendants had admitted to the first two
elements. The only issues at trial centered around causation and damages.
Dr. Trickett’s Testimony on EMG Finding
11
{¶23} In granting Wolf’s motion for a new trial, the trial court found that the
jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, finding the following:
Plaintiff presented uncontroverted scientific expert testimony of the
reliability of the EMG studies to establish the time frame when his nerve
injury occurred. Defendant’s contrary testimony by defendant’s medical
expert was, by his own admission, not based on a review of the scientific
literature of EMG studies.
{¶24} This rationale, however, is not supported by the record. While the trial
court was correct in stating that Wolf relied on EMG studies to establish that he
suffered a nerve injury and that the defendants did not challenge this finding or Dr.
Trickett’s testimony about when the finding would be detectable by EMG, the defense
adamantly disputed that the nerve injury was caused by the May 2005 accident.
Indeed, the gravamen of the entire defense was that Wolf’s claimed injuries were not
caused by the May 2005 accident; they arose from his pre-existing spinal stenosis.
This defense was supported by Dr. Gordon’s expert testimony.
{¶25} The trial court seems to have mistakenly interpreted Dr. Trickett’s
testimony as conclusively establishing that the May 2005 accident caused Wolf’s nerve
root injury because Dr. Gordon did not rely on EMG studies in reaching his opinion.
But this rationale is flawed. The mere fact that Dr. Gordon based his expert opinion
on test results other than EMG studies, such as the MRI, does not automatically render
his opinion irrelevant to the fact finder.
12
{¶26} Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, Dr. Trickett conceded on
cross-examination that the nerve injury could have occurred before the May 5, 2005 car
accident based on the applicable time line for detecting acute nerve injuries on an EMG.
Dr. Trickett testified that the time line of when an acute nerve root injury would appear
on an EMG is generally six months but could be ongoing for a year in “very, very
limited” circumstances. Therefore, Dr. Trickett’s testimony did not conclusively
establish that the May 2005 car accident caused Wolf’s nerve injury. And while Dr.
Trickett opined that she believed that the nerve injury was attributed to the accident, the
jury clearly disagreed and did not find Dr. Trickett’s testimony determinative on the
issue of causation — a determination that rests squarely within the province of the jury.
{¶27} We further note that the defense disputed the significance of the EMG
finding. Although Dr. Trickett opined that the October 2005 EMG finding
demonstrated that the acute nerve injury must have been caused by the May 2005 car
accident by mere timing, Dr. Gordon conversely testified that the EMG finding was not
surprising given Wolf’s condition of spinal stenosis — a condition totally unrelated to
the car accident. And to the extent that the jury found Dr. Gordon’s testimony more
persuasive, the record contains competent, credible evidence to support that finding.
{¶28} Thus, while we refrain from weighing the evidence, and view the evidence
in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we nonetheless find that the trial court’s
stated reasoning does not accurately reflect the record and is therefore unreasonable.
13
Inadequacy of the Damages
{¶29} We next turn to the trial court’s second stated reasoning for finding that
the verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence: the inadequacy of the
damages. Specifically, the trial court noted that the award of damages failed to include
those services that Wolf initially received at the emergency room and by his primary
care physician.
{¶30} A trial court is not at liberty to disturb a jury’s verdict on damages except
under very limited circumstances. As this court has previously stated,
The assessment of damages lies so thoroughly within the province of the
trier of fact that a reviewing court is not at liberty to disturb the trier of
fact’s assessment absent an affirmative finding of passion and prejudice or a
finding that the award is manifestly excessive or inadequate.
{¶31} DeCapua v. Rychlik, 8th Dist. No. 91189, 2009-Ohio-2029, ¶ 22, citing
Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 655, 635 N.E.2d 331 (1994).
{¶32} In order to set aside a judgment as inadequate and against the manifest
weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine that “the verdict is so gross as
to the shock the sense of justice and fairness, cannot be reconciled with the undisputed
evidence in the case, or is the result of an apparent failure by the jury to include all the
items of damage making up the plaintiff’s claim.” Bailey v. Allbery, 88 Ohio App.3d
432, 435, 624 N.E.2d 279 (2d Dist.1993). Thus, where it appears the jury awarded
inadequate damages because it failed to consider an element of damages established by
14
uncontroverted expert testimony, a new trial should be ordered. Dillon v. Bundy, 72
Ohio App.3d 767, 596 N.E.2d 500 (10th Dist.1991).
{¶33} In this case, it appears that the trial court substituted its opinion for that of
the jury. The trial court clearly found that the damages were inadequate. The
defense, however, contradicted Wolf’s claimed damages except medical bills between
$2,000 to $3,000. Specifically, Dr. Gordon testified that the nature of Wolf’s
soft-tissue injury would result in approximately $2,000 to $3,000 in medical expenses
for a treatment period of six to eight weeks. The jury’s verdict fell squarely within the
amount of damages advanced by the defense. Thus, we find that the trial court acted
unreasonably in setting aside the verdict.
{¶34} Accordingly, we sustain Montgomery and Interstate’s sole assignment of
error.
{¶35} Judgment reversed and case remanded with instructions for the trial court
to reinstate the verdict of the jury.
It is ordered that appellants recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
15
MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR