State v. Snuffer

[Cite as State v. Snuffer, 2011-Ohio-6430.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Nos. 96480, 96481, 96482, and 96483
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
SHANE S. SNUFFER
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeals from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-536812, CR-536868, CR-538335,
and CR-539285
BEFORE: Stewart, P.J., Boyle, J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 15, 2011
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Kelly A. Gallagher
P.O. Box 306
Avon Lake, OH 44012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Brett Kyker
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Shane Snuffer, pleaded guilty in four different
criminal cases to 15 counts of theft and one count of forgery. The state charged that
Snuffer, the director of a company that handled the disbursement of government funds to
the disabled, deposited less than the full amount of those government funds that his
clients received and also withdrew money from the clients’ accounts for his own
purposes. After merging some of the counts, the court sentenced Snuffer to a total term
of 12 years in prison and ordered him to make restitution to the affected government
agencies and victims. On appeal, Snuffer complains that the court committed plain error
by failing to merge the counts for sentencing and that the length of his sentence
constituted an abuse of the court’s discretion.
I
{¶ 2} Snuffer first argues that the court committed plain error by failing to merge
any of the ten counts of theft contained in CR-538335 or the theft and forgery counts
contained in CR-539285.
{¶ 3} When a defendant’s conduct results in the commission of two or more
“allied” offenses of similar import, that conduct can be charged separately, but the
defendant can be convicted and sentenced for only one offense. R.C. 2941.25(A).
Offenses are “allied” and must be merged for sentencing if the defendant’s conduct is
such that a single act could lead to the commission of separately defined offenses, but
those separate offenses were committed with a state of mind to commit only one act. See
State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶48-50.
A
{¶ 4} In CR-538335, Snuffer pleaded guilty to ten different counts of theft
charged against ten different victims. “When an offense is defined in terms of conduct
towards another, then there is a dissimilar import for each person affected by the
conduct.” State v. Phillips (1991), 75 Ohio App. 3d 785, 790, 600 N.E.2d 825, citing
State v. Jones (1985), 18 Ohio St. 3d 116, 118, 480 N.E.2d 408. See, also, State v. Polk,
8th Dist. No. 88639, 2007-Ohio-4436, ¶15. Although he may have had the single goal of
stealing money, Snuffer committed ten different acts of theft against ten different victims.
These offenses were not allied and could be separately punished.
B
{¶ 5} The theft and forgery counts charged in CR-539285 were committed against
the same victim. In Count 1, Snuffer pleaded guilty to theft under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1),
which prohibits a person from obtaining or exerting control over the property of another
without the other’s consent. In Count 4, Snuffer pleaded guilty to forgery under R.C.
2913.31(A)(2), which prohibits another from fraudulently forging any writing of another
without that person’s authority.
{¶ 6} Courts have uniformly found that theft and forgery are not allied offenses
because each offense contains elements not possessed by the other: forgery only requires
a fraudulent writing, so unlike theft, it does not require that one obtain control over the
property of another. State v. Marvin, 134 Ohio App. 3d 63, 70, 1999-Ohio-811, 730
N.E.2d 401, citing State v. Wilson (1996), 113 Ohio App. 3d 737, 746, 682 N.E.2d 5; State
v. Hunter (1983), 12 Ohio App. 3d 75, 78, 466 N.E.2d 183; State v. Anderson, 10th Dist.
No. 08AP-1071, 2009-Ohio-6566, ¶37.
{¶ 7} Nevertheless, Johnson no longer requires us to slavishly compare the
elements of each offense, but rather to determine “whether it is possible to commit one
offense and commit the other with the same conduct[.]” Id., 128 Ohio St.3d at ¶48. The
forgery count charged Snuffer with forging the victim’s signature on a bank account
withdrawal slip. The theft count did not describe the nature of the theft, stating only that
Snuffer obtained control over the victim’s property without consent.
{¶ 8} Snuffer might plausibly argue that he used the forged withdrawal slip to
facilitate the theft of money from the victim’s bank account so that the forgery was in
essence the act of theft. But Snuffer does not make this argument. Instead, he states
only that “[t]he record of Snuffer’s plea does not contain the necessary details as to the
time and circumstances of the various criminal acts from which to make a determination
[as to whether offenses are allied].” Appellant’s Brief at 9.
{¶ 9} Snuffer did not object to his sentence, so we review for plain error. See
State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶31. Plain error
exists only when it is obvious on the record. See State v. Tichon (1995), 102 Ohio
App.3d 758, 767, 658 N.E.2d 16. Snuffer pleaded guilty to the indictment, thus
admitting the facts as charged in the indictment and obviating the need for any factual
basis for the plea. State v. Kent (1980), 68 Ohio App. 2d 151, 156, 428 N.E.2d 453. As
he concedes, he offered no other facts at sentencing, so the record on appeal is such that
we cannot say that plain error in failing to merge the sentences was “obvious.”
{¶ 10} We are aware that in State v. Masters, 8th Dist. No. 95120, 2011-Ohio-937,
a panel of this court cited to Underwood for the proposition that the “trial court should
have inquired into the facts when accepting Masters’s plea to all charges in order to
determine whether any of the offenses were allied.” Id. at ¶9. The holding that the
court must inquire into the facts during a plea hearing cannot be reconciled with Crim.R.
11(C), which does not require a factual basis for a guilty plea. Implicit within Crim.R.
11(C), is the idea that a guilty plea constitutes a full admission of factual guilt that
obviates the need for a fact-finding trial on the charges. State v. Wilson (1979), 58 Ohio
St.2d 52, 388 N.E.2d 745, paragraph one of the syllabus. Moreover, Masters failed to
grasp that merger of offenses is a sentencing issue, not a plea issue, see Cleveland v. Scott
(1983), 8 Ohio App. 3d 358, 359, 457 N.E.2d 351, so even if a factual inquiry had to be
made, it could only occur during sentencing, not during the plea hearing. Masters
assumed the existence of plain error despite acknowledging that “there are insufficient
facts in the record for this court to [find whether offenses are allied] in the instant case.”
Id. As noted, plain error exists only when it is “obvious” in the record. Masters found
the opposite — that the absence of facts raised an issue of fact that the court needed to
resolve on remand — thus showing that the error could not have been “plain” on the face
of the record. Finally, unlike in Underwood, there was no direct concession from the
state that the offenses were allied — in Masters the state only conceded that “unless a
separate animus exists” the charged offenses would be allied. Id. The state did not
concede that Masters’s offenses were allied, only that the offenses might be allied had
there been facts showing that Masters committed them with a single animus.
{¶ 11} For the foregoing reasons, we find that Snuffer failed to offer any evidence
to make an obvious case for plain error in the court’s failure to merge the theft and
forgery counts in CR-539285. The first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶ 12} We need not dwell on Snuffer’s second claim — that the court abused its
discretion by sentencing him to a combined prison term of 12 years in all four cases.
Snuffer offers no argument in support of that claim apart from noting that the crimes
occurred over a two-year period. It is unclear why Snuffer believes that fact benefits
him. That the crimes occurred over a two-year period indicates that Snuffer acted
according to a long-term plan as opposed to a one-time lapse of judgment. In fact, the
court learned during sentencing that in 2002, Snuffer pleaded guilty in West Virginia to
stealing more that $14,000 in federal funds designated for police officer training (Snuffer
was a police officer at the time). Given Snuffer’s predilection for stealing government
money, the long-term nature of the theft in these cases, and the particularly damning fact
that his victims were disabled persons under government supervision, a 12-year combined
sentence did not constitute an abuse of the court’s discretion. See State v. Payne, 114
Ohio St. 3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶25.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded
to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR