State v. Taylor

[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2016-Ohio-7894.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 104243
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
RONELLE TAYLOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-13-580285-A and CR-14-591206-A
BEFORE: Keough, P.J., E.A. Gallagher, J., and Boyle, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 23, 2016
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Brian R. McGraw
55 Public Square, Suite 2100
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Melissa Riley
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ronelle Taylor, appeals his sentence following a guilty
plea. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} In December 2013, Taylor was indicted under Cuyahoga C.P. No.
CR-13-580285 with four counts of drug trafficking, three counts of drug possession, and
one count of possessing criminal tools. All charges were felonies of the fifth degree. In
December 2014, Taylor was named in a five-count indictment filed under Cuyahoga C.P.
No. CR-14-591206, charging him with drug trafficking with a juvenile specification
(first-degree felony), drug possession (second-degree felony), possessing criminal tools
(fifth-degree felony), and two counts of endangering children (first-degree
misdemeanors).
{¶3} Taylor entered into a plea agreement in both cases. In Case No.
CR-13-580285, he pleaded guilty to two counts of drug trafficking and possessing
criminal tools. In Case No. CR-14-591206, Taylor pleaded guilty to an amended count
of drug trafficking, which carried a mandatory prison sentence, and one count of
endangering children. All remaining charges in both cases were dismissed.
{¶4} In Case No. CR-13-580285, Taylor was sentenced to one year in prison on all
three counts, to run concurrently to each other. In Case No. CR-14-591206, the court
imposed a seven-year sentence on the drug trafficking offense, and to time served on the
endangering children offense. The trial court ordered the sentences in both cases to run
consecutively to each other, for a total prison term of eight years.
{¶5} In his delayed appeal, Taylor raises two assignments of error.
I. Consecutive Sentences
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Taylor contends that the trial court erred and
lacked sufficient justification to impose consecutive sentences. Specifically, he asks this
court to find that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and to the danger he
poses to the public.
{¶7} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that when reviewing felony sentences, a
reviewing court may overturn the imposition of consecutive sentences where the court
“clearly and convincingly” finds that (1) “the record does not support the sentencing
court's findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),” or (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to
law.”
{¶8} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that in order to impose consecutive sentences,
the trial court must find that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public
from future crime or to punish the offender, (2) such sentences would not be
disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and to the danger the offender poses to
the public, and (3) one of the following applies:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
was under postrelease control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
by the offender.
{¶9} Compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to make the
statutory findings at the sentencing hearing, which means that “‘the [trial] court must note
that it engaged in the analysis’ and that it ‘has considered the statutory criteria and
specifie[d] which of the given bases warrants its decision.’” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio
St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio
St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999). Further, the reviewing court must be able to
discern that the record contains evidence to support the findings. State v. Davis, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 102639, 2015-Ohio-4501, ¶ 21, citing Bonnell at ¶ 29. A trial court is not,
however, required to state its reasons to support its findings, nor is it required to give a
rote recitation of the statutory language, “provided that the necessary findings can be
found in the record and are incorporated in the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.
{¶10} In this case, the trial court made the requisite R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings in
support of its imposition of consecutive sentences. Additionally, the record supports
these findings.
{¶11} In making the first finding, the court stated that it was
[r]unning the cases consecutively because I believe that it’s necessary to
protect the public from future crime. Being a heroin salesman has created
a major epidemic and caused many, many deaths in our community. I also
consider consecutive sentences necessary to punish you. Other judges have
given you as much as four years. It didn’t stop you from selling dangerous
drugs to our community.
(Tr. 134.)
{¶12} In making the second finding, the trial court stated that consecutive
sentences are “not disproportionate to the seriousness of your conduct. As I ‘ve said, it’s
caused many deaths in our community, heroin has.” (Tr. at id.) Furthermore, during the
sentencing colloquy, the trial court noted that Taylor had been in prison approximately
five times for drug offenses, with the first yielding a six-month sentence, and the most
recent being a four-year sentence. (Tr. 129.) The court noted that the prison terms did
not “teach [Taylor] anything” because he continued in his course of conduct when he was
subsequently charged with additional drug-related offenses. The court stated that his
prior four-year prison sentence did not teach him anything — “You come out, you
continue to sell drugs in our neighborhoods. You continue to be a monster. You steal
people’s lives and futures. You steal people’s children or you steal people’s parents or
spouses because you steal their futures, don’t you?” (Tr.130.)
{¶13} Finally, the trial court satisfied the third finding by noting that for at least in
Case No. CR-13-580285, he was on postrelease control when he committed the offenses.
Additionally, the court stated that
at least two or more of these offenses were committed as one course of
conduct, a continuing course of conduct of selling heroin and other
dangerous drugs to our community. And, of course, the history of your
criminal conduct, which I’ve gone over, demonstrates that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by you.
(Tr. 135.)
{¶14} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court made the appropriate
consecutive sentence findings and engaged in the analysis required under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). We cannot “clearly and convincingly” find that the record does not
support the court’s findings. However, the matter is remanded to the trial court for the
court to issue a new sentencing journal entry, nunc pro tunc, to incorporate in the journal
entry the statutory findings the trial court made at sentencing. See Bonnell at syllabus.
Taylor’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II. Sentencing Comments
{¶15} After the trial court reviewed Taylor’s extensive criminal history, which was
mostly drug-related offenses dating from 1999, lack of employment history, lack of
education, and continued course of selling drugs, the trial court noted that the shortened
prison sentences that he received previously did not teach him anything. Instead, he
continued to sell drugs in the neighborhoods and continued to be a “monster.” (Tr. 130,
133.)
{¶16} In his second assignment of error, Taylor contends that the trial court
abdicated its neutral function when it concluded that Taylor was a “monster” and
sentenced him accordingly. Taylor contends that the trial court’s characterization of him
as a monster deprived him of a fair sentence.
{¶17} “Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that ‘[a] judge shall
perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.’” State v. Bonnell, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91785, 2009-Ohio-2721, ¶ 6.
“The term ‘bias or prejudice,’ when used in reference to a judge, ‘implies a
hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or favoritism toward
one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory
judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state
of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.’
Id., quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956),
paragraph four of the syllabus.
{¶18} In Bonnell, this court addressed a similar scenario in where the trial judge
allegedly referred to Bonnell as a “monster” in off-the-record proceedings before
sentencing — remarks that were not acknowledged by the trial judge. This court
concluded that the trial court’s characterization of Bonnell as a “monster” did not prove
that the judge was biased or partial when the record showed that the trial judge was
acquainted with the facts of the case, had the benefit of a presentence report and
sentencing memorandum, and considered the statements made by all parties. This court
held that while the judge should have kept her impression of Bonnell to herself, the
record did not support that the imposed sentence was inherently unfair. Id. at ¶ 9
{¶19} Much like in Bonnell, the record here does not support that the sentence
imposed was unfair. The trial judge presided over both proceedings for over a year, was
acquainted with the facts of the case, had the benefit of reviewing the presentence
investigation report, and heard statements from the prosecutor, defense counsel, and
Taylor. The sentencing colloquy between the trial judge and Taylor was considerable,
where Taylor admitted that the prison sentences previously imposed did not deter his
continued conduct of selling drugs, including heroin. The trial court’s use of the term
“monster” was made after the court considered all the facts, including mitigation
evidence. The record does not support that the trial court acted with bias or prejudice
when it characterized Taylor as a monster; the record supports the trial court’s decision to
impose more than the mandatory minimum sentence was based on Taylor’s criminal
history and undeterred conduct.
{¶20} However, as admonished in Bonnell, trial judges should keep their personal
characterizations of a defendant or of a defendant’s conduct to themself “rather than open
[themself] to the kind of complaint raised in this appeal.” Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶21} Taylor’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶22} Judgment affirmed; remanded for the issuance of a nunc pro tunc sentencing
journal entry.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR