State v. Wiesler

[Cite as State v. Wiesler, 2019-Ohio-3826.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 19CA0014-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
ZACHARY M. WIESLER MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 18 TRC 06926
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 23, 2019
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Zachary Wiesler appeals his sentence from the Medina Municipal Court. This
Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Wiesler pleaded no contest to operating a vehicle under the influence of
alcohol (“OVI”) in violation of Revised Code Section 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and driving under an
OVI suspension in violation of Section 4510.14, both misdemeanor offenses. The trial court
found Mr. Wiesler guilty, and the matter proceeded to sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the
trial court noted three times that this was a “second in ten” offense, but also noted that this was
Mr. Wiesler’s “third OVI conviction in three years.” It then sentenced him to 180 days of
incarceration for the OVI conviction, and three days of mandatory jail time for the driving-
under-an-OVI-suspension conviction. It ordered those sentences to run consecutively for a total
of 183 days, and suspended 150 of those days for a total of 33 days of incarceration. It noted that
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the 33 days in jail would “cover the ten mandatory days that are associated with the second in ten
offense.” Mr. Wiesler now appeals his sentence, raising two assignments of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE COURT ERRED BY RELYING ON INFORMATION NOT CONTAINED
WITHIN THE RECORD AT SENTENCING AND FASHIONED AN
IMPROPER SENTENCE.
{¶3} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Wiesler argues that the trial court erred by
relying on information not contained within the record when fashioning its sentence. More
specifically, he argues that the trial court considered a third OVI offense, the details of which
were not contained within the record, and sentenced him as if this was a third-in-ten offense,
rather than a second-in-ten offense. Upon review of the record, this Court disagrees.
{¶4} “We review the trial court’s misdemeanor sentence for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Carney, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010706, 2016-Ohio-2684, ¶ 9. “An abuse of
discretion implies that the court’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.” Id.,citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). “When a misdemeanor sentence
is imposed within the statutory limits, a reviewing court will presume the trial judge followed the
statutes, unless there is evidence to the contrary.” State v. Jones, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1014,
2017-Ohio-413, ¶ 9.
{¶5} Section 4511.19 governs OVIs and provides, in part, that a defendant who pleads
guilty to or is convicted of a second OVI offense within ten years of the first offense is subject to
“a mandatory jail term of ten consecutive days.” R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(b)(i). It further provides
that the trial court “may impose a jail term in addition to the ten-day mandatory jail term[,]” and
that the “cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed six months.”
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{¶6} Here, the trial court stated at least three times that this was a “second in ten”
offense. It sentenced Mr. Wiesler to 180 days for that offense, and indicated that he would serve
33 days in jail, ten of which would “cover the ten mandatory days that are associated with the
second in ten offense.” Despite mentioning that Mr. Wiesler had committed a third OVI offense,
nothing in the record indicates that the trial court relied upon that offense at sentencing. Even if
it did, Mr. Wiesler has not properly developed an argument in that regard. See App.R. 16(A)(7).
Mr. Wiesler’s sentence comports with the statute governing second-in-ten offenses. See R.C.
4511.19(G)(1)(b)(i). Accordingly, Mr. Wiesler’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE COURT ERRED BY ORDERING A CUMULATIVE SENTENCE OF 183
DAYS CONTRARY TO O.R.C. 4510.14.
{¶7} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Wiesler argues that the trial court erred by
sentencing him to 183 days of incarceration because that sentence exceeds the maximum
sentence for violations of Section 4510.14. This Court disagrees.
{¶8} We apply the same standard of review set forth in the preceding assignment of
error, and note that “[j]udges have no inherent power to create sentences.” State v. Fischer, 128
Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶ 22. “Rather, judges are duty-bound to apply sentencing laws
as they are written.” Id. When a trial court’s sentence is outside the permissible statutory range,
the sentence is contrary to law. See State v. Stump, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103109, 2016-Ohio-
2723, ¶ 16
{¶9} Section 4510.14 governs driving under an OVI suspension, and provides, in part,
that a person convicted thereunder shall be sentenced to “[a] mandatory jail term of three
consecutive days.” R.C. 4510.14(B)(1)(a). It further provides that “[i]f the court imposes a
mandatory three-day jail term under this division, the court may impose a jail term in addition to
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that term, provided that in no case shall the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense exceed
six months.” Id.{¶10} As previously noted, Mr. Wiesler argues that his cumulative sentence of 183 days
is contrary to the driving-under-an-OVI-suspension statute because it exceeds 180 days. His
argument is misplaced. The trial court sentenced Mr. Wiesler to 180 days of incarceration for his
OVI conviction, not for his driving-under-an-OVI-suspension conviction. See R.C.
4511.19(G)(1)(b)(i) (providing that the cumulative jail term for a second-in-ten OVI offense
“shall not exceed six months.”). It then sentenced him to three days of mandatory jail time for
the driving-under-an-OVI-suspension conviction, which it ran consecutively to the 180 days of
incarceration for the OVI conviction. The trial court’s three-day sentence for the driving-under-
an-OVI-suspension offense, therefore, complied with the statute and did not exceed the statutory
maximum. R.C. 4510.14(B)(1)(a). Mr. Wiesler’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶11} Mr. Wiesler’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina
Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal
Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
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period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
TEODOSIO, P. J.
CALLAHAN, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
SEAN C. BUCHANAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
GREGORY HUBER and ROBERT B. CAMPBELL, Prosecuting Attorneys, for Appellee.