State v. Feagin

[Cite as State v. Feagin, 2014-Ohio-5133.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 14CA11
:
TERRY J. FEAGIN :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court
of Common Pleas, Case No. 2013 CR
0728 D
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 14, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
JAMES J. MAYER, JR. WILLIAM T. CRAMER
RICHLAND CO. PROSECUTOR 470 Olde Worthington Road, Ste. 200
JOHN C. NIEFT Westerville, OH 43082
38 South Park St.
Mansfield, OH 44902
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Terry J. Feagin appeals from the Sentencing Entry of January
23, 2014 of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state of
Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} This case arose on October 12, 2013 around 12:30 a.m. in the Richland
County Jail during “commissary,” a time period when inmates are permitted to buy food
and supplies. Inmates often stay up all night talking and drinking coffee during
commissary. Appellant, Jason Jarvis, and Austin Risner were inmates in the jail, in the
same pod.
{¶3} Earlier that day, appellant was in the shower when Risner was “doing
squats” in the bathroom outside the shower. Appellant confronted Risner and asked
why he was working out in the bathroom while someone else was showering. Risner
left the bathroom and the confrontation ended without further incident.
The Assaults
{¶4} Later, during commissary, an inmate remarked upon a newspaper
photograph of a high-school girls’ volleyball team, stating the girls would be 18 when
he got out of jail. In reply, Risner stated something along the lines of “don’t judge a
book by its cover” because “his neighbor was 12 years old but looked like she was in
high school.” Appellant approached Risner, stating he had a 12-year-old daughter and
accusing Risner of being a pedophile. Risner stated he meant nothing by the
statement. As Risner sat at a table eating, appellant approached him and punched him
several times in the left side of his face.
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 3
{¶5} During this altercation, a group of inmates sat nearby playing cards.
Shortly after the assault by appellant, one of those inmates, Jason Jarvis, stood up,
grabbed Risner by the back of the head, and struck him repeatedly with uppercut
punches from behind.
{¶6} Reportedly Risner did not immediately report the assaults. He cleaned
himself up and went about his business, but soon the pain around his eye socket
became worse and other inmates told him “something was wrong with [his] face.”
Risner initially told corrections officers he fell in the shower, but after he was separated
from other inmates he reported the assaults.
{¶7} Risner was transported to MedCentral Hospital where he was found to
have “complex facial fractures,” meaning multiple bones of his face were moved out of
place. He was transported to Grant Hospital in Columbus for specialized facial
surgery.
The Jail Investigation Yields Video of the Incident
{¶8} Most areas of the Richland County Jail are on camera and corrections
officers were able to find film of the assaults. Appellant and Jarvis were identified from
the videotape by corrections officers and by Risner. Appellant was disciplined with 10
days in “lockdown” and was moved to a maximum-security pod.
{¶9} During the jail discipline process, appellant was granted a hearing with
Sgt. James. Appellant told James he pushed Risner but did not hit him and Risner was
fine when appellant walked away from him. James watched the jail video, however,
and determined appellant assaulted Risner by punching him.
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 4
Indictment, Trial, and Conviction
{¶10} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of aiding and
abetting felonious assault pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second
degree. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and the case proceeded to trial by jury.
{¶11} Appellee’s evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of several
corrections officers, Risner, and the doctor who evaluated Risner at MedCentral.
Appellee’s exhibits included the videotape of the incident at the jail, Risner’s medical
records, and photos of his injuries.
{¶12} Appellant was the only witness in his own defense. He testified to the
verbal confrontations with Risner which culminated when he “mugged [Risner’s] face”
with his finger, causing him to fall back. On direct, appellant testified he walked away
and later heard the sounds of a fight, looked up, saw Jarvis assaulting Risner, and
heard a loud crack. Appellant stated he had no contact with Jarvis regarding the
incident and did not encourage him to assault Risner.
{¶13} On cross examination, appellant was confronted with the jail video and
admitted he, too, punched Risner in the face.
Corrections Officer James is Voir Dired by the Trial Court
{¶14} Outside the presence of the jury, after appellant’s testimony, Sgt. James
was brought back to be voir dired by the trial court over the matter of lockdown. During
his testimony, James was asked whether he told appellant Jarvis received more
lockdown time than he did. James responded he didn’t know how much lockdown time
Jarvis received because he didn’t recall investigating Jarvis.
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 5
{¶15} During the voir dire outside the presence of the jury, the trial court stated
appellant alleged James had changed his testimony. James explained he was
confronted by appellant at the jail after his testimony and called a liar, so he reviewed
the discipline records and discovered a different corrections officer had investigated
Jarvis. Thus, James had testified truthfully he did not know the outcome of the Jarvis
investigation or how much lockdown time each received.
{¶16} During this voir dire, James stated he asked other inmates present if
anyone had anything to say in defense of appellant, and no one came forward.
Several days later, however, an inmate trustee named Williams told him Risner’s face
made a cracking sound when he was struck by Jarvis.
{¶17} Defense counsel stated this was the first time he was told the trustee’s
name and requested a continuance, which was denied. (T. 244).
Jury Question and Verdict
{¶18} The trial court instructed the jury upon aiding and abetting felonious
assault and the lesser included offense of simple assault. During deliberations, the jury
asked whether they could “seperate (sic) the felonious assault from the aiding and
abetting in the charge or do we have to find the * * * entire charge.” The trial court
responded, over objection by appellant, “ * * * [Y]ou may return a verdict of guilty for
aiding and abetting felonious assault if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
[appellant] either knowingly caused * * * the serious physical harm to Mr. Risner
himself or that he aided and abetted, under the definition in your instructions, Mr. Jarvis
in causing serious physical harm to Mr. Risner.”
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 6
{¶19} The jury found appellant guilty of felonious assault and the trial court
sentenced him to a prison term of 6 years.
{¶20} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entry of his conviction and
sentence.
{¶21} Appellant raises four assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶22} “I. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO A UNANIMOUS
VERDICT UNDER PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS AND CRIM.R. 31(A) WHEN THE
TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THEY COULD FIND HIM GUILTY OF
AIDING AND ABETTING FELONIOUS ASSAULT IF THEY FOUND THAT HE WAS
EITHER THE PRINCIPAL OR HE AIDED THE PRINCIPAL.”
{¶23} “II. APPELLANT’S STATE AND FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
WERE VIOLATED BY HIS CONVICTION FOR AIDING AND ABETTING FELONIOUS
ASSAULT BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION.”
{¶24} “III. APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR AIDING AND ABETTING
FELONIOUS ASSAULT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.”
{¶25} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO
ALLOW A CONTINUANCE SO THAT THE DEFENSE COULD SUBPOENA A
RELEVANT WITNESS.”
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 7
ANALYSIS
II., III.
{¶26} In his second and third assignments of error, appellant argues his
conviction is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶27} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the
evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, paragraph two of the syllabus. The
standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State
v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus,
in which the Ohio Supreme Court held, “An appellate court’s function when reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the
evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would
convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶28} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing
the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78
Ohio St.3d at 387. Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 8
evidence and ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id.
{¶29} The jury found appellant guilty of one count of aiding and abetting
felonious assault pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(1): “No person shall knowingly * * *
[c]ause serious physical harm to another * * *.” R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) states: “No person,
acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall * * *
[a]id or abet another in committing the offense.” We further note R.C. 2923.03(F)
states, “Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an
offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender. A
charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal
offense.”
{¶30} Appellant’s arguments are premised upon the following characterization
of the evidence: Jarvis was the “principal offender” whose “more vicious and sustained
assault” upon Risner caused the serious physical harm. Upon our review of the record,
however, we find the evidence belies this assumption, most notably in the video
showing appellant striking Risner not once but multiple times. Appellant’s arguments
here are based upon his own self-serving testimony which the jury was free to accept
or reject.
{¶31} Appellant further argues aiding and abetting requires “some sort of active
involvement beyond mere presence at the crime scene” while acknowledging “the
evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated
with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the
defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal. Such intent may be inferred from
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 9
the circumstances surrounding the crime.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Johnson, 93
Ohio St.3d 240, 245, 2001-Ohio-1336, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001). “Incite” means “[t]o
provoke or stir up (someone to commit a criminal act, or the criminal act itself).” Black's
Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the jury could reasonably find appellant incited Jarvis to the subsequent
attack on Risner.
{¶32} Appellant directs our attention to a “mob fight” rule first articulated by the
Ohio Supreme Court in Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277, 34 N.E. 352 (1893),
arguing his mere presence at the scene does not rise to the level of the cooperation,
connection, or conspiracy required for aiding and abetting. We note, though,
Woolweaver holds “In such case, to constitute the person engaged in the fight an aider
or abettor of the homicide, it should appear, either that there was a prior conspiracy, or
that he purposely incited or encouraged the slayer, or did some overt act himself
with an intent to cause the death of his antagonist.” (Emphasis added.)
Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277, 34 N.E. 352 (1893), paragraph two of the
syllabus. In the instant case, appellant was not merely present at the scene when an
independent actor suddenly inflicted serious physical harm upon the victim. The video
depicts what is in fact a sustained assault first by appellant, followed shortly thereafter
by Jarvis; the ferocity of appellant’s attack is such that the jury could reasonably
conclude he caused the serious physical harm.
{¶33} We have previously concluded “* * * a defendant violently striking the eye
area of another person, who had already been knocked to the ground, must be held to
know that this action will probably cause serious physical harm to such person.” State
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 10
v. Freeman, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010 CA 00019, 2010-Ohio-5818, ¶ 16. Such is the
case here.
{¶34} We find reasonable triers of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, appellant knowingly caused serious physical harm to Risner for purposes of
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). Appellant's conviction upon felonious assault is supported by
sufficient evidence.
{¶35} Further, upon review of the trial record, including the video of the incident,
we find the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice
requiring that appellant's conviction be reversed and a new trial ordered.
{¶36} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.
I.
{¶37} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in its
response to the jury question stating appellant is guilty of aiding and abetting felonious
assault if they found him either to be the principal or that he aided the principal. We
disagree.
{¶38} Appellant asserts he was denied a unanimous verdict because the jury
could find he was either the principal or and aider and abettor. A unanimous jury
verdict is required by Crim.R. 31(A). “Although Crim.R. 31(A) requires juror unanimity
on each element of the crime, jurors need not agree to a single way by which an
element is satisfied.” State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-2787, 889
N.E.2d 995, ¶ 38, citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817, 119 S.Ct.
1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999). “[A] ‘jury need not always decide unanimously which of
several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say,
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 11
which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the
crime.’ ” Id., quoting Richardson.
{¶39} Gardner, supra, does not support appellant’s argument. In that case, the
defendant’s aggravated-burglary conviction was vacated at the appellate level because
“the jury instructions did not specify that the jury needed to agree unanimously as to
which criminal offense [the defendant] intended to commit during the course of the
aggravated burglary.”1 Id. at ¶ 2. The Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis focuses on the
third element of “any criminal offense,” the issue being whether jurors must agree
unanimously which criminal offense a defendant intended to commit during a burglary.
Gardner, 2008-Ohio-2787 at ¶ 32, 37. The Court observed that although Crim.R. 31(A)
requires juror unanimity on each element of the crime, jurors need not agree to a single
way by which an element is satisfied. Id., 2008-Ohio-2787 at ¶ 38, citing Richardson v.
United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999). The Court
reinstated the defendant’s conviction for aggravated burglary, distinguishing between
“alternative-means” and “multiple-acts” fact scenarios:
In an alternative means case, where a single offense may
be committed in more than one way, there must be jury unanimity
as to guilt for the single crime charged. Unanimity is not required,
however, as to the means by which the crime was committed so
long as substantial evidence supports each alternative means. In
1
To convict the defendant of aggravated burglary pursuant to R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), the
state was required to establish (1) he trespassed in the victim’s home by use of force,
stealth, or deception, (2) while someone other than his accomplice was present, (3)
with the purpose to commit “any criminal offense” inside, (4) while carrying a deadly
weapon or dangerous ordnance.
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 12
reviewing an alternative means case, the court must determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have found each means of
committing the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In multiple acts cases, on the other hand, several acts are
alleged and any one of them could constitute the crime charged. In
these cases, the jury must be unanimous as to which act or incident
constitutes the crime. To ensure jury unanimity in multiple acts
cases, we require that either the State elect the particular criminal
act upon which it will rely for conviction, or that the trial court
instruct the jury that all of them must agree that the same
underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Citations omitted.)
State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-2787, 889 N.E.2d
995, ¶ 49-50.
{¶40} We find the instant case to be an alternative-means case, not a multiple-
acts case, the issue being what caused the victim’s serious physical harm. See State
v. Jeffery, 2013-Ohio-504, 986 N.E.2d 1093, ¶ 34-35 (2nd Dist.). The jury was not
required to agree whether appellant’s punches caused the serious physical harm (his
own conduct) or whether Jarvis’ punches caused the serious physical harm (appellant
complicit in Jarvis’ conduct) because each is an alternative form of aiding and abetting
felonious assault. Id. There is no distinction between a defendant convicted of
complicity or as a principal offender. Id., citing R.C. 2923.03(F).
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 13
{¶41} Having found this case to be an alternative means case, we “must
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found each means of committing
the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jeffery, supra, 2013-Ohio-504 at ¶ 35,
citing Gardner at ¶ 49. As we have already determined in our analysis of appellant’s
second and third assignments of error, supra, we conclude a rational trier of fact could
have found each means of committing complicity to felonious assault proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
{¶42} Appellant was not deprived of a unanimous jury verdict and his first
assignment of error is therefore overruled.
IV.
{¶43} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should
have permitted a continuance so he could subpoena an alleged witness to the assault.
We disagree.
{¶44} Sgt. James identified the alleged witness during the voir dire after
appellant’s testimony. Defense trial counsel stated this was the first he heard of the
statement and the trustee’s name (Williams). Specifically, counsel stated: “Well, I
didn’t know. I don’t know. All I knew was [the corrections officer] told [appellant] that
somebody told him they heard a crack. And [appellant] said, well, Sergeant James told
him that. I never heard anybody’s name.” T. 243. The trial court denied the request
for continuance because appellant was aware of Williams’ statement and identity well
in advance of trial although he did not communicate the information to counsel.
{¶45} A trial court's decision to deny a continuance which would otherwise
enable a defendant to exercise his constitutionally-protected right to offer the testimony
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 14
of witnesses and compel their attendance may, in some circumstances, constitute a
denial of due process and we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Blankenship, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2010-CA-118, 2011-Ohio-2984, ¶ 13. First, though,
“[w]hen the reason for a continuance is to secure the attendance of a witness, ‘it is
incumbent upon the moving party to show that such witnesses would have given
substantial favorable evidence and that they were available and willing to testify.’” Id.,citations omitted.
{¶46} In the instant case, defense trial counsel was admittedly aware, prior to
trial, someone made a statement about the victim’s face “cracking.” James testified
and was cross-examined, but no one asked him about witness statements. No
explanation was offered why appellant could not have learned Williams’ identity by
asking James prior to trial or even on the stand. The Williams matter only came up at
all because James was brought back, outside the presence of the jury, to explain a
discrepancy about which corrections officer investigated and disciplined Jarvis.
{¶47} Moreover, no proffer of anticipated testimony was made for the trial court
to weigh in determining whether appellant's rights would be jeopardized if the
continuance was not granted. Blankenship, supra, 2011-Ohio-2984 at ¶ 18. It is not
evident from the record that Williams would have been willing to testify or what his
testimony would have been; the statement about the “crack” was hearsay as presented
by James.
{¶48} Under these circumstances, we are unable to find the trial court abused
its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for continuance. Appellant’s fourth
assignment of error is overruled.
Richland County, Case No. 14CA11 15
CONCLUSION
{¶49} Appellant’s four assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of
the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J. and
Gwin, P.J.
Baldwin, J., concur.