Williams v. Foster

[Cite as Williams v. Foster, 2019-Ohio-4601.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant : Appellate Case No. 28416
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2018-CV-4086
:
SAMUEL FOSTER : (Civil Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellee :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 8th day of November, 2019.
...........
TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS, 1955 Kipling Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45406
Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se
SAMUEL FOSTER, 45 Perrine Street, Dayton, Ohio 45410
Defendant-Appellee, Pro Se
.............
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FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Travis Lanier Williams, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery
County Court of Common Pleas, which concluded that Williams did not have a valid
mechanic’s lien on Samuel Foster’s property and entered judgment in favor of Foster.
For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
{¶ 2} On August 31, 2018, Williams brought an action to quiet title to residential
property owned by Foster. Williams claimed that, in July 2018, he performed work on
the property, including cutting the grass, trimming trees, and picking up trash, the value
of which he claimed was $500. Williams asserted that he had a mechanic’s lien on the
property.
{¶ 3} After Foster failed to respond to the complaint, Williams sought a default
judgment. A magistrate denied the motion, stating that the parties had indicated that
they were discussing a settlement.
{¶ 4} A trial before a magistrate was held on February 1, 2019. The record does
not contain a transcript of that hearing, but the record reflects that Williams testified on
his own behalf and Foster did not appear. On March 4, 2019, Williams filed a “notice of
Revised Code 5303.01 Judgement default [in] accordance with Revised Code 5309.72.”
{¶ 5} On March 20, 2019, the magistrate issued a decision, finding in favor of
Foster. The magistrate made the following factual findings:
The short of it is the parties had no contract for Plaintiff to perform
any work at the property. Defendant never agreed to pay Plaintiff any
money to do any work at the property. While Plaintiff claims Defendant
said he would just give the house to Plaintiff, the only evidence of this is
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Plaintiff’s testimony, which was less than credible. Plaintiff scattered his
testimony with different legal verbiage, that upon questioning, it was clear
he did not understand the meaning of the words he chose to employ.
There was not [sic] written or oral agreement between the parties that
Plaintiff was to be paid for any work he completed at the property.
The magistrate concluded that, in the absence of a contract that Williams was owed
anything for the work he did at the property, “no mechanic’s lien can follow.”
{¶ 6} Following the magistrate’s decision, Williams filed a “motion for judges and
magistrate decision,” which the trial court construed as objections to the magistrate’s
decision. The court set a briefing schedule on the objections, following which Williams
filed an “affidavit of truth,” an “affidavit of trust,” and a “plaintiff brief.” Williams generally
asserted that he was entitled to Foster’s property due to the alleged mechanic’s lien and
was entitled to judgment against Foster due to Foster’s non-responsiveness. Foster did
not file any responsive memoranda.
{¶ 7} On May 24, 2019, the trial court overruled Williams’s objections and granted
judgment to Foster. The trial court reasoned:
The Court first finds that Plaintiff does not have a valid mechanic’s
lien. Plaintiff did not have an express or implied contract with Defendant
regarding the work done around the property or the value of that work. The
Court cannot find that a meeting of the minds took place between Plaintiff
and Defendant regarding not only the value of the work performed, but even
if the work should have been performed to begin with. A contract is not
formed unless all the essential elements of the contract are agreed to by
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the parties. Plaintiff testified that he was the one who determined the value
of his work with no input from Defendant. Therefore, there is no valid
implied contract.
The only evidence of any possible contract is Plaintiff’s own
testimony and the hearsay that it contains. The Court cannot find Plaintiff’s
testimony credible based upon the trial that was held in this matter. It
appears to this Court that Plaintiff sought to own the property in question
and is attempting to gain ownership through a mechanic’s lien. Plaintiff
stated that he did not even ask Defendant for payment prior to filing the
mechanic’s lien. Plaintiff also stated that he attempted to file a notice of
commencement before the work was completed. As the parties did not
enter into a contract, and even if there was [sic] a contract, Defendant was
never given an opportunity to perform under said contract, there can be no
mechanic’s lien in this matter.
{¶ 8} Williams appeals from the trial court’s judgment. Williams’s appellate brief
does not include assignments of error as required by App.R. 16(A), but he claims that the
trial court should have granted him judgment due to Foster’s failure to respond to his
complaint and because he (Williams) has a valid mechanic’s lien.
{¶ 9} At the outset, we emphasize that the record does not contain a written
transcript or video recording of the February 1, 2019 hearing. Williams did not request
the preparation of a transcript as part of his appeal, nor did he request the preparation of
a transcript in the trial court.
{¶ 10} Under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii), the party objecting to a magistrate’s decision
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is required to provide a transcript when it asks the trial court to review the factual findings
of a magistrate. See also Price v. Combs, 2d Dist. Darke No. 2015-CA-17, 2016-Ohio-
429, ¶ 16. In the absence of a written transcript of the hearing before the magistrate, we
have no record of the evidence presented to the magistrate, and we cannot speculate
what the testimony was at that hearing. Miller v. Tye, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26277,
2015-Ohio-199, ¶ 9. We must presume that the magistrate’s and the trial court’s findings
were supported by the evidence presented at the hearing.
{¶ 11} Accepting the trial court’s findings, we find no error in the trial court’s
conclusion that Foster was entitled to judgment on Williams’s claim. R.C. 1311.02, which
governs liens upon improvements to real property, provides:
Every person who performs work or labor upon or furnishes material in
furtherance of any improvement undertaken by virtue of a contract, express
or implied, with the owner * * * has a lien to secure the payment therefor
upon the improvement and all interests that the owner, part owner, or lessee
may have or subsequently acquire in the land or leasehold to which the
improvement was made or removed.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 1311.011 further allows for a lien by a contractor,
subcontractor, material supplier, or laborer in connection with a home construction
contract or home purchase contract. See R.C. 1311.011(B)(1).
{¶ 12} The trial court expressly found that there was no implied or express contract
between the parties. In the absence of a contract between the property owner and the
contractor -- in this case, Foster and Williams -- no mechanic’s lien is permitted. In
addition, the trial court found, based on Williams’s testimony, that even if a contract
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existed, Foster was never given an opportunity to perform under the alleged contract
before the filing of the mechanic’s lien. The trial court therefore properly granted
judgment to Foster on Williams’s claims based on an alleged mechanic’s lien.
{¶ 13} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
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DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Travis Lanier Williams
Samuel Foster
Hon. Dennis J. Adkins