State v. Begley

[Cite as State v. Begley, 2019-Ohio-5297.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
DEFIANCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 4-19-11
v.
JOHNNY R. BEGLEY, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 16-CR-12687
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: December 23, 2019
APPEARANCES:
Johnny R. Begley, Appellant
Russell R. Herman for Appellee
Case No. 4-19-11
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Johnny R. Begley (“Begley”), appeals the June
24, 2019 judgment of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas denying his
“Motion to Vacate/Correct Void Judgments.” For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
{¶2} On November 4, 2016, the Defiance County Grand Jury indicted
Begley on three counts: Count One of involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C.
2903.04(A), a first-degree felony; Count Two of trafficking in heroin in violation of
R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(6)(c), a fourth-degree felony; and Count Three of
possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6)(b), a fourth-degree
felony. (Doc. No. 1). Count Two included a forfeiture specification under R.C.
2941.1417(A). (Id.). On November 17, 2016, Begley appeared for arraignment and
pleaded not guilty to the counts of the indictment. (See Doc. No. 12).
{¶3} A change of plea hearing was held on December 21, 2016. (Doc. No.
12). Under the terms of a negotiated plea agreement, Begley withdrew his previous
pleas of not guilty and pleaded guilty to Counts One and Two as well as the
forfeiture specification. (Id.). In exchange, the State agreed to move for dismissal
of Count Three. (Id.). The trial court accepted Begley’s guilty pleas and found him
guilty. (Id.). The trial court also granted the State’s motion to dismiss Count Three
and dismissed the same. (Id.). The trial court then proceeded immediately to
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sentencing. (Id.). The trial court sentenced Begley to 4 years in prison on Count
One and 11 months in prison on Count Two and ordered that Begley’s sentences be
served consecutively for an aggregate term of 4 years and 11 months’ imprisonment.
(Id.). The trial court filed its judgment entry of conviction and sentence on January
11, 2017. (Id.). Begley did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
{¶4} On November 8, 2017, Begley filed a motion for judicial release. (Doc.
No. 16). On January 5, 2018, the trial court granted Begley’s motion for judicial
release. (Doc. No. 18). The trial court suspended the balance of Begley’s 4 year
and 11 month prison sentence, reserved the right to reimpose Begley’s prison
sentence, and placed Begley on community control for a period of 4 years. (Id.).
{¶5} On August 15, 2018, the State filed a motion to revoke Begley’s judicial
release and reimpose his suspended prison sentence.1 (Doc. No. 22). In its motion,
the State alleged that Begley had violated the terms of his community control by
providing a urine sample that tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and
opiates. (Id.). The State also alleged that Begley had failed to report to his
supervising officer. (Id.).
{¶6} On September 26, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s
motion to revoke Begley’s judicial release. (Doc. No. 26). At the hearing, Begley
admitted that he violated the terms of his community control. (Id.). The trial court
1
The State erroneously styled its motion as a “Motion to Revoke Community Control.”
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accepted Begley’s admission, found the allegations made by the State in its motion
to be true, and proceeded immediately to disposition. (Id.). The trial court revoked
Begley’s judicial release and reimposed his 4 year and 11 month prison sentence,
with credit for 540 days served. (Id.). Begley did not appeal the revocation of his
judicial release or the reimposition of his prison sentence.
{¶7} On March 22, 2019, Begley filed a “Motion to Vacate/Correct Void
Judgements.” (Doc. No. 29). In his motion, Begley alleged that the trial court failed
to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.20(J) when it granted his motion for
judicial release. (Id.). He argued that the trial court’s judgment granting his motion
for judicial release is consequently void and that his community control was
therefore invalid. (Id.). Begley asked the trial court to vacate its judgment granting
his motion for judicial release, vacate its judgment granting the State’s motion to
revoke his judicial release because he “could never have been on community
control, as there was no statutory authority,” and “reinstate[] * * * community
control upon being granted judicial release properly.” (Id.). On May 10, 2019,
Begley filed an amendment to his “Motion to Vacate/Correct Void Judgements.”
(Doc. No. 33).
{¶8} On May 17, 2019, the State filed a memorandum in opposition to
Begley’s motion. (Doc. No. 34). On June 3, 2019, Begley filed a motion to strike
the State’s memorandum in opposition. (Doc. No. 39). In his motion to strike,
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Begley argued that the State’s memorandum should be stricken because it was not
filed within 10 days after the filing of his “Motion to Vacate/Correct Void
Judgements” as required by R.C. 2953.21(E). (Id.).
{¶9} On June 24, 2019, the trial court denied Begley’s “Motion to
Vacate/Correct Void Judgements” on grounds that his arguments were barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. (Doc. No. 40). The trial court did not explicitly deny
Begley’s motion to strike. (See id.).
{¶10} On July 22, 2019, Begley filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 42). He
raises two assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
Trial court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion to
Vacate/Correct Void Judgments.
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Begley argues that the trial court erred
by denying his “Motion to Vacate/Correct Void Judgements.” Specifically, Begley
contends that the trial court erred by concluding that his arguments are barred by
principles of res judicata because the judgments he seeks to vacate are void and res
judicata does not bar a trial court from vacating void judgments.
{¶12} A judgment granting judicial release “is a modification of a sentence
* * *.” State v. Sykes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106390, 2018-Ohio-4774, ¶ 16, citing
State v. Costlow, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89501, 2008-Ohio-1097, ¶ 9. R.C.
2929.20(J) provides that
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[a] court shall not grant a judicial release * * * to an eligible offender
who is imprisoned for a felony of the first or second degree * * *
unless the court, with reference to factors under [R.C. 2929.12], finds
both of the following:
(a) That a sanction other than a prison term would adequately punish
the offender and protect the public from future criminal violations by
the eligible offender because the applicable factors indicating a lesser
likelihood of recidivism outweigh the applicable factors indicating a
greater likelihood of recidivism;
(b) That a sanction other than a prison term would not demean the
seriousness of the offense because factors indicating that the eligible
offender’s conduct in committing the offense was less serious than
conduct normally constituting the offense outweigh factors indicating
that the eligible offender’s conduct was more serious than conduct
normally constituting the offense.
R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a)-(b). Furthermore, “[a] court that grants a judicial release to
an eligible offender under [R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)] shall specify on the record both
findings required in that division and also shall list all the factors described in that
division that were presented at the hearing.” R.C. 2929.20(J)(2).
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{¶13} Begley argues that the trial court’s judgment granting his motion for
judicial release and imposing a term of community control is void because the trial
court failed to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.20(J) on the record. After
reviewing the record, we agree with Begley that the trial court did not make the
findings required by R.C. 2929.20(J) before granting his motion for judicial release,
and we assume for the sake of Begley’s argument that the trial court erred by failing
to make these findings. Nevertheless, we reject Begley’s argument that the trial
court’s oversight renders its judgment granting his motion for judicial release void.
{¶14} “Typically, ‘sentencing errors are not jurisdictional and do not render
a judgment void.’” State v. Cupp, 4th Dist. Adams No. 16CA1024, 2016-Ohio-
8462, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St. 3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶ 7. “‘[I]f
the sentencing court had jurisdiction and statutory authority to act, sentencing errors
do not render the sentence void and the sentence can be set aside only if successfully
challenged on direct appeal.’” State ex rel. Rodriguez v. Barker, __ Ohio St.3d __,
2019-Ohio-4155, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St. 3d 403, 2016-Ohio-
7658, ¶ 23. Furthermore, courts have held that a trial court’s failure to make certain
statutory findings before imposing a sentence does not render the sentence void.
See State v. Chapin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-1003, 2015-Ohio-3013, ¶ 9
(holding that the trial court’s alleged failure to make the findings required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences did not render the
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defendant’s sentence void). In this case, the trial court erred by failing to make the
findings required by R.C. 2929.20(J) on the record. However, it is undisputed that
the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction and statutory authority to grant
Begley’s motion for judicial release and modify his sentence. Therefore, at most,
the trial court’s failure to make the required findings renders its judgment granting
Begley’s motion for judicial release and modifying his sentence merely voidable,
rather than void. See Fischer at ¶ 6 (“‘[A] voidable judgment is one rendered by a
court that has both jurisdiction and authority to act, but the court’s judgment is
invalid, irregular, or erroneous.’”), quoting State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St. 3d 420,
2008-Ohio-1197, ¶ 12.
{¶15} Because the trial court’s judgment granting Begley’s motion for
judicial release and modifying his sentence is, at most, voidable, the doctrine of res
judicata applies. State v. Mack, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-680, 2017-Ohio-
7417, ¶ 15 (“Res judicata ‘bars attacks on voidable judgments * * *.’”), quoting
State v. Mack, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-884, 2014-Ohio-1648, ¶ 7; State v.
Hall, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2016-A-0069, 2017-Ohio-4376, ¶ 12. “‘Under the
doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment bars a convicted defendant who was
represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an
appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that the
defendant raised or could have raised at trial or on appeal.’” (Emphasis added.)
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State v. Jacobs, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-18-04, 2018-Ohio-3218, ¶ 8, quoting State v.
Brown, 167 Ohio App. 3d 239, 2006-Ohio-3266, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). Begley could have
attempted to raise his argument in a direct appeal from the trial court’s judgment
granting his motion for judicial release or in an appeal from the trial court’s
judgment revoking his judicial release and reimposing his prison sentence. Because
Begley did not appeal either of the trial court’s judgments, his argument is now
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
did not err by denying Begley’s motion.
{¶16} Begley’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. II
Trial court erred in not ruling on Defendant’s “Motion to Strike
State’s Motion to Deny” before issuing a ruling.
{¶17} In his second assignment of error, Begley argues that the trial court
erred by failing to rule on his motion to strike the State’s memorandum in opposition
to his “Motion to Vacate/Correct Void Judgements” before denying the motion.
Begley also argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to strike
because the State’s memorandum in opposition to his “Motion to Vacate/Correct
Void Judgements” was filed outside of R.C. 2953.21(E)’s 10-day response period.
{¶18} Begley’s arguments are without merit. First, contrary to Begley’s
suggestion, we conclude that the trial court effectively denied his motion to strike.
“[G]enerally, when a trial court fails to rule on a motion, an appellate court will
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presume that the trial court overruled that motion.” State v. Henson, 4th Dist.
Highland No. 05CA13, 2006-Ohio-2861, ¶ 4, fn. 1, citing State v. Rozell, 4th Dist.
Pickaway No. 95CA17, 1996 WL 344034 (June 20, 1996) and State v. Kennedy, 4th
Dist. Athens No. 95CA1657, 1995 WL 580858 (Oct. 2, 1995). Here, although the
trial court did not explicitly deny Begley’s motion to strike, there is nothing in the
record suggesting that it granted Begley’s motion. In fact, the presumption that the
trial court denied Begley’s motion is bolstered by the fact that the trial court’s
judgment denying Begley’s “Motion to Vacate/Correct Void Judgements” relied
heavily on legal arguments and cases contained in the State’s memorandum. Thus,
we conclude that the trial court implicitly denied Begley’s motion to strike.
{¶19} Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying
Begley’s motion to strike. To the extent that Begley’s “Motion to Vacate/Correct
Void Judgements” can be regarded as a petition for postconviction relief, the State’s
memorandum in opposition was filed within R.C. 2953.21(E)’s time constraints.
Although the State’s memorandum in opposition was filed more than 50 days after
Begley originally filed his “Motion to Vacate/Correct Void Judgements,” the State’s
memorandum was filed only 7 days after Begley filed the amendment to his petition.
(Doc. Nos. 29, 33, 34). Because the State’s memorandum was filed in direct
response to Begley’s amended petition, the State filed its memorandum within the
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10-day period provided for by R.C. 2953.21(E). Accordingly, the trial court did not
err by denying Begley’s motion to strike.
{¶20} Begley’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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