State v. Miller

[Cite as State v. Miller, 2015-Ohio-3529.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 9-14-50
v.
BRYAN S. MILLER, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 14CR452
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: August 31, 2015
APPEARANCES:
Brent W. Yager and David J. Stamolis for Appellant
Jon L. Jensen for Appellee
Case No. 9-14-50
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the December 22, 2014
judgment entry of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas granting
defendant-appellee’s, Bryan S. Miller (“Miller”), motion to suppress. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} This case stems from a January 14, 2014 traffic stop of Miller’s
vehicle by Ohio Highway State Patrol Trooper Joshua Beynon (“Trooper
Beynon”) after Miller failed to stop at a clearly marked stop line. As a result of
the traffic stop, Miller was indicted on October 9, 2014 for possession of heroin in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6), a second-degree felony. (Doc. No. 1).
{¶3} On November 21, 2014, Miller appeared for arraignment and entered
a plea of not guilty. (Doc. No. 21).
{¶4} On December 11, 2014, Miller filed a motion to suppress. (Doc. No.
24). The State filed a response to Miller’s motion to suppress that same day.
(Doc. No. 25). After a hearing on December 12, 2014, the trial court granted
Miller’s motion to suppress on December 22, 2014. (Doc. No. 27).
{¶5} The State filed its notice of appeal on December 23, 2014. (Doc. No.
28). It raises one assignment of error for our review.
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Assignment of Error
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Granting the
Defendant/Appellees’ Motion to Suppress the Traffic Stop and
by Applying the Exclusionary Rule.
{¶6} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by granting Miller’s motion to suppress because Trooper Beynon had
a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Miller. In the alternative, the State
argues that if Trooper Beynon mistakenly applied R.C. 4511.43(A) to stop Miller,
the exclusionary rule does not apply since Trooper Beynon was acting in good
faith because he reasonably and mistakenly applied R.C. 4511.43(A).
{¶7} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At
a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such,
is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id.See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling
on a motion to suppress, deference is given to the trial court’s findings of fact so
long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8,
citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s
conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo; and therefore, we
must decide whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing
State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997). “De novo review
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is independent, without deference to the lower court’s decision.” State v.
Robertson, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-14-16, 2015-Ohio-1758, ¶ 17, quoting State v.
Hudson, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-38, 2013-Ohio-647, ¶ 27.
{¶8} Because the facts are not in dispute, we proceed directly to reviewing
de novo the trial court’s conclusion that Trooper Beynon did not have a reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop Miller.
{¶9} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution generally prohibit warrantless searches and
seizures, and any evidence that is obtained during an unlawful search or seizure
will be excluded from being used against the defendant. State v. Jenkins, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-10-10, 2010-Ohio-5943, ¶ 9; State v. Steinbrunner, 3d Dist.
Auglaize No. 2-11-27, 2012-Ohio-2358, ¶ 12.
Neither the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution explicitly provides that
violations of its provisions against unlawful searches and seizures
will result in the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of such
violation, but the United States Supreme Court has held that the
exclusion of evidence is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment.
Jenkins at ¶ 9, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961) and
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914).
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{¶10} “A traffic stop constitutes a seizure and implicates the protections of
the Fourth Amendment” but “‘is constitutionally valid if an officer has a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing,
or is about to commit a crime.’” State v. Dillehay, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-12-07,
2013-Ohio-327, ¶ 13, citing State v. Johnson, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-07-43,
2008-Ohio-1147, ¶ 16; State v. Aldridge, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-13-54,
2014-Ohio-4537, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406,
2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 7. “The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined ‘reasonable
articulable suspicion’ as ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion [upon an
individual’s freedom of movement].’” State v. Shaffer, 3d Dist. Paulding No.
11-13-02, 2013-Ohio-3581, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178
(1988). “In determining whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists, a
reviewing court must look to the totality of the circumstances.” Steinbrunner at ¶
14, citing State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991). “A police officer’s
testimony alone is sufficient to establish reasonable articulable suspicion for a
stop.” State v. McClellan, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-21, 2010-Ohio-314, ¶ 38, citing
State v. Claiborne, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19060, 2002-Ohio-2696.
{¶11} In addition to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, “[p]robable cause is certainly a complete justification for a traffic stop,”
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but it is not required to justify a traffic stop. Mays at ¶ 23. “Probable cause” is a
stricter standard than “reasonable and articulable suspicion” and subsumes
“reasonable and articulable suspicion.” Id., citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d
405, 411 (1993). Accordingly, “an officer who witnesses a traffic violation
possesses probable cause, and a reasonable articulable suspicion, to conduct a
traffic stop.” State v. Haas, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-10-15, 2012-Ohio-2362, ¶ 16,
citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002). See also
Mays at ¶ 24.
{¶12} Here, Trooper Beynon stopped Miller for violating R.C. 4511.43(A),
which provides, in relevant part:
Except when directed to proceed by a law enforcement officer, every
driver of a vehicle * * * approaching a stop sign shall stop at a
clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk
on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point
nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of
approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it.
(Emphasis added.) Because the parties dispute whether Miller stopped at a clearly
marked stop line under R.C. 4511.43(A), we must determine what is required of a
motorist under R.C. 4511.43(A). We review de novo the interpretation of a
statute. Robertson, 2015-Ohio-1758, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Brennco, Inc., 3d Dist.
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Allen No. 1-14-24, 2015-Ohio-467, ¶ 6, citing State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d
339, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 9 and State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81,
2013-Ohio-4010, ¶ 9; State v. Thornsbury, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 12CA9,
2013-Ohio-1914, ¶ 8.
{¶13} “‘“The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.”’” Robertson at ¶ 18,
quoting Thornsbury at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-
606, ¶ 9. See also Brennco, Inc. at ¶ 6. “To determine the legislative intent, we
first look at the language of the statute itself and if the language is clear and
unambiguous, we apply it as written and no further construction is required.” Id.,quoting Brennco, Inc. at ¶ 6, citing Straley at ¶ 9 and Pariag at ¶ 11.
{¶14} However, “[a] statute is ambiguous if its language is susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id., quoting Thornsbury at ¶ 8, citing
State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 508, 513 (1996). “Only if
a statute is unclear and ambiguous, may we interpret it to determine the
legislature’s intent.” Id., quoting Thornsbury at ¶ 8, citing State v. Chappell, 127
Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, ¶ 16. See also State v. Black, 142 Ohio St.3d
332, 2015-Ohio-513, ¶ 38 (“If a statute is ambiguous, ‘courts seek to interpret the
statutory provision in a manner that most readily furthers the legislative purpose as
reflected in the wording used in the legislation.’”), quoting Clyde at 513.
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{¶15} If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of
the legislature, may consider among other matters:
(A) The object sought to be attained;
(B) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
(C) The legislative history;
(D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws
upon the same or similar subjects;
(E) The consequences of a particular construction;
(F) The administrative construction of the statute.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 1.49.
{¶16} The Revised Code does not define “at” or what it means to stop at a
clearly marked stop line. “In the absence of a definition of a word or phrase used
in a statute, words are to be given their common, ordinary, and accepted
meaning.” Black at ¶ 39, citing Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231 (1948),
paragraph five of the syllabus.
{¶17} There is little guidance available regarding the common, ordinary,
and accepted meaning of what it means to stop at a clearly marked stop line. In
particular, the Supreme Court of Ohio has not addressed the proper interpretation
of R.C. 4511.43(A) or what it means to stop at a clearly marked stop line. The
current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary also does not define “at.” However,
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“at” is defined by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary as “used as a function
word to indicate presence or occurrence in, on, or near.” (Emphasis added.)
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 77 (11th Ed.2009). Stopping “in, on, or
near” can mean a multitude of things. Accordingly, we conclude that R.C.
4511.43(A)’s requirement that a motorist stop at a clearly marked stop line is
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.
{¶18} That stopping at a clearly marked stop line is reasonably susceptible
to more than one interpretation is demonstrated by the split of courts on the issue.
In interpreting nearly identical stop-sign statutes, some courts have concluded that
so long as a driver stops on or near a clearly marked stop line, he or she is in
compliance with the statute. See, e.g., State v. Drushal, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
13CA0028, 2014-Ohio-3088, ¶ 12, abrogated on other grounds by Heien v. North
Carolina, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014); City of Olathe v. McGregor, Ks.App.
No. 108, 316, 2013 WL 5870040, *3 (Oct. 25, 2013); Mumper v. State, Tx.App.
No. 05-08-00141-CR, 2009 WL 201142, *2 (Jan. 29, 2009). Other courts have
concluded that a driver must stop before any part of his or her vehicle crosses a
clearly marked stop line. See, e.g., People v. Wood, 379 Ill.App.3d 705, 708-709
(2008); U.S. v. Mack, D.Vt. No. 5:14-cr-28, 2014 WL 7140604, *8, fn. 6 (Dec. 12,
2014); U.S. v. Smith, M.D.Fla. No. 2:06-cr-42-FtM-29SPC, 2006 WL 2226313, *7
(Aug. 3, 2006); State v. Daniels, 158 So.3d 629, 630-631 (Fla.2014); People v.
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Binkowski, 157 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 6 (2007); State v. Denner, 298 Wis.2d 249,
726 N.W.2d 357, ¶ 7, fn. 2 (2006). Although this court has not specifically
defined what it means to stop at a clearly marked stop line, we previously affirmed
a stop-sign violation in State v. Rannes where the arresting officer testified that
Rannes “‘made an improper stop’” because “she ‘went past the clearly marked
stop line in the roadway’” and assumed in State v. Aldridge that Aldridge’s failure
to “stop before a marked stop line” was a violation of R.C. 4511.43(A) to justify
the arresting officer’s stop and detention of Aldridge. State v. Rannes, 3d Dist.
Logan No. 8-02-12, 2002-Ohio-4691, ¶ 39-40; Aldridge, 2014-Ohio-4537, at ¶ 2,
5, 10.
{¶19} Because we conclude that the statute is unclear and ambiguous, we
must apply the principles of statutory interpretation to determine what R.C.
4511.43(A) requires of a motorist. See Black, 142 Ohio St.3d 332,
2015-Ohio-513, at ¶ 45. To determine the General Assembly’s intent, we will
consider the consequences of a particular construction of the statute, the object
sought to be obtained by the statute, and the administrative construction of the
statute. R.C. 1.49(A), (E), (F).
{¶20} We conclude that the General Assembly did not contemplate that
stopping astride—where any portion of a vehicle extends across—a clearly
marked stop line would constitute compliance with R.C. 4511.43(A) and hold that
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a motorist must stop his or her vehicle before the front-most portion of the vehicle
breaks the plane of the outermost edge of a clearly marked stop line. In other
words, to comply with the statute, a motorist must stop his or her vehicle before
any portion of his or her vehicle crosses the edge of the stop line that is furthest
from the front-most portion of his or her approaching vehicle.
{¶21} First, the consequences of interpreting “at” under R.C. 4511.43(A) to
permit a motorist to stop on or near a clearly marked stop line does not readily
further any legislative purpose because “[i]f a vehicle stops ‘at’ the stop line by
straddling it, the line does not mark a definite stopping point; it marks a range of
stopping points that varies with the length of a particular vehicle involved.”
(Emphasis added.) Wood, 379 Ill.App.3d at 709. In crafting R.C. 4511.43(A), it
is illogical that the General Assembly would want to establish a range of stopping
points for a motorist as opposed to a definite stopping point. This point is best
described by the Illinois Court of Appeals in Wood:
In the case of a relatively small passenger automobile, it may not
make much difference, in terms of road safety, whether the vehicle
stops behind the line or astride it. However, the vehicles that travel
on * * * roads come in all shapes and sizes. The trial court’s
interpretation becomes significantly more problematic if applied to a
40-foot-long bus that could project well into an intersection before
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its rear wheels reach the stop line. Under the trial court’s
interpretation of the applicable statutes, the bus would have made a
proper stop.
Id. See also Binkowski, 157 Cal.App.4th Supp. at 6 (concluding that the California
legislature “could not have intended such an absurd—and potentially perilous—
result” if the court interpreted the stop-sign statute to permit a motorist to stop
astride a clearly marked stop line). In addition, interpreting “at” under R.C.
4511.43(A) in this manner could result in an unconstitutional disparate application
of the statute since it could be applied differently to motorists depending on the
size or length of the vehicle they are operating. See, e.g., State ex rel. Patterson v.
Indus. Comm., 77 Ohio St.3d 201, 204 (1996) (discussing the constitutional
guarantee “that all similarly situated individuals be treated in a similar manner”).
{¶22} Moreover, the object sought to be attained in regulating Ohio’s
highways is the safety of motorists and pedestrians. Interpreting “at” under R.C.
4511.43(A) to permit a motorist to stop on or near a clearly marked stop line does
not further that purpose. In Daniels, the Florida Court of Appeals concluded that
the stop-sign statute at issue in that case requires a motorist to stop before any part
of his or her vehicle “crosses the line” because “[a] stop line protects other
motorists and pedestrians only if a vehicle stops when its front bumper reaches
that line.” Daniels, 158 So.3d at 631. In making that conclusion, the Florida
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Court of Appeals acknowledged that the purpose of a stop-sign statute is “to
require a vehicle to stop before it is in a position where it could impede or hit
pedestrians who might be in a crosswalk, or cross-traffic that could be in an
intersection.” Id. In addition, stop lines are often used to protect other motorists
by providing a point at which a vehicle must stop to allow ample room for large
vehicles to complete turns at an intersection. As a result, we interpret the statute
to require a motorist to stop prior to the point at which the front-most portion of
his or her vehicle will break the plane of the outermost edge of the clearly marked
stop line to most readily further the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting R.C.
4511.43(A).
{¶23} Further support that the General Assembly did not contemplate that
stopping astride a clearly marked stop line would constitute compliance with R.C.
4511.43(A) can be found in the administrative construction of the statute. In
particular, the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (OMUTCD),
which provides the official specifications for highway signs and markings as
mandated by R.C. 4511.09, supports our holding. See State v. Phillips, 3d Dist.
Logan No. 8-04-25, 2006-Ohio-6338, ¶ 25, 30-31 (consulting the OMUTCD for
statutory-construction purposes), abrogated on other grounds by Mays, 119 Ohio
St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, at ¶ 15; Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58,
2006-Ohio-3563, ¶ 4 (noting that the OMUTCD was adopted by the Ohio
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Department of Transportation under R.C. 4511.09). Specifically, the OMUTCD
describes the use of a “stop line”: “Stop lines should be used to indicate the point
behind which vehicles are required to stop, in compliance with a traffic control
signal.” (Emphasis added.) OMUTCD, Section 3B.16 (2012 Ed.).
{¶24} Therefore, we conclude that it is unlawful to stop astride a clearly
marked stop line, and that a motorist must stop his or her vehicle prior to the point
at which the front-most portion of his or her vehicle will break the plane of the
outermost edge of that clearly marked stop line.
{¶25} Based on that conclusion, we hold that Trooper Beynon had probable
cause to stop Miller since Miller stopped his vehicle astride a clearly marked stop
line. See Mays at ¶ 23, 24; Haas, 2012-Ohio-2362, at ¶ 23. Furthermore, since we
hold that Trooper Beynon had probable cause to stop Miller based on his violation
of R.C. 4511.43(A), we also hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply. Too,
we need not analyze the State’s alternative argument—whether Trooper Beynon
possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Miller based on a reasonable
mistake of law under Heien. See 135 S.Ct. at 539.
{¶26} For the reasons stated above, the trial court erred in granting Miller’s
motion to suppress.
{¶27} The State’s assignment of error is sustained.
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{¶28} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed and
Cause Remanded
SHAW and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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