State v. Landrum

[Cite as State v. Landrum, 2016-Ohio-5666.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-150718
TRIAL NO. 15CRB-24674
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
CANDACE LANDRUM, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 7, 2016
Paula Boggs Muething, City Solicitor, Natalia Harris, City Prosecutor, and Heidi
Rosales, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Marguerite Slagle,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FISCHER, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} The sole issue in this appeal is whether defendant-appellant Candace
Landrum’s aggravated-menacing conviction was supported by sufficient evidence
and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence with regard to the victim’s
belief that Landrum would cause her serious physical harm. Landrum’s actions in
running toward the victim, while brandishing a knife and yelling threats, along with
the victim’s testimony that she was in fear and felt threatened, meets the belief-of-
serious-physical-harm element. Thus, we affirm.
{¶2} The state charged Landrum with aggravated menacing stemming from
an altercation with Landrum’s niece, the victim. The matter proceeded to a bench
trial. At trial, the victim recounted that the day prior to the incident at issue,
Landrum had been involved in a confrontation with the victim and her family, in
which Landrum had called the police. The following day, the victim’s friend, Kesha
Washington, drove the victim, the victim’s three-year-old daughter, the victim’s
sister, and the victim’s three-year-old niece to the victim’s sister’s home. The
victim’s sister lived near Landrum. While the victim was exiting from the car,
Landrum came running toward her and pulled a butcher knife out of her pants.
According to the victim, Landrum threatened: “to beat my A, she was going to cut me
* * *.” Landrum threw the knife on the ground, but the threats continued. According
to the victim, her sister and cousin got in between them and Landrum called the
police.
{¶3} Washington also testified at trial and corroborated the victim’s story
that Landrum had come running towards the victim with a butcher knife in a
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
threatening and angry manner. Washington testified that she had recovered the
thrown knife and had placed it in her car to keep it out of reach.
{¶4} The state then presented testimony from the police officer who had
responded to the scene. The officer testified that the victim had reported to him that
Landrum had threatened her with a knife, and, as a result, Landrum was arrested.
{¶5} Landrum was the sole defense witness. She conceded in her testimony
that she had been angry when she saw Washington drive up with the victim because
of the confrontation from the day before. Landrum testified that she confronted the
group exiting from the car to ask Washington why she would bring the victim to the
area the day after they had been in an altercation. But, according to Landrum, when
Landrum confronted the victim and Washington, the victim’s mother, Landrum’s
sister, pulled up in her car and gave the victim a gun. The victim then stated, “Aunt
Coke, I’m going to shoot you.” At one point, Landrum stated that she had the event
“on camera,” although Landrum offered no video evidence at trial. Landrum denied
having a butcher knife that day and testified that she does not cook and owns no
knives.
{¶6} The trial court found Landrum guilty and sentenced her to 180 days in
jail, suspended 179 days, and sentenced her to time served. The trial court imposed
six months of community control and a mental-health assessment as ordered by the
probation department. The trial court stayed its sentence pending appeal.
{¶7} Landrum appeals the trial court’s judgment in one assignment of
error, asserting that the trial court erred in convicting her of aggravated menacing
because the evidence was insufficient and the finding of guilt was against the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
manifest weight of the evidence with regard to whether the victim believed that
Landrum would cause her serious physical harm.
{¶8} When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
determine, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
offenses proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. To reverse a conviction on
manifest weight of the evidence, this court must review the entire record, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and
determine whether, in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly
lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding the defendant
guilty. See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
{¶9} R.C. 2903.21(A) defines the crime of aggravating menacing and
provides in relevant part that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause another to believe
that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the
other person[.]” In order to prove aggravated menacing, the state must show that
the victim had a subjective belief of fear of serious physical harm. In re Amos, 3d
Dist. Crawford No. 3-04-07, 2004-Ohio-7037, ¶ 21-23; In re Fugate, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 01AP-1195, 2002-Ohio-2771. Evidence of a person’s belief that an
offender will cause serious physical harm can be proven with circumstantial
evidence. See State v. Crews, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-1391, 2001 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2937, *9 (June 26, 2001).
{¶10} In Fugate, the Tenth Appellate District held the evidence was
insufficient to sustain an aggravating-menacing conviction where a student told an
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
instructor that he would bring a gun to school and shoot another instructor—the
victim. The victim testified that the student’s threat against her made her feel
“uncomfortable” and “surprised.” Fugate ¶ 7-9. Similarly, the Eighth Appellate
District found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant
committed aggravating menacing after a road-rage incident in which the defendant
flashed a gun at the victim, because the victim offered no testimony as “to any
subjective belief that [the defendant] would cause [the victim] serious physical
harm.” City of Garfield Hts. v. Greer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87078, 2006-Ohio-
5936, ¶ 7.
{¶11} In contrast, the Tenth Appellate District held that sufficient evidence
existed on the issue of whether the victim believed that the defendant would cause
her serious physical harm where the defendant, who was an acquaintance of the
victim, showed up at the victim’s home, lifted up his shirt to reveal a firearm, and
then left. State v. Goodwin, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 05AP-267 and 05AP-268,
2006-Ohio-66. The victim testified that she had been surprised initially by the
defendant’s actions and did not feel threatened. Id. at ¶ 21-22. The victim
discovered later through a mutual friend that the defendant had come to the victim’s
home because the defendant had thought the victim burglarized his home, so the
victim then called the defendant and “yelled and cursed at him.” Id. at ¶ 23. The
victim testified that once she discovered the reason for the defendant’s actions, she
felt fearful.
{¶12} As to the victim’s subjective belief that Landrum was going to cause
her serious physical harm, the state questioned the victim as follows:
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Q: And you stated that [Landrum] was saying that she
was going to beat you up. Did you believe her when she
was saying those things?
A: Oh yeah, I did.
Q: And why did you believe her?
A: Because like the – her rage and her emotions,
everything just had me in fear, like she was really, really
ready to do something to me.
{¶13} The victim then testified, “Like I wasn’t scared. I was more so scared
for my daughter, what she was thinking. Because she was already afraid to walk past
her house from the incident before, leaving school. * * * I wasn’t like scared like, oh,
because that’s my aunt. But she did fear me. * * * I had fear.” On cross-examination,
the defense attorney returned to the issue of the victim’s state of mind: “On direct,
you said you weren’t really scared.” The victim responded, “No. I said I feared.”
{¶14} On redirect, the following exchange took place between the prosecutor
and the victim:
Q: And you’ve stated that you weren’t scared but you
were afraid. What do you mean by that?
A: I mean, like she probably was just to, you know, put
me in a state to be scared. Because that’s my aunt, I
wasn’t expecting for her to use [the knife]. Let me just
say that. I wasn’t expecting for her to use it, which
before – she had pulled it out on me the day before, too.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
But it wasn’t really – I wasn’t expecting for her to
actually use it.
Q: Okay. So on direct, when I asked about did you
believe her –
A: And I said yes.
Q: So you did believe –
A: Yes.
Q: --that she was going too—
A: Yeah. Like, I mean, I believe she just was trying to
intimidate me with it, you know, like put fear in me, like
– but I didn’t feel like she was really going to use it.
Q: Okay. So did you feel like – did you feel threatened at
all—
A: Yes.
{¶15} The portion of the victim’s testimony stating that she did not expect
Landrum to “actually use” the knife because of their blood relationship does not
overshadow her consistent assertions that she feared Landrum and felt threatened
when Landrum ran up to her with the butcher knife, threatening to “beat her A” and
to “cut” her. This is not a case where the victim failed to testify regarding any
subjective belief that serious physical harm would result from the defendant’s
actions, or where the victim merely felt surprised or uncomfortable due to the
defendant’s actions. See Greer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87078, 2006-Ohio-5936, at ¶
7; Fugate, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1195, 2002-Ohio-2771, at ¶ 7-9; Amos, 3d
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Dist. Crawford No. 3-04-07, 2004-Ohio-7037, at ¶ 22 (where the victim indicated
that she did not experience any fear and did not feel threatened).
{¶16} The victim testified four times that she had been in a state of fear
because of Landrum’s actions. The victim testified that she believed Landrum would
hurt her because of Landrum’s “rage.” At the end of her testimony, the victim stated
unequivocally that she felt threatened. Viewing this evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, which we are required to do in reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the
victim believed Landrum was going to cause her serious physical harm. See Jenks,
61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, at paragraph two of the syllabus; Goodwin, 10th
Dist. Franklin Nos. 05AP-267 and 05AP-268, 2006-Ohio-66, at ¶ 22 (where the
victim testified that she was fearful and felt threatened, sufficient evidence existed to
sustain an aggravating-menacing conviction).
{¶17} Nor did the trier of fact clearly lose its way and create a manifest
miscarriage of justice in finding Landrum guilty. See Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d at
386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541. The trial court was free to accept the victim’s version of
the events and reject Landrum’s story that the victim had threatened her with a gun,
especially where Landrum admitted to being angry upon seeing the victim, and the
victim’s version was corroborated by another witness at the scene. See State v. Sims,
1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-150252 and C-150253, 2015-Ohio-4996, ¶ 11. We are also
mindful that a trial court, which sits as a trier of fact in a bench trial, remains in the
best position to judge witness credibility and can freely reject testimony. See State v.
Railey, 2012-Ohio-4233, 977 N.E.2d 703, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶18} Having determined that Landrum’s argument is without merit, we
overrule Landrum’s sole assignment of error. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
STAUTBERG, J., concurs.
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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