State v. Matthews

[Cite as State v. Matthews, 2018-Ohio-2424.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 27718
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 17-CRB-1903
:
ATAYVIA MATTHEWS : (Criminal Appeal from
: Municipal Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 22nd day of June, 2018.
...........
ANDREW D. SEXTON, Atty. Reg. No. 0070892, 335 W. Third Street, Room 390, Dayton,
Ohio 45402
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
J. DAVID TURNER, Atty. Reg. No. 0017456, P.O. Box 291771, 101 Southmoor Circle
NW, Kettering, Ohio 45429
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Atayvia Matthews appeals from her conviction and sentence on
misdemeanor charges of menacing and aggravated menacing.
{¶ 2} In her sole assignment of error, Matthews challenges the legal sufficiency
and manifest weight of the evidence to sustain her aggravated menacing conviction.
{¶ 3} The present appeal stems from a dispute that occurred at the manager’s
office in a Dayton-area apartment complex. A resident, Tameka Hines, went to the office
to complain about children writing on her car. Matthews and her brother followed Hines
to the office because they believed Hines was going to accuse Matthews’s children. The
complex manager, Dwanna Tory, testified at trial that she refused to speak to Matthews’s
brother because he was not a resident. According to Tory, Matthews became enraged
and threatened her. Specifically, Tory testified that Matthews told her, “B**ch, I will f***
you up. I will bash your head in the m***** f****** wall.” (Tr. at 15). Tory testified that
Matthews “balled up” her fist and got nose to nose with Tory while “yelling, cursing, spitting
in my face telling me how she would bash my m***** f****** head in. She would beat my
a**.” (Id. at 16). Tory responded by calling 911. She testified that she was afraid and
feared for her life. (Id. at 18). Hines, the complaining tenant, observed the incident. She
recalled that Matthews had her fists “balled up” and was “moving back and forth like she
wanted some type of altercation.” (Id. at 76). Hines testified that Matthews was “very
confrontational” and was “breathing real heavy.” (Id.). Hines stated that she heard
Matthews threaten to “bash [Tory’s] head in” and call her “all types of b**ches.” (Id. at 74).
Based on Matthews’s demeanor, Hines perceived her as very threatening. (Id. at 77).
Hines never heard Tory threaten Matthews. (Id. at 75).
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{¶ 4} Matthews’s brother, Kevin, testified as a defense witness. He testified that
Tory and Matthews were yelling and cursing at each other, but he did not recall Matthews
threatening Tory. (Id. at 100-102). Kevin stated that Tory actually grabbed Matthews’s
arm. (Id. at 101). He then intervened to defuse the situation. (Id. at 101). Kevin also
confirmed that Matthews recently had undergone a cesarean-section birth, implying that
she would have been incapable of fighting. (Id. at 125). The final witness was Matthews’s
mother, Michelle Matlock. She testified that she was visiting Matthews, who recently had
given birth. (Id. at 127). Matlock stated that she spoke with Matthews on the telephone
while Matthews and Tory were arguing. (Id. at 128). Matlock advised Matthews to stop
arguing and to call the police. (Id.). Matlock testified that she did not overhear any threats
from anyone while she was on the telephone with Matthews. (Id. at 130). Specifically, she
never heard Matthews threaten to do anything to Tory. (Id. at 131-132).
{¶ 5} Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found Matthews guilty of
menacing and aggravated menacing. It imposed suspended jail sentences for both
offenses and credited her for time already served. The trial court also imposed and
suspended two fines, placed Matthews on probation for eighteen months, and imposed
other conditions. (Tr. at 169-170; Doc. # 78). This appeal followed.1
{¶ 6} In her assignment of error, Matthews challenges the legal sufficiency and
manifest weight of the evidence to sustain her aggravated menacing conviction. Matthews
contends the prosecution failed to prove that Tory believed Matthews was going to cause
1 We note that Matthews’s appeal cannot be moot because she requested a stay of
execution of sentence in the trial court. (Doc. # 81). Although the trial court denied a stay
(Doc. # 81), the act of requesting a stay precludes a finding of mootness. Cleveland Hts.
v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St. 3d 389, 2011-Ohio-2673, 953 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 23-26.
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Tory serious physical harm. Matthews makes two arguments in support. First, she cites
portions of Tory’s trial testimony to suggest that Tory feared some physical harm on the
day in question but not serious physical harm. Second, she asserts that Tory’s testimony
about fearing for her life is belied by a recording of the 911 call to police, which does not
reflect such fear.
{¶ 7} When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, she is arguing
that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the
verdict as a matter of law. State v. Hawn, 138 Ohio App. 3d 449, 471, 741 N.E.2d 594 (2d
Dist. 2000). “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine
whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 8} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When
a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an
appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in
the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A judgment should be
reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional
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case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 9} With the foregoing standards in mind, we conclude that Matthews’s
aggravated menacing conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence and is not
against the weight of the evidence. The prosecution’s evidence supports a finding that
Matthews threatened to “bash” Tory’s head into a wall and to “f*** her up.” While making
these threats, Matthews was enraged, standing nose to nose with Tory with her fists
balled as if she wanted to fight. Tory testified that she was afraid and feared for her life.
This evidence, if believed, is legally sufficient to establish that Matthews knowingly
caused Tory to believe that Matthews would cause serious physical harm in violation of
R.C. 2903.21(A), the aggravated menacing statute.
{¶ 10} For purposes of aggravated menacing, “serious physical harm” includes,
inter alia, (1) physical harm that involves temporary, substantial incapacity, (2) physical
harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or some temporary serious
disfigurement, and (3) “physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result
in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain.” R.C.
2901.01(A)(5). Matthews’s threat to “bash” Tory’s head into a wall and to “f*** her up”
reasonably could fit within any of these definitions of serious physical harm.
{¶ 11} Matthews’s aggravated menacing conviction also is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. She cites portions of Tory’s trial testimony to suggest
that Tory feared some physical harm but not serious physical harm. We disagree. While
admitting that Matthews never explicitly threatened to kill her, Tory insisted that she did
fear for her life during the incident. On cross examination, Tory also testified that she still
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feared Matthews but that she no longer feared (at the time of trial) that Matthews would
kill her. (Tr. at 51-52). On redirect examination, Tory reiterated that Matthews had
threatened to “bash [her] head in,” not to “kill” her. (Id. at 59). Tory then added: “I believe
she would do bodily harm. What bodily harm? I don’t know because I don’t know her. I
don’t know what she’s capable of doing but I do know or believe she is a violent person.”
(Id.). Based on these last statements Matthews suggests the aggravated menacing
conviction cannot stand because Tory claimed not to know what bodily harm Matthews
might inflict. It appears, however, that Tory was talking about her existing fear and beliefs
at the time of trial, not the time of the incident. In any event, Tory unambiguously testified
at trial that she feared for her life at the time of the incident because Matthews had
threatened to “bash” her head into a wall and to “f*** her up”—acts from which the trier of
fact could reasonably have concluded Tory feared Matthews would cause serious
physical harm within the meaning of the aggravated menacing statute.
{¶ 12} Matthews next contends Tory’s claim about fearing for her life was
controverted by an audio recording of the 911 call to police. Matthews notes Tory’s failure
to tell the 911 operator that she feared for her life. Matthews also asserts that Tory
sounded too “calm” on the recording aside from when she could be heard arguing with
the other parties. These arguments do not render Matthews’s conviction against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Tory’s level of composure on the telephone and her
failure to mention fearing for her life while speaking to the 911 operator were perhaps
matters for the trial court to consider when assessing her credibility. The trial court acted
well within its discretion as the trier of fact, however, in crediting the testimony of Tory
and Hines over the testimony of Matthews’s brother and mother. This is not an exceptional
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case in which the evidence weighs heavily against Matthews’s conviction.
{¶ 13} Based on the reasoning set forth above, we overrule Matthews’s
assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the Dayton Municipal Court.
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WELBAUM, P. J., and TUCKER, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Andrew D. Sexton
J. David Turner
Hon. Deirdre E. Logan