State v. Hassenruck

[Cite as State v. Hassenruck, 2018-Ohio-4546.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 17CA011230
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
HAROLD DAVID HASSENRUCK COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 08 CR 077116
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: November 13, 2018
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Harold Hassenruck, appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court
of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} This matter involves a crime that was committed in 2007. Hassenruck was
indicted on one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) in relation to the incident.
After a competency evaluation was conducted and he was declared competent to stand trial,
Hassenruck entered into a plea agreement where he pleaded guilty to rape and the trial court
imposed a nine-year prison sentence. Hassenruck was also classified as a Tier III sex offender
pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act.
{¶3} On September 19, 2017, the Ohio Department of Corrections informed the State
of Hassenruck’s impending release from prison and noted that there might be an issue with his
sexual offender classification. Hassenruck was scheduled to be released from prison on October
2
25, 2017. On September 22, 2017, the State filed a motion for a sexual predator classification
hearing. Therein, the State argued that Hassenruck’s sex offender classification was void
because the offense occurred before January 1, 2008, the date when the Adam Walsh Act
became effective. The State asked the trial court to hold a hearing so that Hassenruck could be
classified under Megan’s Law. The trial court set the matter for a hearing on October 16, 2017.
When Hassenruck appeared for the hearing, he indicated that he would like the trial court to
appoint counsel. The trial court appointed counsel and rescheduled the hearing for October 23,
2017. On the morning of the hearing, Hassenruck filed a number of motions including a motion
to dismiss, a motion for discovery, and a motion for a competency hearing. In support of his
motion to dismiss, Hassenruck noted his impending release date and argued that reclassifying
him so close to his release date violated his due process rights because he would not be able to
adequately prepare for the hearing. The issues raised in the motions were addressed by the trial
court prior to the hearing. The trial court ultimately denied the motions and, after the hearing,
classified Hassenruck as a sexual predator under Megan’s Law.
{¶4} On appeal, Hassenruck raises two assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING
APPELLANT TO SUBMIT TO A MEGAN’S LAW SEXUAL
CLASSIFICATION HEARING ON SEVEN DAYS NOTICE AND 35 HOURS
PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF HIS PRISON SENTENCE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE
OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE AND OTHERWISE ALLOWING VICTIM
IMPACT TESTIMONY AT A MEGAN’S LAW SEXUAL CLASSIFICATION
HEARING.
3
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Hassenruck argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it proceeded with the sexual offender classification hearing in such a short
timeframe. In his second assignment of error, Hassenruck argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing improper victim impact testimony. This Court disagrees with both
assertions.
Background
{¶6} After briefly recapping the case’s procedural history at the outset of the sexual
offender classification hearing, the trial court allowed Hassenruck to make arguments in support
his various motions. Hassenruck raised two arguments in support of his motion to dismiss,
namely that (1) Megan’s Law was unconstitutional; and (2) holding a hearing on an accelerated
schedule violated Hassenruck’s due process rights. While acknowledging that the trial court had
previously found Hassenruck “both competent and criminally sane[,]” defense counsel noted that
his meeting with Hassenruck in preparation for the hearing raised concerns about his client’s
competency. Defense counsel opined that if Hassenruck had any mental health issues prior to
entering prison, those issues may have been exacerbated while he was incarcerated. On this
basis, defense counsel argued that it would be prejudicial to his client to go forward with the
hearing without a competency evaluation. Defense counsel further argued that he had only been
on the case for one week which had inhibited his ability to engage in adequate discovery and
prepare for the hearing. Defense counsel stressed that “Hassenruck wants this behind him * * *
and he doesn’t want a continuance. He wants this over. He would like a dismissal today, as he
believes is his right.”
{¶7} In response, the State emphasized that the notion of “dismiss[ing]” the
classification was somewhat misleading because the trial court was not required to determine
4
whether Hassenruck was guilty or not guilty in a criminal proceeding. Instead, the State argued,
the trial court was required to hold a hearing and determine the extent to which Hassenruck was
subject to the registration and classification system under Megan’s Law. The State further
pointed to Ohio Supreme Court precedent in support of the proposition that, unlike the Adam
Walsh Act, Megan’s Law was remedial, and not criminal, in nature.
{¶8} While the trial court articulated its concerns regarding the time constraints, it
further expressed apprehension that the court would lose jurisdiction over the matter if the
classification hearing did not go forward prior to the conclusion of Hassenruck’s sentence. The
trial court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss, noting that Megan’s Law had been “vetted
enough” for the trial court to be “very comfortable” with the process. The trial court further
found that the fact that Hassenruck has been incarcerated for an extended period of time was an
insufficient justification to order a competency evaluation. The trial court also denied the
request for further discovery.
{¶9} After denying Hassenruck’s motions, the trial court proceeded with the hearing as
scheduled. The State worked through the factors set forth in former R.C. 2950.09(B) in support
of its position that Hassenruck should be classified as a sexual predator. During that discussion,
the State mentioned a report from a physician at North Coast Behavioral Health Care.
Hassenruck stipulated to the admission of the report during the pretrial process. The report
indicated that Hassenruck suffered with mild depression, anxiety, polysubstance dependence,
and pedophilia.
{¶10} The State called Detective Adam Freas of the North Ridgeville Police Department
to testify at the hearing. Detective Freas testified regarding an incident in 2008 where he was
called to a Subway restaurant in response to a voyeurism complaint. Video footage revealed that
5
a man, later determined to be Hassenruck, was using his cell phone to take photographs of a
young girl without her permission. Detective Freas further explained that Hassenruck was
known by a different name at the time of that incident. When questioned by police, Hassenruck
told a story that he had recently been in prison and wanted to change his name to something
“catchy” in order to “start afresh” upon his release. In actuality, Hassenruck had legally changed
his name to that of another young girl who lived in a neighboring community. Police
subsequently searched Hassenruck’s possessions and found a newspaper photograph of a young
girl with that name. The text accompanying the photograph indicated that the girl was ten years
old and in fourth grade. Detective Freas acknowledged on cross-examination that Hassenruck
was never actually convicted of the voyeurism charge.
{¶11} The State also called on the victim’s mother (“Mother”) to make a statement. The
trial court initially noted that it would be unconventional to place someone under oath to deliver
what was referred to as a “victim impact statement[.]” Defense counsel objected to the statement
on the basis that permitting such a statement would not be “procedurally correct.” The trial court
ultimately permitted Mother to make a statement but insisted that she do so under oath in order
to ensure that her statement was truthful. Mother stated that the victim was just a three-year-old
boy at the time of the incident. The victim had been hospitalized due to suicidal ideation and
needed extensive counseling. Mother stressed the impact that the offense had had on her family
and noted that the victim, who is now a freshman in high school, was worried about
Hassenruck’s impending release. Mother also discussed her own concerns that Hassenruck had
not expressed adequate remorse and that he would be a threat to other families upon his release
from prison. Both the State and defense counsel declined to question Mother after she delivered
her statement.
6
{¶12} At the end of the hearing, the trial court worked through the relevant factors and
found Hassenruck to be a sexual predator.
Due Process
{¶13} On appeal, Hassenruck argues that his due process rights were violated because
the classification hearing was held just seven days after counsel was appointed and immediately
preceding his release from prison. Hassenruck points to the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, in support of the proposition that
a litigant must have notice of the proceeding and sufficient time to prepare when there is a lapse
between the triggering event and the hearing. Hassenruck further maintains that defense counsel
was unable to adequately prepare for the hearing given that there was no time for a competency
evaluation.
{¶14} Hassenruck’s notice argument is without merit. The trial court was required to
hold a sexual offender classification hearing under former R.C. 2950.09(B)(1). Sex offender
classification proceedings under former R.C. 2950 were not considered punitive in nature. State
v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, at ¶ 30-32. Instead, they were civil proceedings
intended to protect the public. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that Megan’s Law
contained a mandatory requirement that the trial court give an offender “notice of the date, time,
and location” of the sexual offender classification hearing. State v. Gowdy, 88 Ohio St.3d 387,
397 (2000), quoting former R.C. 2950.09(B)(1). The notice was necessary in order to ensure that
counsel had time to “adequately prepare” for the hearing. Id. at 398. In Gowdy, the Supreme
Court held that a trial court violated the statute by conducting a sexual offender classification
hearing on the same day as sentencing without having provided notice of the sexual offender
classification hearing. Id. at 397-399. Unlike Gowdy, or the circumstances that this Court
7
confronted in State v. Linscott, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 19947, 20021, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 48,
*21-23 (Jan. 10, 2001), this case does not involve a scenario where the trial court failed to give
Hassenruck written or oral notice of the hearing. Here, after the State filed its motion on
September 22, 2017, the trial court promptly issued a journal entry setting the matter for hearing
on October 16, 2017. At that time, the trial court appointed counsel and informed Hassenruck
that the matter would go forward one week later on October 23, 2017. Thus, Hassenruck, along
with newly appointed counsel, had notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing a week in
advance in compliance with former R.C. 2950.09(B)(1).
{¶15} Hassenruck further contends that going forward with the hearing on such short
notice violated the Loudermill standard in that he was not provided a meaningful opportunity to
prepare. In support of this position, Hassenruck points to the trial court’s own statements
regarding the accelerated schedule and the fact that he was unable to have a competency
evaluation.
{¶16} Under the circumstances of this case, Hassenruck’s argument that seven days was
not an adequate amount of time to prepare for the hearing is purely speculative. While the trial
court expressed a degree of concern regarding the accelerated nature of the proceedings, it
ultimately exercised its judgment to move forward with the sexual offender classification
hearing. Hassenruck has not explained on appeal how the trial court’s application of the
pertinent factors might have been different if he had additional time to prepare. To the extent
that Hassenruck argues that he was prejudiced because the trial court denied his request for a
competency evaluation, we note that, with respect to the amount of due process required, the
“need to protect the public from convicted sex offenders whose recidivism rates are known to be
‘alarming’ outweigh[s] the ‘significant and often harsh consequences for offenders[.]’” State v.
8
Kahn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104360, 2017-Ohio-4067, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Ferguson, 120
Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, ¶ 32, 35. As former R.C. Chapter 2950 is civil and remedial in
nature, there is no requirement that a trial court hold a competency hearing prior to holding a
sexual offender classification hearing. See Kahn at ¶ 19. Here, defense counsel’s request for a
competency evaluation was based on his observations of Hassenruck when they met in
preparation for the sexual offender classification hearing. Hassenruck was found competent
prior to trial. In rejecting defense counsel’s request, the trial court concluded that the fact that
Hassenruck had spent time in prison was not a sufficient basis to revisit the issue. Under these
circumstances, Hassenruck has not demonstrated that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unconscionable in proceeding with the sexual offender classification hearing without ordering
a second competency evaluation. See Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶17} Hassenruck’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Mother’s Statement
{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Hassenruck contends that the trial court failed
to apply the Ohio Rules of Evidence by allowing Mother to give a “victim impact statement”
under oath at the sexual offender classification hearing. This Court disagrees.
{¶19} As an initial matter, “[a] sexual predator determination hearing is similar to
sentencing or probation hearings where it is well settled that the Rules of Evidence do not strictly
apply.” State v. Wright, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18941, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2980, *5 (June 23,
1999), quoting State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 425 (1998). It follows that the trial court was
not required to strictly apply the Ohio Rules of Evidence in conducting the hearing in this matter.
{¶20} Hassenruck contends that Mother’s statement that was referred to as a victim
impact statement was improperly used as an “emotional ploy.” In addressing this contention, we
9
first must clarify that Mother’s statement was not a victim impact statement as defined by statute.
Pursuant to R.C. 2947.051(A), a victim impact statement is prepared prior to sentencing in
conjunction with either the department of probation, the court’s own regular probation officer, or
a victim assistance program. “A victim impact statement prepared under [R.C. 2947.051] shall
be kept confidential and is not a public record as defined by [R.C. 149.43].” R.C. 2947.051(C).
R.C. 2930.14(A) underscores that a victim impact statement should come prior to the imposition
of sentence. Consequently, this case does not involve a victim impact statement as contemplated
by Ohio law. Instead, the trial court effectively allowed Mother to make a testimonial statement
at the classification hearing and then gave the parties an opportunity to question her, though both
sides declined to do so. There is a general presumption that a trial judge will only consider
relevant and appropriate evidence when arriving at its judgment. See generally State v. Richey,
64 Ohio St.3d 353, 357-358 (1992). Here, the trial court stressed that Mother’s statement was of
limited relevance to the underlying issue and further noted that its decision to allow the statement
was motivated in part by the fact that Mother had been unable to address the court at the time of
sentencing. Hassenruck has not demonstrated that the result below would have been different
but for Mother’s statement. Under these circumstances, where the trial court was mindful of the
limited value of the statement, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting Mother to make a statement on the record.
{¶21} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶22} Hassenruck’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
10
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
SCHAFER, P. J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOHN F. CORRIGAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.