Grande Arcade, Ltd. v. Grand Arcade Condominium Owners' Assn., Inc.

[Cite as Grande Arcade, Ltd. v. Grand Arcade Condominium Owners' Assn., Inc., 2017-Ohio-2760.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 104890
GRAND ARCADE, LTD.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
GRAND ARCADE CONDOMINIUM
OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-14-833375
BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., Kilbane, P.J., and Stewart, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 11, 2017
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Michael D. Linn
Thomas Owen
Powers Friedman Linn, P.L.L.
23240 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 180
Cleveland, Ohio 44122
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Robert E. Kmiecik
Joseph E. DiBaggio
Kaman & Cusimano, L.L.C.
50 Public Square, Suite 2000
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Continental Management Co., pro se
C/O Stat. Agt. John G. Moir
2012 West 25th Street, Suite 810
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Grand Arcade, Ltd. (“Appellant”), appeals an order
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Grand Arcade Condominium
Owners’ Association, Inc. (“the Association”). Appellant raises three assignments of
error:
1. The trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary
judgment on the issue of whether the Condominium Documents required a
commercial owner to pay a proportionate share of the cost associated with
the installation of windows for the residential units.
2. The trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary
judgment when the appellant raised a genuine issue of fact regarding the
calculation of the assessment.
3. The trial court erred by issuing an order declaring that the appellant was
responsible for the special assessment when the appellee did not file a
counterclaim or otherwise seek affirmative relief from the court.
{¶2} We find no merit to the appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} The Association is a corporate entity created for the purpose of managing 99
condominium units in the Grand Arcade, Warning Block, Klein-Marks, and Blair Block
buildings. The buildings, which are located on St. Clair Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio, were
built in the 1880s. Appellant is a member of the Association by virtue of its ownership
of five condominium units in the Grand Arcade building. In 2006, the Association
entered into a contract with Continental Management Company (“Continental”) to act as
the Association’s agent in performing management functions under the direction of the
Association’s board of directors (“the Board”).
{¶4} In 2012, the Association determined that the windows and exterior masonry
on Grand Arcade, Warning Block, Klein-Marks, and Blair Block buildings were in need
of repairs. In an effort to prioritize spending, the Association obtained an engineering
report that identified the areas in greatest need of repair, including the removal and
replacement of existing window frames, trim work, glass, sash, screens, caulking, and
sealing work throughout all four buildings. This case involves a dispute as to whether
Appellant is responsible for a percentage of the assessment levied against Association
members to pay for the expansive window replacement project (“the project”).
{¶5} In January 2013, the Association, through the Board, determined that each
member would pay a proportionate share of the cost for all “Common Element” 1
expenses, such as brick masonry, window frames, and the removal and replacement of
window frames according to each member’s percentage of ownership in the buildings.
Individual unit owners would be responsible for the labor and material cost to replace the
glass and sash on their own windows, if they had to be replaced. Appellant did not have
any windows that needed to be replaced.
{¶6} In August 2013, the Association held a special meeting of the membership at
which the Board approved the project. The Board informed members that individual unit
The terms “Common Elements,” “Limited Residential Elements,” and “Units” are terms
1
defined in the Association’s Declaration and Bylaws.
owners were responsible for the cost to replace the glass and sash in their own windows.
The Board estimated the project would cost between $1.3 and $1.7 million dollars and
informed members that it would either levy a special assessment to members and/or
secure financing to pay for the project. Either way, members would be charged their
proportionate share of the cost.
{¶7} In October 2013, the Association received bids from three construction
companies and awarded the bid to Miceli Glass, Inc. (“Miceli Glass”) because its bid of
$1,622,862 was the lowest and best bid. The Board voted to proceed with a special
assessment for the project that would begin in January 2014 and run through September
2014. Members of the Association subsequently voted to allow the Association to obtain
a loan to finance the project.
{¶8} The Association calculated the total cost per square foot for all windows
based on Miceli Glass’s bid. The total cost for the project was $167 per square foot,
which was determined based on the total cost of the project divided by the total square
footage of the affected windows. At the Association’s request, Miceli Glass informed
the Association that the price per square foot for the glass and sash portion of the
windows to be installed was $60 per square foot. Accordingly, the Board determined
that the Common Element expense for the window replacement project was $107 per
square foot.
{¶9} In August 2014, the Board sent a letter to all condominium owners to discuss
its decision to move forward with the window replacement project, the cost of the project,
and the payment options available to owners. Owners could either pay their respective
shares in advance interest free, if paid by September 3, 2014, or through a loan that
required monthly payments with interest over a 15-year term. Scott Sauter, Continental’s
chief operating officer, subsequently sent an email to Appellant’s representative, Michael
Carney (“Carney”), to clarify the cost allocation of the project. The email contained two
spreadsheets that indicated Appellant would only be charged for the Common Element
cost of the project, which was $107 per square foot.
{¶10} The project proceeded as planned, and Appellant did not make the advance
payment for its share of project. By default, Appellant was subsequently placed on the
15-year loan repayment plan. Appellant was assessed a total of $108,000 based on its
percentage of ownership in the buildings.
{¶11} In September 2014, Appellant filed a complaint against the Association and
Continental seeking an order (1) declaring that it was “not responsible for paying any part
of the assessed costs or expenses relating to the residential unit window project,” (2)
enjoining the Association and Continental “from assessing to and demanding from
[Appellant] a percentage of the costs and expenses relating to the residential unit window
project,” and (3) awarding money damages resulting from the Association and
Continental’s alleged negligence. (Complaint ¶ 9-17.) Appellant further alleged that
the Association and Continental negligently caused the deterioration of the windows and
that the stated cost of the repair work was “grossly overstated.”
{¶12} The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. Appellant
argued that because it owned commercial units, it was not responsible for any portion of
the repair costs, which were limited to either residential “Units” or residential “Limited
Common Elements.” The Association, however, argued that based on the definitions of
“Common Elements” and “Units” in the Association’s Declaration and Bylaws, Appellant
was responsible for its proportionate share of the project regardless of the fact that it
owned commercial units.
{¶13} A magistrate determined that Appellant was responsible for the full amount
of the assessment levied against it for the project. The magistrate concluded that, based
on the unambiguous language in the Association’s Declaration and Bylaws, “window
frames” and associated costs were “Common Elements” of the property as opposed to
“Limited Common Elements.” The magistrate further determined that Appellant was
responsible for its share of the cost to repair the “Common Elements.”
{¶14} Appellant filed timely objections. In a journal entry adopting the
magistrate’s decision, the trial court explained, in relevant part:
The court finds and declares that the window frames are a Common
Element in the Declaration and Bylaws. The court further finds that and
declares that “window frames” are not listed as a Common Element or in
the description of a Unit and must, therefore, be a Common Element by
virtue of the express terms of the agreement. The court further finds and
declares that plaintiff, as a unit owner, is therefore responsible for the
proportional assessment for the costs of window frames and window frame
installation.
Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association and
denied Appellant’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant now appeals the trial
court’s judgment.
II. Law and Analysis
A. “Common Elements”
{¶15} In the first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
finding that the condominium documents, i.e., the Association’s “Declaration and
Bylaws,” required a commercial owner to pay a proportionate share of the project.
Appellant contends the trial court misinterpreted the contractual obligations embodied in
the Association’s Declaration and Bylaws.
{¶16} Condominium declarations and bylaws are contracts between the association
and the purchaser and are subject to the traditional rules of contract interpretation.
Nottingdale Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Darby, 33 Ohio St.3d 32, 35-36, 514 N.E.2d 702(1987). A contract that is clear and unambiguous requires no real interpretation or
construction and will be given the effect called for by the plain language of the contract.
Aultman Hosp. Assn. v. Community Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ohio St.3d 51, 55, 544 N.E.2d 920(1989).
{¶17} Where a contract’s terms are clear and unambiguous, its interpretation is as
a matter of law, not fact, and may be adjudicated by summary judgment. Dutch Maid
Logistics, Inc. v. Acuity, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 91932 and 92002, 2009-Ohio-1783, ¶
19. We, therefore, interpret the terms of the Association’s Declaration and Bylaws de
novo. Continental W. Condo. Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc., 74 Ohio
St.3d 501, 502, 660 N.E.2d 431 (1996).
{¶18} Appellant concedes it is responsible for its proportionate share of Common
Element expenses, but asserts that none of the repairs in the project constitute Common
Element expenses. In support of its argument, Appellant cites the definitions of the
terms “Common Elements” and “Limited Common Elements” in Article I of the
Declaration,2 which state, in relevant part:
(I) “Common Elements” include, unless otherwise provided in the
Declaration, the following parts of the Condominium Property:
***
(2) All other areas, facilities, places, and structures that are not part of a
Unit, including but not limited to:
***
(f) All other parts of the Condominium Property necessary or convenient to
its existence, maintenance, and safety, or normally in common use, or that
have been designated as Common Areas and Facilities in the Declaration or
Drawings.
***
(U) “Limited Common Elements” means the Common Areas and Facilities
designated in the Declaration as reserved for a certain Unit or Units to the
exclusion of other Units, including those Limited Common Areas and
In 2005, the Association recorded an Amendment to the Declarations and Bylaws “to bring
2
the Declaration in compliance with” R.C. 5311.05(E)(1). The amendment changed the term “Common
Areas and Facilities” to “Common Elements,” and changed “Limited Common Areas” or “Limited
Common Areas and Facilities” to “Limited Common Elements.” Therefore, we refer to any
reference to “Common Areas and Facilities” and “Limited Common Areas” as “Common Elements”
and “Limited Common Elements.”
Facilities reserved exclusively for the Commercial Units (“Commercial
Limited Common Elements”) and those Limited Common Areas and
Facilities reserved exclusively for the Residential Units (“Residential
Limited Common Elements”).
{¶19} Appellant also cites the following language from Article II, Section (A) of
the Declaration that defines the term “Units,” in part, as including “[a]ll window sashes.”
{¶20} Appellant argues that because none of the definitions of “Common
Elements” and “Limited Common Elements” include the words “windows,” “glass,”
“sash,” or “frame,” none of the areas within the project fall within the scope of “Common
Element” expenses. Appellant argues this conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that
the definition of “Limited Common Elements” includes “[a]ll glass and screens within
window and door frames within or attached to the perimeter walls of such Unit.”
Finally, Appellant argues that because the phrase “attached to the perimeter walls of such
Unit” modifies the terms “window” and “door frames,” it is consistent with the language
in Article II, Section (A) that defines “Units,” in part, as including “[a]ll window sashes”
and “windows and glass frames * * * affixed to the perimeter walls.” Appellant
contends these definitions can only lead to the conclusion that these areas fall within the
definition of Limited Common Elements and are not Common Elements.
{¶21} However, Appellant ignores the plain language contained in Article I,
Section (I) that further defines “Common Elements,” in part, as “[a]ll other areas,
facilities, places, and structures that are not part of a Unit.” (Emphasis added.) Thus,
Common Elements include those elements that are not part of a Unit.
{¶22} Article I, Section (EE) of the Declaration defines “Unit” as “a part of the
Condominium Property consisting of one or more rooms on one or more floors of the
Building and designated as a Unit in the Declaration and delineated on the Drawings.”
Although the language Appellant quotes from Article II, Section (A) of the Declaration
suggests that “all windows and glass frames * * * affixed to the perimeter walls” are part
of a “Unit,” Appellant takes that language out of context and ignores other language in
that section that identifies areas excluded from the definition of a “Unit.” Article II,
Section (A) of the Declaration states, in relevant part:
(A) Units. Each of the ninety-nine (99) Units hereby declared and established as
a freehold estate shall consist of all space bounded by the interior (un-drywalled)
surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings of each such Unit, including the
vestibule, if any, immediately adjacent to each such Unit, projected, if necessary,
by reason of structural divisions such as interior walls and other partitions, the
layout, location, designation and dimensions of each such Unit * * * including,
without limitation:
***
All window sashes and doors exclusive of door frames in perimeter walls
and space occupied thereby;
***
but excepting therefrom all of the following items located within the bounds
of the Unit as described above and, to the extent the following are Common
Elements or Limited Common Elements as defined in this Declaration, are
to be used and enjoyed by the Unit Owner or Occupant of the Unit in or to
which they are appurtenant:
***
All doors, door frames, glass doors, skylights, if any, and windows (and the
glass and frames constituting or included therein) and window sashes,
affixed to the perimeter walls, floors, and roofs or ceilings of a Unit, which
are hereby declared to be parts of said walls, floors, and roofs.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶23} The clear and unambiguous language of the Declaration states that “[a]ll
window sashes and doors * * * in the perimeter walls and space” are specifically included
as part of the “Unit” and excluded from the Common Elements. The language also
indicates the confines of a “Unit” are “bounded by the interior (un-drywalled) surfaces of
the perimeter walls.” This language suggests that exterior perimeter walls are outside
the Unit and fall within the scope of “Common Elements.” See State v. Cunningham,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85342, 2005-Ohio-3840, ¶ 12 (applying the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, a rule of contract construction that means “the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another”).
{¶24} Additionally, the “but excepting therefrom” language specifically excludes
window glass and frames from the definition of a “Unit” to the extent they may be
defined elsewhere in the Declaration as “Common Elements” or Limited “Common
Elements.” Therefore, we must further examine the definitions of “Common Elements”
and “Limited Common Elements” to determine if any parts of the project constitute
“Common Elements” expenses.
{¶25} Article I, Section (B)(2) of the Declaration governs Common Elements and
Limited Common Elements and states, in relevant part:
Limited Common Elements. Each Unit Owner is hereby granted an exclusive
and irrevocable license to use and occupy to the exclusion of all others the Limited
Common Elements[,] which are located within the bounds of his Unit and serve
only his Unit. The Limited Common Elements with respect to each Unit (or
group of Units) shall consist of such of the following as may be construed to be
Common Areas:
***
(b) All glass and screens within window * * * frames within or attached to the
perimeter walls of such Unit; and all doors, hinges, locks, latches and hardware
within or on the perimeter walls of such Unit or on the Limited Common Elements
belonging to such Unit.
{¶26} This language indicates that glass and screens within window frames are
“Limited Common Elements” whereas the frame itself and anything outside the window
glass and sash are “Common Elements.” Article II, Section (B)(1) supports this
interpretation and describes “Common Elements” as:
The entire balance of the land and improvements thereon, including but not
limited to, the Building, foundations, roofs, main and supporting walls, columns,
girders, beams, halls, corridors, stairways not within Units * * * now or hereafter
situated on the Condominium Property, all as hereinbefore more specifically
described as “Common Elements” in Article I hereof, are hereby declared and
established as the Common Elements. * * * Unless otherwise provided by the Unit
Owners’ Association, however, the care, maintenance, repair and replacement of
all or any portion of such elements or fixtures located within a Unit shall be the
responsibility of the owner of such Unit.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶27} Neither the definition of a “Unit” nor the definition of a “Limited Common
Element” includes the window frames that connect windows to the structure of any of the
Association’s buildings. And since the description of “Common Elements” includes
“[t]he entire balance of the land and improvements thereon” that are not located “within a
Unit,” the window frames, which are not part of individual units or “Limited Common
Elements,” are “Common Elements.”
{¶28} Further, John Miceli (“Miceli”), of Miceli Glass, testified that much of the
repair work to the windows occurred on the exterior walls of the building and included
“trim work that had to be installed once the window frame was replaced in order to
comply with the historical aspects of the requirements of the City of Cleveland.”
(Miceli Depo. at 85.) The frame and trim were attached to the structure of the building.
Id. The exterior surfaces between the windows and the frame also required caulking.
Id. In Miceli’s opinion, these materials were “Common Elements” expenses because
they “had nothing to do with the window and the sash.” (Miceli Depo. at 86.)
{¶29} Nevertheless, Appellant argues that “pursuant to the terms of the
Condominium Documents, all of the costs and expenses relating to the replacement of
residential unit windows of the Grande Arcade are not its responsibility.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 10.) Appellant cites the following language from Article V of the Declaration to
support its argument:
(A) The Owners of Commercial Units shall not be charged with
Assessments attributable to the Residential Limited Common Areas * * *
and the Owners of Residential Units shall not be charged with Assessments
relating to the Commercial Limited Common Areas.
(B) The Owners of the Residential Units shall pay the expenses relating to
the Residential Limited Common Areas on the basis that the Par Value of
each Residential Unit bears the Par Value of all Residential Units and the
Owners of the Commercial Units shall pay the expenses relating to the
Commercial Limited Common Areas on the basis that the Par Value of each
Commercial bears the Par Value of all Commercial Units.
{¶30} Although Appellant concedes it is responsible for “Common Elements”
expenses, none of the language quoted by Appellant explains how its ownership of
commercial units exempts it from its obligation to pay its proportionate share of
“Common Elements” expenses. With respect to an owner’s duty to pay a share of
“Common Elements” expenses, Article V states, in relevant part:
(A) General Assessments for the management, maintenance, repair and
insurance of the Common Elements and amounts determined by the Board
of Directors of the Association for the establishment and maintenance of the
reserve fund to meet the cost and expense of repair and replacement of the
Common Elements together with the payment of the Common Expenses,
shall be made in the manner provided herein, and in the manner provided in
the Bylaws.
(B) Division of Common Expenses, Common Assessments, Common
Surplus, Common Profits and Common Losses. The proportionate share
of the separate owners of the respective Units in the Common Expenses,
Common Assessments, Common Surplus, Common Profits and Common
Losses of the operation of the Condominium Property is based upon the
percentage of interest in the Common Elements of such Units expressed in
Article II(B)(4) hereof. * * * The obligation of an Owner to pay his
proportionate share of Common Assessments shall commence upon such
Owner’s acquisition of his Unit.
(C) Non-Use of Facilities. No owner of a Unit may exempt himself from
liability for his contribution toward the Common Expenses by waiver of the
use or enjoyment of the Common Elements, or by abandonment of his Unit.
{¶31} Earlier we determined that window frames and the surrounding areas
outside the frames are “Common Elements” because they are not included in the
description and definition of “Units” or “Limited Common Elements.” Article V(A)
authorizes the Board to levy assessments against individual owners for “Common
Elements” expenses, and Article V(B) mandates that individual owners pay his or her
“proportionate share” of “Common Elements” “based upon the percentage of interest in
the Common Elements.” Therefore, the Association had authority to assess Appellant
for its proportionate share of the “Common Elements” portion of the project.
{¶32} It is undisputed that the Association assessed Appellant for its proportionate
share of the labor and material cost for the removal and installation of new window
frames. The assessment included the cost to repair the framing, remove windows,
connect new windows to the exterior masonry walls, seal the windows, and install trim
around the exterior face of the windows. The charges were levied against all owners
regardless of whether an individual or entity owned a commercial or residential unit.
Carney, Appellant’s representative, admitted at deposition that Appellant was not charged
for any glass window or sash portions of the project because none of its units needed new
windows. Thus, the Association only charged Appellant for Common Element
expenses. (Carney Depo. at 54.)
{¶33} Therefore, the trial court properly determined that Appellant was responsible
for the “Common Elements” expenses of the window replacement project. The amount
of the assessment is the subject of Appellant’s second assignment of error.
{¶34} The first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Calculation of the Assessment
{¶35} In the second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
accepting the Association’s stated cost of $108,000 for the “Common Elements”
expenses. Appellant contends the $108,000 is not supported by the evidence and that
the Association’s calculation of the Common Elements portion of the window
replacement project was flawed.
{¶36} The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the essential elements of the case with
evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292,
662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). Once the moving party demonstrates entitlement to summary
judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence related to any
issue on which the party bears the burden of production at trial. Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶37} Summary judgment is appropriate when, after construing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, reasonable minds can
only reach a conclusion that is adverse to the nonmoving party. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer
Club, 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998). We review an appeal from
summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671
N.E.2d 241 (1996).
{¶38} Appellant cites Miceli’s deposition testimony to support its argument.
When asked how Miceli estimated the cost of the sash and glass portion of the project,
Miceli responded: “Those dollar amounts were what we in the industry call WAG, and
that’s a wild ass guess.” (Miceli Depo. at 28.) He later stated that his estimate was “an
arbitrary number.” (Miceli Depo. at 66.) Out of context, this testimony suggests that
Miceli had no reasonable basis for estimating the cost of the sash and glass portions of the
project.
{¶39} However, Miceli explained that it was difficult to estimate the cost of the
glass and sash because the window manufacturer refused to provide a breakdown of the
cost. Nevertheless, in determining the cost of the glass and sash, Miceli considered the
total cost of all the other materials and labor necessary to complete the project and
subtracted those costs from the bottom line. In this way, he reasonably narrowed the
range of the estimated cost of the sash and glass. (See Miceli Depo. at 66, 83-89.)
Indeed, when asked whether his estimate of $60 per square foot for the glass and sash was
a fair and reasonable cost for the labor and glass and sash material, Miceli replied, based
on years of experience in the window replacement industry, “As I perceived it, yes.”
(Miceli Depo. at 89.)
{¶40} Appellant offered no evidence to refute Miceli’s calculations. When asked
what basis Appellant had to support its claim that the split between the cost per square
foot for glass and sash and “Common Expenses” was excessive, Carney replied: “I
personally do not know. It was never explained to me in a way that I could understand
it.” (Carney Depo at 55.) Carney further testified at deposition:
Q: And do you have any information that would support that the association
improperly calculated the percentage to Grand Arcade, Ltd.?
A: I do not.
***
Q: And as we sit here today, you have no evidence to support that the basis
for the cost allocation by [the Association] to Grand Arcade, Ltd., was
incorrect?
A: I do not.
Q: And you can provide no evidence — document evidence to support the
fact that [the Association] did anything improper on how it allocated the
cost to your company, Grand Arcade Ltd.?
A: No.
(Carney Depo. at 69, 74-75.) Therefore, because Appellant failed to present evidence of
the type required by Civ.R. 56(C) to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
accuracy of the $108,000 assessment the Association levied against it, the trial court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Association.
{¶41} The second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Affirmative Declaratory Relief
{¶42} In the third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
declaring that Appellant was responsible for the assessment where the Association did not
file any claims for affirmative relief. Appellant contends that because it was the only
party seeking affirmative and declaratory relief, the trial court should not have
affirmatively declared that Appellant is responsible for its proportionate share of the cost
of the window replacement project.
{¶43} However, Appellant’s claim for declaratory judgment asked the court to
decide whether or not Appellant was responsible for its proportionate share of the cost of
the project and whether the amount assessed for its share was accurate. The trial court’s
judgment answered this question by declaring Appellant is responsible for its
proportionate share of the “Common Elements” expense equal to $108,000. The
Association was not required to file a separate claim mirroring Appellant’s claim in order
to benefit from this judgment. The court merely adjudicated the issues set forth in
Appellant’s complaint, nothing more.
{¶44} Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶45} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR