In re N.W.

[Cite as In re N.W., 2022-Ohio-4346.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: N.W. JUDGES:
Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., P.J.
Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
Case No. 2022 CA 00035
OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Licking County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case
No. F2018-0449
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 5, 2022
APPEARANCES:
For Appellee For Appellant
JENNY WELLS CAROLYNN E. FITTRO
Licking County Prosecutor 1335 Dublin Road – Suite #115F
Columbus, Ohio 43215
J. BRANDON PIGG
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney For Mother
65 E. Main Street – 3rd Floor
Newark, Ohio 43055 MATTHEW DAWSON
35 S. Park Pl. – Suite #150
Guardian ad Litem Newark, Ohio 43055
CEDRIC COLLINS
P.O. Box 564
Pickerington, Ohio 43147
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 2
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Appellant P.R. (“Father”) appeals the April 26, 2022 Opinion/Judgment
Entry entered by the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which
terminated his parental rights with respect to his minor child (“the Child”) and granted
permanent custody of the Child to appellee Licking County Job and Family Services
(“LCJFS”).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Father and R.W. (“Mother”) are the biological parents of the Child. Parents
have never been married.
{¶3} On July 9, 2018, LCJFS filed a complaint, alleging the Child was dependent.
The complaint asserted the Child, who was 4 years old, was found in a stranger’s home,
after exiting her own home. The Child had been seen wandering alone down the road.
Mother contacted the police approximately 45 minutes after the Child had been
discovered in the stranger’s home. When LCJFS workers entered Mother’s residence,
they discovered there were no beds for the Child and her sibling (collectively, “the
Children”), and the Children were sleeping on coats placed on the floor. In addition,
LCJFS workers found little to no food in the residence. Until recently, the family had been
residing at a hotel for several months. The Children were dirty and had lice, and were
behind on their vaccinations. LCJFS workers observed bruises on the Children’s
buttocks, lower backs, and legs. Mother is unemployed and relies upon her boyfriend,
Daniel Fosnaugh, for support. Fosnaugh has a history of domestic violence and alcohol
abuse, and was on probation in Licking County. Mother and Fosnaugh both tested
positive for THC. In addition, the complaint noted Father resides in Indiana, and had had
no contact with the Child since infancy.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 3
{¶4} The trial court issued an ex-parte emergency order of removal of the Child
and her sibling on July 9, 2018.1 The trial court conducted a shelter care hearing on July
30, 2018, and placed the Child in the emergency shelter care of LCJFS. The trial court
appointed Attorney Yousef Faroniya as Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) for the Child.2
{¶5} Following an adjudicatory hearing on October 9, 2018, the trial court found
the Child to be dependent and immediately proceeded to disposition. The trial court
ordered the Child remain in the temporary custody of LCJFS. The trial court specifically
found LCJFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the Child from the
home. October 11, 2018 Magistrate’s Decision at 2. The trial court conducted review
hearings on December 28, 2018, June 27, 2019, December 27, 2019, June 26, 2020,
December 23, 2020, and June 23, 2021, and maintained the status quo each time. The
trial court made reasonable efforts findings at each hearing.
{¶6} Mother filed a motion to modify disposition on March 21, 2019, seeking
termination of temporary custody and the return of the Child to her full legal custody. On
June 11, 2019, LCJFS requested a six-month extension of temporary custody in order for
an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”) assessment of Father to be
completed in Indiana. The trial court granted LCJFS’s request for a six-month extension
via Judgment Entry filed July 31, 2019.
{¶7} LCJFS filed a motion for permanent custody on November 6, 2019.
Therein, LCJFS informed the trial court Father was not approved for ICPC due to his
criminal history, Father’s girlfriend’s substantial history with Indiana child protective
services, and the fact Father and his girlfriend were in debt and unable to financially meet
1 The Child’s sibling is the subject of another case.
2 Cedric Collins was appointed GAL on July 24, 2019, after the unexpected death of Yousef Faroniya.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 4
their own needs. The hearing on LCJFS’s motion was continued a number of times due
to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Father filed a motion for custody on May 11, 2020.
Mother filed a motion to return legal custody on July 15, 2020. Father filed a motion to
modify disposition, requesting legal custody of the Child, on March 8, 2021.
{¶8} The magistrate conducted a hearing on the motions on March 4, 2021, and
May 11, 24, and 28, 2021. The following evidence with respect to Father only was
presented at the hearing.
{¶9} Allison Keeley, the ongoing caseworker originally assigned to the family,
testified Father was living, and continued to live, in Muncie, Indiana, throughout the
pendency of the matter. LCJFS requested an ICPC, which denied placement of the Child
with Father. Father was doing well and LCJFS considered transitioning the Child for
placement with Father. However, LCJFS decided not to move forward after the ICPC
was denied.
{¶10} Shaina Williams with Close to Home Supervised Visitation Center testified
she supervised visits between Father and the Child. Father’s visits generally went well.
However, during visits on December 5, 2020, and January 30, 2021, the Child had
outbursts which required calls to the foster mother to pick up the Child and resulted in the
visits ending early. During the January 30, 2021 visit, the Child became violent and hit
Father, his girlfriend, and Williams. Williams explained the Child would “blow up”
whenever she was told, “No,” or did not get what she wanted. Transcript of Hearing, Vol.
I at 120. Williams observed between 18 and 20 visits between Father and the Child and
all, but the two reported visits, went well. On cross-examination, Williams stated Father
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 5
never had to be redirected for inappropriate behavior and he did not trigger the Child’s
outbursts.
{¶11} Cindy White, the Child’s foster mother, testified the Child came to her on
December 2, 2020. That evening, when White told the Child it was time for bed, the Child
threw “a huge tantrum.” Id. at 174. White described the severity of the Child’s tantrums
when the Child initially came into her home. The Child was physically and verbally violent
both in the foster home and at school. On her first day of school, the Child was “out of
control” – throwing chairs and other items and engaging in self-harm.
{¶12} On the Child’s second evening with White, the Child became angry, ranting,
running around, breaking things, and throwing things. White called her boss, explaining,
“I have been a foster mom for 12 years. I’ve been around kids a lot of the time, but I’ve
never dealt with the anger issue as this child had.” Id. at 178. White’s boss suggested
she talk to the Child. White asked the Child if she would like to speak to “Stephanie.” At
the name “Stephanie,” the Child threw herself onto the floor and began weeping. The
Child eventually crawled into White’s lap, hugging White, and crying into the phone, “Why
did – why did you make me leave? Why – why couldn’t I stay with you?” Id. at 179. White
realized the Child thought it was her first foster mother, who was also named “Stephanie.”
{¶13} White stated the Child was “always very anxious” before visits with Father.
Id. at 184. Following the visits, “it’s like a roller coaster. She struggles with her feelings
and she doesn’t know how to put anything into words; so she kind of lashes out.” Id. The
Child refers to Father as “Patrick.” White described picking up the Child early from a visit
with Father. As White put the Child into her vehicle, the Child threw the car seat at her
and started screaming and yelling. The Child then jumped out of the car and ran around
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 6
the street. Once back in White’s vehicle, the Child was crying and screaming, and
throwing things.
{¶14} White explained the Child is behind developmentally. The Child cannot
spell her own name and does not recognize numbers. The Child did not know her own
age when she came into White’s care. On cross-examination, White indicated the Child
still had outbursts, but was doing “much better.” Id. at 192. White maintains a consistent
routine for the Child. White constantly prepares the Child for what will occur next. White
has learned de-escalation techniques for handling the Child’s outbursts.
{¶15} Juanita Oiler, a clinical therapist with the Village Network Treatment House
of Care, testified she conducted an evaluation of the Child. Oiler diagnosed the Child
with post-traumatic stress syndrome disorder, receptive expressive communication
disorder, partial fetal alcohol syndrome, and a developmental disability. Oiler explained
because of the trauma she has experienced, the Child “reacts in ways that are different
than you would expect necessarily. So she is – tends to be hyperaroused, she tends to
be hypersensitive to stimulus, she has cognitive issues, she has communication issues,
she has relational disorders, and all of those things because of the trauma she has
experienced throughout her life.” Tr. Vol. II at 303. Oiler continued, “She has difficulty
expressing herself in ways that are understandable and expected. So she – she does
become over-reactive when she expresses herself. She does have some difficulty
processing sometimes, and with the fetal alcohol – the partial fetal alcohol syndrome we
find it’s not affecting her growth physically, but it does affect her development and her
emotional – her intellectual development.” Id. at 303-304. Although the Child is 6 ½ years
old, she functions at about a 2 ½ year old level. The Child’s IQ is in the low 70s.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 7
{¶16} With regard to treatment, the Child also works with a behavior management
specialist every week. The Child sees a psychiatrist at Children’s Hospital. The Child is
in specialized educational placement in school. Oiler stated the Village Network provides
ongoing training and education to the Child’s foster parents. Oiler noted, dealing with the
Child would be different from what one would expect in a conventional parent/child
relationship: “It does require a lot of special training. It does require a lot of special
interventions. It does require a lot of support, and it does require a great deal of patience,
as well as the willingness to adapt and modify and try new things.” Id. at 310.
{¶17} On cross-examination, Oiler stated the Child is starting to self-regulate
quicker and has become less reactive. Oiler credits the Child’s foster parents with her
progress as they are very cognizant of her needs and have provided the Child with
assistance. Oiler indicated the Child needs a schedule of regularly planned daily activity.
Transitions are difficult for the Child.
{¶18} Kelsey Weisenstein, an ongoing social worker with LCJFS, was assigned
to the family in December, 2019. Weisenstein stated she reviewed the results of the ICPC
and explained the reasons for the denial were Father’s lack of a support system, a
negative $750/month income, prison time for a 2000 child molestation conviction, and his
live-in girlfriend had substantiated children’s services involvement. Weisenstein detailed
the Child’s foster placement. On cross-examination, Weisenstein explained, she did not
add case plan services for Father after the ICPC was denied because once the ICPC was
denied, the Child could not be placed with Father. Weisenstein added, although Father’s
financial situation had improved, other factors resulting in the denial of the ICPC could
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 8
not be changed. Weisenstein agreed Father provided support for the Child and showed
a level of dedication to the Child.
{¶19} Palma Ashcraft, an ongoing social worker with LCJFS, was assigned to the
family on January 22, 2021. On cross-examination, Ashcraft agreed the Child enjoyed
her visits with Father. Ashcraft acknowledged Father’s financial situation had improved
since the ICPC and Father had shown a level of dedication to the Child.
{¶20} Cedric Collins, the court-appointed GAL, testified he was assigned to the
Child after the original GAL passed away unexpectedly. Collins contacted the foster
family and LCJFS. He met with the Child and visited Father’s home. Collins questioned
whether Father was really able to comprehend and address the concerns and special
needs of the Child. While Father is aware the Child has special needs, Collins had not
seen any evidence Father had educated himself on how to best advocate and work with
the Child. Collins opined it was in the best interest of the Child to grant permanent custody
to LCJFS.
{¶21} Via Decision of Magistrate filed June 16, 2021, the magistrate denied
Father’s motion for custody and LCJFS’s motion for permanent custody. The magistrate
found Father has consistently shown a dedication to the Child and Father’s financial
situation had substantially changed “in a positive direction.” Decision of Magistrate at 4,
unpaginated. In addition, the magistrate added the issues raised in the ICPC
investigation were old and an updated ICPC “would be beneficial.” Id. The magistrate
noted placement with Father “could be considered in the future.” Id.
{¶22} LCJFS filed timely objections to the magistrate’s decision. Via Judgment
Entry filed July 6, 2021, the trial court returned the matter to the magistrate for clarification
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 9
as to the disposition. The magistrate issued a subsequent decision on August 10, 2021,
again denying all parties’ motions. LCJFS filed timely objections on August 11, 2021.
{¶23} Via Opinion/Judgment Entry filed April 26, 2022, the trial court granted, in
part, LCJFS’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, terminated Father and Mother’s
parental rights, and granted permanent custody of the Child to LCJFS. The trial court
found LCJFS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify Father and the Child pursuant
to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), but found granting permanent
custody of the Child to LCJFS was proper as such was in the Child’s best interest and the
Child had been in the temporary custody of LCJFS for twelve or more of a consecutive
twenty-two month period.
{¶24} It is from this judgment entry Father appeals, raising the following
assignments of error:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT IT WOULD BE
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF [THE CHILD] TO PERMANENTLY
TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF HER PARENTS AND PLACE
HER IN THE PERMANENT CUSTODY OF LICKING COUNTY JOB AND
FAMILY SERVICES, CHILDREN SERVICES DEPARTMENT.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT FOUND BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE [THE
CHILD] COULD NOT BE PLACED WITH HER FATHER WITHIN A
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 10
REASONABLE TIME OR SHOULD NOT BE PLACED WITH HER
FATHER.
III. THE TRIAL CURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT FOUND BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
LICKING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES DID
NOT MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO REUNIFY THE MINOR CHILD
WITH FATHER, BUT STILL GRANTED THE MOTION FOR PERMANENT
CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO THE AGENCY.
{¶25} This case came to us on the expedited calendar and shall be considered in
compliance with App. R. 11.2(C).
I, II
{¶26} In his first assignment of error, Father contends the trial court erred and
abused its discretion in finding the best interest of the Child would be served by
terminating Father’s parental rights and granting permanent custody of the Child to
LCJFS. In his second assignment of error, Father asserts the trial court erred and abused
its discretion in finding the Child could not be placed with Father within a reasonable time
or should not be placed with Father.
{¶27} Initially, Father argues the trial court erred in conducting the hearing on
LCJFS’s motion for permanent custody beyond the statutory 120 day time period set forth
in R.C. 2151.414(A)(2).
{¶28} R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) provides, in part:
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 11
The court shall hold the hearing scheduled pursuant to division (A)(1)
of this section not later than one hundred twenty days after the agency files
the motion for permanent custody, except that, for good cause shown, the
court may continue the hearing for a reasonable period of time beyond the
one-hundred-twenty-day deadline. The court shall issue an order that
grants, denies, or otherwise disposes of the motion for permanent custody,
and journalize the order, not later than two hundred days after the agency
files the motion.
R.C. 2151.414(A)(2).
{¶29} Despite the time limitation, however, R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) also expressly
states “[t]he failure of the court to comply with the time periods set forth in division (A)(2)
of this section does not affect the authority of the court to issue any order under this
chapter and does not provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the
validity of any order of the court.” R.C. 2151.414(A)(2).
{¶30} In In re M.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98214 and 98215, 2012-Ohio-5075,
the Eighth District Court of Appeal explained, “Because of this expressive language, this
court has determined that the time limitation language in R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) is ‘directory’
rather than mandatory — the language exists ‘for the assurance of the prompt resolution
of child custody matters,’ rather than as a jurisdictional perquisite.” Id. at ¶ 21. Further,
“[b]ecause the time provisions of R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) are directory and not mandatory,
the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a litigant must seek a writ of procedendo against
the juvenile court if it does not comply with these time limits.” In re K.H., 5th Dist. Licking
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 12
No. 13-CA-100, 2014-Ohio-1594, ¶ 14, citing In re Davis, 84 Ohio St.3d 520, 523-524,
1999-Ohio-0419. If a party does not seek such a writ, he is stopped from arguing on
appeal that delay by the juvenile court violated his due process rights. In re Davis, supra
at 524.
{¶31} Father did not file a writ of procedendo against the trial court. Accordingly,
we find Father’s due process rights were not violated.
{¶32} We now turn to Father’s arguments relative to the trial court’s finding it was
in the Child’s best interest to grant permanent custody to LCJFS and finding the Child
could not be placed with Father within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
Father.
{¶33} As an appellate court, we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Our role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent
and credible evidence upon which the fact finder could base its judgment. Cross Truck v.
Jeffries (Feb. 10, 1982), Stark App. No. CA5758. Accordingly, judgments supported by
some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not
be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v.
Foley Constr. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578.
{¶34} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the guidelines a trial court must follow when
deciding a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court
schedule a hearing and provide notice upon the filing of a motion for permanent custody
of a child by a public children services agency or private child placing agency that has
temporary custody of the child or has placed the child in long term foster care.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 13
{¶35} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B) authorizes the juvenile court to
grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court
determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant
permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply: (a) the child is not
abandoned or orphaned, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents
within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents; (b) the child is
abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are able
to take permanent custody; or (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or
more public children services agencies or private child placement agencies for twelve or
more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18,
1999.
{¶36} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial
court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial
court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding
the best interest of the child.
{¶37} Although Father assigns as error the trial court’s finding the Child could not
be placed with Father within a reasonable time or should not be placed with Father, within
the argument portion of his Brief, Father acknowledges the trial court found “the Agency
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ohio Revised Code 2151.414(E)
existed as to Father.”3 Brief of Appellant at 6. In its April 26, 2022 Opinion/Judgment
3 R.C. 2151.414(E) provides: “In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for
the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed
with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 14
Entry, the trial court found, “the Magistrate did not err in concluding that clear and
convincing evidence did not demonstrate, based upon R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C.
2151.414(E)(1), that [the Child] cannot placed or should not be placed with [Father]
because the Agency failed to make reasonable and diligent efforts towards reunification.”
Id. at 12.
shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing
held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the
Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child's parents, the court shall enter
a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed
with either parent:
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and notwithstanding reasonable case
planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused
the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially
remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home. * * *.
(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual disability, physical disability, or chemical
dependency of the parent * * *;
(3) The parent committed any abuse as described in section 2151.031 of the Revised Code against the
child * * *;
(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit,
or communicate with the child when able to do so, * * *;
(5) The parent is incarcerated for an offense committed against the child or a sibling of the child;
(6) The parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense under division (A) or (C) of section
2919.22 * * *.
(7) The parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one of the following:
(a) An offense under section 2903.01, 2903.02, or 2903.03 of the Revised Code * * *;
(b) An offense under section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code * * *;
(c) An offense under division (B)(2) of section 2919.22 of the Revised Code * * *;
(d) An offense under section 2907.02, 2907.03, 2907.04, 2907.05, or 2907.06 of the Revised Code * * *;
(e) An offense under section 2905.32, 2907.21, or 2907.22 of the Revised Code * * *;
(f) A conspiracy or attempt to commit, or complicity in committing, an offense described in division (E)(7)(a),
(d), or (e) of this section.
(8) The parent has repeatedly withheld medical treatment or food from the child * * *.
(9) The parent has placed the child at substantial risk of harm two or more times due to alcohol or drug
abuse and has rejected treatment * * *.
(10) The parent has abandoned the child.
(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child * * *.
(12) The parent is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the
dispositional hearing * * *.
(13) The parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated incarceration prevents the parent from
providing care for the child.
(14) The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities for
the child or to prevent the child from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, emotional,
or mental neglect.
(15) The parent has committed abuse * * *.
(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 15
{¶38} The trial court did, however, find, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the
Child had been in the temporary custody of LCJFS for a period of time in excess of twelve
of the prior twenty-two consecutive months. Id. at 12-13. The 12 of 22 finding alone, in
conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent
custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. No. 2008CA00118, 2008-Ohio-5458, ¶ 45.
{¶39} The trial court also found a grant of permanent custody was in the Child’s
best interest.
{¶40} R.C. 2151.414(D) sets forth the factors to be considered in making a best
interest determination and provides:
(D)(1) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held
pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4)
or (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415 of the Revised
Code, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited
to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or
through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 16
agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section
2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary
custody of an equivalent agency in another state;
(d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶41} Upon review, we find the trial court's decision finding permanent custody
was in the best interests of the Child was supported by relevant, competent and credible
evidence. The evidence at the hearing established the Child had a relationship with
Father, but such was limited to contact at scheduled visitation. The Child had significant
special needs and behaviors, and, as a result, was physically and verbally violent. The
Child required intensive services and resources. In a December 22, 2021 Semi-Annual
Review Report, the GAL noted Father lacked the understanding and meaning to parent
the Child and meet the Child’s needs. At the hearing, the GAL questioned whether Father
was really able to comprehend and address the concerns and special needs of the Child.
The GAL added, while Father was aware the Child has special needs, the GAL had not
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 17
seen any evidence Father had educated himself on how to best advocate and work with
the Child. The GAL opined it was in the best interest of the Child to grant permanent
custody to LCJFS. Although the Child’s was 6 ½ years old at the time of the hearing, she
functioned on a 2 ½ year old level.
{¶42} In its April 26, 2022 Opinion/Judgment Entry, the trial court considered each
of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). The trial court found the Child had a
relationship with Father, but the relationship was limited to the contact at their visits. The
trial court indicated the Child had significant special needs and behaviors, which required
extensive and intensive services and resources. The Child needed constant supervision,
consistency in schedule and routine, and on-going therapy. The trial court determined
Father, due to his limited relationship with the Child, was unable to meet the Child’s
special needs. The trial court noted the Child was unable to express her wishes. The
trial court found the Child had been in the temporary custody of LCJFS for 12 or more
months of a consecutive 22-month period, adding the Child needed stability. The trial
court added the Child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement was immense
given her special needs. In addition, the trial court stated the GAL had conducted an
investigation and found granting permanent custody was in the Child’s best interest.
{¶43} Based upon the foregoing, we find Father’s first and second assignment of
error to be without merit, and overrule the same.
III
{¶44} In his final assignment of error, Father submits the trial court erred and
abused its discretion in finding LCJFS made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the
Child when LCJFS failed to request an additional ICPC. Based upon the arguments
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 18
asserted within this assignment of error, this Court interprets Father’s position to be the
trial court erred and abused its discretion in granting permanent custody of the Child to
LCJFS after finding LCJFS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with the Child.
{¶45} A trial court is not obligated by R.C. § 2151.419 to make a determination an
agency used reasonable efforts to reunify the family at the time of the permanent custody
hearing unless the agency has not established reasonable efforts have been made prior
to that hearing. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 21;
see also, R.C. § 2151.419. A trial court is only obligated to make a determination an
agency has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family at “adjudicatory, emergency,
detention, and temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional hearings for abused,
neglected, or dependent children, all of which occur prior to a decision transferring
permanent custody to the state.” In re C.F., supra at ¶ 41; In the Matter of L.J., 5th Dist.
Licking No. 2019 CA 0079, 2019-Ohio-5231, ¶44.
{¶46} In this case, the trial court made the requisite determination LCJFS made
reasonable efforts at each of the following hearings: the July 10, 2018 temporary orders
hearing, the October 9, 2018 adjudicatory/dispositional hearing, and the December 28,
2018, June 27, 2019, December 27, 2019, June 26, 2020, December 23, 2020, and June
23, 2021 review hearings. The trial court was not required to make such finding at the
permanent custody hearing.
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00035 19
{¶47} Accordingly, Father’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶48} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division, is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, J.
Wise, Earle, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. EARLE E. WISE, JR.
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY