Toledo v. Blade

[Cite as Toledo v. Blade, 2023-Ohio-658.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-22-1091
Appellee Trial Court No. CRB-22-00731
v.
Henry E. Blade DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: March 3, 2023
*****
Rebecca Facey, City of Toledo Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and
Jimmie L. Jones, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Autumn D. Adams, for appellant.
*****
MAYLE, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} The defendant-appellant, Henry Blade, was convicted in the Toledo
Municipal Court of domestic violence and resisting arrest and sentenced to serve 40 days
in jail. On appeal, Blade argues that the judgments must be overturned because the
evidence does not support his domestic violence conviction and because the state failed
to produce exculpatory evidence. As set forth below, we affirm.
I. Background
{¶ 2} Blade and “A.B.,” the victim in this case, were in a relationship and share a
young son together. In early December of 2021, A.B. asked Blade to move out of her
Burton Avenue home in Toledo. According to A.B., Blade’s behavior “drastically
changed,” after he stopped taking his medication used to treat his mental health
conditions. For example, Blade became “very aggressive towards men” by picking fights
in public, and also became “infatuate[ed]” about getting his “felonies * * * expunged [s]o
that he [could] get a weapon.” A.B. “could not take it anymore” and felt “very
concerned” and “nervous for [her] children” when Blade was around.
{¶ 3} In early January of 2022, A.B. was granted a civil protection order (“CPO”)
from the domestic relations court. According to A.B., the CPO ordered Blade not to
“threaten” or “cause physical harm” to A.B., but it did not prohibit him from contacting
her or speaking with her. And indeed, A.B. continued to allow Blade to visit their son in
her home, even after the CPO went into effect. During one such visit, however, an
“altercation” ensued after A.B. told Blade that it was time for him to go. In response,
Blade “threw a kitchen glass and shattered it in the family room” and took A.B.’s “Xbox”
and “threw it in the kitchen sink and turned the water on.” A.B. filed a police report the
next day.
{¶ 4} As a result of that incident, “when [Blade] called [A.B.] * * * a few
evenings later,” on January 21, 2021, she did not answer her phone. Later though, when
2.
she was “at home and settled,” A.B. took his call. A.B. told Blade that “him coming over
was not a good idea anymore.” A.B. described Blade’s response as follows:
[A]ll, [he said was], if you don’t want me to come over and see your
son, I promise you’ll end up in jail and lose your job, or you’ll end up dead.
And then he used some cuss words, and I didn’t even continue the
conversation with him. I just immediately hung up. And at that point, I
called the police. Because I didn’t know at any point he could have showed
up at my house.
{¶ 5} Officer Paige Benson, of the Toledo Police Department, and her partner
were dispatched to A.B.’s home that night. During the fifteen-minute visit, Officer
Benson witnessed A.B.’s cell phone “go off * * * continually * * * over and over and
over again.” Each time it did, a man’s picture appeared on A.B.’s cell phone, whom A.B.
identified to police as Blade. At trial, Officer Benson also identified Blade as the person
who appeared on A.B.’s phone that night.
{¶ 6} A criminal complaint was filed against Blade, charging him with domestic
violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(C), and menacing, in violation of R.C. 2903.22,
both misdemeanors of the fourth degree, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The
police also filed, on A.B.’s behalf, a motion for a temporary protection order (“TPO”)
against Blade.
3.
{¶ 7} Three days later, around 11:30 p.m. on January 24, 2022, the police located
a maroon Chevy Blazer, registered in Blade’s name, that was parked in an empty lot of
the Toledo Public Library on Sylvania Avenue. Officer Amber O’Connell was one of
three officers who were called to serve the warrant. She testified that, as police
approached the vehicle, Blade appeared to be asleep in the driver’s seat. The lead officer
knocked on Blade’s car window and advised him, “[t]hrough the window” that there were
“warrants for his arrest.” Blade awoke and responded that he “had no warrants” and
“wasn’t getting out the vehicle.” Blade appeared to be “irate” and “immediately upset”
that the police were there “knocking on his window,” and he continued “hollering” and
“yelling” that he did not have any warrants and was not getting out of his vehicle. Police
told Blade “numerous times,” that “we’re here for a warrant. That’s it. Just get out of the
vehicle. That’s all we’re here for.” Blade’s “vehicle door was [then] opened” and Blade
“was advised * * * to stay in the vehicle.” When Blade “reach[ed]” for something “on
his right side,” police told him, “don’t reach.” The lead officer then “t[ook] him out of
the vehicle” and “escorted [him] by the arm onto the ground,” while Officer O’Connell
and her partner “assisted in handcuffing” him. At that time, Blade was served with the
arrest warrant in the domestic violence and menacing case (TMC case No. 22-CRB-644).
He was also charged with resisting arrest, in violation of R.C. 2921.33, a misdemeanor in
the second degree (TMC case No. 22-CRB-731).
4.
{¶ 8} A hearing was held on January 26, 2022, on the issue of A.B.’s motion for a
TPO. A.B. testified that Blade called her phone “over 70 times” and left “two dozen”
voice mails, some of which were “nice” and some of which were “angry.” Over the
objection of his counsel, Blade also testified. Much of Blade’s examination on the
witness stand was conducted by the trial court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court indicated it was “very concerned” that Blade was “not in full control of [his]
emotions” and that he was “dangerous.” The court granted A.B.’s request for a TPO and
entered a not guilty plea on Blade’s behalf.
{¶ 9} A bench trial, as to both cases, was held on March 2, 2022. A.B. and
Officers Benson and O’Connell, whose testimony is described above, testified on behalf
of the state. After the state rested its case, the defense moved for an acquittal, which the
court denied. Blade then testified in his own defense.
{¶ 10} Blade described himself as “homeless” and living out of his car. When
A.B. forced Blade to move out in December, he began “camping out” in his car, which he
parked “across the street from [A.B.’s] residence * * * on Burton Avenue.”
{¶ 11} With regard to the charges related to his harassing and threatening phone
calls, Blade testified that he did not remember having any interaction with A.B. that day,
i.e. January 21, 2022. When asked a second time, Blade testified, “[y]ou know, I [will
be] honest because I took a[n] oath. I don’t remember that at all. But I do know that
[A.B.] has an app [called] Spoof,” which allows the user to “make a number appear on
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somebody else’s phone as if it was a different person calling.” Blade speculated that
A.B. may have used Spoof to make it appear as though he was the caller because she had
done that before. And, although Blade testified a third time that he did not “remember”
calling A.B. on January 21, 2022, he also claimed that he “did not call and threaten her”
and had “never threatened her.”
{¶ 12} As for the resisting arrest charge, Blade adamantly denied that he was
asleep when the officers arrived to serve him with a warrant. Blade testified that he saw
the patrol cars enter the library parking lot and then stop, temporarily, at the opposite end
of the parking lot, from Blade. Blade thought that the officers were likely “waiting for
[him] to run * * * because [he] knew [he] had warrants already.” So, when the police
drove closer to him, Blade said that he “was like, oh man. At that time, * * * [he] opened
the door half way * * * [a]nd * * * proceeded to step out.” Before he was “all the way
out,” of his vehicle, “between * * * the door and [his] seat,” he heard a voice say, “’[p]ut
your hands up.’” Blade did as he was instructed, and said, “[d]on’t shoot.” Blade
described what happened next: After that, a male police officer “came to my door,
opened the rest of [the] door, * * * dragged me out of my car by my locks, whiplashed
my back, my side, my ankle twisted, and threw me on the ground.” Blade insisted that
neither of the other officers, both female, assisted in making the arrest, because he “never
* * * resist[ed].” He described himself as fully “compliant.”
6.
{¶ 13} In case No. CRB-22-644, the trial court found Blade not guilty of menacing
and guilty of domestic violence. It sentenced him to serve 30 days in jail, with all days
suspended, and placed him on active probation for two years, subject to a number of
conditions, including no contact with A.B. and compliance with any and all protective
orders and all mental health requirements, as outlined by the probation department. In
case No. CRB-22-731, the trial court found Blade guilty of resisting arrest and sentenced
him to serve 90 days in jail, of which 50 days were suspended, plus probation. Blade
appealed and assigns two errors for our review:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I: Body camera footage of Blade’s
arrest was material to his defense as it would have been independent
evidence of what actually occurred and the failure of the City to turn that
footage over was a prejudicial violation of Brady v. Maryland that requires
this Court to reverse Blade’s conviction.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II: The weight of the evidence did
not support a conviction for domestic violence.
III. Analysis
A. There is no evidence to support Blade’s claim that the state committed a
Brady violation.
{¶ 14} In his first assignment of error, Blade claims that the state violated Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.E.2d 215 (1963) by failing to “disclose the
body camera footage of [his] arrest.” Blade argues that such footage would have
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exonerated him of the resisting arrest offense and shown that Officer O’Connell
“committed perjury on the stand.”
{¶ 15} “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87; See
also, State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 529 N.E.2d 898 (1988), paragraph four of the
syllabus (following Brady).
{¶ 16} To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) the
prosecution withheld evidence, (2) the defense was not aware of the evidence, and (3) the
withheld evidence was material and exculpatory. State v. Hawk, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
21AP-265, 2021-Ohio-4533, ¶ 20. See also State v. Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-
Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470, ¶ 19, quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119
S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (“‘There are three components of a true Brady
violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’”).
{¶ 17} “When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt
or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility” falls within the Brady
rule. (Internal quotation omitted.) State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180091,
8.
2019-Ohio-4862, ¶ 59, quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763,
31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).
{¶ 18} Here, the trial court record contains only one reference to the officers’ use
of body cameras from the time of his arrest. That is, during cross examination, Officer
O’Connell confirmed that she was wearing a “body cam” at that time and that it was
“active.” Defense counsel did not inquire further or request to see any footage from that
night that might exist.
{¶ 19} Blade’s Brady claim therefore fails for several reasons. First, Blade did not
make any demand for discovery from the state, including any request for body camera
footage, which he would have been entitled to had he requested it. Crim.R. 16(B)
provides that, upon demand by a defendant, the prosecutor “shall provide copies [of] * *
* (1) any written or recorded statement by the defendant; * * * [or] (5) [a]ny evidence
favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment.” However, for Brady to
apply, Blade must be able to show “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request.” (Emphasis added.) Brady at 87. Absent any evidence that
Blade requested the evidence, much less that the state suppressed it, he cannot establish a
violation under Brady.
{¶ 20} Moreover, since Brady, the United States Supreme Court has “clarified”
that the Brady rule only applies in situations involving the discovery of exculpatory
information “after” trial. (Emphasis in the original.) Jones at ¶ 59 citing United States v.
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Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). The Ohio Supreme
Court “followed suit” in State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 116, 552 N.E.2d 913(1990), which held that where “alleged exculpatory records [are] presented during the
trial, there exists no Brady violation requiring a new trial.” (Emphasis in the original.)
Id.; compare State v. Aldridge, 120 Ohio App.3d 122, 146, 697 N.E.2d 228 (2d
Dist.1997) (Interpreting Brady and finding that the rule “applies only to material
discovered after trial because the defendant, if he chooses to, can generally ensure that
material discovered prior to or during trial will be entered into evidence and is, thus, not
substantially prejudiced”) (Emphasis added).
{¶ 21} In this case, because Blade learned of the possibility that exculpatory
evidence could exist during the trial, there was no Brady violation. Accord State v.
Beaver, 5th Dist. Trumbull No. 2011-T-0037, 2012-Ohio-871, ¶ 45 (“Because the photo
was presented during trial, there could be no Brady violation in this case. Appellant’s
suggestion that the rule in Brady requires a mistrial is therefore misplaced.”); Jones at ¶
61 (“[E]ven if promises were made [to witnesses who testified at trial] and not disclosed
prior to trial, the rule in Giglio does not apply because the promises allegedly made were
discovered during trial and [the defendant] had the ability to recall [them] and get the
impeachment material into evidence.”); State v. Steele, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 2011-CA-
110, 2012-Ohio-3777, ¶ 68 (“As in Wickline, Steele was given access to the complete
report during trial, and, therefore, a Brady violation did not occur. While it is unclear
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whether counsel looked at the report during the trial, had counsel done so when it was
made available to him and believed the information therein was material, Steele could
have asked the trial court to revisit the prior ruling sustaining Steel’s request that the
report not be admissible.”).
{¶ 22} As explained by the court in Aldridge, the rationale for limiting Brady
claims to those situations where the exculpatory evidence is not discovered until after the
trial is that a defendant is not prejudiced where the exculpatory material is discovered
before or during trial because there are other remedies available which allow the
exculpatory material to be entered into evidence. Indeed, where the existence of
previously undisclosed evidence becomes known at trial, a defendant may make a
demand for the evidence, and “the court may ensure a fair trial by ordering inspection or
discovery, granting a continuance or holding an in camera hearing.” State v. Goodwin,
7th Dist. Mahoning No. 99CA220, 2001 WL 1740065, *14, citing State v. Green, 90
Ohio St.3d 352, 372 (2000); See also Crim.R. 16(L) (“The trial court may make orders
regulating discovery not inconsistent with this rule. If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply
with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule, the court may order such party
to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from
introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may make such other order as it
deems just under the circumstances.”). In short, Blade may not now complain about the
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state’s failure to produce allegedly exculpatory evidence when he passed upon the
opportunity to rectify the issue during the trial.
{¶ 23} Finally, we note that, even though Officer O’Connell’s body camera may
have been “active” at the time of Blade’s arrest, there is no evidence that any footage
from her body camera actually exists. Indeed, in his brief, Blade merely speculates that
“body worn cameras are common for all officers now-a-days.” “Implicit within the first
element of a Brady claim is that the evidence allegedly withheld must have actually
existed.” State v. Black, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 22AP-180, 2022-Ohio-3119, ¶ 19-22, fn.
2, appeal not allowed, 168 Ohio St. 3d 1474, 2022-Ohio-4380, 199 N.E.3d 550 (“A
defendant may allege a Brady violation based upon the loss or destruction of exculpatory
evidence; however, in those cases the evidence must have actually existed at some
point.”). Here, Blade cannot establish a Brady violation based solely on his unsupported
assertion that exculpatory body camera footage could have existed without some
evidence to suggest that such footage actually did exist. Accord Black at ¶ 21.
{¶ 24} For all of these reasons, Blade’s argument that he was denied due process
due to nondisclosure of body camera evidence by the state is without merit. Accordingly,
we overrule Blade’s first assignment of error.
B. Blade’s conviction for domestic violence is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 25} In his second assignment of error, Blade argues that his conviction for
domestic violence was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
12.
{¶ 26} When we review a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether the jury clearly lost its way
in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We do not view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the state. “Instead, we sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and scrutinize ‘the
factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.’” State v. Robinson, 6th Dist. Lucas
No. L-10-1369, 2012-Ohio-6068, ¶ 15, citing Thompkins at 387. Reversal on manifest
weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 27} Although we consider the credibility of witnesses under a manifest-weight
standard, we must, nonetheless, extend special deference to the trial court’s credibility
determinations, given that it is the trial court that has the benefit of seeing the witnesses
testify, observing their facial expressions and body language, hearing their voice
inflections, and discerning qualities such as hesitancy, equivocation, and candor. State v.
Fell, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1162, 2012-Ohio-616, ¶ 14. The trial court, as the finder
of fact and the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses, may believe or disbelieve all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony. State v.
13.
Caudill, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-07-009, 2008-Ohio-1557, ¶ 62, citing State v. Antill,
176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964).
{¶ 28} Here, Blade argues that his conviction for domestic violence is against the
manifest weight of the evidence because (1) “A.B. admitted that she did not feel she was
in imminent danger but instead she testified that he ‘could’ harm her,” and (2) Blade had
no access to a firearm and “has no prior convictions for weapons charges so it is also
unreasonable to believe that Blade would harm her with a weapon.”
{¶ 29} Blade was convicted of violating R.C. 2919.25(C), which provides that,
“[n]o person, by threat of force, shall knowingly cause a family or household member to
believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm to the family or household
member.” The definition of “[p]hysical harm,” as used in the domestic violence statute,
includes “any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity
or duration.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(3). The term “imminent” is not defined by statute.
Recently, this court discussed that term at length, and we “agree[d]” with the “robust
definition” employed by the Fourth District in State v. Tackett, 4th Dist. Jackson No.
04CA12, 2005-Ohio-1437, which defined ‘imminent’ to mean “ready to take place,”
“near at hand,” “impending,” “hanging threateningly over one’s head,” or “menacingly
near.” State v. Stevens, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1182, 2022-Ohio-3508, ¶ 45, quoting
Tackett at ¶ 14. The court in Tackett also said that imminent does not mean that the
defendant would “carry out the threat immediately or be in the process of carrying it out.”
14.
(Internal quotations omitted.) Id., citing Henry v. Henry, 4th Dist. Ross No. 04CA2781,
2005-Ohio-67. “Rather, the critical inquiry is ‘whether a reasonable person would be
placed in fear of imminent (in the sense of unconditional, non-contingent), serious
physical harm * * *.’” Id., quoting Henry at ¶ 19; see also State v. Taylor, 79 Ohio
Misc.2d 82, 85, 671 N.E.2d 343 (M.C. 1996). Thus, a threat can be imminent even when
the defendant specifically tells the victim that “she [will] not know the day, time or place
he [will] carry through on that threat.” State v. McClelland, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
01AP-630, 2002 WL 356306, *5 (Mar. 7, 2002); see also State v. Sexton, 11th Dist.
Geauga No. 2021-G-027, 2022-Ohio-1461, at ¶ 42-44 (“imminent” does not “equate[ ] to
a temporal element of physical harm”).
{¶ 30} Additionally, “[t]he victim’s state of mind is an essential element of
domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(C).” Stevens at ¶ 48, quoting State v. South, 2d
Dist. Champaign No. 2017-CA-34, 2018-Ohio-4146, ¶ 13. “To prove the victim’s state
of mind, the prosecution is required to present either (1) some evidence that the victim
said that she thought the defendant would cause her imminent physical harm, or (2)
evidence that allows the factfinder to infer the victim’s state of mind.” Id., citing State v.
Baker, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2020-08-086, 2021-Ohio-272, ¶ 13. The prosecution
does not have to prove that “the victim believed she would suffer imminent physical
harm.” Rather, the prosecution’s burden is to show that “the victim believed that the
defendant desired to harm her and that he intended to act on that desire.” (Emphasis
15.
added.) Id., quoting State v. Fisher, 197 Ohio App.3d 591, 2011-Ohio-5965, 968 N.E.2d
510, ¶ 31 (2d. Dist.). The victim’s fear of imminent physical harm must exist at the time
the defendant makes the threat. Id., citing State v. Marshall, 12th Dist. Madison No.
CA2016-11-031, 2017-Ohio-9269, ¶ 11.
{¶ 31} Here, Blade argues that A.B. merely testified that she was afraid of what
Blade “could” do to her—and, he argues, the trial court therefore lost its way by
concluding this testimony, alone, indicated a fear of imminent physical harm. Blade does
not accurately describe the record in this case.
{¶ 32} Blade told A.B., over the phone, that “if you don’t want me to come over
and see your son, I promise you’ll end up in jail and lose your job, or you’ll end up
dead.” (Emphasis added.) At trial, A.B. testified that she understood Blade to mean that
“he would kill [her].” Regarding the imminence of the threat and A.B.’s state of mind,
the following exchange took place between her and the state:
Q. [D]id you feel that that was an imminent physical threat to you?
A. Not at that immediate moment. Since he wasn’t physically
present.
Q. Okay.
A. But I wasn’t sure of his location. So he could have well been
down the street or outside my house. But I did take that as a threat. That’s
why I called the police immediately. * * *
16.
Q. Okay. And were you in fear of your safety at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. And were you in fear that he could cause you physical harm?
A. Yes, ma’am.
{¶ 33} Importantly, the state did not have to prove that Blade was inside of her
apartment or in a position to harm her in that moment because, again, “imminent” is not
limited to the situation where the offender is able to “carry out the threat immediately or
be in the process of carrying it out.” Tackett at ¶ 14. Moreover, as shown above, the
state did show that Blade posed an imminent threat and that A.B. perceived it as such.
That is, A.B. said that she feared for her safety at the time of the threat because, for all
she knew, Blade could have been right “outside [her] house.” Certainly, the proximity of
Blade, perceived or real, constitutes a threat that is “impending” or “menacingly near,”
such that it may be said to be “imminent.” Moreover, the fact that A.B. contacted the
police immediately “may serve as evidence” that A.B. believed that physical harm was
imminent. Tackett at ¶ 15.
{¶ 34} In addition, we note that the police officer who was dispatched to A.B.’s
home said that A.B. appeared to be “truly afraid * * * [that Blade’s threats] could be
viable.” The officer observed the “shakiness [of A.B.’s] voice,” her “nonstop hand
gestures,” and peering “past [the officers] toward the door, as if maybe [Blade] would be
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outside.” Accordingly, we find that there was competent and credible evidence to
support the trial court’s conclusion that A.B. was in fear of imminent physical harm.
{¶ 35} Finally, Blade argues that even if A.B. feared imminent physical harm, her
fear was unreasonable because Blade did not have access to a firearm and did not have
any prior convictions for weapons charges. See Stevens at ¶ 19 (the “critical inquiry” is
“whether a reasonable person would be placed in fear of * * * unconditional, non-
contingent * * * physical harm * * *.”) (Emphasis added). We disagree.
{¶ 36} A.B. testified that, in the weeks preceding Blade’s threatening phone calls,
his behavior “drastically changed” from the “person [A.B.] knew” to someone who was
“increasingly more aggressive.” Blade expressed “bizarre” and “violent” fantasies that
resulted in A.B. fearing for her children. A.B. also sought legal protection, first from the
domestic relations court which granted her a CPO, and then from the police, after Blade
threatened her with “broken glass.” The events giving rise to the domestic violence
charge occurred two days after the broken glass incident. A.B. testified that she took
Blade’s threat seriously, especially, given that Blade was living in his car, across the
street from her home. By contrast, when Blade testified, he contradicted himself
repeatedly, testifying that he had no memory of threatening A.B., then suggested that she
framed him, and then changed his story yet again by claiming he did not, and would
never, threaten her. Accordingly, we find that there is competent and credible evidence
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in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that a reasonable person in A.B.’s
position would have feared imminent physical harm by Blade.
{¶ 37} In sum, after carefully reviewing the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses and weighing the testimony, we are not convinced that this is an exceptional
case in which the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction. We find, therefore, that
Blade’s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. For all of the
above reasons, we find that Blade’s second assignment of error is not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, the March 2, 2022 judgment of the Toledo
Municipal Court in case No. CRB-22-0731, and the June 1, 2022 judgment of the Toledo
Municipal Court in case No. CRB-22-0644, are affirmed. Blade is ordered to pay the
cost of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgments affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
19.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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