DocketNumber: No. 2169-M.
Citation Numbers: 631 N.E.2d 676, 91 Ohio App. 3d 27
Judges: REECE, Judge.
Filed Date: 10/6/1993
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
Plaintiff-appellant, Renee M. Davidson, filed a complaint alleging she was injured due to the negligence of the defendant-appellee CSX Transportation *Page 29 ("CSX"). The trial court granted CSX's motion for summary judgment, finding that both statutory and common law considerations barred Davidson's claim. We affirm.
On December 4, 1989, Davidson was driving east on State Route 162 in Medina County. Davidson was traveling from her aunt's home to her place of employment, a route she traveled at least once a week. As Davidson approached the train crossing she observed a train; however, she was unable to stop before she collided with the train's second engine. The skid marks left by Davidson's automobile tires were one hundred eighty-four feet in length. A crossbuck, a yellow warning disc and other road markings were in place to warn of the approaching railroad intersection. Davidson does not recall how far she or the train was from the intersection when she first noticed the train. A CSX crewman stated that he sounded two longs, one short and then a long horn when the train approached the intersection. However, Davidson did not remember hearing the horn. At the time of the accident, she was driving with her window cracked and the heater and radio on.
Davidson filed her action for personal injuries, alleging that they were caused by the negligence of CSX and Terry Lubdan, the train's engineer. The trial court granted CSX's motion for summary judgment and Davidson appeals, raising one assignment of error1:
"The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee where genuine issues of material fact exist, and appellee has not shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. These issues should have properly been submitted for jury determination."
A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if the trial court finds:
"(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party." Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977),
The dispute must be "material" in that the facts involved have the potential to affect the outcome of the lawsuit.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986),
The trial court found that Davidson violated R.C.
"Whenever any person driving a vehicle * * * approaches a railroad grade crossing under any of the circumstances stated in this section, he shall stop within fifty feet but not less than fifteen feet from the nearest rail of the railroad, and shall not proceed until he can do so safely. The foregoing requirements shall apply when:
"* * *
"(5) An approaching train is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to the crossing."
The Ohio Supreme Court elaborated on this duty in Zuments v.Baltimore Ohio RR. Co. (1971),
"The driver of a motor vehicle about to pass over a railroad grade crossing on a public highway is required both to look and to listen for approaching trains, and the looking and listening must be at such time and place and in such manner as to be effective for that purpose. Where the uncontrovertible physical facts demonstrate that [plaintiff] did not so do, then such failure on his part was a proximate cause of the collision as a matter of law. * * *"
Davidson asserts that the train was not "plainly visible" because her view was obstructed by brush. However, other courts have held that a driver owes a greater duty to exercise caution to discover danger when natural conditions affect his ability to view the train. Osburn v. Norfolk Western Ry. Co. (1990),
Davidson was not able to recall how far she was from the crossing when she first viewed the train. However, the uncontrovertible physical evidence was that she saw the train at least one hundred eighty-four feet from the intersection as she left skid marks of this length on the road. Trains have been held to be plainly visible at 2:00 a.m. on a foggy night,State v. Miller (Dec. 10, 1991), Holmes App. No. CA-437, unreported, 1991 WL 271686, and when a driver had an unobstructed view of the train one hundred ten feet from the train crossing, Cox v. Consol. Rail Corp. (Aug. 28, 1989), Butler App. No. CA 89-02-030, unreported, 1989 WL 99314. In this case the accident occurred during the day and the train must have been visible to Davidson at least one hundred eighty-four feet from the train crossing, based on the skid marks. Considering this evidence, reasonable minds could only conclude that Davidson violated R.C.
R.C.
Once it is found that the plaintiff violated a statutory duty, generally it is also necessary to consider whether the train operator was negligent. Barger v. Chesapeake Ohio Ry.Co. (1990),
In this case, we have already determined that the train was "plainly visible" within the meaning of R.C.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
COOK, P.J., and BAIRD, J., concur.