State ex rel. Alexander v. Jones

[Cite as State ex rel. Alexander v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-253.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE EX REL. WILLIAM
ALEXANDER
C.A. No. 29561
Relator
v.
ORIGINAL ACTION IN
JUDGE AMY CORRIGALL JONES MANDAMUS
Respondent
Dated: January 29, 2020
PER CURIAM.
{¶1} William Alexander has petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus to
order Respondent, Judge Amy Corrigall Jones, to resentence him. Judge Jones has moved
to dismiss. Mr. Alexander responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss. For the
following reasons, this Court grants the motion to dismiss.
{¶2} “For a writ of mandamus to issue, a relator must demonstrate that (1) the
relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) respondent is under a
corresponding clear legal duty to perform the requested acts, and (3) relator has no plain
and adequate legal remedy.” State ex rel. Serv. Emp. Internatl. Union, Dist. 925 v. State
Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St. 3d 173, 176 (1998). The petitioner must demonstrate all
three elements in order for this Court to grant the writ of mandamus. “A court can dismiss
a mandamus action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if, after all factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true and all
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reasonable inferences are made in relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that he can
prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of mandamus.” State ex rel.
Russell v. Thornton, 111 Ohio St. 3d 409, 2006-Ohio-5858, ¶ 9.
{¶3} We first consider the facts Mr. Alexander alleged in his complaint. The
facts are presumed true, with reasonable inferences made in his favor, as the first step in
deciding the motion to dismiss.
{¶4} In 2004, Mr. Alexander was tried on charges of aggravated murder,
attempted murder, and having weapons while under disability. The trial court instructed
the jury on murder, as a lesser included offense of aggravated murder, and felonious
assault, as a lesser-included offense of attempted murder. The jury found Mr. Alexander
guilty of murder, felonious assault, and having weapons under disability. The trial court
sentenced Mr. Alexander to 15 years to life for murder, 8 years for felonious assault (plus
3 years for a firearm specification), and merged having weapons under disability with
felonious assault. This Court affirmed Mr. Alexander’s conviction. State v. Alexander,
9th Dist. Summit No. 22295, 2005-Ohio-2393.
{¶5} A dozen years later, Mr. Alexander filed a “Motion to Vacate Void
Judgment” in the trial court. He alleged that the trial court’s sentence was void because
felonious assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The trial court
granted his motion and vacated the convictions for felonious assault, with the firearm
specification, and having weapons under disability.
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{¶6} A year later, Mr. Alexander filed another motion with the trial court. This
time, he asked the trial court to resentence him to issue a final, appealable order. The trial
court denied his motion in September 2019.
{¶7} Mr. Alexander’s complaint alleges that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus
to direct Judge Jones to resentence him to issue a new sentencing entry. He alleges that
there is no final sentencing order in his case and that Judge Jones has a clear legal duty to
enter a final, appealable, order.
{¶8} Mr. Alexander sets forth a number of arguments in his complaint, including
that this Court’s decision in State v. Goodwin, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23337, 2007-Ohio-
2343, mandates resentencing, and that the Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel.
Culgan v. Medina Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 119 Ohio St. 3d 535, 2008-Ohio-4609,
supports his request for mandamus relief. Judge Jones moved to dismiss, arguing that Mr.
Alexander was not entitled to the writ of mandamus.
{¶9} We need not reach Mr. Alexander’s specific arguments because, as Judge
Jones noted, he has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus.
Specifically, appeal served as an adequate remedy to challenge Judge Jones’ decision.
With respect to alleged legal errors, it is well-established that mandamus cannot be used
as a substitute for appeal to challenge a trial court’s actions. State ex rel. Richfield v.
Laria, 138 Ohio St. 3d 168, 2014-Ohio-243, ¶ 11. Appeal from an adverse judgment
constitutes an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Caskey v.
Gano, 135 Ohio St. 3d 175, 2013-Ohio-71, ¶ 5.
C.A. No. 29561
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{¶10} Mr. Alexander relied upon Culgan to establish that mandamus provided a
remedy to challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion for a final, appealable, order. As
Judge Jones argued, however, her order was itself a final, appealable, order. The Supreme
Court recently considered whether mandamus was available to challenge a trial court’s
denial of a motion for a new sentencing entry. In concluding that it was not, the Supreme
Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Culgan:
In Culgan, we mistakenly focused on the finality of the underlying
judgment of conviction and we failed to consider the finality of the entry
denying the motion for a new sentencing entry; our decision in that case
should no longer be relied on as authority for the proposition that in such
circumstances, a criminal defendant has a remedy in mandamus or
procedendo.
State ex rel. Daniels v. Russo, 156 Ohio St. 3d 143, 2018-Ohio-5194, ¶ 13. See, also, State
ex rel. Henley v. Langer, 156 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2018-Ohio-5204.
{¶11} In light of Daniels and Henley, we conclude that Mr. Alexander had an
adequate remedy through appeal. Mr. Alexander could have appealed from the trial
court’s order that denied his motion to be resentenced. Because appeal was an adequate
remedy, the writ of mandamus is not available.
{¶12} For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted, and this case is
dismissed. Costs are taxed to Mr. Alexander. The clerk of courts is hereby directed to
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serve upon all parties not in default notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the
journal. See Civ.R. 58.
THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
WILLIAM ALEXANDER, Pro se, Relator.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and COLLEEN SIMS, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Respondent.