DocketNumber: No. C-971011.
Citation Numbers: 723 N.E.2d 580, 131 Ohio App. 3d 657
Judges: Painter, Gorman, Shannon
Filed Date: 9/11/1998
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/12/2024
On May 24, 1997, defendant-appellee, Tommy Acoff, pleaded no contest to a charge of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, a violation of R.C.
In its sole assignment, the state asserts that the trial court's decision to release the firearm to Acoff was contrary to law.1 We must agree.
The proof of the state's argument is contained in R.C.
"A person loses any right that the person may have to the possession, or the possession and ownership, of property if any of the following applies:
"(1) The property was the subject, or was used in a conspiracy or attempt to commit, or in the commission, of an offense other than a traffic offense, and the person is a conspirator, accomplice, or offender with respect to the offense.
"(2) A court determines that the property should be forfeited because, in light of the nature of the property or the circumstances of the person, it is unlawful for the person to acquire or possess the property." *Page 659
By operation of law, then, an individual loses any right to possession and ownership of property that is the subject of an offense other than a traffic offense. The improper handling of firearms under R.C.
Additionally, we summarily reject Acoff's argument that the forfeiture of the gun would result in double jeopardy. The state requested the forfeiture in the same proceeding in which the fine was levied. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not restrict the imposition of multiple punishments in a single proceeding. SeeState v. Gustafson (1996),
For the reasons stated above, we vacate that part of the trial court's order releasing the firearm to Acoff. We remand this case to the trial court for implementation and execution of the, amended judgment in accordance with this decision and law.
Vacated in part and cause remanded.
GORMAN, P.J., and SHANNON, J., concur.
RAYMOND E. SHANNON, J., retired, of the First Appellate District, sitting by assignment.