State v. Williamson

[Cite as State v. Williamson, 2018-Ohio-4905.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
OTTAWA COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. OT-18-010
Appellee Trial Court No. CRB 1800088
v.
Cassondra N. Williamson DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: December 7, 2018
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James J. VanEerten, Ottawa County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Barbara Gallé Rivas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Howard C. Whitcomb, III, for appellant.
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PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from the judgment of the Ottawa County Municipal Court,
convicting appellant, Cassondra Williamson, of one count of theft in violation of R.C.
2913.02, a misdemeanor of the first degree, and sentencing her to six months in jail. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On January 23, 2018, appellant stole a makeup sponge priced at $5.99 from
a Rite Aid store. Store management had suspected that appellant had been stealing
several items over the previous few weeks, and conducted an inventory after she left the
store to see if anything was missing. Appellant was subsequently apprehended in
possession of the sponge. She was charged with one count of theft in violation of R.C.
2913.02(A)(1). At her initial appearance in the Ottawa Municipal Court, appellant
pleaded no contest to the charge. The trial court then found her guilty, and continued the
matter for preparation of a presentence investigation report. However, appellant did not
submit any information to the probation department, nor did she attend her scheduled
meeting with them.
{¶ 3} Appellant’s sentencing hearing was held on March 9, 2018. At the hearing,
appellant tried to explain that she missed her appointment with the probation department
because she was working six days a week. She further stated that someone from the
probation department informed her that she should request a continuance, but appellant
did not do that. Appellant offered that she was no longer working six days a week as a
result of her charge, and was set to begin new employment.
{¶ 4} After appellant spoke, the trial court admonished her for not participating in
the presentence investigation. The court then recounted appellant’s criminal record,
which it described as “terrible,” noting that she had several stolen property convictions,
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including one that began as felony theft, as well as drug convictions. Thereafter, the trial
court sentenced appellant to six months in jail and ordered her to pay a $100 fine.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} Appellant has timely appealed her conviction, and now assigns one error for
our review:
1. The trial court abused its discretion in imposing a maximum
sentence upon defendant-appellant as it was against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
III. Analysis
{¶ 6} We review misdemeanor sentences for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Reese, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1184, 2018-Ohio-1654, ¶ 20, citing State v. Cook, 6th
Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1178, 2016-Ohio-2975, ¶ 18. An abuse of discretion connotes that
the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 7} R.C. 2929.21(A) sets forth the two overriding purposes of misdemeanor
sentencing, which are (1) to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
others, and (2) to punish the offender. To achieve these purposes, the sentencing court
must consider “the impact of the offense upon the victim and the need for changing the
offender’s behavior, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of
the offense, the public, or the victim and the public.” Id. In addition, any sentence
imposed “shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of
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misdemeanor sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate with and
not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the
victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar offenses committed by similar
offenders.” R.C. 2929.21(B).
{¶ 8} In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the trial court is guided by the
following factors under R.C. 2929.22(B)(1):
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses;
(b) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the
offense or offenses indicate that the offender has a history of persistent
criminal activity and that the offender’s character and condition reveal a
substantial risk that the offender will commit another offense;
(c) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the
offense or offenses indicate that the offender’s history, character, and
condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will be a danger to
others and that the offender’s conduct has been characterized by a pattern
of repetitive, compulsive, or aggressive behavior with heedless indifference
to the consequences;
(d) Whether the victim’s youth, age, disability, or other factor made
the victim particularly vulnerable to the offense or made the impact of the
offense more serious;
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(e) Whether the offender is likely to commit future crimes in
general, in addition to the circumstances described in divisions (B)(1)(b)
and (c) of this section;
(f) Whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or physical
condition that is traceable to the offender’s service in the armed forces of
the United States and that was a contributing factor in the offender’s
commission of the offense or offenses;
(g) The offender’s military service record.
The trial court is also instructed that it “may impose the longest jail term authorized
under section 2929.24 of the Revised Code only upon offenders who commit the worst
forms of the offense or upon offenders whose conduct and response to prior sanctions for
prior offenses demonstrate that the imposition of the longest jail term is necessary to
deter the offender from committing a future crime.” R.C. 2929.22(C).
{¶ 9} Here, the parties do not dispute that appellant’s sentence falls within the
statutory range for a first-degree misdemeanor set forth in R.C. 2929.24(A)(1). “When a
misdemeanor sentence is imposed within the statutory limits, a reviewing court will
presume the trial judge followed the statutes, unless there is evidence to the contrary.”
Reese, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1184, 2018-Ohio-1654, at ¶ 22.
{¶ 10} Appellant argues in her brief that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing her to six months in jail for stealing a $6 sponge. She further contends that
the trial court was “annoyed” or “irritated” by the fact that she did not participate in her
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presentence investigation with the probation department. Finally, she notes that the trial
court appeared confused about her criminal history because it originally stated that she
had a felony theft charge in her criminal background, but later acknowledged that it was
disposed of in municipal court after appellant protested that she did not have any felony
convictions. Thus, appellant concludes that the trial court’s sentence was abrupt,
arbitrary, and unreasonable.
{¶ 11} The state, on the other hand, argues that appellant’s history of theft and
receiving stolen property convictions, including the fact that she had been suspected of
stealing from Rite Aid for several weeks, in addition to her failure to participate in the
presentence investigation demonstrates that previous sanctions have not deterred her from
committing theft. Thus, the state concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing her to the maximum sentence.
{¶ 12} We agree with the state. In fashioning its sentence, the trial court took note
of appellant’s “terrible” criminal record of theft convictions and drug charges. While the
theft of a $6 sponge is certainly not the worst form of the offense, appellant’s pattern of
conduct supports the conclusion that the longest jail term is necessary to deter her from
committing future crimes. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to
impose the maximum sentence was an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 13} Accordingly, appellant’s assignment of error is not well-taken.
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IV. Conclusion
{¶ 14} For the foregoing reasons, we find that substantial justice has been done the
party complaining, and the judgment of the Ottawa County Municipal Court is affirmed.
Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
_______________________________
James D. Jensen, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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