In re R.B.

[Cite as In re R.B., 2019-Ohio-3298.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: R.B. : APPEAL NOS. C-170622
C-170623
: TRIAL NOS. 11-9083X
11-9085X
:
: O P I N I O N.
Appeals From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Vacated
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 16, 2019
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Ohio,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Julie Kahrs Nessler,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant R.B.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
CROUSE, Judge.
{¶1} R.B. has appealed the judgments of the juvenile court continuing his
classification as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant under Ohio’s version of the
Adam Walsh Act. We vacate the judgments of the juvenile court continuing R.B.’s
Tier I classification, because we hold that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to
enter an order continuing R.B.’s Tier I classification after he had turned 21 and his
disposition, by its own terms, had ended.
I. Procedural Background
{¶2} On October 14, 2011, R.B. admitted in juvenile court to acts which if
committed by an adult would have constituted two counts of gross sexual imposition,
felonies of the fourth degree. R.B., who was 14 when he committed the acts,
admitted to placing his penis into the mouths of his two four-year-old cousins. The
magistrate entered an order in both cases stating that the parties agreed that “this is
a Tier I offense.” On December 2, 2011, R.B. was committed to the Department of
Youth Services (“DYS”) until age 21. The commitment was suspended, and he was
placed on probation and ordered to complete the residential treatment program at
Altercrest.
{¶3} At a hearing on January 13, 2012, the magistrate stated on the record
that the parties had agreed that R.B. would be classified as a Tier I juvenile-offender
registrant, and the parties agreed with the magistrate’s statement on the record. The
same day, the magistrate issued a decision in each case, which erroneously stated in
the body that R.B. was a Tier III sex offender, but at the end of each entry is typed
“THIS IS A TIER I CLASSIFICATION—NOT TIER III.” The entries contain the R.C.
2152.84 and 2152.85 modification or termination language. R.B. was notified of his
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Tier I registration duties, and both R.B. and his mother signed the notice of
registration duties. There was no objection to the January 13, 2012 decisions.
{¶4} On February 6, 2013, R.B.’s Altercrest placement was terminated. The
juvenile court entered an order on July 29, 2013, releasing R.B. from official
probation and placing him on nonreporting probation with monitored time. On
September 3, 2014, the magistrate denied R.B.’s application to seal the record and
noted that he was required to register until 2022 unless reclassified.
{¶5} The state filed a motion to set a completion-of-disposition hearing on
October 24, 2016. R.B. objected on the basis that the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to hold a completion-of-disposition hearing. R.B. argued that his end-of-
disposition hearing under R.C. 2152.84 was held too late, because it should have
been held when he completed his court-ordered treatment, in the alternative, he
argued that the hearing was being held too early, because he had not yet completed
his disposition. On January 30, 2017, the magistrate ordered the completion-of-
disposition hearing to be held. R.B.’s objection was overruled by the juvenile court,
which found that it had jurisdiction to hold the completion-of-disposition hearing.
The magistrate held the completion-of-disposition hearing on May 8, 2017. On July
13 and 14, 2017, the magistrate entered decisions continuing R.B.’s Tier I
classification. R.B. filed objections.
{¶6} On July 20, 2017, R.B. turned 21 years of age. The juvenile court held
a hearing on R.B.’s objections on September 19, 2017. On October 30, 2017, the
juvenile court denied R.B.’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decisions
continuing R.B.’s Tier I classification. R.B. has appealed.
II. Analysis
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶7} This court entered an order advising counsel of an issue, identified by
the court but not raised in the parties’ briefs, to be addressed at oral argument. We
framed the issue as:
Did the juvenile court have jurisdiction to enter an order continuing
R.B.’s Tier I classification after he turned 21 and his disposition, by its
own terms, had ended? Be prepared to discuss the impact, if any, of
State v. Amos, 2017-Ohio-8448, 87 N.E.3d 1305 (1st Dist.), on this
issue.
{¶8} We answer the question raised by this court in the negative and hold
that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to enter an order continuing R.B.’s Tier I
classification after he turned 21 and his disposition, by its own terms, had ended.
{¶9} R.C. 2152.83(B)(1) provides that in the case of a juvenile offender who
was 14 or 15 years of age when he committed his offense the juvenile court has
discretion as to whether to classify the juvenile as a juvenile-offender registrant. In
this case, the juvenile court classified R.B., who was 14 at the time he committed his
offenses, as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant. R.C. 2152.84(A)(1) requires that
when a juvenile court has issued an order under R.C. 2152.83 classifying the juvenile
as a juvenile-offender registrant, “upon completion of the disposition of that child
made for the sexually oriented offense or the child-victim oriented offense on which
the juvenile offender registrant order was based, the judge * * * shall conduct a
hearing to review the effectiveness of the disposition * * * to determine whether the
prior classification” should be continued, terminated, or modified. R.C.
2152.84(A)(1) refers to the completion-of-disposition hearing in mandatory terms,
stating that the juvenile court shall hold a second classification hearing upon the
completion of disposition.
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{¶10} This court stated in In re Antwon C., 182 Ohio App.3d 237, 2009-
Ohio-2567, 912 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.),
Juvenile [offender registrants] are afforded two classification hearings.
First, under R.C. 2152.83, a juvenile is afforded a tier-classification
hearing either as part of the child’s disposition or, if the child is
committed to a secure facility, when the child is released. Second,
under R.C. 2152.84, when a child completes all aspects of the
disposition, including probation and any ordered treatment, the trial
court “shall conduct a hearing” to consider the risk of reoffending so
that the trial court can determine whether the order to register as a sex
offender should be continued or terminated. Further, at the
reclassification hearing, the trial court must determine whether the
specific tier classification in which the child has been placed is proper
and if it should be continued or modified.
{¶11} In State v. Schulze, 2016-Ohio-470, 59 N.E.3d 673 (1st Dist.), the
juvenile court had correctly entered an initial classification order under Megan’s
Law, former R.C. Chapter 2950, but had erroneously held Schulze’s completion-of-
disposition hearing and entered the reclassification order under the Adam Walsh
Act, rendering the order void. We held that the juvenile court had not properly
completed the statutorily-required process for classifying Schulze as a juvenile-
offender registrant, and that the initial classification order was not “revived or still in
effect.” Therefore, there was no valid order in place requiring Schulze to register.
We stated, “In order to complete the process of classifying a juvenile as a sex-
offender registrant, the juvenile court was required to hold an end-of-disposition
hearing.” Id. at ¶ 8.
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{¶12} We relied on In re Antwon C. and Schulze in State v. Amos, 2017-
Ohio-8448, 87 N.E.3d 1305 (1st Dist.), appeal accepted, 152 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2018-
Ohio-1600, 96 N.E.3d 298, appeal dismissed as improvidently accepted, 156 Ohio
St.3d 237, 2019-Ohio-168, 125 N.E.3d 832. Amos had been adjudicated delinquent
of rape and committed to DYS. He was subsequently released from DYS, placed on
“parole,” and, by agreement, classified by the juvenile court as a Tier I juvenile-
offender registrant. Amos was discharged from parole without a completion-of-
disposition hearing being held. Over a year later, the juvenile court held, in Amos’s
absence, what it termed a “completion-of-disposition hearing” and continued Amos’s
Tier I classification. In holding that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to classify
Amos as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant because the court had not properly
completed the statutorily-required classification process, we stated,
The juvenile court loses its jurisdiction over a juvenile who has
completed his parole or community control and has been discharged
by the court. Because the juvenile court did not hold a hearing before
Amos was discharged from parole, completing his disposition for his
sexually-oriented offense, the juvenile court did not properly complete
the statutorily-required process for classifying him as a juvenile-
offender registrant, and thus, it had no authority to classify Amos as a
Tier I offender. Therefore, Amos has no duty to register as a sex
offender.
Id. at ¶ 14. We noted that when Amos had been discharged from parole by the
juvenile court he had “completed all aspects of the disposition” for his sexually-
oriented offense. We held that at that time, the juvenile court should have held a
completion-of-disposition hearing under R.C. 2152.84.
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{¶13} In deciding Amos, we also relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision
in State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697, 983
N.E.2d 302, in which the court held that the juvenile court lacked statutory authority
to conduct an initial juvenile-offender-registration hearing after the juvenile had
fully satisfied the court’s delinquency adjudication and had turned 21. The Supreme
Court stated that the juvenile court “patently and unambiguously” lacked jurisdiction
to classify Jean-Baptiste once his juvenile disposition had been fully satisfied. The
court stated,
Because the juvenile court lacks statutory authority to classify Jean-
Baptiste after he was released and the court’s delinquency adjudication
has been fully satisfied, we agree with Jean-Baptiste’s first proposition
of law as applied to this case and hold that the juvenile court lacks
jurisdiction to classify Jean-Baptiste who is now no longer a “child”
under the applicable statute.
Id. at ¶ 32. The Supreme Court noted that Jean-Baptiste was “in accord” with its
decision in In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183, 774 N.E.2d 258, in
which the court held that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to reimpose a
suspended commitment to a DYS facility after the juvenile had been released from
probation, because “the completion of probation signals the end of the court’s
jurisdiction over a delinquent juvenile.” In re Cross at ¶ 28. “When the court ended
Cross’s probation, it ended its ability to make further dispositions as to Cross on that
delinquency count.” Id.{¶14} In the instant case, R.B.’s disposition was commitment to DYS until
age 21, although that commitment was suspended. R.B. turned 21 on July 20, 2017.
At that time, his disposition, by its own terms, was completed. The juvenile court
held a hearing on R.B.’s objections to the magistrate’s decision on September 19,
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2017, and did not enter orders continuing R.B.’s Tier I classification until October
30, 2017, well after R.B. had turned 21 and his disposition had ended. Because the
trial court did not complete the statutorily-required process for classifying R.B. prior
to the completion of his disposition upon his turning 21, it had no jurisdiction to
classify him as a Tier I offender. The initial classification order is not revived or still
in effect, and therefore, there is no order in place requiring R.B. to register as a sex
offender. See Amos, 2017-Ohio-1305, 87 N.E.3d 1305, at ¶ 8; Schulze, 2016-Ohio-
470, 59 N.E.3d 673, at ¶ 9-11. Therefore, R.B. has no duty to register as a sex
offender under R.C. Chapter 2950. See Amos at ¶ 14.
{¶15} We note that our holding in this case in no way impacts our opinion in
State v. Buttery, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160609, 2017-Ohio-9113, in which we
upheld R.B.’s adult conviction for failing to register, because that conviction was
based on the initial Tier I classification imposed at his disposition, which was still in
effect at that time. We pointed out in that case that the record did not reflect that
R.B. had had his completion-of-disposition hearing.
{¶16} R.B.’s assignments of error are made moot by our disposition in this
case. The juvenile court’s judgments continuing R.B.’s classification as a Tier I
juvenile-offender registrant are hereby vacated.
Judgments vacated.
MOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
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