State v. Carlisle

[Cite as State v. Carlisle, 2019-Ohio-4651.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2018-L-141
- vs - :
CHRISTIAN CARLISLE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal from the Willoughby Municipal Court, Case No. 2018 CRB 02145.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Judson J. Hawkins, 37811 Lake Shore Boulevard, Eastlake, OH 44095 (For Plaintiff-
Appellee).
Vanessa R. Clapp, Lake County Public Defender, and Melissa A. Blake, Assistant
Public Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendant-
Appellant).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Christian Carlisle, appeals the judgment of the Willoughby
Municipal Court in which the trial judge determined he was required, pursuant to Ohio’s
Arson Offender Registry scheme, to register for the remainder of his life as mandated
by statute. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} After appellant was let go from his position as an employee at Walmart, he
ignited a fire in the store. He was ultimately charged with aggravated arson, arson, and
inducing panic. Appellant ultimately entered a plea of guilty to arson, a misdemeanor of
the first degree. At sentencing, defense counsel acknowledged appellant was subject
to registration pursuant to the Arson Offender Registry but requested that the trial court
impose a ten-year mandatory registration, rather than the presumptive mandatory
lifetime registration. In light of the circumstances of the case, the lack of any criminal
record, and appellant’s cooperation and remorse, the prosecutor agreed with defense
counsel. The trial court, however, did not accept the joint recommendation and
appellant was sentenced to 180 days in jail, with 90 days suspended, 12-months
community control, and a $250 fine. He was also ordered to register as part of the
Arson Offender Registry for his lifetime. This appeal follows. Appellant’s assignments
of error provide:
{¶3} “[1.] The trial court erred by sentencing the defendant-appellant to register
for his lifetime pursuant to Ohio’s arson registry.
{¶4} “[2.] The trial court abused its discretion and erred to the prejudice [of] the
defendant-appellant by ordering him to participate in Ohio’s arson registry for the
duration of his lifetime.”
{¶5} Pursuant to R.C. 2909.15, any arson offender must register with the
sheriff’s office in the county where they live within 10 days of being so classified or
released from incarceration. R.C. 2909.15(A)(1) - (2). The offender must register with
the sheriff annually, updating any information that changed. R.C. 2909.15(D)(1). This
reporting requirement shall continue for the offender’s lifetime. R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(a).
The reporting requirement, however, may be reduced to 10 years if the trial court
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receives a request from the prosecutor and investigating agency to so limit the
registration period.
{¶6} Appellant first argues this court should modify the trial court’s judgment
imposing a life-long obligation to register because the record clearly and convincingly
does not support the judgment.
{¶7} This court has found the “General Assembly’s intent with regard to R.C.
2909.14 and R.C. 2909.15 to be civil in nature, and not punitive.” State v. Jones, 11th
Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-130, 2014-Ohio-5463, ¶80. As such, they are not part of the
sentence imposed in a criminal proceeding. See State v. Jirousek, 11th Dist. Geauga
No. 2014-G-3192, 2015-Ohio-949, ¶23. While this court reviews a felony sentence
pursuant to the standard appellant cites (and this case involves a misdemeanor
conviction), we conclude the statutory registration requirements are not an aspect of a
criminal sentence. In light of these points, appellant asks this court to improperly apply
a felony-sentencing standard of review to a misdemeanor case that challenges a civil
registration requirement. We decline to do so as the premise of appellant’s argument is
ill-founded.
{¶8} Next, appellant argues R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional
because it transfers judicial discretion to the executive branch, viz., prosecutors and
investigators. Specifically, appellant contends, by conditioning a judge’s discretion to
reduce the registration period from life to ten years upon the requests of prosecutors
and investigators, the statute violates the doctrine of separation of powers. In support,
appellant cites State v. Dingus, 4th Dist. Ross No. 16CA3525, 2017-Ohio-2619, wherein
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the Fourth Appellate District concluded the statute did indeed unconstitutionally violate
the separation-of-powers doctrine.
{¶9} In Dingus, the defendant preserved the constitutional issue by allowing the
trial judge to consider the argument. In the instant matter, appellant did not advance the
constitutional argument to the trial court. Rather, at the sentencing hearing, appellant’s
counsel simply noted that he and the prosecutor agreed that appellant’s registration
obligation should be limited to ten years. Although counsel highlighted appellant’s lack
of a criminal record and the personal problems he was experiencing at the time of the
offense which, in counsel’s view, mitigated appellant’s actions, no constitutional
objection was noted. Thus, the trial court had no opportunity to hear and consider the
separation-of-powers argument.
{¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court has held: “Failure to raise at the trial court level
the issue of the constitutionality of a statute or its application, which issue is apparent at
the time of trial, constitutes a waiver of such issue and a deviation from this state’s
orderly procedure, and therefore need not be heard for the first time on appeal.” State
v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120 (1986), syllabus. The Court subsequently clarified Awan,
holding a court has the right to consider constitutional challenges in its discretion even if
the argument was waived “in specific cases of plain error or where the rights and
interests involved may warrant it.” See In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149 (1988), syllabus.
Here, appellant did not make the constitutional challenge before the trial court; because,
however, we conclude “the interests involved may warrant it,” we shall consider
appellant’s argument.
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{¶11} The separation-of-powers doctrine represents the constitutional allocation
of authority within our tripartite government. Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353,
2006-Ohio-3799, ¶114. The doctrine secures liberty by simultaneously fostering
autonomy and comity, as well as interdependence and independence, among the three
branches. See, e.g., Fairview v. Giffee (1905), 73 Ohio St. 183, 187 (1905). The
doctrine “is ‘implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio
Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three
branches of state government.’” State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 134
(2000), quoting S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 159 (1986).
{¶12} Pursuant to Section 1, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, the judicial
power resides exclusively in the judicial branch, and the courts’ authority within that
realm shall not be violated. Bray, supra, at 136. Courts have long understood that they
must be wary of any usurpation of the constitutional powers of the judiciary and any
intrusion upon the courts’ inherent powers, i.e., those powers that “are necessary to the
orderly and efficient exercise of jurisdiction” and without which “no other [power] could
be exercised.” Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 213 (1896). Courts must thus “jealously
guard the judicial power against encroachment from the other two branches of
government and * * * conscientiously perform our constitutional duties and continue our
most precious legacy.” State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86
Ohio St.3d 451, 467 (1999)
{¶13} With this in mind, statutes enacted by the General Assembly are entitled
to a “strong presumption of constitutionality.” State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390,
2014-Ohio-783, ¶7. Thus, “if at all possible, statutes must be construed in conformity
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with the Ohio and the United States Constitutions.” State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267,
269 (1991). A court is only permitted to declare a statute unconstitutional if it “‘appear[s]
beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly
incompatible.’” State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1998), quoting State ex rel.
Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, (1955).
{¶14} In Dingus, the Fourth District determined that because R.C.
2909.15(D)(2)(b) does not allow the trial court to consider reducing an arson offender’s
registration period without the authorization of the executive branch, that portion of the
statute encroached upon the independence of the judiciary and therefore violated the
doctrine of separation of powers. The court held:
{¶15} By depriving the trial court of the ability to act without the request of
the prosecutor and the investigating law enforcement agency, the
trial court’s independence is compromised. The prosecutor and the
investigating law enforcement agency effectively decide which
registration periods can be reviewed by the trial court; thus, the
prosecutor and the investigating law enforcement agency have an
“overruling influence” over the trial court. Id. at ¶31.
{¶16} We differ with the Fourth District’s analysis and conclusion in Dingus. The
General Assembly has enacted various mandatory registries that remove all judicial
discretion. See, e.g., R.C. Chapter 2950 (certain classes of sexual offenders are
required by statute to register); see, also, R.C. 2952.83(A) (requiring registration for 16-
17-year-old juvenile sex offenders). Under these schemes, a court does not have the
inherent discretion to evaluate whether an offender should register or the discretion to
reduce the length of time an offender is required to register. The arson registry affords a
trial court some discretion, but only after it is triggered by a request by the prosecutor
and law enforcement, i.e., the executive branch. This request, while conferring
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discretion on the court, in no way eliminates, compromises, or necessarily influences a
court’s ultimate discretion to reduce the registration time or order a lifetime registration
period once the discretion is triggered. Although the request is a necessary
precondition for discretion, it does not interfere or remove a court’s discretion because
the executive branch’s request does not bind the court to act in accordance with the
recommendation.
{¶17} The flaw in the Fourth District’s analysis is the presumption that, if a court
does not have complete discretion unto itself to reduce the registration period, then the
legislature, via the executive branch, has absconded with a power “necessary to the
orderly and efficient exercise of jurisdiction” without which “no other [power] could be
exercised,” i.e., an inherent power of the judiciary. See Hale, supra. Simply because
lifetime registration is mandatory unless the executive branch recommends otherwise
does not mean the court’s discretion has been taken away. If there is no
recommendation, the court never had discretion; if there is a recommendation, the court
has full discretion to choose between lifetime registration or a reduced, 10-year
registration period. It might be said the executive branch, via statute, is the catalyst of
the court’s discretion. Registration statutes, however, regularly negate a court’s
discretion, requiring an offender to register based solely on the offense committed.
Such statutes do not infringe upon the judiciary’s authority. In effect, the Arson
Offender Registry statute is simply a mandatory registration statute until a request is
submitted. Then, the court has full discretion to reduce or not. In our view, separation
of powers would be violated only if the prosecutor’s and law enforcement agency’s
request required the court to act in accord with the request.
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{¶18} The Fourth District’s position is premised upon the presumption that the
judiciary has inherent discretion to classify and the executive branch has encroached
upon that power. We do not accept this premise. The Arson Offender Registration
scheme may be vulnerable to other constitutional challenges; we do not, however,
agree with the Fourth District that the R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. Because we conclude the statute is not facially unconstitutional
on this ground, the trial court’s discretion was never triggered. We discern no error in
the trial court’s judgment
{¶19} Appellant’s assignments of error lack merit.
{¶20} Because our conclusion and analysis is in direct conflict with the Fourth
District’s opinion in Dingus, supra, we sua sponte certify a conflict to the Supreme Court
of Ohio on the following question:
{¶21} “Does R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) unconstitutionally violate the doctrine of
separation of powers?”
{¶22} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Willoughby
Municipal Court is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J., concurs,
MARY JANE TRAPP, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with Concurring/
Dissenting Opinion.
____________________
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MARY JANE TRAPP, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with Concurring/
Dissenting Opinion.
{¶23} While I concur with the majority’s decision to sua sponte certify a conflict
to the Supreme Court of Ohio, and I agree that the question for determination by the
court is whether R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) unconstitutionally violates the doctrine of
separation of powers,” I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion because I would
answer the certified question in the affirmative.
{¶24} I find R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine by
impeding the judiciary in its province to impose a reduced registration period on an
arson offender during sentencing. I agree with the Fourth District’s determination in
State v. Dingus, 4th Dist. Ross No. 16CA3525, 2017-Ohio-2619, that the “offending
language” of R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) may be severed so that an arson offender is subject
to a lifetime registration period unless the trial court decides to reduce that period at the
arson offender’s sentencing hearing to a specified term not less than ten years. Id. at
¶41.
The Arson Offender Registry
{¶25} Effective July 1, 2013, Ohio adopted an arson offender registry. One who
meets the definition of an “arson offender” under R.C. 2909.13(B) must register annually
for life. R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(a). An exception allows the trial court to “limit an arson
offender's duty to reregister at an arson offender's sentencing hearing to not less than
ten years if the judge receives a request from the prosecutor and the investigating law
enforcement agency to consider limiting the arson offender's registration period.” R.C.
2909.15(D)(2)(b).
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{¶26} When the arson offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, it falls
upon the “official in charge of” the applicable institution to “provide the notice to the
arson offender before the arson offender is released.” R.C. 2909.14(A)(1). On the
other hand, if the arson offender is not sentenced to a term of incarceration, then “the
judge shall provide the notice to the arson offender at the time of the arson offender's
sentencing.” R.C. 2909.14(A)(2).
{¶27} The initial registration requires payment of a fee of $50, and annual re-
registration thereafter requires payment of a fee of $25. R.C. 2909.15(F). Failure to
register or to re-register as required is a felony of the fifth degree. R.C. 2909.15(H).
The Separation of Powers Doctrine
{¶28} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[al]though the Ohio Constitution
does not contain explicit language establishing the doctrine of separation of powers, it is
inherent in the constitutional framework of government defining the scope of authority
conferred upon the three separate branches of government.” State v. Sterling, 113
Ohio St.3d 255, 2007-Ohio-1790, ¶22.
{¶29} In S. Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 159 (1986), the court stated
“[w]hile no exact rule can be set forth for determining what powers of government may
or may not be assigned by law to each branch, * * * ‘[i]t is nevertheless true, in the
American theory of government, that each of the three grand divisions of the
government, must be protected from encroachment by the others, so far that its integrity
and independence may be preserved.” (Internal citation omitted.) Id. at 159, quoting
Fairview v. Giffee, 73 Ohio St. 183, 187 (1905).
10
{¶30} In State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132 (2000), the court stated:
“In our constitutional scheme, the judicial power resides in the judicial branch. Section 1,
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. The determination of guilt in a criminal matter and
the sentencing of a defendant convicted of a crime are solely the province of the
judiciary.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at 136.
{¶31} In State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455 (1996), the court stated as
follows:
{¶32} “The administration of justice by the judicial branch of the government
cannot be impeded by the other branches of the government in the exercise of their
respective powers. * * * Courts of general jurisdiction, whether named in the
Constitution or established pursuant to the provisions thereof, possess all powers
necessary to secure and safeguard the free and untrammeled exercise of their judicial
functions and cannot be directed, controlled or impeded therein by other branches of
the government. * * * The legislative branch has no right to limit the inherent powers of
the judicial branch of the government.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at 463-64.
State v. Dingus
{¶33} In Dingus, supra, the Fourth District Court of Appeals determined that R.C.
2909.15(D)(2)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine. The court held:
{¶34} “Under R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b), the trial court has discretion to impose a
reduced reporting period of not less than ten years only if it receives a request from the
prosecutor and the investigating law enforcement agency. If the prosecutor or the
investigating law enforcement agency does not make such a request, then the trial court
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cannot consider imposing a reduced reporting period; and the arson offender must
register for life.
{¶35} “By depriving the trial court of the ability to act without the request of the
prosecutor and the investigating law enforcement agency, the trial court's independence
is compromised. The prosecutor and the investigating law enforcement agency
effectively decide which registration periods can be reviewed by the trial court; thus, the
prosecutor and the investigating law enforcement agency have an ‘overruling influence’
over the trial court.” Id. at ¶30-31, citing Sterling, supra, at ¶23.
{¶36} The court determined that the “offending language” of R.C.
2909.15(D)(2)(b) could be severed so that an arson offender is subject to a lifetime
registration period “unless the trial court decided to reduce that period to a specified
term not less than ten years at the offender’s sentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶36.
{¶37} The Dingus opinion does not provide much in the way of analysis, but its
holding appears to rely primarily on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Sterling,
supra (which affirmed this court’s decision in State v. Sterling, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.
2003-A-0135, 2005-Ohio-6081).
State v. Sterling
{¶38} In Sterling, the Supreme Court of Ohio analyzed a statute that authorized
a prosecuting attorney to disagree with an application for DNA testing presented by an
inmate who had pleaded guilty or no contest to a felony offense. Id. at ¶34, citing R.C.
2953.82(D). The disagreement was final and not appealable by any person to any
court. Id.
{¶39} The Supreme Court of Ohio held as follows:
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{¶40} (1) “Insofar as the statute authorizes a prosecuting attorney to agree or
disagree with an inmate's request for DNA testing, it comports with the exercise of
authority by the executive department of government because the prosecutor is charged
with the responsibility to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶35.
{¶41} (2) “However, those portions of the statute that make the prosecuting
attorney's disagreement final, and not appealable to any court, and that deprive the
court of its ability to act without the prosecutor's agreement interfere with the court's
function in determining guilt, which is solely the province of the judicial branch of
government.” Id., citing Bray, supra, at 136.
{¶42} (3) “Accordingly, R.C. 2953.82(D) violates the doctrine of separation of
powers and is therefore unconstitutional.” Id.
{¶43} The Sterling court’s holding was based on the principle set forth in
Jemison, supra, that “each of the three grand divisions of the government, must be
protected from encroachment by the others, so far that its integrity and independence
may be preserved.” Sterling at ¶33, quoting Jemison at 159, quoting Fairview at 187.
{¶44} According to the court, the statute at issue “confin[ed] the exercise of
judicial authority to those instances where the prosecutor agrees with the application.”
Id. at ¶34. Thus, the statute “impede[d] the judiciary in its province to determine guilt in
a criminal matter” and “delegate[d] to the executive branch of government the power to
exercise judicial authority.” Id.
{¶45} The court determined the unconstitutional subsection could be severed
from the statute. Id. at ¶41. Under the remaining provisions, the inmate could file an
application, the prosecutor attorney would agree or disagree with the request, and the
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application would be submitted to the trial court for it to “exercise its judicial authority to
determine the disposition of the request subject to appropriate appellate review.” Id. at
¶42.
{¶46} In light of the foregoing authorities, the relevant issues in this case are (1)
whether R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) involves a judicial power, and (2) whether R.C.
2909.15(D)(2)(b) encroaches on that judicial power.
Judicial Power
{¶47} The first issue is whether R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) involves a judicial power.
{¶48} The majority argues that the judiciary does not have the “inherent
discretion to evaluate whether an offender should register or the discretion to reduce the
length of time an offender is required to register.”
{¶49} This is not an accurate characterization of the relevant inquiry. In Sterling,
the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the principle that “[t]he determination of guilt in a
criminal matter and the sentencing of a defendant convicted of a crime are solely the
province of the judiciary.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶31, quoting Bray at 136.
{¶50} The statute at issue in Sterling implicated the judiciary’s power to
determine guilt. See id. at ¶35. Here, R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) potentially implicates the
judiciary’s power of sentencing. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether reducing an arson
offender’s registration period under R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) involves the sentencing of a
defendant convicted of a crime.
{¶51} The majority also argues that the arson offender registry is not part of the
sentence imposed in a criminal proceeding.
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{¶52} Courts previously held that the prior version of the sex-offender
registration and notification statutes were remedial and not punitive, and thus, they were
not punishment or part of any sentence imposed on the sex offender. See, e.g.,
Burbrink v. State, 185 Ohio App.3d 130, 2009-Ohio-5346, ¶10 (1st Dist.).
{¶53} This court in State v. Reed, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-130, 2014-Ohio-
5463, held that the arson registry does not violate the ex post facto clause of the U.S.
Constitution and was not unconstitutionally retroactive. Id. at ¶84, 85. In so holding,
this court found that the General Assembly’s intent with respect to the arson offender
registry was civil in nature rather than punitive because registration serves the remedial
purpose of protecting the local community from repeat arson offender. Id. at ¶79-80.
Thus, one may conclude that the arson offender registry is not part of the sentence
imposed in a criminal proceeding.
{¶54} Reed is not determinative of this case. As an initial matter, it is not clear
why the protection of the public is not also indicative of a punitive intent. In fact, one of
the “overriding purposes” of both felony and misdemeanor sentencing” is “to protect the
public from future crime by the offender.” R.C. 2929.11(A); R.C. 2929.21(A).
{¶55} In addition, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed course by holding that
the sex offender registration and notification requirements are punitive. See State v.
Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, ¶16 (“Following the enactment of S.B.
10, all doubt has been removed: R.C. Chapter 2950 is punitive.”); State v. Blankenship,
145 Ohio St.3d 221, 2015-Ohio-4624, ¶9 (“We * * * have held that the enhanced sex-
offender reporting and notification requirements contained in R.C. Chapter 2950
enacted by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 * * * are punitive in nature”). Accordingly, the First and
15
Eighth Districts have held that the sex offender registration and notification
requirements are now part of a defendant’s sentence. See, e.g., State v. Lawson, 1st
Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120077 & C-120067, 2012-Ohio-5281, ¶18 (“S.B. 10's sex-
offender registration requirements are part of a sex offender's sentence”); State v.
Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150294, 2016-Ohio-501, ¶7 (The Adam Walsh Act
“made registration, verification, and community notification requirements part of the
penalty for the offense”); State v. Martinez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103572, 2016-Ohio-
5515, ¶39 (“Thus, ‘sentence’ as used in R.C. 2949.02(A) and 2953.09(A)(2)(a) includes
the requirement that a defendant register as a sex offender”).
{¶56} Although Williams was issued prior to Reed, this court did not consider or
apply the factors that the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth in that case. See Reed at
¶85. At least six factors discussed in Williams support a finding that the arson offender
registry is punitive: (1) it is placed within R.C. Title 29, Ohio’s criminal code; (2) the
failure to register subjects an offender to criminal prosecution; (3) the registration
requirements are automatic; (4) there is no entitlement to a hearing prior to
classification; (5) there is no opportunity for the court to review the appropriateness of
the classification; and (6) reporting is a lifetime requirement, with the limited exception
set forth R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b). See State v. Caldwell, 1st Dist. No. C-130812, 2014-
Ohio-3566, ¶33, citing Williams at ¶11, 16, 19.
{¶57} In any event, the issue in this case is resolved on a narrower basis.
Again, the relevant inquiry is whether one provision of the arson registry statutory
scheme, i.e., R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b), not the entire statutory scheme, involves the
judicial power of sentencing.
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{¶58} Under R.C. 2929.01(EE), "sentence" is defined as “the sanction or
combination of sanctions imposed by the sentencing court on an offender who is
convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense.” (Emphasis added.) Under R.C.
2929.01(DD), “sanction” is defined as “any penalty imposed upon an offender who is
convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense, as punishment for the offense.” (Emphasis
added.) “Simply put, a sentence is a penalty or combination of penalties imposed on a
defendant as punishment for the offense he or she is found guilty of committing.” State
v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, ¶28.
{¶59} The General Assembly has the power to define, classify, and prescribe
punishment. See State v. Bates, 118 Ohio St.3d 174, 2008-Ohio-1983, ¶12, quoting
State v. O’Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94 (1922), paragraph one of the syllabus. The judiciary
imposes the punishment through its sentencing authority. See id. at ¶13.
{¶60} Since R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(a) imposes a lifetime registration duty upon an
arson offender that attaches as a matter of law upon conviction, the lifetime registration
is arguably not part of the sentence that the trial court imposes. See State v. Hayden,
96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, ¶18 (“if a defendant has been convicted of a
sexually oriented offense as defined in R.C. 2950.01(D) and is neither a habitual sex
offender nor a sexual predator, the sexually oriented offender designation attaches as a
matter of law”). Rather, the trial court’s only involvement with the lifetime registration
appears to be providing notice to the arson offender in the event it does not sentence
him or her to a term of incarceration. See R.C. 2909.14(A)(2).
{¶61} By contrast, under R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b), “the judge may limit an arson
offender's duty to reregister at an arson offender's sentencing hearing to not less than
17
ten years if the judge receives a request from the prosecutor and the investigating law
enforcement agency to consider limiting the arson offender's registration period.”
(Emphasis added.) In other words, the sentencing court may impose a reduced
registration period at the sentencing hearing on a person who has been convicted of or
pleads guilty to an arson-related offense. It is difficult to comprehend how something a
sentencing court imposes on an offender at a sentencing hearing could not be
considered part of the sentence.
{¶62} By analogy, R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) requires the trial court to “include in the
sentence the costs of prosecution * * * and render a judgment against the defendant for
such costs.” (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the
imposition of these costs does not constitute criminal punishment. See State v. Threatt,
108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, ¶15 (“although costs in criminal cases are
assessed at sentencing and are included in the sentencing entry, costs are not
punishment, but are more akin to a civil judgment for money”). There can be no
dispute, however, that the imposition of court costs is part of a defendant’s sentence.
See State v. Clevenger, 114 Ohio St.3d 258, 2007-Ohio-4006, ¶3 (“R.C. 2947.23
requires the imposition of court costs as a part of a criminal sentence”).
{¶63} To conclude otherwise implies these statutes are unconstitutional for
requiring the judiciary’s involvement in non-judicial matters. See Thompson v.
Redington, 92 Ohio St. 101 (1915), syllabus (“In the absence of express constitutional
provision therefor, the General Assembly of Ohio cannot assign to the judicial branch of
the government any duties other than those that are properly judicial, to be performed in
a judicial manner”).
18
{¶64} Since R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) authorizes the sentencing court to impose a
reduced registration period at the sentencing hearing on an arson offender, R.C.
2909.15(D)(2)(b) involves the judicial power of sentencing.
Encroachment of Judicial Power
{¶65} The second issue is whether R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) encroaches on the
judicial power to sentence an arson offender.
{¶66} The majority recognizes that the trial court’s “discretion” to reduce the
registration period is only “triggered” by the prosecutor’s and law enforcement agency’s
request, making the request a “necessary precondition” or “catalyst.” It argues R.C.
2909.15(D)(2)(b) is not unconstitutional because the request does not affect the court’s
ultimate discretion whether to reduce the registration period or bind the court to act in
accordance with the recommendation. According to the majority, judicial power would
only be encroached if the request required the trial court to act in accordance with the
request.
{¶67} This argument reflects a constrained view of the separation of powers
doctrine set forth in Sterling, where the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that a similar
executive branch “trigger,” “precondition,” or “catalyst” to judicial power was
unconstitutional.
{¶68} Under the statute involved in Sterling, an inmate could file an application
for DNA testing with the trial court. The trial court had two options – to accept the
application or reject the application. However, if the trial court thought the application
should be accepted, but the prosecutor did not, the trial court was not authorized to
accept the application. The prosecutor’s decision controlled. Similarly, if the trial court
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thought the application should be rejected, but the prosecutor thought it should be
accepted, the trial court was required to accept the application and proceed to DNA
testing and determining guilt. The prosecutor’s decision once again controlled.
{¶69} The court in Sterling determined that the legislature had confined the trial
court’s exercise of its judicial authority to those instances where the prosecutor agreed
with the inmate’s application. Id. at ¶34. Thus, the legislature had impeded the
judiciary’s power to determine guilt and delegated that power to the executive branch.
Id.
{¶70} Here, under R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b), an arson offender appears before the
trial court for sentencing. The trial court has two options - to impose a reduced
registration period or to do nothing and permit the lifetime registration to attach by
operation of law. However, the trial court can only exercise the first option if the
prosecutor and the investigating law enforcement agency request consideration of a
reduction. If the trial court thinks the registration period should be limited, but the
prosecutor and investigating law enforcement agency do not think it should be limited
and do not request limitation, the statute does not authorize the trial court to reduce the
registration period. Instead, the lifetime registration requirement attaches by operation
of law.
{¶71} Thus, the trial court is only able to impose a reduced registration period if
the executive branch thinks the registration period should be limited and requests that
the trial court impose a limitation. In essence, the executive branch controls the trial
court’s exercise of its judicial authority to reduce an arson offender’s registration period.
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See Dingus at ¶39. Like the statute in Sterling, the legislature has impeded the
judiciary’s power to sentence.
Conclusion
{¶72} Based on Sterling, as applied by Dingus, R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) violates
the separation of powers doctrine by impeding the judiciary in its province to impose a
reduced registration period on an arson offender during sentencing. Accordingly, the
“offending language” of R.C. 2909.15(D)(2)(b) should be severed so that an arson
offender is subject to a lifetime registration period unless the trial court decides to
reduce that period at the arson offender’s sentencing hearing to a specified term not
less than ten years.
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