Gilliam v. Vaughn's Auto Repair & Towing

[Cite as Gilliam v. Vaughn's Auto Repair & Towing, 2019-Ohio-5020.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
JAMES GILLIAM C.A. No. 19CA011505
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
VAUGHN’S AUTO REPAIR & TOWING OBERLIN MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Defendant CASE No. 17CVF00486
and
LORAIN COUNTY SHERIFF
Appellant
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 9, 2019
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Lorain County Sheriff (“the Sheriff”) appeals the judgment
of the Oberlin Municipal Court. This Court reverses and remands the matter for proceedings
consistent with this decision.
I.
{¶2} This Court summarized the facts of the matter in the prior appeal:
According to [Plaintiff] James Gilliam, following a traffic stop in Lorain County,
his vehicle was towed and stored by [Defendant] Vaughn’s Auto Repair &
Towing [(“Vaughn’s”)]. Over the next few months, he attempted to recover his
vehicle, but every time he tried to pay the requested fee, Vaughn’s would increase
the amount it said he owed. Finally, one day it told him that his vehicle had been
sold. Mr. Gilliam filed a complaint against Vaughn’s, alleging several causes of
action. After discovering that the Sheriff had approved the sale, Mr. Gilliam
amended his complaint to add claims against the Sheriff. Specifically, Mr.
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Gilliam alleged that the Sheriff had failed to provide him the notice required by
statute that his vehicle was going to be sold.
After answering the amended complaint, the Sheriff moved for summary
judgment, alleging that it was immune from liability. The municipal court denied
its motion because it determined that some of the documents the Sheriff had
submitted were not properly incorporated into an affidavit. It gave the Sheriff 14
days to supplement the record. After the Sheriff submitted a supplemental brief,
the municipal court again denied its motion for summary judgment, concluding
that it was not immune because it had not followed the statutory procedure for
disposal of the vehicle.
Gilliam v. Vaughn’s Auto Repair & Towing, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011340, 2019-Ohio-
1392, ¶ 2-3.
{¶3} The Sheriff appealed and this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court. See
id. at ¶ 1, 3. In so doing, this Court concluded that it did not “appear that the municipal court
conducted the three-tiered analysis for political subdivision immunity.” Id. at ¶ 7. We noted that
the trial court “did not analyze whether the exceptions to immunity under Section 2744.02(B) or
the statutory defenses to liability under Section 2744.03(A) applied.” Id. In conclusion, we
determined that a remand was warranted because, even “[t]hough the municipal court may have
worked through the three-tier immunity analysis under Sections 2744.02 and 2744.03, we
can[not] determine from the judgment entry its conclusions in that regard.” Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶4} Upon remand, the trial court again issued an entry denying the Sheriff’s motion
for summary judgment. The trial court, albeit reluctantly, conducted the analysis ordered by this
Court in the prior appeal and concluded that the Sheriff “is a political subdivision immune from
tort liability under R.C. 2744.01(F)[,]” that “none of the exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B)
appl[ied,]” and that it was therefore not necessary for it to make a finding under R.C.
2744.03(A). Notwithstanding the foregoing, inexplicably, the trial court stated that, “[r]egardless
of the court’s conclusions in the three tier analysis the court finds that the Lorain County Sheriff
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under the unique facts and circumstances of this case is not as a matter of law immune from
liability.” In concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained and the Sheriff was
therefore not entitled to the benefit of immunity, the trial court appears to have primarily relied
upon Broadvue Motors, Inc. v. Maple Hts., 135 Ohio App. 3d 405 (8th Dist.1999). The Sheriff
has appealed, raising a single assignment of error for our review. Mr. Gilliam has not filed a
brief in this matter. See App.R. 18(C).
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
AS TO THE LORAIN COUNTY SHERIFF BECAUSE THE SHERIFF IS
IMMUNE FROM SUIT[.]
{¶5} The Sheriff asserts in its assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying
its motion for summary judgment. Based upon the trial court’s own conclusions concerning the
three-tiered statutory immunity analysis, which are not challenged on appeal, we agree.
{¶6} “A court engages in a three-tiered analysis to determine whether a political
subdivision is immune from liability for damages in a civil action.” Molnar v. Green, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 29072, 2019-Ohio-3083, ¶ 11. “R.C. 2744.02(A) provides that ‘a political
subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or
property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of
the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.’” Thomas v.
Lorain Metro. Hous. Auth., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011177, 2018-Ohio-2997, ¶ 13. “When it
has been determined that a party generally qualifies for immunity due to its status as a political
subdivision, the second tier of the analysis is to determine whether one of the exceptions to
immunity set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B) is applicable.” Id. “Under circumstances where an
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exception to immunity applies, the third tier of the analysis involves a determination of whether
immunity may be restored under R.C. 2744.03(A).” Id.
{¶7} Here, the trial court engaged in the three-tiered analysis in its judgment entry; an
analysis that is not challenged on appeal. Therein, the trial court determined that the Sheriff was
a political subdivision and thus, absent an exception, would be immune from liability. The trial
court also concluded that none of the exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B) applied. Further, the trial
court did not conclude that Chapter 2744 of the Revised Code was inapplicable. See R.C.
2744.09. Accordingly, given those findings, which are unchallenged on appeal, the trial court
should have ended its analysis there and, based upon its own three-tiered analysis, concluded that
the Sheriff was immune and granted its motion for summary judgment.
{¶8} Instead, the trial court ignored the three-tiered analysis and, based primarily upon
Broadvue Motors, Inc., and “the unique facts and circumstances of this case[,]” concluded that
the Sheriff was not as a matter of law immune from liability. Initially, we cannot say that
Broadvue Motors, Inc., irrespective of whether we agree with its holding, stands for the
proposition that the three-tiered immunity analysis can be ignored. In Broadvue Motors, Inc., it
appears the appellate court concluded that the exception contained in R.C. 2744.02(B)(5)
applied. See id. at 411. Nothing in Broadvue Motors, Inc. suggests that it is correct for the trial
court to disregard the three-tiered statutory analysis.
{¶9} The trial court erred in disregarding the three-tiered analysis, particularly given
this Court’s order in the prior appeal. See Elston v. Howland Loc. Schools, 113 Ohio St. 3d 314,
2007-Ohio-2070, ¶ 10 (“The process of determining whether a political subdivision is immune
from liability involves a three-tiered analysis.”).
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{¶10} Given that the trial court engaged in the three-tiered analysis and found that no
exception to immunity applied, and that the substance of the trial court’s three-tiered analysis is
not challenged on appeal, the Sheriff’s assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶11} The Sheriff’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Oberlin
Municipal Court is reversed and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Oberlin Municipal
Court, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
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TEODOSIO, P. J.
CALLAHAN, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and DANIEL F. PETTICORD, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellant.
RICHARD RAMSEY, Attorney at Law, for Defendant.
ANTHONY BAKER, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.