State v. Cruse

[Cite as State v. Cruse, 2019-Ohio-1223.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 29140
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JOHN WILLIAM CRUSE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR-2018-04-1301
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: April 3, 2019
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} John Cruse appeals a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas
that denied his motion to withdraw his Alford plea. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} During the early morning hours of June 5, 2017, a fire started on the back porch
of a house in Akron. After the fire was extinguished, a bottle of lighter fluid was discovered in
the backyard that had not been there when the residents of the house went to bed. The lighter
fluid was consistent with fluid found on the porch. DNA recovered from the bottle matched Mr.
Cruse, who used to date one of the women living in the house.
{¶3} The Grand Jury indicted Mr. Cruse on two counts of aggravated arson. At the
beginning of the second day of his trial, Mr. Cruse entered an Alford plea, alleging that he would
never be able to prove that he did not touch the bottle of lighter fluid. He also explained that he
would rather be in prison than in society and that it would only postpone the inevitable to finish
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the trial. He further expressed skepticism about whether the jury would actually require the State
to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court accepted his plea, released the jury,
and scheduled Mr. Cruse’s sentencing for the afternoon.
{¶4} At sentencing, Mr. Cruse continued to assert that he had not committed the
offenses. Mr. Cruse’s attorney, therefore, moved to withdraw Mr. Cruse’s plea during a sidebar,
arguing that he was not satisfied that Mr. Cruse wanted to go through with his plea. The State
opposed the motion because nothing had changed since the morning. Mr. Cruse’s attorney
responded that the State had used Mr. Cruse’s continued assertion of innocence against him
when it argued that he should receive the maximum sentence, in part, because he had refused to
take responsibility for his actions. The trial court found that nothing had changed regarding Mr.
Cruse’s claim of innocence and that Mr. Cruse, himself, had not indicated that his feelings about
his plea had changed. It, therefore, refused to allow Mr. Cruse to withdraw his plea. Mr. Cruse
then spoke regarding his sentence and again asked to withdraw his plea, claiming that he only
entered it because he believed he would not be able to prove his innocence and did not believe
that any jury would acquit him when only his DNA was on the lighter fluid bottle. Following his
statements, the trial court addressed Mr. Cruse’s renewed motion to withdraw. It stated that Mr.
Cruse had to show something more than a change of mind. It found that the State would be
prejudiced by the withdrawal. It also found that Mr. Cruse had had excellent representation, that
the plea hearing was very detailed, and that Mr. Cruse had understood the nature of the charges
and the potential sentence. It, therefore, denied his motion to withdraw. The court proceeded to
sentence Mr. Cruse to eight years imprisonment. Mr. Cruse has appealed, assigning as error that
the trial court denied his right to due process and a fair trial.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED CRUSE HIS RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS AND
A FAIR TRIAL, IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIX[TH], AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 1, 10 AND 16, OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
{¶5} Mr. Cruse argues that the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his
plea. The Ohio Supreme Court has advised that motions to withdraw guilty pleas that occur
before sentencing “should be freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St. 3d 521, 527
(1992). Nevertheless, a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea
before sentencing. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. It is the defendant’s burden to provide a
reasonable and legitimate reason justifying withdrawal of the guilty plea. State v. West, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 04CA008554, 2005-Ohio-990, ¶ 21. The trial court has discretion to grant or deny
the motion. Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus. We review the court’s decision for an abuse of
that discretion. State v. Krieg, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008442, 2004-Ohio-5174, ¶ 18. “An
abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it implies a decision that is ‘unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable.’” Id., quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St. 2d 151, 157 (1980).
{¶6} This Court has held that, if “a defendant (1) is represented by competent counsel,
(2) is given a full hearing before entering the plea, and (3) is given a hearing on the motion to
withdraw during which the court considers the defendant’s arguments in support of the motion,
the trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea.” State v.
Remines, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 97CA006700, 1998 WL 103350, *2 (Feb. 25, 1998). Upon
review of the record, we conclude that those circumstances occurred in this case. The trial court
found that Mr. Cruse’s counsel’s performance was exceptional, which Mr. Cruse does not
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contest. The court also afforded Mr. Cruse a full hearing on his request to enter an Alford plea,
which Mr. Cruse also has not contested.
{¶7} Mr. Cruse does challenge whether the court afforded him a hearing on his motions
to withdraw, arguing that the court did not do any sort of inquiry into the legitimacy of the
requests. We note, however, that the parties were in open court at the time of Mr. Cruse’s
motions. Both Mr. Cruse and his attorney had an opportunity to explain to the court why they
thought Mr. Cruse should be allowed to withdraw his plea. Following both the attorney’s motion
and Mr. Cruse’s motion, the court considered their arguments and explained why it was denying
them. We, therefore, conclude that Mr. Cruse was given a hearing on his motions to withdraw in
which the court considered the arguments in support of the motions. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Mr. Cruse to withdraw his
plea. Mr. Cruse’s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶8} Mr. Cruse’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
CALLAHAN, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JEREMY A. VEILLETTE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.