DocketNumber: No. 2-05-30.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 883
Judges: SHAW, J.
Filed Date: 2/27/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} On June 2, 2005, Jennifer filed a petition in the Common Pleas Court of Auglaize County, Ohio requesting a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order against Timothy. In her petition, she alleged that Timothy yelled at her on June 1, 2005 at her son's ball game. She claims that he said she "had better drop [her] contempt charges against him or [she] will get what's coming to [her]" and "[she] was walking into a hornet's nest." The petition also states that "[H]is yelling at me was scary and scared my daughter [Allison] as well" and "Allison started yelling at him to stop and don't hurt her mom." During this altercation, only three people were present: Timothy, Jennifer, and their nine year old daughter, Allison.1 On June 2, 2005, an ex parte hearing was held and an ex parte Civil Protection Order was granted based upon her petition and testimony.
{¶ 3} On June 13, 2005, Timothy was served by the Auglaize County Sheriff's Department with the Ex Parte Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order. On June 15, 2005, Timothy filed a Subpoena Duces Tecum for Jennifer to bring the parties' minor child, Allison, to testify at the June 27, 2005 final hearing as to her rendition of the events that took place on June 1, 2005.
{¶ 4} On June 27, 2005, the final hearing was held. Jennifer proceeded with her testimony and prior to her resting her case, she acknowledged that her daughter, Allison was present under subpoena and that she would like to call Allison as a witness in the event that Timothy was going to call her. At that time the trial court inquired whether Timothy had the child under subpoena. Timothy's counsel indicated that he did have the child under subpoena and began to offer proof as to the necessity for the children's testimony. He stated "I subpoened her because there is reference as to what she said to Mr. Brandt at the most recent incident that's being alleged. I thought it might be, —." Trans. p. 21. However, the trial court interrupted counsel and stated "I'm not gonna allow either one of you to bring a child into the middle of this so, — * * * your subpoena will be QUASHED. Your request will be DENIED. This is not in the best interest of a child of this age." Trans. p. 20-21. At this point, Jennifer offered her exhibits to the court and rested her case. Timothy then proceeded with his case without calling anyone else to testify, offered his exhibits to the court and rested his case.
{¶ 5} The trial court then denied Timothy's request that the trial court at least interview Allison in chambers on the relevant issues regarding the Civil Protection Order stating that "an in camera interview for any child before the Court is for the purpose of the Court to determine which parent the child may want to live with, and not to elicit from the child factual determinations that the Court may then consider." Trans. p. 31-32. Jennifer then proceeded with closing arguments requesting that the Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order be granted and Timothy waived closing arguments.
{¶ 6} In conclusion, the trial court granted Jennifer a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order for five years requiring Timothy to remain a minimum of five hundred feet from Jennifer.
{¶ 7} On July 8, 2005, Timothy filed a notice of appeal alleging the following assignments of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION TO THE MATERIALPREJUDICE OF APPELLANT WHEN QUASHING APPELLANT'S SUBPOENA DUCESTECUM FOR THE PARTIES' CHILD TO TESTIFY AT THE C.P.O. HEARING ANDHOLDING THAT IT WOULD NOT ALLOW EITHER PARTY TO PRESENT TESTIMONYOF THEIR CHILDREN BASED UPON A BEST INTEREST STANDARD AND THAT ITWOULD NOT CONDUCT AN IN CAMERA INTERVIEW WITH EITHER OF THE MINORCHILDREN.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE A DOMESTIC VIOLENCECIVIL PROTECTION ORDER UPON A FINDING THAT APPELLEE IS IN DANGEROF OR HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS DEFINED IN O.R.C.§
{¶ 8} We note at the outset that Timothy's first assignment of error mentions "children"; however, the record and transcript of the CPO Final Hearing reflect that only one child was subpoenaed as a possible witness prior to the filing of the appellate briefs. Therefore, despite Timothy's references to "children" our analysis of the assignments of error concern only Allison. In Timothy's first assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred in not allowing the parties' children to testify at the civil protection order hearing. Timothy argues that the trial court's ruling materially prejudiced him by preventing him from presenting the testimony of the parties' minor children and by not conducting an in camera interview with either of the parties' minor children.
{¶ 9} Evid. R. 601(A) states that every person is competent to be a witness except children who are under the age of ten and "appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly." "The trial judge has the duty to conduct preliminary determinations as to the competency of all witnesses." State v.Walsh (1997), 3rd Dist. No. 14-97-20, citing State v. Clark
(1994)
{¶ 10} In this case, the trial court had a duty to conduct a preliminary determination as to the competency of Allison. However, the trial court did not conduct a voir dire examination of Allison to determine whether she was competent to testify. Rather, the trial court just stated "I'm not gonna allow either one of you to bring a child into the middle of this so, — * * * This is not in the best interest of a child of this age."
{¶ 11} In sum, the trial court in this case relied on a public policy determination to exclude the testimony of a minor child. However, "[W]here the need for calling the child to testify is imperative, public policy and private views of propriety do not justify a refusal to listen to competent testimony of young children." 46 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1994) 670, Family Law — Trial and Hearing — Witnesses — Children of the Parties.
{¶ 12} We are sympathetic to the public policy enunciated by the trial court. However, where the child is the only eyewitness to the central incident of the hearing besides the parties themselves, it seems to us that the need for calling the child to testify is sufficiently imperative to either request a competency hearing or permit the testimony. Therefore, the trial court should have considered whether Allison was competent to testify as to the events that occurred on June 1, 2005.
{¶ 13} In Moser v. Moser (1991),
[t]he Court refuses to allow her to testify because the Court feels that it puts an undo (sic) burden on the child. And is going to create a rift with the mother and the father, that uh, probably will never be healed.
Moser,
{¶ 14} However, notwithstanding our determination of error, the assignment of error was overruled in Moser because this Court found that the proffer that was made was insufficient to place this Court on notice as to what the child's testimony would have been. Moser,
{¶ 15} In sum, because the trial court failed to conduct the predicate competency examination in this case and did not permit the parties to make any proffer of the proposed testimony, the trial court did not have before it an adequate record to make the requisite decisions as to either the imperative nature of the child's testimony or the competency of the witness. For these reasons, the first assignment of error is sustained. To this extent only, the second assignment of error is also sustained.
{¶ 16} In conclusion, the June 27, 2005 judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Auglaize County, Ohio granting Jennifer a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order against Timothy is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed. Cupp and Rogers, JJ., concur.