State v. Jackson

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2015-Ohio-4274.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 102394
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
WALTER JACKSON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-14-585519-A
BEFORE: Stewart, J., Kilbane, P.J., Laster Mays, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 15, 2015
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Britta M. Barthol
P.O. Box 218
Northfield, OH 44067
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Mary Weston
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, J.:
{¶1} A jury found defendant-appellant Walter Jackson guilty of raping two women
in separate incidents. The first rape occurred in June 1996 and a positive identification
led to Jackson’s arrest, but he was released because the victim refused to cooperate with
the police. The second rape occurred in July 1996, and the victim likewise refused to
cooperate with the police. No charges were filed in either case until 2014, after test
results from rape kits were matched to Jackson. Jackson filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment (both incidents were charged in a single indictment), claiming that the
substantial passage of time between the date of the alleged rapes and the date of the
prosecution prejudiced his ability to present a defense. The court denied the motion,
leading to trial and a subsequent conviction for both rapes.
{¶2} In this appeal, Jackson’s first assignment of error is that the court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for preindictment delay. He argues that a
nearly 18-year delay from the date of the offense to the date of the indictment caused him
actual prejudice because potential witnesses were lost, memories diminished, and physical
evidence was lost or spoiled. He also argues that the state failed to offer a justifiable
reason for the delay.
{¶3} The statute of limitations for a criminal offense is a defendant’s primary
protection against overly stale criminal charges. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
322, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971). In some circumstances, however, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been applied to provide additional protection
against egregious delay in instituting prosecutions. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.
783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977). As with all due processes claims, a claim of
preindictment delay rests on “basic concepts of due process and fundamental justice.”
State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101258, 2015-Ohio-2853, ¶ 13. To establish that
preindictment delay violated the Due Process Clause, a defendant must first show that the
delay caused actual and substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and, second, that
the state delayed to gain a tactical advantage or slowed the process down for some other
impermissible reason. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 81
L. Ed. 2d 146 (1984), citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789. Regarding the second factor, the
state must produce evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay. State v. Whiting, 84
Ohio St. 3d 215, 217, 1998-Ohio-575, 702 N.E.2d 1199. Decisions to grant or deny a
motion to dismiss on grounds of preindictment delay are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St. 3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶
33, citing State v. Parson, 6 Ohio St. 3d 442, 445, 453 N.E.2d 689 (1983).
{¶4} Evidence at trial showed that the victim of the June 1996 rape, M.C., told the
police that she was hitchhiking and accepted a ride from a man she later identified as
Jackson. After driving a short distance, Jackson pulled the car onto a side street,
brandished a knife and forced her to perform oral sex on him and then engage in sexual
intercourse. At one point, a cyclist approached the car and asked if everything was okay,
but the rapist pointed a BB gun at the cyclist and told him to leave. After being released
from the car, M.C. called the police and gave them a description of the assailant and the
license number of his car. The police used this information to apprehend Jackson within
minutes of receiving the call. M.C. identified Jackson in a cold stand lineup at the scene
of the rape. The police arrested Jackson and recovered a knife and a BB gun. Jackson
told the police that M.C. was a prostitute and he had paid for her services. He also told
the police that he believed that the cyclist who approached the car while he and M.C.
were engaged in sexual conduct was attempting to rob him. M.C. did not follow up with
the police and Jackson was released from custody without being charged. The police
returned the confiscated weapons. In 2013, vaginal swabs taken at the time of the
offense were tested for the first time and identified Jackson as the source of the DNA
recovered from M.C. The police contacted M.C. and she agreed to testify against
Jackson.
{¶5} Jackson argues that the 18-year delay in instituting the prosecution for
offenses committed against M.C. resulted in the loss of crucial evidence: the medical
records compiled when M.C. sought treatment have been destroyed, the clothing taken
from the victim at the time is lost, and the car in which the rape was alleged to have
occurred is no longer available. In addition, Jackson argued that he was unable to locate
the sex crimes detective assigned to the case in 1996.
{¶6} Courts have consistently held that proof of actual prejudice must be
“‘specific, particularized, and non-speculative.’” State v. McFeeture, 2014-Ohio-5271,
24 N.E.3d 724, ¶ 120 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Stricker, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
03AP-746, 2004-Ohio-3557, ¶ 36. Nothing Jackson offered in support of his motion to
dismiss went beyond speculation as to what he might have been able to show had the trial
occurred sooner. Having told the police at the time of his arrest that he and M.C. were
engaged in consensual sexual conduct, he could not claim prejudice stemming from the
delay in DNA testing. In addition, Jackson never claimed to have any witnesses who
might corroborate his version of events. Although Jackson maintains that M.C.’s
medical records were no longer available by the time of his indictment, he makes no
specific argument as to why those records would be of any benefit to him. What is more,
Jackson’s need for the medical records was not obvious given that he defended a rape
charge on the basis of consensual sexual conduct. His assertion that the car in which the
rape occurred might have provided evidence was likewise nothing more than speculation.
We have consistently held that speculation does not show actual prejudice. State v.
Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101202, 2015-Ohio-415, ¶ 11; McFeeture at ¶ 120. In
any event, M.C. did not claim that she resisted in any way after Jackson forced her
submission by threatening her with the knife, so it is unclear exactly what evidence would
have been recovered that would have aided the defense. On these facts, we cannot say
that the court abused its discretion by finding that Jackson failed to show actual prejudice
when claiming preindictment delay relating to his prosecution for the rape of M.C. With
Jackson having failed to show actual prejudice, we need not examine whether the state
engaged in the delay for the sole purpose of gaining a tactical advantage over him or for
some other impermissible reason.
{¶7} The July 1996 rape was of M.P. She told the police that she had been
sleeping in a house boat that had been trailered in a residential area when she awakened to
find a man she knew as “Ron” engaging in intercourse with her. The male placed the
blade of a knife against her neck and told her that he would cut her throat if she screamed.
When the male finished, he left. M.P. called the police. The police report described
M.P. as “heavily intoxed [sic].” M.P. was transported to the hospital and examined.
She told the police that she knew “Ron” from the neighborhood. At that point, M.P.
stopped cooperating — the police report stated that “attempts have been made for this
victim to assist in this investigation. As of this date, there have been no responses to said
attempts. As of this date, there are no further investigative leads.”
{¶8} Jackson argued that he suffered actual prejudice from the delay in returning
the indictment charging the rape of M.P. because the victim’s 911 telephone call
reporting the rape is unavailable, the house boat is no longer available for inspection, and
the whereabouts of the investigating detective are “unknown.” None of these claims
rises to the level of actual prejudice because they all rely on speculation as to what the
“evidence” would have shown. With DNA testing conclusively establishing Jackson as
the source of the semen recovered from M.P., he no longer had a plausible defense of
alibi. That left him with a theory of consensual sexual conduct and there was no reason
to think that the houseboat would have yielded evidence in support of that theory.
Jackson did not claim that there was anyone else present who might corroborate his claim
that he and M.P. engaged in consensual sexual conduct, so it is unclear what “additional
investigation” by the police would have uncovered, at least insofar as Jackson believed
that other witnesses might have been useful to his defense.
{¶9} As was the case with the rape of M.C., we have no basis for concluding that
the court abused its discretion by finding that Jackson failed to show actual prejudice
from the delay in returning the indictment charging him with the rape of M.P. Jackson
offered nothing but speculation as to how he had been prejudiced from the delay.
{¶10} Prior to trial, Jackson filed a motion for separate trials of the rape counts,
arguing that they were not part of the same act or transaction, were not connected by time,
were not part of a common plan or scheme, and were not part of a course of criminal
conduct. He maintained that there was a real and substantial risk that, if the counts were
not severed, the jury might not keep evidence relating to each count segregated, leading to
the possibility that he could be convicted for “something” as a result of having been
charged with crimes occurring on multiple occasions. The state argued that joinder of
both rape charges was proper because the crimes were so similar that it could use the facts
of either case as other acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) to show motive, preparation
and plan in targeting women of a certain age as targets for rape. The court denied the
motion without opinion and Jackson assigns this decision as error.
{¶11} Under Crim.R. 8(A), two or more offenses may be charged together if the
offenses “are of the same or similar character, * * * or are based on two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are
part of a course of criminal conduct.” As the language of the rule suggests, the word
“offenses” is applied broadly to include not only those acts stemming from a single
criminal transaction, but to criminal transactions that may not be tied by time and place.
The law favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial under Crim.R. 8(A) for reasons
of judicial economy. State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St. 3d 153, 157-158, 524 N.E.2d 476
(1988).
{¶12} Although favored, joinder is not automatic. Crim.R. 14 protects parties
from prejudicial joinder, stating: “If it appears that a defendant * * * is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses * * * the court shall order an election or separate trial of counts * * *,
or provide such other relief as justice requires.” Severance may be warranted if the trial
court finds a serious risk that a joint trial would prevent the jury from making a reliable
judgment about guilt or innocence. United States v. Zafiro, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S. Ct.
933, 122 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1993). This has been characterized as the “spill-over effect” —
where the jury “relies on evidence presented on one set of counts when reaching a
conclusion on the other set.” United States v. Ervin, 540 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir.2008).
Given that joinder is favored, the defendant bears the burden of proving prejudice and of
proving that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance. State v. Torres, 66
Ohio St. 2d 340, 421 N.E.2d 1288 (1981), syllabus.
{¶13} If the defendant establishes prejudice from joinder, the burden shifts to the
state to rebut in one of two ways. First, if in separate trials the state could introduce
evidence of the joined offenses as “other acts” under Evid.R. 404(B), a defendant cannot
claim prejudice from the joinder. State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St. 3d 253, 259,
2001-Ohio-1340, 754 N.E.2d 1129. Second, the state can refute prejudice by showing
that “evidence of each crime joined at trial is simple and direct.” State v. Schaim, 65
Ohio St. 3d 51, 59, 1992-Ohio-31, 600 N.E.2d 661. A decision to deny severance will be
reversed only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. LaMar, 95
Ohio St. 3d 181, 194, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166.
{¶14} If we were to assume without deciding that Jackson showed prejudice from
the joinder of the two rape offenses and that evidence of one rape would not have been
admissible to prove the other rape as other acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B), we would
nonetheless have no basis for finding that the court abused its discretion by denying
severance. Prejudice was negated by the simple and direct nature of the evidence in both
cases, such that it was unlikely that the jury would have confused the evidence proving
the separate offenses. State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St. 3d 95, 110, 2000-Ohio-276, 723
N.E.2d 1054; Schaim, 65 Ohio St. 3d at 59, 1992-Ohio-31, 600 N.E.2d 661 (evidence of
each offense was so simple and distinct that the jury could clearly segregate the
evidence). With Jackson pursuing a consent defense to the charges and there being no
eyewitnesses to the rapes, the state’s case came down to a credibility contest between
Jackson and the victims. These issues did not require complicated proof. In fact,
Jackson makes no claim that the facts were confused or that the testimony overlapped in
any sense, nor would the record on appeal permit that conclusion if asserted. See State v.
Robinson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1001, 2010-Ohio-4713, ¶ 50. The simple and direct
nature of the cases against Jackson offset any prejudice that might have resulted in trying
both rape offenses together. The court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever
the separate incidents for trial.
{¶15} Jackson defended the rape charge filed by M.C. by claiming that she was a
prostitute and that they engaged in a consensual transaction. To bolster that defense,
Jackson filed a motion in limine prior to trial seeking a ruling allowing him to introduce
evidence that M.C. had a history of arrests for prostitution and loitering for prostitution
(five in the 12-month period leading up to the rape, including an arrest for loitering for
prostitution nine days before the rape and an arrest for prostitution just seven days after
the rape), and that police reports characterized M.C. as a “well known prostitute.” The
state invoked the rape shield statute to oppose the motion in limine, arguing that the
evidence did not answer the question of consent, that the evidence was inflammatory and
prejudicial, and that it was being offered for the sole purpose of discrediting the victim.
The court denied the motion in limine without opinion.
{¶16} The Rape Shield Statute, R.C. 2907.02(D), states:
Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity, opinion
evidence of the victim’s sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the
victim’s sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it
involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the
victim’s past sexual activity with the offender, and only to the extent that
the court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and
that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
value.
{¶17} The desire to protect victims of sexual assault does not supersede a
defendant’s constitutional rights — the rape shield statute may not infringe upon a
defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation, right to a fair trial, and right to present a
defense. See State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 17-18, 391 N.E.2d 337 (1979); State v.
Young, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92127, 2009-Ohio-5354, ¶ 23. To strike a balance
between a defendant’s rights and the interests promoted by the rape shield statute, the
court must consider the probative value of the excluded evidence in terms of its relevancy
to the matters as proof of which it is offered. Gardner at 18.
{¶18} Evid.R. 609 permits a witness to be impeached with evidence of a prior
felony conviction or a conviction for a crime of dishonesty. The police records showed
only that M.C. had been arrested 19 different times for prostitution-related offenses, but
none of those arrests appeared to lead to a conviction: the records showed that 17 of the
arrests led to dismissals; the records did not indicate any disposition for two of the arrests.
With M.C. having no felony convictions, the arrest records could not be used to impeach
her. State v. McLeod, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 05 JE 15, 2006-Ohio-7076, ¶ 45. Had
M.C. given testimony specifically denying that she had been arrested for prostitution, that
may have opened the door to impeachment with the arrest records. See, e.g., State
Hapney, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 01CA30 and 01CA31, 2002-Ohio-3250, ¶ 60, fn. 6.
But M.C. did not so testify so the court had no basis for allowing Jackson to use the arrest
records for impeachment.
{¶19} In the motion in limine, Jackson claimed to seek admission of the police
records for reasons other than impeachment of the victim — he wished to use those
records as proof that M.C. engaged in prostitution to earn money to support a drug habit.
This argument fails for the same reason that the arrest records could not be used for
impeachment: they did not prove that M.C. was guilty of prostitution-related offenses. In
addition, evidence that M.C. had a reputation as a prostitute “is not sufficiently probative
of consent to outweigh the state’s legitimate interests in excluding the testimony, at least
where there is no suggestion in the record that financial arrangements were entered into
for sexual activities in this instance.” Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d at 18.
{¶20} Jackson argues that this case is more like State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St. 3d
33, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986), where the Ohio Supreme Court allowed evidence that a
victim of an alleged rape had engaged in prostitution with men after she testified on direct
examination that she never had sex with men. Williams cited Gardner for the
proposition that “in some circumstances evidence which the rape shield law would render
inadmissible would nevertheless be admitted in furtherance of the defendant’s
constitutional rights.” Id. at 35. The Supreme Court allowed the evidence in Williams
because it was not used for impeachment, but to rebut the victim’s assertion that she did
not consent to sexual conduct with the male defendant because she never had sexual
relations with males. The Supreme Court conceded that the testimony served to impeach
the victim, but found it had been offered for the more important purpose of negating the
victim’s implied assertion that she did not consent to sexual conduct with Williams
because of her sexual orientation. Id. at 36.
{¶21} Factually, this case is distinguishable from Williams. The motion in limine
was obviously filed pre-trial, so the court knew only that Jackson wanted to offer into
evidence records that M.C. had been arrested multiple times for prostitution, but
apparently not convicted of that offense. The decision to bar those records was not an
abuse of discretion.
{¶22} In addition to the motion in limine regarding M.C.’s arrest records, Jackson
filed a motion in limine to exclude in-court identification testimony by both victims. He
argued that although M.C. identified him immediately after the rape, she failed to do so
when shown a photo array some 18 years later before the indictment issued. Jackson
also argued that M.P. failed to identify him either at the time of the offense or by photo
array 18 years later.
{¶23} We need not consider whether the court erred by refusing to bar the in-court
identification because any error would have been harmless beyond a doubt given that
Jackson’s DNA had been found in both victims, thus providing positive proof of his
identity. See State v. Young, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23438, 2010-Ohio-5157, ¶ 148;
State v. Johnstone, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92885, 2010-Ohio-1854, ¶ 30-31. Crim.R.
52(A) states that we may disregard “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which
does not affect substantial rights.” The DNA evidence essentially forced Jackson’s
concession that he engaged in sexual conduct with both victims but that it was consensual
— a theory that defense counsel outlined to the jury in opening statement. Jackson
makes no argument that the concession rested in any way on the court’s refusing to
suppress an in-court identification by either victim. The in-court identification could not
have been as prejudicial to the defense case as the DNA evidence, so the error was truly
harmless.
{¶24} During the state’s examination of M.C., it asked her to explain why she did
not contact the police and pursue her initial allegation that she had been raped by Jackson.
She answered by stating that she was uncomfortable “reliving her darkest secrets” and
then stated, “[t]he guy’s in jail for rape now * * *.” Jackson objected and asked for a
mistrial on grounds that the victim had mentioned his criminal record — at the time of
trial, Jackson was in prison for felonious assault and abduction with a sexual predator
specification. The state noted that in opening statement, the defense told the jury that
Jackson would be testifying, so it argued that any error in the victim’s testimony was
harmless given that the state would be entitled to delve into Jackson’s criminal record
when he took the witness stand. The court denied the motion for a mistrial, instructed
the jury to disregard M.C.’s statement, and told the jury that “defendant has not been
convicted nor did he plead to a rape charge.” Jackson argues that the court abused its
discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial.
{¶25} We review a court’s decision on a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St. 3d 173, 182, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987). What is
more, we presume that the jury heeds the court’s cautionary instructions. See State v.
Williams, 134 Ohio St. 3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 23.
{¶26} Any reference to the prior convictions of a defendant during the state’s
case-in-chief is a violation of Evid.R. 609(A)(1), which allows a party to attack the
credibility of a witness with a prior conviction. The use of the word “witness” in the rule
presupposes that the witness has testified — and at the point where M.C. made reference
to Jackson being in jail for “rape,” Jackson had yet to testify.
{¶27} Despite M.C.’s improper mention of Jackson’s being in jail, the court cured
the error. It not only instructed the jury to disregard M.C.’s statement, but told the jury
that Jackson did not have a rape conviction. We presume that the jury followed this
instruction and Jackson points to nothing in the record that would convince us that M.C.’s
testimony was so egregious that a fair trial was no longer possible. See State v. Treesh,
90 Ohio St. 3d 460, 480, 2001-Ohio-4, 739 N.E.2d 749. In addition, we find that even
without the curative instruction, any error would have been harmless given that defense
counsel told the jury in opening statement that Jackson would be testifying, so his
impeachment by prior conviction was assured. See State v. Spirko, 59 Ohio St. 3d 1, 15,
570 N.E.2d 229 (1991).
{¶28} In his sixth assignment of error, Jackson argues that his convictions were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. He maintains that his version of events was
“just as credible as the version [sic] testified to by both M.C. and M.P.”
{¶29} The manifest weight of the evidence standard of review requires us to
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the
credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App. 3d
339, 340, 515 N.E.2d 1009 (9th Dist.1986). The use of the word “manifest” means that
the trier of fact’s decision must be plainly or obviously contrary to all of the evidence.
This is a difficult burden for an appellant to overcome because the resolution of factual
issues resides with the trier of fact, State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St. 2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212
(1967), paragraph one of the syllabus, and the trier of fact has the authority to “believe or
disbelieve any witness or accept part of what a witness says and reject the rest.” State v.
Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). For this reason, it is only the “rare”
case in which the trier of fact’s verdict will be overturned as being against the manifest
weight of the evidence. State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st
Dist.1983).
{¶30} Jackson’s argument against conviction for the rape of M.C. is that she
lacked reliability and credibility. He argues that she admitted that at the time of the
offense, she had been addicted to crack cocaine for almost three years, was unemployed,
and that her addiction cost $75-$100 per day — the implication being that she prostituted
herself to pay for her drug habit consistent with his theory of consent. That M.C. might
have resorted to prostitution to pay for a drug habit did not necessarily mean that her
interaction with Jackson on the night she claimed to have been raped had been a business
transaction. M.C. told the police that Jackson used both a knife and a BB gun during the
rape, and the police confirmed that Jackson had both weapons in the car. In
contradiction to M.C.’s allegation that Jackson held the knife to her throat while raping
her, Jackson testified that “I never pulled out that knife” — he claimed that M.C. pulled
the knife out from between the car seats during the encounter and that he took it away
from her. The jury could find that version of events unbelievable, if for no other reason
than that it ran counter to Jackson’s explanation that the fishing knife was part of his
fishing tackle, but inexplicably not in his tackle box. The jury could have focused on
that fact to find M.C.’s version of events credible.
{¶31} M.P.’s testimony was more lacking in some of the specifics offered by
M.C., but no less credible. She testified that after spending an evening at a bar, she
retired to a houseboat where she was staying (the houseboat was parked in a parking lot in
a residential area). She awoke at some point to find a stranger armed with a knife having
intercourse with her. She hollered and screamed, but the stranger “took his time” to
finish what he started. At some point during the encounter, the knife cut her arm.
Importantly, medical records from that time confirmed that M.P. had an “abrasion to her
right forearm,” a notation that would be consistent with being cut with a knife. This
made M.P.’s assertion that Jackson forced himself on her by use of a knife that much
more credible, particularly when Jackson claimed that they engaged in consensual
intercourse. In addition, the medical records showed M.P. to be “tearful, upset” and
yelling out that “it wasn’t fair” in a manner that the jury could find consistent with her
claim of rape. Against this evidence, Jackson offered nothing more than doubt because
M.P. told the police that her attacker was someone named “Ron,” a name that he never
used. But regardless of whether M.P. had the correct name of her assailant, DNA
evidence conclusively showed Jackson to be the source of semen recovered from her, so
her inability to name her assailant correctly was of no consequence on the issue of
identity. And to the extent that M.P.’s not correctly naming Jackson at the time might
have affected her credibility, the jury could reasonably have found that to pale by
comparison given that she suffered an abrasion on her arm consistent with her claim that
Jackson had a knife out as he raped her.
{¶32} When imposing sentence, the court sentenced Jackson to ten years on both
of the rape counts relating to M.C. and ordered him to serve those sentences concurrently
(the court merged the kidnapping count with the rape counts). The court sentenced
Jackson to ten years on the rape count relating to M.P. (the court merged the kidnapping
and aggravated burglary counts). The court then ordered the rape counts for both victims
to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of 20 years. Jackson argues that
consecutive service was contrary to law because the court failed to make the findings
required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before ordering consecutive service.
{¶33} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides two bases for a reviewing court to overturn the
imposition of consecutive sentences: the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law” or the
reviewing court clearly and convincingly finds that “the record does not support the
sentencing court’s findings” under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Those findings are that (1) a
consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the
offender and (2) that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of
the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public. In addition to
these two factors, the court must find any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple
offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or
sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or
2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under
post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
by the offender.
{¶34} Jackson argues that the court only made partial findings under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) in that it did not specifically find that consecutive sentences were not
disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and did not find that consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the danger he poses to the public.
{¶35} The court made the following statement at sentencing:
This was a troubling case. This gentleman is obviously a sick person, both
emotionally and mentally.
I agree that he’ll never stop committing the type of offenses that he has
committed. He was arrested on the first victim and obviously didn’t learn
his lesson because shortly thereafter, four or five weeks later, he did the
same type of behavior with another person; apparently thinking he’s gotten
away with it. Many years later, he does the same type of behavior for which
he’s presently serving a lengthy prison term.
In terms of punishing the offender and protecting the public, this case cries
out for it. Also this is clearly a pattern of conduct with multiple victims;
therefore, I find that consecutive sentences are necessary in this case.
I’m going to give him ten years on Counts 1 and 2 concurrent. I’m going to
give him ten years on Count 4 consecutive. So that’s a total of 20 years in
this case.
{¶36} We have repeatedly stated that the court does not have to state the R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) findings word-for-word. State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891, 992 N.E.2d
453, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). In fact, we have noted in light of State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St. 3d
209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, that the Ohio Supreme Court has taken a more
“relaxed approach” to the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), finding compliance
when the reviewing court can “discern” those findings from statements made by the
sentencing judge. State v. Gum, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101496, 2015-Ohio-1539, ¶ 15.
{¶37} The court made an explicit finding that consecutive service was necessary to
protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender: “In terms of punishing the
offender and protecting the public, this case cries out for it.” We can discern a finding
that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public from the court’s statement
Jackson committed two rapes in the span of four to five weeks and that he was “obviously
a sick person, both emotionally and mentally.” We discern a finding relating to
Jackson’s history of criminal conduct from both the court’s acknowledgment that Jackson
committed two separate rapes in a five-week period and was at the time of sentencing
serving a prison term for “the same type of behavior.” And the court’s statement that
Jackson engaged in a pattern of conduct with multiple victims and that “he’ll never stop
committing the type of offenses that he has committed” established that consecutive
sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime.
{¶38} Jackson makes no argument that these findings were unsupported by the
record, nor would the facts of this case support that argument even if made. We do,
however, agree with Jackson that the court’s sentencing entry did not include all of these
findings. We therefore sustain this assignment of error in part and remand with
instructions for the court to incorporate its findings nunc pro tunc under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) into the sentencing entry. See Bonnell, at syllabus.
{¶39} Because the rape offenses occurred in 1996, the court classified Jackson as a
sexual predator under Megan’s Law, as codified in former R.C. 2950.01 et seq. Jackson
argues that the facts of this case do not support the classification based on a finding that
there was clear and convincing evidence to show that he was likely to commit a sexually
oriented offense in the future. He maintains that the court made the classification
without expert testimony and primarily on the basis of a 2011 conviction in which he
lured a prostitute into his car and forcibly raped her.
{¶40} Under former R.C. 2950.01(E), a sexual predator is defined in R.C.
2950.01(E) as “a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a
sexually oriented offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually
oriented offenses.” A finding that a person was a sexual predator had to be made upon
clear and convincing evidence. Former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3).
{¶41} It was said that Megan’s Law was not a “one strike and you’re out” law,
meaning that a single conviction was not irrefutable proof that an offender was a sexual
predator. State v. Ward, 130 Ohio App. 3d 551, 561, 720 N.E.2d 603 (8th Dist.1999).
But multiple convictions were a factor for the court to consider in addition to the nature
of the interaction, whether the offender displayed cruelty, and whether the offender
engaged in demonstrated pattern of abuse. See generally former R.C. 2950.09(B)(2)(f),
(h), and (i).
{¶42} The facts of the 2011 conviction for felonious assault were harrowing:
Jackson picked up a prostitute in his van, handcuffed her, and raped her vaginally, orally,
and anally, knocked her unconscious, then abandoned her on the side of the road bound,
naked, and covered in blood. The rapes in this case were likewise committed with the
use of force. The pattern in his behavior was manifest and it required no expert
testimony to convince the court that Jackson was an exceptionally dangerous sexual
deviant. Against these fact, Jackson makes no real argument, so we have no basis for
overturning the court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supported the
conclusion that Jackson was likely to commit a sexually oriented offense in the future.
{¶43} Judgment is affirmed, but the case is remanded for the limited purpose of
correcting the sentencing entry nunc pro tunc.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs
herein taxed.
______________________________________________
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR