State v. Peace

[Cite as State v. Peace, 2014-Ohio-2126.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HANCOCK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 5-13-32
v.
TODD E. PEACE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 1997 CR 29
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: May 19, 2014
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Mark C. Miller for Appellee
Case No. 5-13-32
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Todd E. Peace (“Peace”), appeals the September
23, 2013 judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas imposing a
mandatory five year term of postrelease control.
{¶2} On November 9, 1998, the trial court entered a judgment finding
Peace guilty of aggravated murder, aggravated arson, and tampering with
evidence. On February 11, 1999, the trial court sentenced Peace to a life prison
term with parole eligibility after 20 years for the aggravated murder offense, a nine
year prison term for the aggravated arson offense, and a four year prison term for
the tampering with evidence offense. The trial court ordered that the “prison terms
are to be served consecutively, one after the other, for an aggregate prison term of
life with parole eligibility after serving thirty-three (33) years.” (Doc. No. 103 at
3).
{¶3} In April of 2011, Peace moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial
court denied Peace’s motion and Peace appealed to this Court, asserting a number
of assignments of error. In a judgment entry without opinion, we remanded this
matter to the trial court because it had failed to properly impose postrelease
control.
{¶4} On January 9, 2012, the trial court conducted a limited resentencing
hearing. The hearing was conducted via videoconference. During the hearing, the
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trial court denied Peace’s request for counsel, stating that the hearing was an
administrative proceeding which did not invoke the right to counsel.
{¶5} Peace appealed the trial court’s imposition of postrelease control
arguing, in part, that the trial court erred in denying his request for counsel. This
Court subsequently issued an opinion concluding that the trial court improperly
denied Peace’s request for counsel and remanded the matter to the trial court.
State v. Peace, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-12-04, 2012-Ohio-6118, ¶ 19
(Willamowski, J., dissenting).
{¶6} On March 27, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing to impose
postrelease control where Peace appeared in person with defense counsel present.
The trial court imposed a mandatory period of five years of postrelease control.
{¶7} Peace appeals the trial court’s imposition of postrelease control,
asserting the following assignment of error.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING
POSTRELEASE CONTROL AFTER APPELLANT HAS
COMPLETED THE ELIGIBLE OFFENSES.
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Peace argues that the trial court lacked
the authority to impose postrelease control because at the time of the March 2013
hearing he had already served his thirteen year prison term for the aggravated
arson and the tampering with evidence offenses, which were the only two offenses
to which he was sentenced that the postrelease control sanction applied.
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Case No. 5-13-32
Specifically, Peace relies on the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
State v. Holdcroft, in which the Court held that “a trial court cannot add a term of
postrelease control as a sanction for a particular offense after the defendant has
already served the prison term for that offense, even if the defendant remains in
prison for other offenses.” 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, ¶ 1.1
{¶9} Section 5120-2-03.1(M) of the Ohio Administrative Code describes
the manner in which the time served by an offender is to be allocated when the
offender is sentenced to a stated prison term consecutive to a life prison term:
When an offender is serving any stated prison terms
consecutively to any life terms of imprisonment and/or to any
one, three, five and/or six-year mandatory prison terms imposed
pursuant to division (D)(1)(a)(i) of section 2929.14 the Revised
Code, for using a firearm in the commission of an offense,
and/or division (D)(1)(a)(ii) of section 2929.14 of the Revised
Code, for committing a felony by discharging a firearm from a
motor vehicle, the aggregate of all such one, three, five and/or
six-year mandatory prison terms shall be served first, then the
aggregate of all other mandatory prison terms shall be served,
and then the aggregate of the non-mandatory portion of the
stated prison terms shall be served, and then the aggregate of the
non-mandatory portion of the life terms of imprisonment shall
be served.
{¶10} According to OAC 5120-2-03.1(M), Peace’s time served is to be first
allocated to the stated prison terms of nine years and four years for the aggravated
arson and the tampering with evidence offenses. At the time of the March 2013
hearing, Peace had completed the prison terms for these offenses and was serving
1
We note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Holdcroft was released on November 20, 2013, after the
trial court imposed postrelease control and while this case was pending on appeal.
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time for the life prison term for the aggravated murder offense. We note that
aggravated murder is an unclassified felony to which the postrelease control
sanction does not apply. See State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748,
¶ 36.
{¶11} Therefore, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Holdcroft and
by operation of OAC 5120-2-03.1(M), the trial court was without the authority to
impose the term of postrelease control because at the time of the hearing Peace
had already completed the stated prison terms for the aggravated arson and the
tampering with evidence offenses, which were the only portion of his aggregate
sentence to which the postrelease control sanction applied.
{¶12} Accordingly, Peace’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment
is reversed and we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate
the imposition of postrelease control.
Judgment Reversed and
Cause Remanded
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ROGERS, J., concur.
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