State v. Hale

[Cite as State v. Hale, 2014-Ohio-3322.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100447
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
ISIAH B. HALE
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-09-529253-A
BEFORE: Keough, J., Jones, P.J., and McCormack, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 31, 2014
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Daniel T. Van
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Michael J. Cheselka
75 Public Square, Suite 920
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2084
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the trial court’s decision
allowing defendant-appellee, Isiah Hale, to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
{¶2} In 2009, Hale was charged with murder, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and
having a weapon while under disability. Hale’s codefendant, was charged with
conspiracy and having a weapon while under disability. In 2010, Hale pleaded guilty to
an amended count of involuntary manslaughter with a three-year firearm specification.
He was sentenced to a total prison term of eight years.
{¶3} On January 5, 2011, Hale filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the
basis that the state disclosed at the trial of Hale’s codefendant that gunshot primer residue
was found on the victim’s hand, which was information requested by Hale during pretrial
discovery, but was not disclosed to him. The state opposed the motion, and in May 2011
the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion.
{¶4} In August 2013, the trial court granted Hale’s motion to withdraw his plea by
written decision.
The Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, entered into on April
22, 2010, to correct a manifest injustice pursuant to rule 32.1 of the Ohio
Rules of Criminal Procedure is granted.
The Defendant, Isiah B. Hale, along with a Co-Defendant, was charged
with Murder, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Sections 2903.02(A) and (B)
with Firearm Specifications. There were two additional felony offenses
referencing Mr. Hale. Throughout the pre-trial discovery process, the
Defendant maintained that he acted in self-defense. On March 5, 2010, the
results of a gunshot residue test conducted by the Cuyahoga County
Coroner’s Office were received. The test results reflected that the murder
victim, Montrell Stonewall, did indeed have gunshot primer residue on his
right hand.
The defense requested, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal
Procedure, any evidence material to the defense including the results of any
gunshot residue tests performed on the victim. The State produced the
requested discovery information in its possession. That information
included information from the Coroner’s Office — absent any results of the
gunshot residue test. Defense counsel relied on the fact that no gunshot
residue test had been performed and advised Mr. Hale to forgo his
affirmative defense of self-defense. Subsequently Mr. Hale entered a
change of plea to Involuntary Manslaughter.
On January 4, 2011, the State disclosed, during the trial of the
Co-Defendant that a gunshot residue test had indeed been performed on the
victim. The results proved positive for the presence of gunshot primer
residue on the right hand of the victim. The Co-Defendant was acquitted.
The Defense also alleges a Brady violation. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83. The elements necessary to trigger a Brady violation are:
(i) The evidence must be favorable to the accused;
(ii) The evidence must have been either willfully or
inadvertently suppressed by the government;
(iii) Prejudice must have ensued.
It is the opinion of the Court that the Defendant’s burden of proof is met
under a Brady analysis as well. It must be said that no one believes that the
State intentionally or willfully withheld the gunshot residue test results.
This delayed disclosure was material to the issues of guilt as it substantiated
the Defendant’s self-defense defense and was tantamount to a manifest
injustice mandating the granting of the Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw his
Guilty Plea.
{¶5} The state appeals this decision, raising as its sole assignment of error that the
trial court erred in granting Hale’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶6} “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only
before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may
set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her
plea.” Crim.R. 32.1. The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined “manifest injustice” as a
clear or openly unjust act. State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208,
699 N.E.2d 83 (1998). This standard permits a defendant to withdraw his plea only in
extraordinary cases. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977).
The defendant moving for a postsentence withdrawal of a guilty plea, has the burden of
establishing the existence of a manifest injustice. Id. at paragraph one of syllabus.
{¶7} The decision to grant or deny a Crim.R. 32.1 motion is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. We will not
reverse a trial court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. Id., citing State v. Xie, 62
Ohio St.3d 521, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). A trial court abuses its discretion when its
judgment is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶8} In this case, the state contends that the disclosure of the gunshot residue test
does not constitute a manifest injustice that necessitates the vacation of conviction and
withdrawal of Hale’s guilty plea. Specifically, the states directs this court to the fact that
Hale acknowledged shooting the victim while the victim was pointing a gun at him, but
that Hale never stated that he was being shot at by the victim. The state seems to allude
that only after learning about the presence of the gunshot primer residue, did Hale’s story
change. These arguments were made and rejected in the trial court.
{¶9} The evidence and testimony that was adduced at the hearing on Hale’s motion
shows that in 2010, a trace evidence report was generated by the coroner’s office
following the examination of the victim. Contained in that report was a finding
indicating that gunshot primer residue was detected on the victim’s right hand. Despite
discovery being requested by Hale, the defense did not receive this report. In fact, the
record reveals that this report was not released to either the state or the defense until
January 2011, the day prior to the start of the trial against Hale’s codefendant. It is clear
that the withholding of the report was inadvertent by the coroner’s office, and not willful
by the state.
{¶10} However, it cannot be said that when a defendant is maintaining a defense
of self-defense and the trace evidence report indicates that the victim had gunshot primer
residue on his hand, that this evidence would not be considered potentially exculpatory.
Without knowledge of this potentially exculpatory evidence, it cannot be said that Hale
entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court’s decision
finding that a manifest injustice was demonstrated by Hale was neither arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unconscionable. The court heard all the testimony and reviewed all the
evidence in making its decision. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
Hale’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the state’s assignment of error
is overruled.
{¶11} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR