State v. Melton

[Cite as State v. Melton, 2013-Ohio-257.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97675
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
MARTEZ MELTON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART
AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-549424
BEFORE: Jones, P.J., Rocco, J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 31, 2013
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jana DeLoach
P.O. Box 2385
Akron, Ohio 44309
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Edward Fadel
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ON RECONSIDERATION1
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Martez Melton, appeals his felonious assault and
discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises convictions, which were rendered
after a jury trial. He also appeals his 29-year prison sentence. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. Procedural History
{¶2} In April 2011, Melton was bound over from the juvenile justice system to the
adult justice system and indicted on several charges. In Counts 1 and 2, Melton was
charged with felonious assault upon Lawrence Hanson. In Counts 3 and 4, Melton was
charged with felonious assault upon Dave Whitted. Count 5 charged Melton with
discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. The five counts all contained
one- and three-year firearm specifications.2
{¶3} After its deliberations, the jury found Melton guilty of all counts and
specifications. Sentencing was deferred for the completion of a presentence
investigation report. The trial court sentenced Melton to a 29-year prison term, which
The original announcement of decision, State v. Melton, 8th Dist. No. 97675,
1
2012-Ohio-5413, released November 21, 2012, is hereby vacated. This opinion, issued upon
reconsideration, is the court’s journalized decision in this appeal. See App.R. 22(C); see also
S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.01.
Count 6, having weapons under disability, was dismissed prior to trial.
2
consisted of maximum, consecutive sentences.
II. Facts
{¶4} The following facts were elicited at trial. The victims, Hanson and Whitted,
were friends. They knew Melton, but there was animosity between them. All three
were frequent customers of Eddie’s Discount Store located on Noble Road in Cleveland
Heights.
{¶5} On the evening of the incident, Hanson had been at Eddie’s, made a purchase,
and left the store. Hanson testified that as he was returning to his car he saw Melton and
two other males sitting on his car, so he started to walk back to the store. Melton then
started approaching Hanson, so Hanson ran back into the store and locked the door.
Hanson testified that Melton was yelling at him to “come outside and get beat up.”
Concerned, Hanson called Whitted and asked him to come to the store to help him.
{¶6} The store’s owner, Joseph Dahler, testified that when Hanson ran back into
the store he appeared “terrified.” Dahler testified that Melton and another male were
outside the store yelling at Hanson. A surveillance video from the store, which was
admitted into evidence, shows Melton pacing in front of the store. Dahler talked to
Melton through the glass door, asking him to leave and not “hang out” in front of the
store. Melton did not leave, however.
{¶7} Meanwhile, Whitted arrived at the scene. Both Hanson and Dahler testified
that they saw Whitted start fighting with Melton and Melton fighting back. Hanson ran
outside and joined the fight, which then involved four people: Melton, Melton’s associate,
Hanson, and Whitted.
{¶8} According to Hanson, Melton disengaged himself from the fighting, ran out
into the middle of Noble Road, pulled a gun from his waist, and shot both Hanson and
Whitted. Hanson suffered a gunshot wound to his left calf; Whitted suffered a gunshot
wound to his right bicep. Both Whitted and Hanson testified that they heard Melton’s
associate tell Melton to get his “hammer,” which is slang for gun.
{¶9} Dahler testified that at the time of the shooting he was at the front of his
store, preparing to close it for the evening, when he heard a “pop,” looked out of the
window, and saw Melton with a gun.
{¶10} Hanson and Whitted left the scene by car to go to the hospital. Shortly
thereafter, the police stopped the car. No firearm was recovered from the vehicle or any
of its occupants.
{¶11} Melton testified to a different occurrence. According to Melton, he was
going to Eddie’s when he saw Hanson and Hanson spoke profanely to him. Melton tried
to “work it out” with Hanson, but Hanson was not interested. Melton told Hanson to
“watch his mouth,” and Hanson then “back pedaled” into the store.
{¶12} As Hanson was “back pedaling” into the store, Melton was still trying to talk
to him. Melton testified that he pursued Hanson and waited after Hanson went into the
store because normally Hanson was with Whitted, and he saw this as an opportunity to
talk to Hanson alone and “settle the score.”
{¶13} After Whitted came on to the scene, started assaulting Melton, and Hanson
joined the fray, Melton tried to get the “upper hand” so that he could defend himself.
Melton testified that it was “hard to explain” how everyone was positioned, but he saw
Whitted reach for something and pull out something silver, which he immediately knew
was a gun. As the fight was still going on, Melton grabbed Whitted’s arm for the gun,
and it went off. Melton then ran.
{¶14} Melton denied ever having a gun; he testified that he only grabbed for the
gun Whitted had. Melton also testified that Whitted pulled the trigger.
{¶15} Melton now raises the following assignments of error for our review:
[I.] The trial court erred in sentencing the appellant to a felony of the first
degree for R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), discharge of firearm on or near prohibited
premises, because the verdict form failed to mention the degree of the
offense or an aggravated element of the offense as required by R.C.
2945.75; therefore, the appellant should have been sentenced to the lowest
form of the offense, which is a fourth degree misdemeanor.
[II.] The trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included
offense of aggravated assault.
[III.] The trial court erred in sentencing the appellant to consecutive
sentences for the offenses of discharge of firearm on or near prohibited
area, and two counts of felonious assault because said offenses are allied
offenses of similar import.
[IV.] The trial court committed judicial misconduct when it failed to respect
and comply with the law at all times in a manner [that] promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
[V.] The appellant was denied the right to effective assistance of trial
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
III. Law and Analysis
Verdict Form
{¶16} For his first assigned error, Melton contends that the trial court improperly
sentenced him on discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises as a first degree
felony. Melton contends that because the verdict form did not state the degree of the
offense or an aggravating element of the offense, he should have been sentenced to the
lowest degree of the offense, which is a fourth degree misdemeanor.
{¶17} Melton did not object to the verdict form at the trial court level and, thus, we
review for plain error. Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the
utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978),
paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶18} Melton relies on R.C. 2945.74 in support of his contention. The statute
provides in part as follows:
(A) When the presence of one or more additional elements makes an
offense one of more serious degree:
(1) The affidavit, complaint, indictment, or information either shall state the
degree of the offense which the accused is alleged to have committed, or
shall allege such additional element or elements. Otherwise such affidavit,
complaint, indictment, or information is effective to charge only the least
degree of the offense.
(2) A guilty verdict shall state either the degree of the offense of which the
offender is found guilty, or that such additional element or elements are
present. Otherwise, a guilty verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the
least degree of the offense charged.
{¶19} Discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises is governed by R.C.
2923.162, and provides in part as follows: “(A) No person shall * * * (3) Discharge a
firearm upon or over a public road or highway.”
{¶20} Subsection C of the statute provides the degrees of the offense, with the
least severe being a misdemeanor of the fourth degree and the most severe being a felony
of the first degree. R.C. 2923.162(C). A violation of subsection (A)(3) that “caused
serious physical harm to any person” is a first degree felony. R.C. 2923.162(C)(4).
{¶21} Melton was indicted under R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), for discharging a firearm
upon or over a public road. The indictment charged that Melton “did discharge a
firearm upon or over a public road or highway and the violation caused serious physical
harm to a person Lawrence Hanson and/or Dave Whitted.” The verdict form for the
charge read as follows:
We, the Jury in this case being duly impaneled and sworn, do find the
Defendant, Martez Melton, Guilty of Discharge of Firearm On or Near
Prohibited Premises, in violation of §2923.162(A)(3), of the Ohio Revised
Code, as charged in Count Five of the Indictment.
{¶22} Thus, although the indictment did not state any degree for the offense, it did
allege the additional element of the violation causing serious physical harm to Hanson
and/or Whitted, and therefore, charged Melton with a felony of the first degree under
subsection (C)(4) of R.C. 2923.162. But the verdict form stated neither a degree for the
offense nor the additional element of the violation causing serious physical harm to a
person, which elevates the crime to a first degree felony.
{¶23} The Third Appellate District addressed this issue in a factually similar case.
In State v. Manley, 3d Dist. No. 1-11-04, 2011-Ohio-5082, the defendant was indicted,
among other crimes, on discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. The
indictment charged a felony of the third degree under R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) and (C)(2)3
because the defendant fired a gun across an intersection, and struck and damaged a
nearby home that was occupied at the time. The verdict form, however, did not state the
degree of the offense or the additional element that the crime “created a substantial risk of
physical harm to any person or caused physical harm to property” under R.C.
2923.162(C)(2). The defendant did not raise the issue at either the trial court or
appellate levels; the Third District sua sponte reviewed the issue and found plain error.
Id. at ¶ 24. In so finding, the court relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State
v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256, 860 N.E.2d 735.
{¶24} In Pelfrey, the defendant was charged with tampering with records, in
violation of R.C. 2913.42. Under the statute, the offense is elevated to a third degree
felony if the offender’s tampering involves government records, which was the case in
Pelfrey. The defendant’s conviction was upheld on a manifest weight of the evidence
appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals. State v. Pelfrey, 2d Dist. No. 19955,
2004-Ohio-3401.
R.C. 2923.162(C)(2) provides that a violation of the statute is a third degree felony if the
3
violation “created a substantial risk of physical harm to any person or caused serious physical harm to
property.”
{¶25} Upon the reopening of his appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court
erred in entering a conviction of a third degree felony because the verdict form did not
state the degree of the offense or the additional elements that elevated the offense. The
Second District agreed with the defendant and ordered the trial court to enter a conviction
and sentence for first degree misdemeanor tampering with records, the least degree of the
offense. State v. Pelfrey, 2d Dist. No. 19955, 2005-Ohio-5006.
{¶26} The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the Second District’s decision. The court
noted that R.C. 2945.75 is “clear on its face” and “certainly imposes no unreasonable
burden on lawyers or trial judges.” Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422 at ¶ 11, 12. The court
held:
Because the language of R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) is clear, this court will not
excuse the failure to comply with the statute or uphold Pelfrey’s conviction
based on additional circumstances such as those present in this case. The
express requirement of the statute cannot be fulfilled by demonstrating
additional circumstances, such as that the verdict incorporates the language
of the indictment, or by presenting evidence to show the presence of the
aggravated element at trial or the incorporation of the indictment into the
verdict form, or by showing that the defendant failed to raise the issue of
the inadequacy of the verdict form. We hold that pursuant to the clear
language of R.C. 2945.75, a verdict form signed by a jury must include
either the degree of the offense of which the defendant is convicted or a
statement that an aggravating element has been found to justify convicting a
defendant of a greater degree of a criminal offense.
Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶27} Thus, under Pelfrey, Melton should have been sentenced to the lowest
degree of the offense of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. The
state, however, cites to the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent decision on this issue
post-Pelfrey, which reaches a different result. In State v. Eafford, 132 Ohio St.3d 159,
2012-Ohio-2224, 970 N.E.2d 891, on the state’s appeal from this court, the Ohio Supreme
Court examined the issue in relation to a drug possession charge. The defendant was
indicted on possession of “cocaine or a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance
containing cocaine in an amount of less than 5 grams,” which is a violation of R.C.
2925.11(A) and a felony of the fifth degree. Id. at ¶ 4. The jury was instructed on
the charge as follows:
The defendant * * * is charged in Count 2 of the indictment with possession
of drugs, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2925.11. Before you
can find the defendant guilty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
* * * the defendant did knowingly obtain, possess or use a controlled
substance, and the drug involved was cocaine or a compound, mixture,
preparation or substance containing cocaine in an amount less than five
grams.
Id. at ¶ 5.
{¶28} Further, the verdict form read as follows: “‘We, the jury in this case being
duly impaneled and sworn, do find the Defendant * * * guilty of Possession of Drugs in
violation of §2925.11(A) of the Ohio Revised Code, as charged in Count Two of the
indictment.’” Id. at ¶ 6.
{¶29} This court, relying on Pelfrey, vacated the sentence and remanded for
resentencing, finding that because the jury verdict form did not indicate either the degree
of the offense or the aggravating circumstance, the defendant was only convicted of a
misdemeanor. State v. Eafford, 8th Dist. No. 94718, 2011-Ohio-927.
{¶30} The Ohio Supreme Court reversed this court, holding that because the
indictment charged the defendant with “possession of cocaine,” and the verdict form
“reflected a finding of guilty as charged in Count Two of the indictment, referring to
possession of cocaine,” he could not demonstrate that but for the use of the verdict form
the outcome of the trial would have been different. (Emphasis sic.) State v. Eafford,
132 Ohio St.3d 159 at ¶ 19. (But see Lanzinger, J., dissenting, stating that Pelfrey held
that the “‘clear language of R.C. 2945.75 [required] a verdict form signed by a jury must
include either the degree of the offense of which the defendant is convicted or a statement
that an aggravated element has been found to justify convicting a defendant of a greater
degree of a criminal offense.’” Eafford at ¶ 22, quoting Pelfrey at syllabus.)4
{¶31} Eafford and Pelfrey represent reconcilable applications of the plain error
doctrine. The charge in Eafford, possession of cocaine, did not involve any additional
elements that elevated the level of the offense. The verdict form described the offense
as “possession of drugs,” but the only drug involved was cocaine. Therefore, possession
of cocaine was necessarily what the jury found the defendant guilty of.
{¶32} Here, the crime of discharge of a firearm on prohibited premises which
causes serious physical harm to any person does include an element that increases the
offense. Therefore, this case is more analogous to Pelfrey than to Eafford. As in
Pelfrey, neither the aggravating element here (i.e., serious physical harm) nor the degree
See also State v. Berger, 8th Dist. No. 71618, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 596 (Feb. 19, 1998),
4
O’Donnell, J., dissenting: “since the legislature requires the verdict form to state either the degree of
the offense or that additional elements are present, regardless of whether the evidence is obvious,
apparent or undisputed, trial courts must comply with these directives and properly prepare verdict
forms to enable juries to discharge their duties according to law.”
of the offense was mentioned in the verdict form. Consequently, under R.C. 2945.75,
Melton should have been sentenced to the lowest degree of the offense of discharge of a
firearm on prohibited premises.
{¶33} In light of the above, the first assignment of error is sustained.
Failure to Instruct on Aggravated Assault
{¶34} In his second assignment of error, Melton contends that the trial court erred
by not instructing the jury on aggravated assault, an offense of an inferior degree of
felonious assault.
{¶35} “A criminal defendant has the right to expect that the trial court will give
complete jury instructions on all issues raised by the evidence.” State v. Williford, 49
Ohio St.3d 247, 251, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990). Jury instructions should be tailored to fit
the facts of the case. Avon Lake v. Anderson, 10 Ohio App.3d 297, 299, 462 N.E.2d 188(9th Dist.1980).
[A] jury instruction must be given on a lesser included (or
inferior-degree) offense when sufficient evidence is presented which would
allow a jury to reasonably reject the greater offense and find the defendant
guilty on a lesser included offense.
State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 632-633, 590 N.E.2d 272 (1992).
{¶36} The defense, however, did not request an instruction on aggravated assault
and, therefore, under Crim.R. 52(B), we review for plain error. State v. Franklin, 62
Ohio St.3d 118, 128, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991). An incorrect jury instruction does not
constitute plain error unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have
been otherwise. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶37} R.C. 2903.12 governs aggravated assault and provides as follows:
(A) No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden
fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned
by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using
deadly force, shall knowingly:
***
(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another’s
unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, as defined in
section 2923.11 of the Revised Code.
{¶38} A review of this court’s decisions on instructing on aggravated assault as an
inferior charge of felonious assault demonstrates that there was no plain error here. For
example, in State v. Allen, 8th Dist. No. 76672, 2003-Ohio-24, the defendant, who was
convicted of felonious assault on her brother, contended that the jury should have been
instructed on aggravated assault. The defendant testified at trial that she went to her
mother’s apartment, where her brother was, and her brother immediately began to argue
with her upon her arrival. Her brother accused her of slamming a door in his face and
“came toward” her, so he grabbed a magnifying glass. Id. at ¶ 52. Someone else in the
apartment then called the police.
{¶39} The defendant waited for the police for approximately 40 minutes, but in the
meantime had summoned her daughter to the apartment. The defendant’s mother asked
the mother and daughter to leave. They agreed, and as they were leaving the brother
threatened the defendant. The daughter jumped in between the defendant and her
brother and the defendant then ran to her car to get a stick. The defendant testified that
her brother pushed her daughter away and then pulled his hand back as if he were going
to hit her, so she struck him.
{¶40} This court held that the defendant’s “own version of the facts may not have
been sufficient to establish either provocation ‘to arouse the passions of an ordinary
person beyond the power of his or her control’ or that she herself was ‘actually * * *
under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage.’” Id. at ¶ 54.
{¶41} In another case, State v. Blair, 8th Dist. No. 76511, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS
3046 (July 6, 2000), the defendant was also convicted of felonious assault after a fight
with his neighbor. The defendant and his neighbor were drinking on the defendant’s
front porch. The two got into an argument, which led to a fist fight in the front yard.
Two witnesses saw the altercation.
{¶42} Both witnesses testified that the defendant ran into his home and
immediately returned with a baseball bat. The defendant told his neighbor to leave, and
the neighbor began walking away and said, “I’m leaving, leave me alone.” According to
the witnesses, the defendant then began beating the neighbor with the bat. When
arrested, the defendant claimed that the neighbor came at him with a knife.
{¶43} On appeal, this court found that there was no factual basis to demonstrate
serious provocation for an aggravated assault instruction. This court noted among other
things, that the defendant had the opportunity to retreat.
{¶44} In a final case on this issue, State v. Thomas, 8th Dist. No. 56293, 1989
Ohio App. LEXIS 4988 (Dec. 7, 1989), this court also found that an aggravated assault
instruction was not warranted where the defendant committed a felonious assault on his
girlfriend. The defendant and his girlfriend got into an argument, which escalated to the
defendant hitting the girlfriend in her face. The victim ran away and threw a pop bottle
toward either the defendant or his car. The girlfriend continued to run to a neighbor’s
house, but the defendant caught up to her and beat her on the head with his fist and a
brick. Two witnesses, who lived in the house where the victim ran to, corroborated her
version of the incident.
{¶45} According to the defendant, however, the victim provoked him by slashing
his clothes with a knife, throwing the pop bottle at his car, and drawing a knife on him.
The defendant claimed that when the two were on the neighbor’s property, he wrestled
the knife from the victim and then picked up a brick. But he decided not to use the
brick, threw it back down, and only hit the victim with his fist.
{¶46} This court found that the defendant did not present sufficient evidence of
provocation. This court noted that despite the fact that the victim and the defendant had
a “quarrelsome relationship,” and the victim threw a pop bottle at the defendant or his car,
the victim had removed herself from the situation, but the defendant followed her. This
court specifically stated:
Neither the quarrelsome relationship, nor the victim’s minor attempts to
strike back were reasonably sufficient, as a matter of law, to incite or arouse
defendant into repeatedly beating the victim in the head with his fist and a
brick. This is especially so given the period of time between the initial
confrontation and the beating, and the fact that defendant pursued the
victim across the street.
Id. at *8 -*9.
{¶47} Here, Melton and the victims had a troubled relationship. By all accounts,
including Melton’s, Hanson had retreated into the store after he encountered Melton.
Melton had the opportunity to leave the scene, and even after being requested to do so by
the store’s owner, did not. Rather, Hanson testified that Melton told him to “come
outside and get beat up.” Dahler, the store’s owner, testified that Hanson appeared
“terrified.” And despite Melton’s contention that all he wanted to do was talk to and
“settle the score” with Hanson, Dahler testified that Melton and his associate were yelling
at Hanson. This evidence did not support a finding of “serious provocation occasioned
by the victim” to warrant an aggravated assault instruction.
{¶48} Moreover, the defense’s theory of the case was that Melton did not possess
or fire the gun. Rather, the defense contended that Whitted had the weapon and Melton
was merely trying to get it from him, when Whitted fired it.
{¶49} In light of the above, there was no plain error by the trial court’s failure to
instruct on aggravated assault and the second assignment of error is overruled.
Allied Offenses
{¶50} For his third assigned error, Melton contends that the trial court erred in
sentencing him to consecutive terms for the discharge of firearm on or near prohibited
premises and the felonious assaults because they are allied offenses of similar import.
{¶51} The law in Ohio on allied offenses has journeyed down a winding path. In
the Ohio Supreme Court’s most recent decision regarding allied offenses, the court stated
that “[i]t is time to return our focus to the plain language and purposes of the merger
statute.” State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶
41. That statute, R.C. 2941.25, provides as follows:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute
two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information
may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be
convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of
the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as
to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
{¶52} The court noted that the statute “itself instructs us to look at the defendant’s
conduct when evaluating whether his offenses are allied.” Id. at ¶ 42. First, courts
must determine “whether it is possible to commit one offense and commit the other with
the same conduct * * *.” (Emphasis sic. Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 48. Second,
“[i]f multiple offenses can be committed by the same conduct, then the court must
determine whether the offenses were committed by the same conduct, i.e., ‘a single act,
committed with a single state of mind.’” Id. at ¶ 49, quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio
St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 50, (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). “If the
answer to both questions is yes, then the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and
will be merged.” Johnson at ¶ 50.
{¶53} Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has found that the failure to merge allied
offenses of similar import constitutes plain error and a sentence that contains an allied
offense error is contrary to law. State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1,
922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 26, 31, citing State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-6087,
817 N.E.2d 845; R.C. 2953.08(A)(4).
{¶54} Here, under the first prong of the Johnson inquiry, it is possible to commit
felonious assault by means of a deadly weapon and discharge of a firearm on or near
prohibited premises. We therefore consider the second prong of the Johnson inquiry,
whether the offenses were committed by the same conduct. We find they were. The
evidence here demonstrates that when all the parties (Melton, Melton’s associate, Hanson,
and Whitted) were together, they were fighting and a shooting took place. The fight and
shooting were one continuous act, and the assaults and discharge of the firearm on or near
prohibited premises were committed by the same conduct. As such, they were allied
offenses and should have merged. Under these circumstances, “the state must elect
which of [the] two * * * charges will merge into the other for purposes of * * *
conviction and sentence.” State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895
N.E.2d 149, ¶ 43.
{¶55} In light of the above, the third assignment of error is sustained.
Judicial Bias
{¶56} In his fourth assignment of error, Melton contends that the trial court’s
comments demonstrated its bias against him and deprived him of a fair proceeding.
{¶57} The comments Melton complains of were made by the trial judge at
sentencing and were as follows:
I don’t think he’s [Melton] a good person, I think he’s probably one of the
worst examples of a young man that is produced in our community. I
think that he is everything that society abhors in terms of a young person.
He’s gun-toting, he has no regard for the law, he has a previous conviction
in juvenile court for felonious assault. He doesn’t learn from his mistakes.
He thinks he’s clever. He thinks he’s wise. He’s insistent on criminal
activity.
I think that he is the worst form of a young person. He is the young person
in society that everyone has nightmares about, that you can’t go to a store
without him convening outside with his friends and pulling that on you.
That’s crazy. Who does something like that? And then shooting two
people and coming in here, telling that type of lie that the gun accidentally
went off. Happened to have gone off and shot the two people that he was
in an altercation with. Just more than, you know, the jury didn’t believe it,
I didn’t believe it either. He is totally without guidance.
* * * I mean he has no regard for anybody. And it’s all about him in the
streets and him ruling.
{¶58} The trial court then allowed Melton’s mother to speak. The mother told
the court that Melton was not an “animal,” a “monster,” a “threat to society” or a
“gun-totter,” and that he was “coerced” into the crime. The court told the mother that
Melton was convicted in juvenile court at age 12 of possessing a weapon in a public
place; the mother denied he had a weapon. The trial court stated that that was the
information before the court and that Melton “has been a bad kid.” Melton responded:
“Your Honor, I have made some mistakes in life. I’m still in school, I was getting back
on track.” The court responded:
You know what, Mr. Melton, I would shutter to think if somebody in my
family would be in school with you. It would scare the bejesus out of me
to have someone in my family sit in a classroom with a human being like
you. Nothing could be more frightening to me than to be in a classroom
with a person like you. That would be a nightmare for me that you would
be in the same classroom with someone in my family. Oh, my God, that
would be awful. That would be awful.
The following exchange then took place:
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I love that school, all my teachers love
me. My peers like - -
THE COURT: I don’t believe that.
THE DEFENDANT: I attend school on a regular basis. This would have
been my last year in high school.
THE COURT: I don’t believe that.
THE DEFENDANT: This would have been my last year.
THE COURT: Most people are good, and you are rotten to the core.
{¶59} Defense counsel requested that in sentencing Melton, the court consider his
age, 18, and the goal of rehabilitation. The court responded:
I am trying my best to look at this, think to myself, what could have
happened with this kid to rehabilitate him. He is not — he is like from a
different planet. He has no soul. He has no conscience whatsoever.
He’s unrelenting. He just doesn’t stop. He is a menace to society. He
is a nightmare.
{¶60} A trial judge is not precluded from making comments during the course of a
proceeding,5 and especially at sentencing, where it has to make certain findings and
consider various factors. Nonetheless, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states
that a judge “shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.”
See State v. Thomas, 36 Ohio St.2d 68, 71, 303 N.E.2d 882 (1973).
5
“Bias” or “prejudice,” when used in reference to a judge, “implies a hostile feeling or
spirit of ill will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his
attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part the judge, as
contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law and
facts.” State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956),
paragraph four of the syllabus.
{¶61} Melton contends that because the comments demonstrated the trial court’s
bias and prejudice against him, his entire sentence should be vacated, and upon remand,
the case should be reassigned. Our resolution of Melton’s other assignments of error
already require resentencing, so this assignment of error is moot to the extent Melton asks
for his sentence to be vacated. Under Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section5(C), the
Ohio Supreme Court has the sole authority to disqualify a common pleas court judge.
See also R.C. 2701.03; State v. Bacon, 8th Dist. No. 85475, 2005-Ohio-6238, ¶ 66.
This case will be remanded for resentencing and Melton, therefore, may raise the issue of
judicial bias at that time. See State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951
N.E.2d 381, ¶ 32.
{¶62} In light of the above, the fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶63} For his final assignment of error, Melton contends that he was denied the
effective assistance of trial counsel.
{¶64} We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-part
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984). In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant
must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation; and if so, show there was a reasonable probability that his
counsel’s errors affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. Further, judicial scrutiny
of a lawyer’s performance must be highly deferential. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673,
674, 1998-Ohio-343, 693 N.E.2d 267. Therefore, “a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”
Strickland at 2065. Debatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of
counsel. State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810.
{¶65} Melton bases his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim on trial
counsel’s failure to: (1) object at sentencing to discharge of a firearm on or near
prohibited premises being a first degree felony; (2) request an aggravated assault jury
instruction; and (3) raise the issue of felonious assault and discharge of a firearm on or
near prohibited premises being allied offenses.
{¶66} We find merit to Melton’s first and third contentions. As was discussed
above, the verdict form was insufficient to sustain a first degree felony conviction for
discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. Further, the evidence
demonstrated that Melton acted with a single animus in this incident and, therefore, the
discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises and the felonious assault
convictions should have merged. However, in light of our resolution of his earlier
assignments of error, Melton has not been prejudiced by any ineffective assistance.
{¶67} In light of the above, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶68} The judgment in this case is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Melton
should have been convicted of a fourth degree misdemeanor for discharge of a weapon on
or near prohibited premises. On remand, the conviction judgment should be corrected to
reflect that degree of the offense.
{¶69} Melton’s sentence is vacated. The convictions for discharge of a weapon
on or near prohibited premises and felonious assault should have merged. On remand,
the state shall elect which charges merge into the other for sentencing.
{¶70} Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for
resentencing.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee his costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR