State v. Baldwin

[Cite as State v. Baldwin, 2013-Ohio-2648.]
COURT OF APPEALS
FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
-vs- :
:
JOSHUA BALDWIN : Case No. 12-CA-110
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Municipal Court,
Case No. TRC118937A
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 20, 2013
BAL
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
R. KYLE WITT ANDREW T. SANDERSON
TERRE L. VANDERVOORT 118 West Chestnut Street
P.O. Box 1008 Suite B
121 East Chestnut Street Lancaster, OH 43130
Lancaster, OH 43130
Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-110 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On September 5, 2011, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Chad McMunn
observed appellant, Joshua Baldwin, operating a motor vehicle over the speed limit.
After initiating a traffic stop, Trooper McMunn had appellant perform three field sobriety
tests. Based upon the results, appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence in violation of R.C. 4511.19 and speeding in violation of R.C.
4511.21.
{¶2} On October 6, 2011, appellant filed a motion to suppress, seeking to
suppress the results of the field sobriety tests and claiming an illegal arrest. A hearing
was held on March 12, 2012. By entry filed March 23, 2012, the trial court suppressed
the field sobriety tests, but found probable cause to arrest.
{¶3} On May 30, 2012, appellant pled no contest to the charges. By journal
entry filed May 30, 2012, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to
ninety days in jail, eighty-seven days suspended.
{¶4} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶5} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN DENYING
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE."
I
{¶6} Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress on
the issue of probable cause to arrest. We disagree.
Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-110 3
{¶7} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact.
In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1
Ohio St.3d 19 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486 (4th Dist. 1991); State v.
Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592 (4th Dist. 1993). Second, an appellant may argue the
trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that
case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. State
v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37 (4th Dist. 1993). Finally, assuming the trial court's
findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly
identified the law to be applied, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly
decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing
this type of claim, an appellate court must independently determine, without deference
to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in
any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93 (8th Dist. 1994); State v. Claytor, 85
Ohio App.3d 623 (4th Dist. 1993); Guysinger. As the United States Supreme Court held
in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996), "…as a general matter
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de
novo on appeal."
{¶8} Probable cause to arrest focuses on the prior actions of the accused.
Probable cause exists when a reasonable prudent person would believe that the person
arrested had committed a crime. State v. Timson, 38 Ohio St.2d 122 (1974). A
determination of probable cause is made from the totality of the circumstances. Factors
Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-110 4
to be considered include an officer's observation of some criminal behavior by the
defendant, furtive or suspicious behavior, flight, events escalating reasonable suspicion
into probable cause, association with criminals, and location. Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search
and Seizure, Sections 2:13-2:19, at 59-64 (2009 Ed.). As the United States Supreme
Court stated when speaking of probable cause "we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life in which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
{¶9} Appellant challenges the quality and quantity of the evidence. Appellant
argues the facts were insufficient to support probable cause to arrest. In its entry filed
March 23, 2012, the trial court found the following:
The only testimony disallowed by R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) is the
results of the tests. The general observations of the trooper which may
be considered by the court include:
1. Defendant's eyes were blood shot and glassy.
2. Defendant's ultimate, although reluctant, admission to consuming
alcohol.
3. Defendant swayed while performing the one-legged stand.
4. Defendant had a strong odor of alcohol coming from his breath
as he spoke to Trooper McMunn.
***
Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-110 5
Following this precedent, the court finds that the totality of the
observations made by Trooper McMunn were a sufficient basis for a
finding that he possessed probable cause to arrest Defendant for a
violation of R.C. 4511.19.
{¶10} Probable cause to arrest is subject to some subjective interpretation by a
police officer. After stopping appellant, Tropper McMunn smelled a strong odor of
alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. T. at 9. Appellant's eyes "were bloodshot,
completely bloodshot." Id. After placing appellant in his patrol car, Trooper McMunn
continued to smell alcohol. T. at 29. Appellant executed three field sobriety tests and
failed all three. T. at 22, 30, 36-37, 40. Although the field sobriety tests were excluded
as evidence for trial purposes, the results nonetheless contributed to Trooper McMunn's
independent conclusion. After performing the tests, appellant admitted to consuming
alcohol. T. at 41. Based upon his observations and the totality of the circumstances,
there was sufficient information for Trooper McMunn to make the subjective
determination of probable cause to arrest.
{¶11} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in denying appellant's
motion to suppress on the issue of probable cause to arrest.
{¶12} The sole assignment of error is denied.
Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-110 6
{¶13} The judgment of the Municipal Court of Fairfield County, Ohio is hereby
affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Gwin, P.J. concur and
Hoffman, J. concurs separately.
_________________________________
_________________________________
_______________________________
JUDGES
SGF/sg 521
Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-110 7
Hoffman, P.J., concurring
{¶14} I concur in the majority’s decision to overrule Appellant’s assignment of
error. However, I disagree with the majority’s analysis in reaching its conclusion.
{¶15} The majority cites to State v. Timson, 38 Ohio St.2d 122 (1974), for the
appropriate test to be applied when determining whether probable cause to arrest
exists. Probable cause exists when a reasonable prudent person would believe the
person arrested has committed a crime. This is an objective standard.
{¶16} My concern is the majority interjects a subjective standard into its analysis.
The majority states, “Probable cause to arrest is subject to some subjective
interpretation by a police officer.” (Majority Opinion at ¶10). The majority ultimately
concludes “… there was sufficient information for Trooper McMunn to make the
subjective determination of probable cause to arrest.” Id.{¶17} While there may be an element of subjective interpretation as to various
indicators of intoxication; i.e., strength of odor of alcohol, degree of glassy or bloodshot
eyes, level of distinction of speech – I disagree the arresting officer’s subjective
interpretation is the test to be applied in determining whether probable cause to arrest
exists.
{¶18} I am also concerned with the majority’s mention of the “results” of three
excluded field sobriety tests as contributing to Trooper McMunn’s “independent
conclusion”. (Majority Opinion at ¶10). While Trooper McMunn’s observations of
Appellant’s conduct made during the improper administration of the field sobriety tests
Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-110 8
may properly be considered, I find consideration of the results thereof may not be
considered in determining probable cause.
________________________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
[Cite as State v. Baldwin, 2013-Ohio-2648.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
JOSHUA BALDWIN :
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 12-CA-110
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Municipal Court of Fairfield County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to
appellant.
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_______________________________
_______________________________
JUDGES