Sheet Metal Workers Internatl. Assn. Local Union No. 33 v. Courtad, Inc.

[Cite as Sheet Metal Workers Internatl. Assn. Local Union No. 33 v. Courtad, Inc., 2012-Ohio-4812.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
: JUDGES:
SHEET METAL WORKERS : W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION : William B. Hoffman, J.
LOCAL UNION NO. 33 : Julie A. Edwards, J.
:
Plaintiff-Appellant : Case No. 2012CA00080
:
-vs- :
: OPINION
COURTAD, INC.
Defendant-Appellee
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from Stark County
Court of Common Pleas Case No.
2012CV00168
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: October 9, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
DIANA M. ROBINSON DAVID M. LENEGHAN, ESQ.
MARILYN L. WIDMAN K. SCOTT CARTER, ESQ.
Allotta, Farley & Widman Co. LPA 200 Treeworth Blvd., Suite 200
2222 Centennial Road Broadview Heights, Ohio 44147
Toledo, Ohio 43617
[Cite as Sheet Metal Workers Internatl. Assn. Local Union No. 33 v. Courtad, Inc., 2012-Ohio-4812.]
Edwards, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local
Union No. 33, appeals from the April 10, 2012, Judgment Entry of the Stark County
Court of Common Pleas granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by
defendant-appellee Courtad, Inc.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On January 17, 2012, appellant Sheet Metal Workers International
Association Local Union No. 33 filed a complaint in the Stark County Court of Common
Pleas against appellee Courtad, Inc. pursuant to R.C. 4115.03 ct. seq. Appellant, in its
complaint, alleged that appellee had violated Ohio’s prevailing wage laws. Appellant
alleged in its complaint that previously, on September 28, 2011, it had filed a prevailing
wage complaint against appellee with the director of the Ohio Department of
Commerce, Division of Labor and Workers’ Safety, Bureau of Wage and Hour and that
such complaint had not been ruled on. A copy of the prevailing wage complaint was
attached as Exhibit A to the complaint filed in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas.
The prevailing wage complaint lists David Coleman as the complainant.
{¶3} On February 21, 2012, appellee filed an answer to the complaint.
Subsequently, on March 26, 2012, appellee filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) and (H). Appellee, alleged in its motion, that
appellant was not the real party in interest because the pleadings and exhibits showed
that David Coleman, rather than appellant, had filed the prevailing wage complaint with
the Department of Commerce. Appellee argued that appellant, therefore, lacked
standing to file its complaint in the trial court under R.C. 4115.16(B). Appellant, on April
Stark County App. Case No. 2012CA00080 3
4, 2012, filed a memorandum in response to such motion. Attached to the
memorandum was a letter dated September 26, 2011, from David Coleman to the
Department of Commerce on union letterhead. Coleman, in such letter, indicated that
he was filing the prevailing wage complaint on behalf of the appellant.
{¶4} Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on April 10, 2012, the trial court
granted appellee’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
{¶5} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal:
{¶6} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, COURTAD, INC.”
I
{¶7} Appellant, in its sole assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred
in granting appellee’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
{¶8} A motion for judgment on the pleadings presents only questions of law.
Luthy v. Dover, 5th Dist. No. 2011AP030011, 2011–Ohio–4604, ¶ 13, citing Dearth v.
Stanley, 2nd Dist. No. 22180, 2008–Ohio–487. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the trial court must construe the material allegations in the complaint and any
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. If it finds plaintiff can
prove no set of facts entitling plaintiff to relief, the court must sustain a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Boske v. Massillon City School Dist., 5th Dist. No. 2010–
CA–00120, 2011–Ohio–580, ¶ 12, citing Hester v. Dwivedi, 89 Ohio St.3d 575, 2000–
Ohio–230, 733 N.E.2d 1161. However, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to
support any conclusions, and unsupported conclusions are not presumed to be true. Id.Stark County App. Case No. 2012CA00080 4
{¶9} Judgment on the pleadings may be granted where no material factual
issue exists. However, it is axiomatic that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
restricted solely to the allegations contained in those pleadings. Giesberger v. Alliance
Police Department, 5th Dist. No. 2011 CA00070, 2011–Ohio–5940, at ¶ 18, citing
Flanagan v. Williams, 87 Ohio App.3d 768, 623 N.E.2d 185 (4th Dist.1993).
{¶10} Our review of the trial court's decision granting judgment on the pleadings
is de novo. See, Hignite v. Glick, Layman & Assoc., Inc., 8th Dist. No. 95782, 2011-
Ohio-1698. When reviewing a matter de novo, this Court does not give deference to the
trial court's decision. Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 157 Ohio App.3d 150, 809 N.E.2d
1161, 2004–Ohio–829, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). “Under Civ.R. 12(C), dismissal is appropriate
where a court (1) construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds
beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief.” State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio
St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). In considering such a motion, one must look
only to the face of the complaint. Nelson v. Pleasant, 73 Ohio App.3d 479, 597 N.E.2d
1137 (4th Dist. 1991).
{¶11} At issue in the case sub judice is whether or not the trial court erred in
granting appellee’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the grounds that appellant
lacked standing to file a complaint in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. R.C.
4115.16(A) authorizes an “interested party” to file a complaint with the director of
commerce alleging a prevailing-wage violation. If the director has not ruled on the merits
of the complaint within 60 days, the interested party may file a complaint in the court of
Stark County App. Case No. 2012CA00080 5
common pleas of the county in which the violation allegedly occurred pursuant to R.C.
4115.16(B).
{¶12} The trial court, in its April 10, 2012, Judgment Entry, stated, in relevant
part, as follows:
{¶13} “In this matter, the Court finds that the complaint filed with the director was
done in the name of ‘David Coleman.’ While David Coleman may be the organizer of
the Union, it does not appear that he filed the complaint with the director in his official
capacity. Specifically, the complaint filed with the director, and attached to the
complaint filed in this Court, lists him as ‘David Coleman,’ without a designation as to
capacity within the Union. Further, he signed the complaint without such designation.1
As such, this Court finds that the ‘interested party’ that filed the complaint with the
director was David Coleman. As such, the proper plaintiff in this matter is David
Coleman, not the Union.
{¶14} “Further, while the Union alleges in the complaint filed in this Court that it
filed the complaint with the director (notably, without mention of David Coleman’s
involvement), such allegation is clearly contradicted by the attachment to the complaint,
and insufficient to support a finding as to its standing. Accordingly, the Court finds that,
while the Union may be an ‘interested party’ under R.C. 4115.16, it is not the proper
party, with standing, to maintain the instant action.”
{¶15} However, appellant specifically alleged in paragraph 21 of its complaint
that, on September 28, 2011, it had filed a prevailing wage complaint against appellee
1
“Although David Coleman, in his letter to the director of the Department of Commerce that accompanied
his complaint, indicates that he is filing ‘as interested party’ on behalf of [the Union], such material was
not attached to the pleadings and cannot be considered by the Court in its analysis of the instant motion.
Further, even if such statement was considered, it is clear by the complaint filed with the director that he
did not file it in such capacity.” (Footnote from April 10, 2012, Judgment Entry).
Stark County App. Case No. 2012CA00080 6
with the Department of Commerce. A copy of the prevailing wage complaint attached as
Exhibit A to the complaint filed in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas lists David
Coleman was the complainant. The address listed for David Coleman on the prevailing
wage complaint is the same as the address listed for appellant on the complaint filed in
the trial court. Thus, construing the allegations in appellant’s favor, there is a question
of fact as to whether or not the prevailing wage complaint filed with the director of the
Department of Commerce would be treated by the director as having been filed by
David Coleman on behalf of appellant union or by David Coleman on his own behalf.
{¶16} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in granting
appellee’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
{¶17} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
{¶18} Accordingly, the judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is
reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.
By: Edwards, J.
Gwin, P.J. concurs and
Hoffman, J. dissents
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
JUDGES
JAE/d0619
Stark County App. Case No. 2012CA00080 7
Hoffman, J., dissenting
{¶19} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
{¶20} “Where an instrument attached to a complaint is inconsistent with the
language in the complaint, the document, rather than the language of the complaint, will
control.” Williams and Co., Inc. v. Allied Sales of Columbus, 1975 Ohio App. Lexis
8559, at p.7.2
{¶21} Based on the foregoing authority, I believe the trial court correctly
determined although the Union may be an “interested party” under R.C. 4115.16, it was
not the proper party, with standing, to maintain the action. I would affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
________________________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
2
Although this language is found in Judge Whitesides’s dissenting opinion such proposition is not refuted
in the majority opinion. Judge Whiteside’s dissent in Williams & Co. is premised upon the proper
application of Civ.R. 10(D) as it relates to the sufficiency of a complaint to state a claim upon an account.
Neither the majority nor Judge Whiteside’s dissent involved a challenge to standing as presented in the
case sub judice.
[Cite as Sheet Metal Workers Internatl. Assn. Local Union No. 33 v. Courtad, Inc., 2012-Ohio-4812.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHEET METAL WORKERS :
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION LOCAL :
UNION NO. 33 :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant :
:
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
COURTAD, INC. :
:
Defendant-Appellee : CASE NO. 2012CA00080
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the
judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. Costs assessed to appellee.
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
JUDGES