Sunbury v. Sullivan

[Cite as Sunbury v. Sullivan, 2012-Ohio-3699.]
COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
: JUDGES:
THE VILLAGE OF SUNBURY, OHIO : Sheila G. Farmer, P.J.
: John W. Wise, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Julie A. Edwards, J.
:
-vs- : Case No. 11CAC030025
:
:
GARY M. SULLIVAN : OPINION
Defendant-Appellant
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from Delaware Municipal
Court Case No. 10TRC07891
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 13, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
PETER B. RUFFING JOHN R. CORNELY
Prosecuting Attorney 21 Middle Street
Justice Center P.O. Box 248
70 N. Union Street Galena, Ohio 43021-0248
Delaware, Ohio 43015
[Cite as Sunbury v. Sullivan, 2012-Ohio-3699.]
Edwards, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Gary Sullivan, appeals his conviction and sentence
from the Delaware Municipal Court on one count each of use of unauthorized (fictitious)
plates, driving under an OVI suspension, operating a vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol and refusing a chemical test and driving under an FRA suspension. Plaintiff-
appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On August 17, 2010, a complaint was filed charging appellant with driving
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and refusing a chemical test in violation of
R.C. 4511.19(A)(2), operating a motor vehicle while under an OVI [operating a vehicle
under the influence of alcohol] suspension in violation of R.C. 4510.14(A), use of
unauthorized (fictitious) license plates in violation of R.C. 4549.08(A), driving under an
FRA suspension in violation of R.C. 4510.16, and having no valid operator’s license in
violation of R.C. 4510.12. The complaint indicated that appellant had six (6) prior OVIs.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.
{¶3} A jury trial was held on February 8, 2011. On such date, a joint stipulation
was filed stating that the parties agreed that appellant had been convicted of OVI on
May 27, 2008 in another case, that appellant’s driver’s license had been suspended for
10 years and was under suspension on August 16, 2010 and that, on August 16, 2010,
appellant was not permitted to drive.
{¶4} At the trial, Deputy Larry Dore testified that, on August 16, 2010, at
approximately 7:17 p.m., he was sitting in uniform in a marked cruiser at State Route 61
and Route 3 in Sunbury, Ohio when he was flagged down by a man in a white vehicle
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 3
who told him that appellant was going to be driving in the area shortly and that appellant
had a suspended license. The man provided the Deputy with a description of appellant’s
vehicle and the license plate. When Deputy Dore ran the license plate, he confirmed
that appellant had a suspended license and was provided with a picture of appellant.
{¶5} Approximately five minutes later, Deputy Dore saw appellant’s vehicle go
by. He determined that the man driving the vehicle matched the picture that he had
been provided. When Deputy Dore pulled in behind the vehicle he saw that the license
plate had been altered and that an E on the license plate had been changed to a F.
According to the Deputy, appellant used some type of white out or white substance to
alter the plate. After Deputy Dore activated his lights, appellant turned left and failed to
stop. The Deputy then activated his siren. Appellant continued driving and went through
two traffic lights. Once he reached his house, appellant pulled into his driveway and
then his garage. Deputy Dore testified that he followed appellant a little more than half a
mile with his lights and siren on before appellant stopped.
{¶6} Deputy Dore testified that when appellant got out of his vehicle, he reeked
of an alcoholic beverage coming from his person. Appellant told the officer that he had
imbibed four beers. Appellant, according to the Deputy, was argumentative and refused
to submit to field sobriety tests. Appellant’s speech was slurred and he had slowed
motor skills.
{¶7} Deputy Dore testified that when he told appellant why he had been
stopped appellant “kept saying...you don’t have to do this to me I am a Vietnam vet.”
Transcript at 135. Appellant was arrested and taken to the police department where he
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 4
refused to take a breathalyzer test. The following is an excerpt from Deputy Dore’s
testimony:
{¶8} “Q. And during your entire contact with him, including at the police station,
did he continue to exhibit the signs that you’ve described before, the reeking alcohol
and the slurred speech, those sorts of things?
{¶9} “A. Yes, in fact, when we were in the Sunbury’s little holding cell, it’s a
smaller area than this, two little cells and it was very strong in there, obviously because
it was in an enclosed area, the alcoholic beverage smell coming from his person.
{¶10} “Q. And how about his appearance, his eyes - - describe his eyes?
{¶11} “A. Bloodshot, watery, I mean, displayed everything. Like I said, slurred
speech, his motor skills were slowed. He just - - you know you could tell he was under
the influence of alcohol.
{¶12} “Q. As he was walking around, did he appear to be unsteady or describe
his walking.
{¶13} “A. Yeah, he was just real kind of slow and lethargic.” Transcript at 144.
{¶14} On cross-examination, Deputy Dore testified that he did not observe any
impaired driving by appellant while following appellant for approximately 1.8 miles.
{¶15} At trial, Deputy Charles Gannon, who had been called by Deputy Dore as
back-up, testified that he had contact with appellant and that he detected a very strong
odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from appellant’s person. Deputy Gannon further
testified that appellant’s eyes were red, glassy and bloodshot, his speech was slurred
and that appellant was swaying back and forth.
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 5
{¶16} At the conclusion of the evidence and the end of deliberations, the jury, on
February 8, 2011, found appellant guilty of use of unauthorized (fictitious) plates, driving
under an OVI suspension, and operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and refusing a chemical test. The trial court convicted appellant of driving under an
FRA suspension and found appellant not guilty of having no operator’s license. As
memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed on February 8, 2011, appellant was sentenced
to an aggregate sentence of 250 days in jail. The trial court also fined appellant, ordered
that his driver’s license be suspended for 10 years and placed him on community
control for a period of five years.
{¶17} Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal:
{¶18} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. SULLIVAN’S
CRIMINAL RULE 29 MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL ON THE OVI CHARGE AS THE
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT HIM.
{¶19} “II. MR. SULLIVAN’S CONVICTION FOR OVI IS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶20} “III. THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY IN
ARGUING HIS PERSONAL BELIEFS REGARDING MR. SULLIVAN’S CREDIBILITY IN
CLOSING ARGUMENTS DENIED MR. SULLIVAN HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
{¶21} “IV. COUNSEL FOR MR. SULLIVAN WAS INEFFECTIVE AS THE
RESULT OF HIS CUMULATIVE ERRORS AND THIS DENIED MR. SULLIVAN A FAIR
TRIAL UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 6
I, II
{¶22} Appellant, in his first assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred
in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal as to the charge of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. In his second assignment of error, he
argues that his conviction for such offense is against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶23} In determining whether a trial court erred in overruling an appellant's
motion for judgment of acquittal, the reviewing court focuses on the sufficiency of the
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 553, 1995–Ohio–104, 651
N.E.2d 965; State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991).
{¶24} On review for sufficiency, a reviewing court is to examine the evidence at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction. Jenks,
supra. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of
the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560(1979). On review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record,
weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses
and determine “whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
and a new trial ordered.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st.
Dist. 1983). See also, State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997–Ohio–52, 678
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 7
N.E.2d 541. The granting of a new trial “should be exercised only in the exceptional
case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Martin at 175.
{¶25} Appellant specifically contends that there was insufficient evidence that his
consumption of alcohol impaired, to a noticeable degree, his ability to operate a motor
vehicle and that there was no evidence that he was under the influence. Appellant notes
that the deputies did not observe any impaired driving during the 1.8 miles that they
followed appellant.
{¶26} However, under our review of the evidence, we find that, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found that appellant committed the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. We
further find that the jury did not lose its way in convicting appellant of such offense. As
is stated above, appellant failed to stop after Deputy Dore activated his lights and went
through two traffic lights. When Deputy Dore finally stopped appellant, appellant
smelled of alcohol and told the deputy that he had imbibed four beers. Appellant was
argumentative, his speech was slurred and he had slowed motor skills. Deputy Dore
further testified that appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery and that appellant was
slow and lethargic. Deputy Gannon testified similarly.
{¶27} Furthermore, appellant refused to take a breathalyzer test. Evidence of a
refusal to submit to a chemical test can be used against a defendant at trial. See
Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St.2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968) and State v.
Wise, 5th Dist. No. 2008-CA-9, 2008-Ohio-7003 at paragraphs 82-83. Appellant also
refused to submit to field sobriety tests. A defendant’s refusal to perform such tests is
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 8
admissible as evidence of guilt on an OVI charge. See State v. Holnapy, 8th Dist. No.
2010-L-072, 2011-Ohio-2995.
{¶28} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s first and second assignments of error
are overruled.
III
{¶29} Appellant, in his third assignment of error, argues that he was denied his
right to a fair trial due to misconduct of the prosecuting attorney “in arguing his beliefs
regarding [appellant’s] credibility.”
{¶30} The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor's
comments and remarks were improper and if so, whether those comments and remarks
prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the accused. State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d
160, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990). In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, it is
our duty to consider the complained of conduct in the context of the entire trial. Darden
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). A trial is not
unfair, if, in the context of the entire trial, it appears clear beyond a reasonable doubt the
jury would have found the defendant guilty even without the improper comments. State
v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 464, 2001-Ohio-4, 739 N.E.2d 749. Furthermore, both
the prosecution and the defense have wide latitude during opening and closing
arguments.
{¶31} However, a prosecutor may not express his personal belief or opinion as
to the credibility of a witness, the guilt of an accused or allude to matters that are not
supported by admissible evidence. State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d
883 (1984). The wide latitude given the prosecution during closing arguments “does not
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 9
‘encompass inviting the jury to reach its decision on matters outside the evidence
adduced at trial.’” State v. Hart, 8th Dist. No. 79564, 2002–Ohio–1084, at 3, citing State
v. Freeman, 138 Ohio App.3d 408, 419, 741 N.E.2d 566 (1st Dist. 2000).
{¶32} In the case sub judice, appellant specifically takes issue with the following
comments made by the prosecuting attorney during closing arguments:
{¶33} “The question is, was the defendant impaired while he was driving. And I
submit to you that that’s been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶34} “First of all, the direct evidence. The direct evidence you have Number (1)
is that the defendant was drinking and he admitted to having been drinking at the
Eagle’s. He admitted to having drunk four beers. Now, you may think he
underestimated, and I suspect the officers did think he underestimated, but, regardless,
he felt when he was asked the question how many beers or how much he had been
drinking he felt the need to admit four beers.
{¶35} “Now, I suggest to you from that you can conclude a couple things.
Number (1) that he was drinking more than four beers, but that he was drinking a lot
because he had to admit four beers to even keep a straight face. You can take that for
what it’s worth, but he admitted four beers, he admitted he’d been drinking at the
Eagle’s.” Transcript at 237-238.
{¶36} Appellant, in his brief, concedes that defense counsel failed to object to
such statements. “Absent plain error, an appellate court will not consider errors that the
defendant failed to object to at the trial level.” State v. Thompson, 127 Ohio App.3d 511,
522, 713 N.E.2d 456 (8th Dist. 1998). Crim.R. 52(B) provides that, “[p]lain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 10
attention of the court.” “Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the
utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978),
paragraph three of the syllabus. In order to find plain error under Crim R. 52(B), it must
be determined, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been
otherwise. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶37} Assuming arguendo, that such comment was improper, we find that,
based on the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, as set forth in detail in the
statement of facts, the outcome of the trial would not have been different but for such
alleged error. We find no plain error.
{¶38} Based on the foregoing, appellant's third assignment of error is overruled.
IV
{¶39} Appellant, in his fourth assignment of error, argues that he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
{¶40} To show ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must satisfy a two-
prong test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). First,
he must show that his trial counsel engaged in a substantial violation of any essential
duty to his client. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989),
quoting State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976). Second, he must
show that his trial counsel's ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice. Bradley, at 141–142,
quoting Lytle, at 396–397. “Prejudice exists where there is a reasonable probability that
the trial result would have been different but for the alleged deficiencies of counsel.”
Bradley, ¶ three of the syllabus.
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 11
{¶41} Appellant initially argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in moving to
admit Exhibit 4 and Defendant’s Exhibit A, a photocopy of appellant’s traffic ticket,
without redacting the information regarding appellant’s prior OVI convictions. The ticket
indicated that appellant had six (6) prior OVI’s. Appellant notes that the parties
stipulated prior to trial that appellant had a prior OVI in 2007 to prevent appellee from
introducing evidence of the fact that appellant had five other prior convictions for OVI.
{¶42} However, we note that the jury was instructed that the evidence did not
include the complaint (i.e.-ticket). Moreover, based on the overwhelming evidence of
appellant’s guilt, we cannot say that the outcome of appellant’s trial would have been
different had the information on the ticket regarding the prior OVI’s been redacted.
{¶43} Appellant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object
to Deputy Dore’s testimony that appellant had prior OVI’s. During cross-examination,
defense counsel asked Deputy Dore why appellant’s car was towed and Deputy Dore
responded that it was because appellant had prior OVI’s. The Deputy did not specify
how many prior OVI’s appellant had. Appellant now maintains that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to object to such testimony.
{¶44} However, as noted by appellee, the jury was aware that appellant had a
prior OVI. The jury was informed of the parties’ stipulation that appellant had been
convicted of OVI in 2008 and that appellant’s driver’s license had been suspended for a
period of ten years. Trial counsel's failure to object may have been a tactical or
strategic decision. Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if ultimately unsuccessful,
do not generally constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545,
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 12
558, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995). Moreover, based on the overwhelming evidence, we
cannot say that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel objected.
{¶45} Appellant next maintains that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object
to the State's use of leading and compound questions on direct examination of the
deputies. Evid.R. 611 provides “[l]eading questions could not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony.”
{¶46} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the failure to object to leading
questions does not usually constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 449, 2001-Ohio-1266, 751 N.E.2d 946. The failure to
object is not a per se indicator of ineffective assistance of counsel, because sound trial
strategy might well have been not to interrupt. See State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413,
428, 653 N.E.2d 253 (1995). The questions, though leading, were mainly used to
develop the officer's testimony; or were inconsequential and trial counsel might well
have not wanted to interrupt the proceedings at the very outset. Furthermore, based on
the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt, we cannot say that the outcome of
appellant’s trial would have been different had defense counsel objected.
{¶47} Appellant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to Deputy Dore testifying from his police report. Appellant notes that Deputy Dore
was the primary witness against him and that the case was built upon his testimony.
{¶48} In State v. Neeley, 2nd Dist. No. 20842, 2006-Ohio-418, the appellant
argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object when two of the State’s
witnesses, the coroner and a DNA expert, consulted their written reports during their
testimony. The court, in Neeley, stated, in relevant part, as follows: “Evid.R. 612 permits
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 13
writings to be used to refresh memory while the witness is testifying. That is what
occurred here. We see no error merely because the witness did not declare what was
already obvious: that the witness' memory had been refreshed by his report. Defense
counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to the fact that two of the State's
witnesses consulted their written reports in order to refresh their recollection while
testifying. No ineffective assistance of counsel is demonstrated.” Id at paragraph 39.
Moreover, in the case sub judice, Deputy Gannon testified also. Deputy Charles
Gannon testified that he had contact with appellant and that he detected a very strong
odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from appellant’s person. Deputy Gannon further
testified that appellant’s eyes were red, glassy and bloodshot, his speech was slurred
and that appellant was swaying back and forth. Thus, there was other evidence
corroborating Deputy Dore’s testimony. Moreover, there was evidence that appellant
refused both the field sobriety and breathalyzer tests.
{¶49} Appellant finally contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for
beginning his cross-examination of Deputy Dore with the statement that “it sounds
pretty bleak.” We note that, immediately after making such statement, defense counsel
indicated that he wanted to ask Deputy Dore very specific questions about his
testimony, implying that he was challenging the Deputy’s credibility. Moreover,
assuming, arguendo, that counsel was ineffective in making such statement, we cannot
say, based on the overwhelming evidence, that the outcome of the trial could have been
different had such statement not been made.
Delaware County App. Case No. 11CAC030025 14
{¶50} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶51} Accordingly, the judgment of the Delaware Municipal Court is affirmed.
By: Edwards, J.
Farmer, P.J. and
Wise, J. concur
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
JUDGES
JAE/d0516
[Cite as Sunbury v. Sullivan, 2012-Ohio-3699.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE VILLAGE OF SUNBURY, OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
GARY M. SULLIVAN :
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 11CAC030025
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the
judgment of the Delaware Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs assessed to appellant.
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
JUDGES