State v. Crutchfield

[Cite as State v. Crutchfield, 2012-Ohio-2892.]
COURT OF APPEALS
ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
-vs-
ADRIAN L. CRUTCHFIELD Case No. 11-COA-049
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 11-CRI-055
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 26, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
DANIEL J. PETRICINI ERIN N. POPLAR
110 Cottage Street 1636 Eagle Way
Third Floor Ashland, OH 44805
Ashland, OH 44805
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-049 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On May 26, 2011, the Ashland County Grand Jury indicted appellant,
Adrian Crutchfield, on one count of safecracking in violation of R.C. 2911.31, one count
of petty theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02, one count of possessing criminal tools in
violation of R.C. 2923.24, one count of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C.
2921.12, and one count of breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13. Said
charges arose from an incident wherein appellant entered a place of business and
removed rolled coins from a safe.
{¶2} On July 21, 2011, appellant pled guilty to the safecracking, petty theft, and
possessing criminal tools counts. The remaining counts were dismissed. By judgment
entry filed November 7, 2011, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term
of twenty-seven months in prison: eighteen months on the safecracking count, a felony
of the fourth degree, one hundred and eighty days on the petty theft count, a
misdemeanor in the first degree, and nine months on the possessing criminal tools
count, a felony in the fifth degree, all to be served consecutively.
{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:
I
{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED A PRISON
SENTENCE ON APPELLANT WITHOUT FINDING THAT APPELLANT IS NOT
AMENABLE TO AN AVAILABLE COMMUNITY CONTROL SANCTION AS REQUIRED
BY OHIO REVISED CODE 2929.13(B)(3)(a)."
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-049 3
II
{¶5} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
IMPOSED THE MAXIMUM PRISON TERM FOR THE HIGHEST DEGREE OFFENSE,
A FOURTH DEGREE FELONY, WHEN SENTENCING APPELLANT FOR TWO OR
MORE OFFENSES ARISING OUT OF A SINGLE INCIDENT."
I
{¶6} Appellant claims the trial court erred in imposing a prison sentence without
finding he was not amenable to community control as required under R.C.
2929.13(B)(3)(a). We disagree.
{¶7} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(A)(4), an offender may appeal his/her prison
sentence if it is "contrary to law."
{¶8} In its judgment entry filed November 7, 2011, and also during the October
31, 2011 sentencing hearing at 12, the trial court specifically found appellant had
previously served a prison term under R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(g). Subsection (B)(3)(a)
states the following:
{¶9} "If the court makes a finding described in division (B)(2)(a), (b), (c), (d),
(e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of this section and if the court, after considering the factors set forth
in section 2929.12 of the Revised Code, finds that a prison term is consistent with the
purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code
and finds that the offender is not amenable to an available community control sanction,
the court shall impose a prison term upon the offender."
{¶10} Appellant argues his sentence was contrary to law as the trial court failed
to enter a finding that he was not amenable to community control.
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-049 4
{¶11} In its November 7, 2011 judgment entry, the trial court specifically stated
the following:
{¶12} "Based upon consideration of the purposes and principles of the felony
sentencing law, the statutory sentencing factors, and after weighing the above findings,
this Court finds that the Defendant is NOT amenable to community control sanctions
and that a prison sentence is consistent with the purposes and principles of the felony
sentencing law of Ohio."
{¶13} Clearly the question under this assignment of error is whether the trial
court erred in not orally stating during the sentencing hearing that appellant was not
amenable to community control. In State v. Knighton (May 24, 1999), Stark App. No.
1998CA001901, this court reviewed a sentence wherein the offender argued the trial
court erred in failing to make specific findings under then R.C. 2929.14(B). This court
held, "sentencing findings can be gleaned from a specific fact oriented narrative by the
trial court."
{¶14} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed appellant's criminal
history and informed him that he was "probably [the] most institutionalized individual
that's come before me in my short tenure of Judge." October 31, 2011 T. at 10. The
trial court also noted that appellant had the following:
{¶15} "[T]hree Community Control violations, two of them Post-Release Control
Violations, and another one being a violation of Judicial Release, so you have had
opportunities in the past to reform your conduct under Community Control type of
sanctions, and the last time in Richland County in 2004, it looks like you were only out
about two months before you were violated under your Judicial Release." Id. at 11.
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-049 5
{¶16} Upon review, we find the trial court adequately found that appellant was
not amenable to community control.
{¶17} Assignment of Error I is denied.
II
{¶18} Appellant claims the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence
for two or more offenses arising out of a single incident. We disagree.
{¶19} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(A)(1)(b), an offender may appeal his/her prison
sentence if the sentence "was imposed for two or more offenses arising out of a single
incident, and the court imposed the maximum prison term for the offense of the highest
degree."
{¶20} In State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, ¶4, the Supreme
Court of Ohio set forth the following two-step approach in reviewing a sentence:
{¶21} "First, they must examine the sentencing court's compliance with all
applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the
sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the
trial court's decision shall be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard."
{¶22} In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial court's
decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law
or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983) 5 Ohio St.3d 217.
{¶23} In his brief at 6, appellant correctly points out that his sentences for a
fourth degree felony (eighteen months) and a fifth degree felony (nine months) were
within the allowable prison terms and were not contrary to law as to duration. R.C.
2929.14(A)(4) and (5). Appellant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him to the
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-049 6
maximum allowable prison sentence of eighteen months on the felony four offense, and
said sentence will place an unnecessary burden on state resources.
{¶24} R.C. 2929.11 governs overriding purposes of felony sentences and states
as follows:
{¶25} "(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the
overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony sentencing
are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the
offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those
purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government
resources. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for
incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime,
rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public,
or both.
{¶26} "(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to
achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in division (A) of this
section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's
conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for
similar crimes committed by similar offenders."
{¶27} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court informed appellant of this
standard. October 31, 2011 T. at 11. The trial court was concerned with the likelihood
of appellant committing future crimes, noting he had a history of criminal conduct (going
back over twenty-five years) and had violated the conditions of his parole and
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-049 7
community control on numerous occasions. Id. at 11-13; Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report filed Under Seal on November 18, 2011.
{¶28} In sentencing appellant to the maximum eighteen months on the felony
four, the trial court found the following:
{¶29} "The Court further finds that the Defendant has previously served a prison
term and that the shortest prison term would demean the seriousness of the
Defendant's conduct and would not adequately protect the public from future crimes by
the Defendant. Furthermore, the Court finds that consecutive sentences are necessary
to protect the public from future crime, that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the Defendant's conduct and that due to the
Defendant's history of criminal conduct consecutive sentences are necessary to protect
the public." November 7, 2011 Judgment Entry.
{¶30} While appellant argues he is an admitted drug user needing substance
abuse rehabilitation and therefore incarceration would be a waste of resources,
protecting the public and punishment are the focus of R.C. 2929.11, not rehabilitation.
This was not appellant's "first time at the rodeo." He has had ample opportunities to
rehabilitate himself over the years.
{¶31} We note the trial court met the requirements of consecutive sentencing
under R.C. 2919.14(C)(4)(c). See, H.B. No. 86, effective September 30, 2011.
{¶32} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing appellant to the maximum on the felony four count and imposing an
aggregate term of twenty-seven months in prison.
{¶33} Assignment of Error II is denied.
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-049 8
{¶34} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Edwards, J. concur.
_s/ Sheila G. Farmer______________
_s/ W. Scott Gwin________________
_s/ Julie A. Edwards______________
JUDGES
SGF/sg 601
[Cite as State v. Crutchfield, 2012-Ohio-2892.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
ADRIAN L. CRUTCHFIELD :
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 11-COA-049
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to
appellant.
_s/ Sheila G. Farmer______________
_s/ W. Scott Gwin________________
_s/ Julie A. Edwards______________
JUDGES