Galena v. Delaware Cty. Regional Planning Comm.

[Cite as Galena v. Delaware Cty. Regional Planning Comm., 2012-Ohio-182.]
COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
VILLAGE OF GALENA : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068
DELAWARE COUNTY REGIONAL :
PLANNING COMMISSION, ET AL :
JIMBA, LTD : OPINION
Defendant-Appellant
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Delaware County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
10CVH050775
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 17, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOHN R. CORNLEY DENNIS L. PERGRAM
21 Middle Street MANOS, MARTIN, PERGRAM & DIETZ CO.
Box 248 50 N. Sandusky Street
Galena, OH 43021-0248 Delaware, Oh 43015
KENNETH J. MOLNAR
21 Middle Street
Box 248
Galena, OH 43021-0248
[Cite as Galena v. Delaware Cty. Regional Planning Comm., 2012-Ohio-182.]
Gwin, P.J.
{1} Defendant-appellant JIMBA, LTD appeals a judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio, which overruled its motion for attorney fees
from plaintiff-appellee the Village of Galena, without conducting a hearing. Appellant
assigns a single error to the trial court:
{2} “I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT
GRANTING APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON ITS R.C. 2323.51
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
ARBITRARILY DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES.”
{3} The record indicates the Village filed suit on May 17, 2009. It alleged
JIMBA owns approximately 37.706 acres of real property which it plans to develop or is
currently developing as a six lot subdivision project known as the Sage Creek Section
5. JIMBA submitted plans to defendant The Delaware County Regional Planning
Commission to permit it to install and construct on-site household sewage treatment
systems for each of the six lots. The Village’s complaint alleged Sage Creek Section 5
contains soil unsuitable for septic tanks. The Village asked for a declaration that its
public sewer system was available and accessible to Sage Creek Section 5, and asked
the court to find JIMBA must connect its property to the public sewer system rather
than to household sewage disposal systems.
{4} JIMBA filed an answer denying that the Village had any authority to
require it to connect to its sewer system because JIMBA’s property is outside the
Village’s territorial limits. JIMBA alleged the Board of Health had authority to approve
JIMBA’s plans, and had done so. Defendant the Board of Health of the Delaware
Delaware County, Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068 3
General Health District filed an answer in which it asserted central sewer is not
accessible to the property in question.
{5} The Board’s answer alleged it had completely and adequately studied
examined, and/or investigated whether the Village’s sewer service is accessible to the
property, and determined it was not accessible, practical, or advisable pursuant to the
Board’s Sewage Treatment System Rules and Ohio Administrative Code section 3701-
29-03(B). The Board’s answer also stated that JIMBA’s property is outside the
Village’s territorial boundaries, and as such it did not have jurisdiction over the
property. The Board’s answer alleged the nearest sewer line which is connected to the
Village’s central sewer system is over 4,000 feet away from JIMBA’s property.
Thereafter, the Village dismissed defendant Delaware County Regional Planning
Commission from the action, and it is not a party to this appeal.
{6} On November 12, 2010, the Village dismissed its complaint. JIMBA filed a
motion for attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 on December 13, 2010. The Village
filed its memorandum contra on January 4, 2011, and JIMBA replied on January 14,
2011. On June 27, 2011, the court entered a judgment denying the motion for fees.
This appeal ensued.
{7} R.C. 2323.51 provides:
{8} (B) “(2) An award may be made pursuant to division (B)(1) of this section
upon the motion of a party to a civil action or an appeal of the type described in that
division or on the court's own initiative, but only after the court does all of the following:
{9} “(a) Sets a date for a hearing to be conducted in accordance with division
(B)(2)(c) of this section, to determine whether particular conduct was frivolous, to
Delaware County, Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068 4
determine, if the conduct was frivolous, whether any party was adversely affected by it,
and to determine, if an award is to be made, the amount of that award;
{10} “(b) Gives notice of the date of the hearing described in division (B)(2)(a)
of this section to each party or counsel of record who allegedly engaged in frivolous
conduct and to each party who allegedly was adversely affected by frivolous conduct;
{11} “(c) Conducts the hearing described in division (B)(2)(a) of this section in
accordance with this division, allows the parties and counsel of record involved to
present any relevant evidence at the hearing, including evidence of the type described
in division (B)(5) of this section, determines that the conduct involved was frivolous and
that a party was adversely affected by it, and then determines the amount of the award
to be made. ***”
{12} The statute appears to make a hearing on a motion for attorney fees
mandatory, but courts of appeals have found if the record in the case demonstrates
there was no frivolous behavior, then a trial court need not conduct the hearing. Avon
Poured Wall, Inc. v. Boarman, Lorain App. No. 04CA008448, 2004-Ohio-4588. In
Village of Galena v. Delaware County Regional Planning Commission, Delaware App.
No. 10CAE090076, 2011-Ohio-2982, this court found while the trial court is required to
hold a hearing only if it awards attorney fees, and a hearing is not required if the court
denies the motion. Galena at paragraph 37, citing First Place Bank v. Stamper,
Cuyahoga App. No. 80259, 2002-Ohio-3100.
{13} Civ. R. 16 governs the adoption of local rules concerning pre-trial
procedures and provides the court may adopt rules concerning pre-trial procedures in
order to encourage settlements.
Delaware County, Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068 5
{14} On September 21, 2010, the court entered a case management order
which provided in pertinent part:
{15} “(6). No dispositive motion shall be filed after February 14, 2011. The
proponent shall file any supporting evidentiary materials with the motion.
{16} “(a). The adverse party may file any response to a dispositive motion
together with any responsive evidentiary materials within 30 days after the motion is
filed, and the proponent may file a reply within ten days after the adverse party files
any response.
{17} “(b). A motion will be submitted for a non-oral hearing on the earliest of the
following dates:
{18} “(a). When the adverse parties responsive brief is due if the adverse party
fails to file a response then; or
{19} “(a)(sic)When any proponent’s reply brief is due, whether or not the
proponent files a reply brief. No party may file any supporting or responsive
evidentiary materials after the date of the non-oral hearing.
{20} *** “
{21} In the Galena case cited supra, this court noted the trial court had
scheduled the motion for attorney fees for November 30, 2009, then re-scheduled it for
March 5, 2010, and a third time re-scheduled it for August 31, 2010. The August 31,
2010 hearing never took place because the parties presented the court with a
“stipulation of facts” and submitted the motion for attorney fees on the stipulation and
their briefs. None of this occurred in the case at bar.
Delaware County, Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068 6
{22} In overruling the motion for sanctions without a hearing, the court stated
JIMBA had not attached any evidentiary materials or stipulations to its motion. We find
a motion for sanctions after the case has been dismissed is not a pre-trial motion and
not subject to the pretrial orders.
{23} We find the trial court erred in overruling the motion for attorney fees
without conducting a hearing. JIMBA was not required to submit all its evidentiary
material and/or stipulations along with their motions. JIMBA’s memorandum in support
of its motion was approximately twelve pages in length, and requested the court set a
date for a hearing. The motion alleged frivolous conduct by presenting claims not
warranted under existing law and not supported by any argument to extend, modify or
reverse existing law or to establish new law. It also stated the Village had engaged in
frivolous conduct by presenting allegations that had no evidentiary support.
{24} We find JIMBA’s motion and memorandum in support set out sufficient
allegations to raise the issue of frivolous conduct and to require the court to conduct a
hearing on the matter.
{25} The assignment of error is sustained.
Delaware County, Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068 7
{26} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
Delaware County, Ohio, is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court for further
proceedings in accord with law and consistent with this opinion.
By Gwin, P.J., and
Wise, J., concurs
Delaney, J., dissents
_________________________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
_________________________________
HON. JOHN W. WISE
_________________________________
WSG:clw1122 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
Delaware County, Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068 8
Delaney, J., dissenting
{¶27} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis and disposition of
Appellant’s assignment error. For the following reasons, I would affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
{¶28} It has been uniformly held that a hearing on a motion for sanctions under
R.C. 2323.51(B)(2) is only required when the trial court grants the motion. See, Shields
v. City of Englewood, 172 Ohio App.3d 620, 2007-Ohio-3165 (2nd Dist.)(citing to this
Court’s decision in McKinney v. Aultman Hosp. (Apr. 27, 1992), Stark App. No. CA
8603); McPhillips v. United States Tennis Assoc. Midwest, 11th Dist. No. 2006-L-235,
2007-Ohio-3595; Avon Poured Wall, Inc. v. Boarman, 9th Dist. No. 04CA008448, 2004-
Ohio-4588; Coretext Ltd. v. Pride Media Ltd., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1284, 2003-Ohio-
5760. A trial court must schedule a hearing only on those motions which demonstrate
arguable merit and where a trial court determines there is no basis for the imposition of
sanctions; it may deny the motion without hearing. Id. at ¶12. Such a determination is
subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at ¶15.
{¶29} In this case, the trial court found that “the movant [Appellant] relies solely
on argument in its Memorandum in Support of its motion. Those arguments do not
sufficiently justify an award of attorney fees, or even a hearing on disputed matters
which could determine the merits of the village’s claims.” Judgment Entry, June 27,
2011.
{¶30} Accordingly, the issue this Court must address is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in determining that there was no arguable merit for the imposition
of sanctions.
Delaware County, Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068 9
{¶31} The underlying litigation involves the interplay between local, county and
state agencies as to wastewater collection and treatment. As gleaned from the
pleadings, Appellant desires to install septic tanks on developed lots rather than
connecting to a centralized sewer treatment service. Sewer services apparently were
not available from the Delaware County Sewer District, so the Village sought to have
the development connect to its public sewer system to further protect the Big Walnut
Creek subwatershed where Appellant’s development is planned.
{¶32} In the motion for sanctions, Appellant sets forth two arguments. First,
Appellant argues that the Village lacked the authority to compel connection to its system
because two local entities, the Delaware County Regional Planning Commission and
the Delaware County General Health District, approved its preliminary plat with the
septic tank plan.
{¶33} The only legal authority cited by Appellant to support its argument is a 27
year old case from the Ohio Supreme Court, Demoise v. Dowell (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d
92, 461N.E.2d 1286, which upheld the General Assembly’s grant of authority to
Department of Health and local boards of health to force citizens to connect to sanitary
sewer where accessible and to abandon inherently more dangerous septic systems.
There is absolutely no mention in this case as to the factual and/or legal issues at hand,
i.e., whether the Village’s sanitary sewer system is accessible to the property in
question, whether the Village has the legal authority to require such a connection and if
so, has the Village’s authority been preempted by the State to any extent.
{¶34} The second argument presented by Appellant raises the issue of the
Village’s failure to join other public bodies in the litigation that may have an interest in
Delaware County, Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068 10
any declaratory relief requested by the Village, specifically the Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency, the Delaware County Health District, Delaware County and the
Delaware County Regional Sewer District.
{¶35} R.C. 2721.12(A) provides that “all persons who have or claim any interest
that would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties to the action or
proceeding”.
{¶36} In City of Cincinnati v. Whitman (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 58, 337 N.E.2d 773,
the Ohio Supreme Court found “when declaratory relief is sought which involves the
validity or construction of a statute and affects the powers and duties of public officers,
such officers should be made parties to the action or proceeding in which the relief is
sought.” Id. at 61.
{¶37} Appellant generally contends that the Village was seeking to “divert
authority” away from these agencies. Appellant argues the Village and its legal counsel
knowingly failed to join these public bodies and therefore, failed to invoke the jurisdiction
of the trial court. Again, Appellant cites no relevent case authority to support its
argument nor did Appellant’s raise this alleged jurisdictional defect via a motion to
dismiss the Village’s complaint. It is also important to note that the Delaware County
Regional Planning Commission and the Delaware County General Health District, who
reviewed Appellant’s septic tank plan, were named as defendants in this matter.
{¶38} On its face, Appellant has not demonstrated arguable merit to its
contention that any of the other suggested parties had a legal interest which would be
affected by the litigation between the Village and the Appellant.
Delaware County, Case No. 2011-CAE-07-0068 11
{¶39} Accordingly, I would find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to conduct a hearing on the motion for sanctions that it had determined to be
without merit.
______________________________
JUDGE PATRICIA A. DELANEY
[Cite as Galena v. Delaware Cty. Regional Planning Comm., 2012-Ohio-182.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
VILLAGE OF GALENA :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
DELAWARE COUNTY REGIONAL :
PLANNING COMMISSION, ET AL :
JIMBA, LTD
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2011-CAE-07-0068
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio, is reversed, and the cause is
remanded to the court for further proceedings in accord with law and consistent with this
opinion. Costs to appellee.
_________________________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
_________________________________
HON. JOHN W. WISE
_________________________________
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY