Plaugher v. Oniala

[Cite as Plaugher v. Oniala, 2011-Ohio-1207.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONICA J. PLAUGHER, et al. JUDGES:
Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P. J.
Plaintiffs-Appellees Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
-vs-
JACOB O. ONIALA, et al.
Defendants Case No. 2010 CA 00204
And
ETHAN DAVID KNOWLES,
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 2009 CV 01992
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 14, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs-Appellees For Defendant-Appellant
VIVIANNE WHALEN DONALD P. WILEY
MICHAEL D. DEMCHAK BAKER, DUBLIKAR, BECK,
Suite 206 Belden Village Tower WILEY & MATHEWS
4450 Belden Village Street, NW 400 South Main Street
Canton, Ohio 44718 North Canton, Ohio 44720
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00204 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant Ethan David Knowles appeals from the August 2, 2010,
Judgment Entry entered in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas denying
Appellant’s motion to bifurcate the punitive damages claim from the liability and
compensatory damages claims.
{¶2} Appellees are Monica J. Plaugher and Gary J. Plaugher.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶3} On December 10. 2007, Plaintiff-Appellee Monica J. Plaugher was
involved in a motor vehicle accident with Defendant-Appellant Ethan Knowles.
Knowles vehicle struck Plaugher’s vehicle broadside at the intersection of Cleveland
Avenue and Mt. Pleasant. Witnesses to the accident stated that it appeared that
Knowles accelerated through the red light without even looking in the direction of the
traffic light, and that he and his teenage passengers were engaged in horseplay.
{¶4} Plaugher brought a personal injury action against Knowles. In addition to
seeking compensation for personal injuries caused by the motor vehicle accident, the
complaint also alleges that Knowles engaged in such conduct so as to qualify for an
award of punitive damages.1
{¶5} This matter was scheduled for trial to begin during the week of August 2,
2010.
1
Appellee’s Complaint also included personal injury claims against Jacob Oniala
resulting from a separate automobile collision. No punitive damages claims were
asserted against Oniala. Both injury claims were scheduled to be tried together.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00204 3
{¶6} On July 26, 2010, Appellant Knowles filed a motion to bifurcate the
punitive damages claim from the claims for compensatory damages. Appellees filed a
memorandum in opposition on the same day.
{¶7} By Judgment Entry filed August 2, 2010, the trial court denied Appellant
Knowles’ motion to bifurcate.
{¶8} It is from this decision that Appellant now appeals, raising the following
assignment of error for review:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶9} “I. DOES R.C. §2315.21(B) (AS AMENDED BY SB 80 – EFFECTIVE
APRIL 7, 2005) SUBSTANTIVELY CONFLICT WITH CIVIL RULE 42(B) SO AS TO
VIOLATE ARTICLE IV, §5(B) OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION?”
I.
{¶10} In Appellant’s sole assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to bifurcate. We disagree.
{¶11} Appellant herein relies on a Tenth District case, Hanners v. Ho Wah
Genting Wire & Cable, Franklin App. No. 09AP-361, 2009-Ohio-6481, for the
proposition that the trial court’s refusal to apply R.C. §2315.21(B) because of a conflict
with a civil rule amounts to a declaration of unconstitutionality.
{¶12} This Court recently reviewed this exact issue in Myers v. Brown, Stark
App.No. 2010-CA-00238, 2011-Ohio-_____, wherein we found that R.C. §2315.21 (B)
insofar as it mandates bifurcation, is unconstitutional because it violates Section 5 (B)
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶13} In reaching this decision, this Court found:
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00204 4
{¶14} “R.C. 2315.21 (B) makes bifurcation of a tort action mandatory if there are
claims for both compensatory and punitive and exemplary damages and if any party
requests it. By contrast, Civ.R. 42 (B) provides a court may order a separate trial of a
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims. Thus, the Rule expressly vests the trial court with discretion in
deciding whether bifurcation is necessary. The Rule contains no exception for tort
actions. The statute and Rule are clearly in conflict.
{¶15} “The Ohio Constitution, Section 5 (B), Article IV gives the Ohio Supreme
Court exclusive authority to prescribe rules governing the practice and procedure in all
courts of the state. The Constitution provides where a law conflicts with a rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court, the law has no force or effect. This section
articulates one of the basic concepts of United States jurisprudence, the separation of
powers of the judicial and legislative branches. State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 108 Ohio
St. 3d 86, 2006-Ohio-161, 840 N.E. 2d 1062.
{¶16} “If there is a conflict between the Rule and the statute, the court’s Rules
prevail on procedural matters, but the legislature’s statutes prevail on substantive
matters. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin County Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St. 3d 368,
2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E. 2d 500. Substantive laws or rules relate to rights and duties
giving rise to a cause of action, while procedural rules concern the “machinery” for
carrying on the suit. Norfolk Southern Railroad Company v. Bogle, 115 Ohio St. 3d 455,
2007-Ohio-5248, 875 N.E. 2d 919, citing Jones v. Erie Railroad Company (1922), 106
Ohio St. 408, 140 N.E. 366.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00204 5
{¶17} “The Hanners court found R.C. 2315.21 (B) is a substantive law because
even though it mandates particular procedures for tort actions, the legislative intent was
to create and define a defendant’s right to insure the jury does not inappropriately
consider the defendant’s misconduct when determining questions of liability or
compensatory damages. Hanners, supra, at paragraph 28.
{¶18} “By contrast, the Havel2 court found the statute is procedural, because it
“plainly and unambiguously regulates the procedure at trial for determining
compensatory and punitive damages in a tort action” Havel at paragraph 29. We agree.
{¶19} “We find R.C.2315.21 (B) is not substantive, because it does not create or
define rights and duties giving rise to a cause of action. The statute gives defendants
no additional rights, but sets out the procedural rules whereby courts can better protect
the rights to a jury and to due process that the parties have always possessed.
{¶20} “We find R.C. 2315.21 (B) clearly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s Rules
and the Rule controls. We also conclude insofar as R.C. 2315.21 (B) mandates
bifurcation, it is unconstitutional, because it violates Section 5 (B) Article IV of the Ohio
Constitution.”
2
Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, Cuyahoga App. No. 94677, 2010-Ohio-5251.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00204 6
{¶21} Based on this Court’s decision in Myers, supra, we hereby affirm the
decision of the trial court.
{¶22} Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶23} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas,
Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed.
By: Wise, J.
Farmer, J. and
Edwards, J. concur
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
JUDGES
JWW/d 0228
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00204 7
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONICA J. PLAUGHER, et al. :
:
Plaintiffs-Appellees :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
JACOB O. ONIALA, et al. :
:
Defendants :
:
and :
:
ETHAN DAVID KNOWLES :
:
Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 2010 CA 00204
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed.
Costs assessed to Appellant.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
JUDGES