McQuaide v. McQuaide

[Cite as McQuaide v. McQuaide, 2011-Ohio-273.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARGARET CLAY MCQUAIDE, JUDGES:
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
ESTATE OF KEVIN DAVID Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
MCQUAIDE Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Plaintiff-Appellant
-vs- Case No. 2010CA00114
PATRICIA A. MCQUAIDE
Defendant-Appellee OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas,
Case No. 2009CV04188
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 24, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
EARL C. SHEEHAN KENNETH L. GIBSON
220 Market Avenue South 234 Portage Trail
Suite 1140 Cuyahoga Falls, OH 44221
Canton, OH 44702
Stark County, Case No. 2010CA00114 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On May 15, 2001, Kevin McQuaide and appellee, Patricia McQuaide,
were granted a divorce. Mr. McQuaide was ordered to maintain a term life insurance
policy naming appellee as an irrevocable beneficiary for as long as he had a spousal or
child support obligation.
{¶2} On September 14, 2009, Mr. McQuaide passed away. At the time of his
death, he was married to appellant, Margaret Clay McQuaide. Appellee was the sole
beneficiary of a $100,000 life insurance policy issued by Northwestern Life Insurance
Company.
{¶3} On October 29, 2009, appellant, as Administratrix of the Estate of Kevin
David McQuaide, filed a complaint against appellee and Northwestern seeking a
constructive trust on the insurance proceeds. Appellant claimed the intent of the
Northwestern policy was to secure Mr. McQuaide's spousal and/or child support
obligations and once those obligations were met, the policy's proceeds should go to the
estate. An amended complaint was filed on November 3, 2009.
{¶4} On February 10, 2010, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. By
judgment entry filed April 16, 2010, the trial court granted the motion.
{¶5} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶6} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT IN SUSTAINING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE."
Stark County, Case No. 2010CA00114 3
I
{¶7} Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to
appellee. We disagree.
{¶8} Summary Judgment motions are to be resolved in light of the dictates of
Civ.R. 56. Said rule was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel.
Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St. 3d 447, 448, 1996-Ohio-211:
{¶9} "Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it
must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be
litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it
appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and
viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State
ex. rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St. 3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379,
citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 327, 4 O.O3d 466, 472,
364 N.E.2d 267, 274."
{¶10} As an appellate court reviewing summary judgment motions, we must
stand in the shoes of the trial court and review summary judgments on the same
standard and evidence as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30
Ohio St. 3d 35.
{¶11} Appellant argues she is entitled to the creation of a constructive trust on
the insurance proceeds because with Mr. McQuaide's death, the child support obligation
ceased and the term insurance policy had no value to the child support obligation;
Stark County, Case No. 2010CA00114 4
therefore, the proceeds should inure to the estate. Appellant argues the Supreme Court
of Ohio has endorsed this theory in Ferguson v. Owens (1984), 9 Ohio St. 3d 223, 226:
{¶12} "A constructive trust is, in the main, an appropriate remedy against unjust
enrichment. This type of trust is usually invoked when property has been acquired by
fraud. However, a constructive trust may also be imposed where it is against the
principles of equity that the property be retained by a certain person even though the
property was acquired without fraud. See 53 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d (1962) 578-579,
Trusts, Section 88; V Scott on Trusts (3 Ed.1967) 3412, Section 462.
{¶13} "In applying the theories of constructive trusts, courts also apply the well
known equitable maxim, 'equity regards done that which ought to be done.'
{¶14} "Although this case presents issues somewhat novel to the reported
decisions of this court, we find that other jurisdictions have been confronted with
somewhat similar questions, and have applied the doctrine of constructive trust in
situations involving after-acquired life insurance policies in determining the equities as
between the title owner of such policies and those who were to be named beneficiaries
by the terms of a separation agreement embodied within a divorce decree. See
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Daniels (C.A. 7, 1981), 667 F.2d 572; Appelman v. Appelman
(1980), 87 Ill.App.3d 749, 43 Ill. Dec. 199, 410 N.E.2d 199; Brunnenmeyer v. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. (1979), 66 Ill.App.3d 315, 23 Ill. Dec. 652, 384 N.E.2d 446; Lincoln National
Life Ins. Co. v. Watson (1979), 71 Ill.App.3d 900, 28 Ill. Dec. 339, 390 N.E.2d 506;
McKissick v. McKissick (1977), 93 Nev. 139, 560 P.2d 1366; General American Life Ins.
Co. v. Rogers (Mo.App.1976), 539 S.W.2d 693."
Stark County, Case No. 2010CA00114 5
{¶15} The Ferguson court determined summary judgment was not appropriate in
the case because there were facts to be determined as to the acquisition of the life
insurance policy subsequent to the divorce. In the matter sub judice, the facts are clear
and unambiguous as to the language of the divorce decree, and Mr. McQuaide properly
followed its dictates:
{¶16} "So long as Husband has a spousal or child support obligation, he shall
maintain a term life insurance policy in the face amount of $100,000.00 naming Wife as
an irrevocable beneficiary. Husband shall provide proof to Wife on a semi-annual basis
(June and December or each year) of the existence of the policy, and Wife's designation
as a beneficiary thereon." See, Separation Agreement, attached to May 15, 2001
Decree of Divorce, attached to Stipulation filed February 12, 2010 as Exhibit A.
{¶17} In paragraph three of her complaint filed October 29, 2009, appellant
acknowledged the following:
{¶18} "For the sole purpose of securing spousal and child support obligation,
decedent agreed in the divorce settlement to maintain a life insurance policy in the face
amount of $100,000, naming defendant Patricia McQuaide beneficiary. Said obligations
have been paid, with the possible exception (subject to verification by the domestic
relations court) of a small amount owing on one child, Megan."
{¶19} Appellant further acknowledged in her affidavit filed March 1, 2010 that at
the time of Mr. McQuaide's death on September 14, 2009, Megan was an
unemancipated child and was still receiving child support until her graduation in May of
2010. We find with no facts in dispute, summary judgment was an appropriate vehicle
to resolve the issues in this case.
Stark County, Case No. 2010CA00114 6
{¶20} It is appellant's position that equity requires that the proceeds of the
insurance policy inure to the estate. We disagree with this position. The very language
of the decree states "[s]o long as husband has a spousal or child support obligation***."
At the time of Mr. McQuaide's death, he still had a child support obligation. Therefore,
the policy's beneficiary designation remained appellee.
{¶21} Although appellant now argues it is an unjust windfall to appellee, the
contractual language requires such an interpretation. We note the divorce decree at
Section 19 was very specific as to the parties' rights of inheritance terminating upon
divorce, yet permitted the irrevocable beneficiary designation to last up to and including
the last child support payment.
{¶22} Upon review, we cannot find that equity requires the creation of a
constructive trust in this case. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment
to appellee.
{¶23} The sole assignment of error is denied.
Stark County, Case No. 2010CA00114 7
{¶24} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Wise, J. concur.
s/ Sheila G. Farmer_ _____________
_s/ W. Scott Gwin ________________
_s/ John W. Wise _________________
JUDGES
SGF/sg 112
Stark County, Case No. 2010CA00114 8
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARGARET CLAY MCQUAIDE, :
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE :
OF KEVIN DAVID MCQUAIDE :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
PATRICIA A. MCQUAIDE :
:
Defendant-Appellee : CASE NO. 2010CA00114
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to
appellant.
s/ Sheila G. Farmer_ _____________
_s/ W. Scott Gwin ________________
_s/ John W. Wise _________________
JUDGES