State v. Lee

[Cite as State v. Lee, 2014-Ohio-205.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99796
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
LEFONZA LEE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-568550
BEFORE: Boyle, A.J., S. Gallagher, J., and Rocco, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 23, 2014
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Nancy E. Schieman
9368 Sunrise Court
Mentor, Ohio 44060
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Brad S. Meyer
Assistant County Prosecutor
8th Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
MARY J. BOYLE, A.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Lefonza Lee, appeals his conviction for robbery. We
affirm.
{¶2} In 2012, Lee was charged with a single count of robbery, in violation of
R.C. 2911.02(A)(2), a second-degree felony. Lee was also indicted for the same offense
in a separate case. Lee ultimately pleaded guilty in both cases to an amended indictment
of robbery, a violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(3), a third-degree felony. The trial court
sentenced him to 24 months in prison in the underlying case, to be served concurrently
with a 24-month prison sentence in the other case. Lee appeals, raising two assignments
of error:
I. The trial court erred by accepting appellant’s plea of guilty
without first informing appellant that a plea of guilty
constituted an admission of guilt.
II. The trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion to transfer the case to
the mental health docket.
Effect of Guilty Plea
{¶3} In his first assignment of error, Lee argues that the trial court failed
to explain to him the effect of his guilty plea as required by Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(b), and that the court’s failure prejudiced him. We disagree.
{¶4} Informing a defendant of the effect of his or her plea is a
nonconstitutional right, and, therefore, is subject to review for substantial
compliance rather than strict compliance. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d
85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 11-12. “Substantial compliance
means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively
understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.”
State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).
Furthermore, “failure to comply with nonconstitutional rights will not
invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby suffered prejudice.” Griggs at
¶ 12.
{¶5} To ensure that a plea to a felony charge is knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered into, a trial court must follow the dictates of Crim.R.
11(C)(2). This provision provides that the court must address defendants
personally and (1) determine that they understand the nature of the charges
against them and of the maximum penalty involved, (2) inform them of and
determine that they understand the effect of a plea of guilty or no contest
and that the court may proceed with judgment and sentence, and (3) inform
them of and determine that they understand the constitutional rights that
they are giving up by entering into their plea. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) – (c).
{¶6} Our review of the record reveals that Lee subjectively understood the
effects of his plea. Although the court did not explicitly inform Lee that a
“plea of guilty is a complete admission” of Lee’s guilt, the court reviewed
the amended indictment with Lee and then explained the possible maximum
sentence for the charge and the rights that Lee was waiving. The court
then read the indictment for each case, and Lee stated that he was pleading
guilty to the charge in this case. Notably, in response to the trial court’s
inquiry of Lee’s understanding of the plea process, Lee asked if the
sentences in the two cases would be “running concurrent.” By virtue of his
question, it is evident that he understood that he was admitting guilt by
pleading guilty and would be sentenced accordingly. Additionally, after the
trial court answered Lee’s question, the court inquired again if Lee had any
further questions, to which he indicated that he did not. Finally, after
accepting Lee’s guilty plea, the trial court asked Lee’s counsel whether he
was satisfied that the court complied with Crim.R. 11, and counsel
responded that he was. See State v. Simonoski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
98496, 2013-Ohio-1031, ¶ 10 (rejecting the same argument raised by Lee
with a nearly identical plea colloquy).
{¶7} Moreover, even if the court failed to substantially comply with
explaining the effects of his plea, Lee still has to prove he was prejudiced
by the court’s failure. The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently held that
the court’s failure to tell the defendant the effect of a plea to a felony does
not invalidate the plea unless appellant shows that he was prejudiced by the
court’s failure to substantially comply with the rule. Griggs, 103 Ohio
St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12; State v. Jones, 116 Ohio
St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d 677, ¶ 53; State v. Veney, 120 Ohio
St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 14-17.
{¶8} The test for prejudice is “whether the plea would have otherwise been
made.” Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. Thus, to show
prejudice, Lee must demonstrate that he would not have entered a guilty
plea if the court provided more detail regarding the effects of his plea.
Aside from his blanket assertion, Lee provides no support for his contention
that he was prejudiced. Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that
unless a defendant asserts “actual innocence,” “he is presumed to
understand that he has completely admitted his guilt,” and a “court’s failure
to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as required by
Crim.R. 11 is presumed not to be prejudicial.” Griggs at syllabus.
{¶9} Contrary to Lee’s assertion on appeal, the record contains no evidence
of Lee asserting actual innocence at the time of his plea. Accordingly,
based on the record before us, we find that Lee has failed to overcome the
presumption that he was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to
specifically inform him of the effect of a guilty plea.
{¶10} The first assignment of error is overruled.
Motion to Transfer to the Mental Health Docket
{¶11} In his second assignment of error, Lee argues that the trial court
failed to comply with Loc.R. 30.1 of the general division of the common
pleas court by refusing to transfer his case to the mental health docket.
This argument, however, has no merit.
{¶12} Loc.R. 30.1 governs the assignment of criminal cases to mental
health dockets, which “include cases where the defendant has a confirmed
serious mental illness or is developmentally disabled * * *.” Loc.R.
30.1(A). Relevant to this appeal, the rule further provides that
[i]n cases where it is determined after arraignment that a
defendant has a confirmed serious mental illness or is
developmentally disabled as defined in A(1) or A(2) above,
the administrative judge may reassign the case to a mental
health docket through random assignment.
{¶13} Here, Lee filed a motion to transfer his case to the mental health
docket after arraignment. Assuming that Lee met the criteria for the
mental health docket, Loc.R. 30.1 specifically states that the motion is
addressed to the administrative judge for reassignment and not the trial
court judge. See State v. Wojnarowski, 179 Ohio App.3d 141,
2008-Ohio-5749, 900 N.E.2d 1071, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) Thus, given that Lee
failed to file the motion with the administrative judge, the trial court
properly denied the motion on this basis alone. Id.{¶14} We further note that Loc.R. 30.1 does not mandate the transfer of a
case after arraignment. Indeed, “[t]hrough the use of ‘may,’ the rule
authorizes, but does not mandate, a transfer of a defendant to the common
pleas court’s mental health docket under certain circumstances.” State v.
Ellis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98538, 2013-Ohio-1184, ¶ 30, citing Loc.R.
30.1(C)(2).
{¶15} Finally, the record belies any claim that the trial court did not
properly consider Lee’s stated mental health concerns. In the sentencing
journal entry, the trial court specifically ordered for Lee “to get all
prescribed medications.” Further, the trial court also recommended Lee for
transitional control for the last six months of his sentence to address his
stated drug problem.
{¶16} We find no error in the trial court’s denial of Lee’s motion to
transfer; accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶17} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The
defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is
terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR