Emerald Woods Golf Course v. Cuyahoga Landmark, Inc.

[Cite as Emerald Woods Golf Course v. Cuyahoga Landmark, Inc., 2012-Ohio-2933.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97750
EMERALD WOODS GOLF COURSE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
CUYAHOGA LANDMARK, INC.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Berea Municipal Court
Case No. 10 CVF 03328
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Jones, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 28, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Christopher L. Parker
Ronald K. Lembright
Roderick Linton Belfance LLP
1500 One Cascade Plaza
Akron, OH 44308
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Bruce W. McClain
28218 Knickerbocker
Bay Village, OH 44140
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Appellant, Cuyahoga Landmark, Inc., appeals the judgment of the Berea
Municipal Court, which confirmed the magistrate’s findings, found in favor of the
appellee, Emerald Woods Golf Course (“Emerald Woods”), and awarded damages in the
amount of $1,604.36. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
{¶2} Emerald Woods is a golf course in Columbia Station, Ohio. It purchased
fuel from Cuyahoga Landmark for a number of years. As part of its fuel sales
arrangement, Cuyahoga Landmark supplied Emerald Woods with two storage tanks.
Around May 2010, Emerald Woods switched to another fuel supplier, whose fuel was
placed in the storage tanks that had been supplied by Cuyahoga Landmark.
Approximately one month later, on June 4, 2010, a representative from Cuyahoga
Landmark removed the storage tanks and the fuel that was contained within them. This
occurred without prior notice to Emerald Woods.
{¶3} On December 13, 2010, Emerald Woods filed a complaint against Cuyahoga
Landmark, alleging claims of conversion, breach of contract, and trespass to real
property. In addition to its loss of fuel, Emerald Woods alleged that its business
operations were disrupted because it was without fuel to power the equipment and
vehicles needed to operate the golf course.
{¶4} Cuyahoga Landmark filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting claims for
breach of contract, conversion, trespass to chattels, and fraud. Cuyahoga Landmark
stated that the fuel storage tanks were provided for the sole use of storing Cuyahoga
Landmark’s fuel products. It claimed that Emerald Woods had breached the fuel sales
arrangement by storing a competitor’s fuel in the storage tanks, wrongfully converted the
tanks for its own use and benefit, intentionally deprived Cuyahoga Landmark of rightful
possession of its storage tanks, and fraudulently concealed its use of the tanks to store a
competitor’s product.
{¶5} Cuyahoga Landmark conceded taking the storage tanks and fuel, but claimed
it offered to return the fuel if other storage tanks were provided, and ultimately provided a
check in the amount of $668.35, which represented payment for 220.1 gallons of diesel
fuel and 70 gallons of gasoline. Emerald Woods did not cash the check and disputed
the amount of fuel that was in the tanks. Emerald Woods also claimed damages for lost
revenue and disruption of business.
{¶6} The matter proceeded to trial before a court magistrate. Cuyahoga Landmark
withdrew its counterclaim. On November 3, 2011, the magistrate issued a decision in
which the magistrate found that “the plaintiff substantiated its claim by a preponderance
of the evidence against the defendant as to the amount of fuel taken and for costs of
disrupting the plaintiff’s business.” The magistrate awarded damages to the plaintiff in
the amount of $1,604.36 plus costs and interest of 4 percent per annum from the date of
judgment.
{¶7} Cuyahoga Landmark filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision.
Cuyahoga Landmark asserted that “[w]hile [Cuyahoga Landmark] stipulates the amount
of fuel taken was $688.35, there was no specific evidence elicited by [Emerald Woods]
substantiating their claim for disrupting their business * * *.”
{¶8} The trial court overruled the objection and approved and confirmed the
magistrate’s finding. The court found that Emerald Woods had substantiated its claim on
the evidence presented and entered judgment against Cuyahoga Landmark in the amount
of $1,604.36 plus costs and interest of 4 percent per annum from the date of judgment.
The court issued an amended judgment entry indicating the counterclaim had been
withdrawn.
{¶9} Cuyahoga Landmark filed this appeal, raising one assignment of error for
review. The sole assignment of error provides, “The trial court abused its discretion
when it confirmed and approved the magistrate’s order awarding the plaintiff $1,604.36
when said award was not based upon the preponderance of the evidence.”
{¶10} We review a trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision for an abuse of
discretion. Wade v. Wade, 113 Ohio App.3d 414, 419, 680 N.E.2d 1305 (11th
Dist.1996). An abuse of discretion exists when a court’s decision is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Schaengold v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement
Sys., 114 Ohio St.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-3760, 870 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 8.
{¶11} Civ.R. 53(C)(2) permits a court of record to appoint a magistrate to
“[c]onduct the trial of any case that will not be tried to a jury.” Upon the conclusion of a
matter that has been referred to a court magistrate, the magistrate must prepare a decision.
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(i). The magistrate’s decision “may be general unless findings of fact
and conclusions of law are timely requested by a party or otherwise required by law.”
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii). Any objection to a magistrate’s factual finding “shall be
supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that
finding or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available.” Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(b)(iii). Upon timely objection, the trial court must undertake an independent
review of the objected matters. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). The court may adopt the
magistrate’s decision without modifications and must enter a judgment on the matter.
Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b) and (e).
{¶12} Cuyahoga Landmark argues that while the magistrate’s decision and
judgment entry found that the plaintiff’s claim was substantiated by a preponderance of
the evidence, no reasonable basis was set forth for the determination of damages in the
amount of $1,604.36. Initially, we recognize that neither the magistrate nor the trial
court was required to set forth a rationale for its decision because Cuyahoga Landmark
never requested findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(a)(ii). Also, in objecting to the magistrate’s decision, Cuyahoga Landmark did
not file a transcript for the trial court’s review. Thus, Cuyahoga Landmark did not
properly support its objection.
{¶13} Further, a review of the record on appeal, which does contain the transcript,
shows that the damage award was supported by the record. At trial, Emerald Woods
produced evidence showing its delivery schedule and fuel purchases, the average amount
of fuel used per day, and its calculation for the amount of fuel loss on the date the tanks
were removed. The total value of gasoline and diesel taken was calculated at $1,190.36.
There was also testimony that the fuel disruption caused Emerald Woods to turn away 18
golfers because golf carts were unavailable. There was a calculation of $414 for lost
revenues. The above amounts total the amount of damages awarded by the trial court.
Emerald Woods sought additional amounts for sending employees to the local gas station
to fill five-gallon tanks, but it would appear that these amounts were excluded from the
damage award. Upon our review, we find the claims were substantiated and that the
damage award was supported by the record.
{¶14} Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we overrule appellant’s
sole assignment of error.
{¶15} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the municipal
court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., and
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR