State v. Stover

[Cite as State v. Stover, 2014-Ohio-2572.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WAYNE )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 13CA0035
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
MICHAEL EDWIN STOVER WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CRB-12-12-01880
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: June 16, 2014
WHITMORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Michael Stover, appeals from his convictions in the Wayne County
Municipal Court. This Court affirms in part and reverses in part.
I
{¶2} On December 26, 2012, Stover and his live-in girlfriend, Suzanne Johnson, got
into an argument, and Johnson decided to go to her sister’s apartment. At her sister’s, Johnson
became intoxicated and called an ex-boyfriend, Phillip Adkins. At Johnson’s request, Phillip and
his daughter, Darrian, went over to the apartment to pick Johnson up. At some point before
Phillip and Darrian arrived, Johnson called Stover and asked him to come and take her home.
{¶3} Phillip and Darrian were inside the apartment when Stover arrived. A couple of
other men went outside to tell Stover that he was not welcome inside the apartment. A fight
ensued. Johnson went to the front door to see what was going on and testified that she got
pushed out of the apartment and ended up at the bottom of a pile of people. Stover was on top of
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Johnson, and several men were on top of Stover. Jennifer, Johnson’s sister, then tried to break
up the fight. In the fracas, Stover was bitten by Jennifer’s dog. At some point, Stover was able
to extricate himself from the pile and then, according to Phillip and Darrian, he attacked Phillip’s
jeep. Phillip and Darrian testified that Stover kicked the driver’s side of the jeep, then got inside
and started punching the dashboard. Phillip stated that he pulled Stover out of the jeep and
Stover took off running. Phillip called the police.
{¶4} Officers Nathan Maimone and Cory Seiler responded to the scene. Witnesses
informed Officer Seiler that Stover had fled on foot. Officers apprehended Stover approximately
two blocks from the scene, after following his footprints in the snow. Stover was charged with:
(1) domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree; (2)
assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree; (3) criminal damaging
in violation of R.C. 2909.06(A)(1), a misdemeanor of the second degree; and (4) disorderly
conduct in violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(1), a minor misdemeanor. Stover was convicted on all
counts after a bench trial. Stover now appeals and raises four assignments of error for our
review. To facilitate the analysis, we address his first two assignments of error together.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE STATE TO
INTRODUCE HEARSAY EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF
THE OFFENSES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ASSAULT AND
DISORDERLY CONDUCT.
Assignment of Error Number Two
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE STATE TO IMPEACH
ITS OWN WITNESS ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF SURPRISE AND
AFFIRMATIVE DAMAGE.
3
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Stover argues that the court erred in allowing
hearsay evidence to be admitted at his trial. In his second assignment of error, Stover argues that
the court erred in allowing the State to impeach its own witness without establishing surprise and
affirmative damage.
{¶6} Hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Evid.R. 801(C). Hearsay is not admissible unless provided for by constitution, statue,
or rule. Evid.R. 802. Evid.R. 607(A) prohibits a party from impeaching its own witness with a
prior inconsistent statement, unless the party shows surprise and affirmative damage or the prior
statement is admissible under one of the enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule.
{¶7} The decision to admit or exclude evidence at trial lies within the sound discretion
of the trial judge, and the court’s decision will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of
discretion. O’Brien v. Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d 159, 163 (1980). A trial court’s decision to allow a
party to impeach its own witness is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v.
Taylor, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 01CA007945, 2002-Ohio-6992, ¶ 7. An abuse of discretion
indicates that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶8} At trial, the State called Johnson as its first witness. Johnson testified that, on
December 26, 2012, she had gone to her sister’s apartment after having an argument with Stover.
She admitted that she had been drinking and testified that while at her sister’s things “got really
blurry.” Johnson remembered calling her ex-boyfriend, Phillip, and his daughter and asking
them to come pick her up. She also remembered calling Stover and asking him to come pick her
up. Johnson testified that, sometime after Phillip and Darrian arrived, everyone in the apartment
started going outside so she went to the front door to see what was happening. The next thing
4
she knew, she was pushed out of the front door, landed on the ground, “and somehow ended up
at the bottom of the pile.”
{¶9} The State then asked if Johnson remembered speaking to police officers that
evening. Johnson stated that she did remember talking to Officer Seiler, but did not remember
giving a verbal statement that he wrote down for her. However, Johnson acknowledged that the
signature at the end of the written statement was hers. When the State asked Johnson to read the
written statement aloud, defense counsel objected, arguing that the prior statement was
inadmissible hearsay. The State responded that it was not hearsay because it was her own
statement. The court concluded that the statement was admissible to prove the truth of the matter
asserted because the declarant, regardless of whether that was Johnson or Officer Seiler, was
presently available and could be cross-examined.
{¶10} Hearsay is not admissible as substantive evidence simply because the declarant is
available to be cross-examined on the prior statement. See State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416,
2006-Ohio-4853, ¶ 183. Evid.R. 801(D)(1) provides that a prior statement is not hearsay if:
[t]he declarant testifies at trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is [ ] inconsistent with the declarant’s
testimony, and was given under oath subject to cross-examination by the party
against whom the statement is offered and subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition[.]
Assuming the written statement transcribed by Officer Seiler was attributable to Johnson, it was
not made under oath and was not subject to cross-examination at the time it was made. Because
the written statement is an out of court statement that is being offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, it is hearsay and inadmissible unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies. See
Evid.R. 802.
5
{¶11} On appeal, the State argues that Johnson’s statement was admissible as an excited
utterance. Evid.R. 803(2) permits the admission of “[an out of court] statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition.” The Ohio Supreme Court has identified four conditions necessary to
qualify as an excited utterance. State v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 89 (1988). Those conditions
are:
(a) that there was some occurrence startling enough to produce a nervous
excitement in the declarant, which was sufficient to still his reflective faculties
and thereby make his statements and declarations the unreflective and sincere
expression of his actual impressions and beliefs, and thus render his statement or
declaration spontaneous and unreflective,
(b) that the statement or declaration, even if not strictly contemporaneous with its
exciting cause, was made before there had been time for such nervous excitement
to lose a domination over his reflective faculties, so that such domination
continued to remain sufficient to make his statements and declarations the
unreflective and sincere expression of his actual impressions and beliefs,
(c) that the statement or declaration related to such startling occurrence or the
circumstances of such startling occurrence, and
(d) that the declarant had an opportunity to observe personally the matters
asserted in his statement or declaration.
(Emphasis sic.) Id., quoting Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488 (1955), paragraph two of the
syllabus.
{¶12} While the amount of time between the startling event and the statement is not
dispositive as to whether the statement may be an excited utterance, it is a factor to be
considered. The question is whether Johnson made her statement “before there had been time for
such nervous excitement to lose a domination over h[er] reflective faculties.” Wallace at 89.
The State, as the party seeking to admit the evidence, had the burden to prove that the statement
was made while Johnson was still under the stress of the event. See State v. Smith, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 99CA007399, 2000 WL 1675052, *7 (Nov. 8, 2000).
6
{¶13} It is unclear from the record how much time had lapsed between the incident and
when Johnson spoke to Officer Seiler. Johnson’s testimony provided no timeline. Officer Seiler
testified that he responded to the apartment complex shortly after his shift began at 11:00 p.m.
and was the first officer to arrive on scene. He was met by several people who told him that a
woman had been assaulted and the assailant had fled on foot. Officer Seiler stated that, after he
relayed the information to the other responding officers, he proceeded south on foot to search for
the suspect. Officer Seiler said that he was only in pursuit “briefly” before he received
information via radio that the suspect had been apprehended. He then headed back to the
apartment complex to speak with witnesses.
{¶14} Officer Seiler stated that “[a]s soon as [he] walked in and made contact with [ ]
Johnson, she was extremely distraught, [and that] she couldn’t really speak with [him] because
she was just sobbing hysterically.” It is unclear if Officer Seiler spoke to any other witnesses
before approaching Johnson. He testified that Johnson’s sister, Jennifer, then “pulled [him] aside
and told [him] what had happened.” The record does not reflect how long he spoke with
Jennifer. Officer Seiler said that after he finished talking to Jennifer, he “was able to speak with
[Johnson].”
{¶15} Officer Seiler testified that he relocated his interview with Johnson to the front
seat of his police cruiser because there were other people around talking, presumably causing a
distraction. Officer Seiler then, over the objection of defense counsel, recited what Johnson told
him. Officer Seiler testified that Johnson told him that Stover had “lunged at her, picked her up,
slammed her down,” and “punched her three or four times in the head.” Officer Seiler said that
Johnson told him that Stover then damaged a car and took off. According to Officer Seiler,
Johnson said Stover beat her once a week and that he was going to kill her. At some point,
7
Officer Seiler asked Johnson if she would provide a written statement. Johnson agreed, but,
because she was so intoxicated, her handwriting was illegible. Officer Seiler then offered to
write the statement out for her, and, according to Officer Seiler, she agreed.
{¶16} Assuming without deciding that the written statement is attributable to Johnson,
we cannot conclude that the State has met its burden to establish that the statement was an
excited utterance. There is no indication as to the time between the incident and Johnson’s
statement to Officer Seiler. Moreover, Officer Seiler testified that Johnson was too emotional to
talk to him initially so he waited for her to calm down. This fact is inconsistent with the core
concept of the admissibility of excited utterances. The fact that the officer waited for Johnson to
calm down leads us to conclude that she had time for the nervous excitement of the event to
abate, and instead to use her reflective faculties in relaying to the officer what she had observed.
Based on the record before us, the State did not carry its burden of establishing the applicability
of this exception to the hearsay rule. Because the statement was inadmissible hearsay, the court
abused its discretion in allowing the statement to be admitted. See State v. Sims, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2007-11-300, 2009-Ohio-550, ¶ 11-15. Further, for the following reasons, we
cannot conclude that the error harmless. See Crim.R. 52(A).
{¶17} Having concluded that the statement was not an excited utterance, the State could
only have used the prior statement to impeach the credibility of Johnson if it established surprise
and affirmative damage. See Evid.R. 607(A). However, the State did not, and cannot, argue that
it was surprised by Johnson’s testimony that Stover did not attack her that night. Johnson had
sent a letter to the prosecutor’s office approximately two weeks after the incident indicating that
there was a misunderstanding. In this letter, which was admitted into evidence, Johnson stated
that Stover never attacked her, but was instead trying to protect her from the melee. More
8
importantly, Evid.R. 607(A) is not applicable because the trial court specifically determined that
the statement was not being offered to impeach Johnson’s credibility. It was being offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, at ¶
182-185 (distinguishing between statements being used under Evid.R. 801(D)(1)(a) as
substantive evidence and those being used under Evid.R. 613(B) to impeach a witness’s
credibility).
{¶18} The trial was short, producing a transcript of only 112 pages. The testimony from
both Johnson and Officer Seiler are overwhelmingly tainted with hearsay. Moreover, at the close
of the trial, the court remarked that “[w]e have the statement that was taken from [ ] Johnson at
the time of this event and in this statement she said that [Stover] grabbed her and threw her
down. That statement is consistent with the two statements that [Phillip]1 made as well as his
daughter made.” Shortly thereafter, the court found Stover guilty on all of the charges.
{¶19} Under the circumstances presented in this case, we cannot conclude that the
court’s admission of hearsay evidence was harmless. Stover’s first and second assignments of
error are sustained. His convictions for domestic violence, assault, and disorderly conduct are
reversed.
Assignment of Error Number Three
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ASSAULT, CRIMINAL DAMAGING AND
DISORDERLY CONDUCT, WHEN SUCH VERDICTS WERE AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶20} In his third assignment of error, Stover argues that his convictions are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In light of our resolution of his first two assignments of error,
1
The record does not reflect two statements by Phillip. Presumably, the court was referring to
the testimony of Phillip and his daughter as the two statements.
9
his third assignment of error, as it relates to his convictions for domestic violence, assault, and
disorderly conduct, is moot, and we decline to address it. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). We, therefore,
limit our review to his conviction for criminal damaging.
{¶21} A conviction that is supported by sufficient evidence may still be found to be
against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence,
offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at
387, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).
In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a
judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the
appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the fact[-]finder’s resolution of the
conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). An
appellate court should exercise the power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of
the evidence only in exceptional cases. Otten at 340.
{¶22} R.C. 2909.06(A)(1) provides that no person shall knowingly, by any means,
“cause[] or create a substantial risk of physical harm to any property of another without the other
person’s consent[.]” “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that
his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person
has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C.
2901.22(B).
10
{¶23} Phillip testified that he was standing by the front door of the apartment while
Stover was fighting with several people. According to Phillip, Stover then attacked Johnson and
people piled on top of Stover. After Stover got up from the pile, he ran over to Phillip’s jeep and
started kicking and punching it, “all the way up the driver[’s] side.” Phillip testified that Stover
then got inside the jeep, where he broke the turn signal and cracked the middle console.
{¶24} Darrian Adkins testified that her father was standing by his jeep when the group
was fighting. According to Darrian, Stover got up from the pile, went over to her father’s jeep,
and started kicking the driver’s side. Darrian said Stover then got inside the jeep and started
punching the dash.
{¶25} Officer Maimone testified that he observed some damage to the inside of the jeep.
He stated that it looked like someone had kicked the driver’s side, but that he did not notice any
damage to the outside of the car. Photographs of the jeep and an insurance estimate for repairs
were admitted into evidence.
{¶26} Stover testified that he “got bounced down the side of Phil[lip]’s [jeep]” by the
men who were attacking him. He denied ever intentionally kicking the car and testified that he
never got inside. Stover argues that Phillip and Darrian are not credible witnesses because
Phillip is Johnson’s former boyfriend. Further, Stover argues, their stories are inconsistent.
Specifically, Stover points to Phillip’s testimony that he was standing by the front door of the
apartment when Stover began attacking his jeep. Darrian, on the other hand, testified that Phillip
was standing by the jeep when Stover ran over and started kicking it.
{¶27} We cannot conclude that this inconsistency weighs heavily against his conviction.
See Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. Both Phillip and Darrian testified that Stover kicked the
driver’s side of the jeep before getting inside and punching the dashboard. Officer Maimone
11
testified that he observed damage to the inside of the car. “[T]his Court will not overturn the
trial court’s verdict on a manifest weight of the evidence challenge only because the trier of fact
chose to believe certain witnesses’ testimony over the testimony of others.” State v. Manso, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 26727, 2014-Ohio-1388, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Wayne No.
11CA0054, 2013-Ohio-2945, ¶ 42.
{¶28} Stover’s third assignment of error, as it relates to his criminal damaging
conviction, is overruled. His third assignment of error, as it relates to his other convictions, is
moot.
Assignment of Error Number Four
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO PAY
RESTITUTION TO AN ALLEGED VICTIM’S INSURANCE COMPANY.
{¶29} In his fourth assignment of error, Stover argues that the court erred in ordering
him to pay restitution to a third party.
{¶30} R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) permits the court to order a defendant convicted of a felony to
pay restitution based on the amount of the victim’s economic loss. “If the court imposes
restitution, the court shall order that the restitution be made to the victim in open court, to the
adult probation department that serves the county on behalf of the victim, to the clerk of courts,
or to another agency designated by the court.” Id.{¶31} The court ordered Stover to pay Phillip $500 for his out of pocket expenses to
repair his jeep. Further, the court ordered Stover to pay $2,288.13 to Phillip’s insurance
company for the remaining cost of repairs. The State concedes that the court erred in ordering
Stover pay restitution to Phillip’s insurance company. We agree.
{¶32} The statute permits the court to order restitution to: (1) the victim, (2) the adult
probation department, (3) to the clerk of courts, or (4) to “another agency designated by the
12
court.” Id. Phillip’s insurance company is none of these. See State v. Allen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 98394, 2013-Ohio-1656, ¶ 16-18. Stover’s fourth assignment of error is sustained.
III
{¶33} Stover’s first two assignments of error are sustained, and his convictions for
domestic violence, assault, and disorderly conduct are reversed. His third assignment of error, as
it relates to his criminal damaging conviction, is overruled. Stover’s third assignment of error, as
it relates to his other convictions, is moot. His fourth assignment of error is sustained. The
judgment of the Wayne County Municipal Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wayne County
Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A
certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
13
Costs taxed equally to both parties.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT
BELFANCE, P. J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOHN E. JOHNSON, JR., Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATHAN R. SHAKER, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.