State v. Chapman

[Cite as State v. Chapman, 2013-Ohio-357.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 26175
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JOHNNY B. CHAPMAN, JR. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 11 06 1615
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: February 6, 2013
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Johnny Chapman appeals his conviction in the Summit County Court of Common
Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} This case arises from an incident that occurred in the early morning hours of June
20, 2011, in which two boys were robbed at gunpoint as they were walking on Vernon Odom
Blvd. in Akron. The substantive facts of the incident are set forth below.
{¶3} On June 30, 2011, Chapman was indicted on two counts of aggravated robbery
with firearm specifications, one count of tampering with evidence, one count of having weapons
while under disability, one count of carrying concealed weapons, and one count of obstructing
official business. On July 20, 2011, the Grand Jury returned a supplemental indictment charging
Chapman with one count of attempted murder with a firearm specification, and one count of
felonious assault with a firearm specification. After a jury trial, Chapman was found guilty of
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both counts of aggravated robbery with the related firearm specifications, tampering with
evidence, carrying a concealed weapon, and obstructing official business. The jury found
Chapman not guilty of the charges in the supplemental indictment, and the charge of having
weapons while under disability was dismissed prior to trial. Chapman was sentenced to a total of
13 years of incarceration in this case. The trial court further specified that Chapman’s sentence
in this case was ordered to be served consecutively to his sentence in Case No. CR 09 03
0973(A), for a total sentence of fourteen years.
{¶4} After filing a timely appeal, Chapman now raises seven assignments of error. We
rearrange some assignments of error to facilitate review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. CHAPMAN’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL IN VIOLATION [OF] HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AND
FOURTE[E]NTH AMENDMENT[S] TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Chapman argues that the trial court violated his
speedy trial rights when it sua sponte continued the trial date because the court would be
occupied with an older criminal case. This Court disagrees.
{¶6} “When reviewing an appellant’s claim that he was denied his right to a speedy
trial, this Court applies the de novo standard of review to questions of law and the clearly
erroneous standard of review to questions of fact.” State v. Downing, 9th Dist. No. 22012, 2004-
Ohio-5952, ¶ 36; State v. Hamlet, 9th Dist. No. 04CA008527, 2005-Ohio-3110, ¶ 15.
{¶7} The right to a speedy trial by the State is guaranteed to a criminal defendant by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Klopfer v. North
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Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-223 (1967). The same right is conferred to a criminal defendant by
Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution. State v. O’Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 8 (1987). A criminal
defendant may waive his right to a speedy trial if it is knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
made. State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 69 (1989). The waiver must also be expressed in
writing or made in open court on the record. State v. King, 70 Ohio St.3d 158 (1994), syllabus.
{¶8} R.C. 2945.71 et seq. is an enforcement mechanism to make sure that a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial is upheld. State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218(1980), syllabus. R.C. 2945.71 dictates the time limits in which a defendant must be brought to
trial. R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) provides that “[a] person against whom a charge of felony is pending
*** [s]hall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the person’s arrest.” R.C.
2945.71(E) addresses the computation of time and provides that “each day during which the
accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days.” Time
is calculated to run the day after the date of arrest. State v. Friedhof, 9th Dist. No. 2505-M, 1996
WL 385612 (July 10, 1996), citing State v. Steiner, 71 Ohio App.3d 249, 250-251 (9th
Dist.1991). See also Crim.R. 45(A).
{¶9} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.73, if a defendant is not brought to trial within the
prescribed time period, the trial court must discharge the defendant upon motion for dismissal
prior to or at the commencement of trial. R.C. 2945.73(B). However, the time within which a
defendant must be brought to trial can be tolled.
{¶10} R.C. 2945.72(H) provides that the statutorily prescribed time for a speedy trial
may be lengthened by any period of continuance granted on the accused’s own motion, or by any
reasonable period granted other than on the accused’s motion. See also Hamlet at ¶ 18.
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{¶11} Furthermore, this Court has held that “a motion to suppress tolls the speedy trial
clock from the time the defendant files the motion until the trial court disposes of the motion, as
long as the trial court’s disposition occurs within a reasonable time.” State v. Kolvek, 9th Dist.
No. 21808, 2004-Ohio-2515, ¶ 7, citing State v. Arrizola, 79 Ohio App.3d 72, 76 (3d Dist.1992).
Additionally, R.C. 2945.72(E) provides that the statutorily prescribed time for a speedy trial may
be lengthened by “[a]ny period of delay necessitated by reason of a * * * motion, proceeding, or
action made or instituted by the accused[.]”
{¶12} In this case, Chapman was arrested on June 20, 2011, and remained in jail until
the commencement of trial on October 11, 2011. He was, therefore, entitled to the triple-count
provision in R.C. 2945.71(E), and the State was required to bring him to trial within 90 days
absent any tolling events. Prior to the expiration of the speedy trial deadline, on September 15,
2011, Chapman filed a motion to suppress, a motion to sever, a motion in limine, and a motion
for funds for a firearms expert. On Monday, September 26, 2011, Chapman appeared before the
trial court for a pretrial conference. At the outset of the hearing, the State noted the matter was
set to go to trial on Wednesday, September 28, 2011, but that it appeared the trial court had an
older case scheduled for trial that day as well. The State also noted that it had received copies of
Chapman’s motions. The court acknowledged that it would be in trial on an older case on
September 28, and that a new trial date had to be set.
{¶13} In response, defense counsel stated, “It’s [Chapman’s] intention to go forward
with trial on Wednesday. I did explain to him that notwithstanding the 90 days, because he’s
been in custody since his arrest, that if there’s an older case, that there’s also a guy in custody,
that case will take precedence and our case will have to be reset. It’s our position that we plan
on going forward Wednesday, although we do have issues of the motion to suppress [and] the
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motion to sever because there’s basically a robbery case involving two young men and then an
attempted murder involving one other person.” After a pause in the proceedings, defense
counsel continued, “my client doesn’t feel that he wants any motions being filed or litigated due
to the fact that it will simply delay the trial in this case. I think [i]f we could get a trial date as
soon as there’s an availability, if I could set the hearing before that time and then if we withdraw
it after going over the evidence with my client, we can withdraw it and still have the trial date.”
The trial court then responded, “I understand your desire to try the case quickly; I do. But we
have another gentleman [who] has been in jail for a much longer time, and it’s a retrial. And
then we have another trial set for Wednesday. * * * So the Court has to follow that order when
people are in custody, even though the 90 days is generally a hard-and-fast rule, you know, you
can only try one case at a time. * * * What I’ll do is set the trial as soon as we can. And it would
be the Court’s plan to try to rule on these motions and get that all handled before your trial date.”
{¶14} Chapman himself stated on the record that he never wanted defense counsel to file
“any motions or any continuances.” The trial judge then explained that even if no motions had
been filed, there were still older cases that had to be heard prior to Chapman’s trial. After the
trial court offered to allow Chapman to consult with counsel regarding the pending motions,
Chapman indicated he had made his decision. The trial judge stated, “That is not the reason the
Court is continuing your case. It really doesn’t have anything to do with the motions. It’s
because I’ll be in trial on another case.” After a side-bar discussion, the trial court stated on the
record that the trial would be set for October 11, 2011. Chapman then reiterated that he wanted
defense counsel to withdraw all of the motions that had been filed. The trial judge asked for
clarification if Chapman’s request included the motion to sever trials, and encouraged Chapman
to discuss that issue with defense counsel to make sure he understood the ramifications.
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Chapman responded that he thought it would be better to try the cases together, and that he felt
like he would “get through it.” Defense counsel stated on the record that he was opposed to
withdrawing the motions, but he understood that Chapman had his own reasons for withdrawing
the motions. At the conclusion of the September 26, 2011 hearing, the trial court ordered the
motions withdrawn.
{¶15} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[w]hen [] granting a continuance under
R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by
journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a
defendant to trial.” State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 (1982), syllabus. Here, on September 28,
2011, prior to the expiration of the speedy trial deadline, the trial court issued a journal entry
stating, “upon due consideration of this Court, and for good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the jury trial set in this case [] be continued until Tuesday, October 11, 2011 at
9:00 A.M., which may fall outside the Defendant’s speedy trial deadline, due to the Court
already engaged in trial in State v. Earl Wayne Martin, Case Number CR 11 02 0469.” Chapman
had several motions pending before the court at the time of the September 26, 2011 hearing that
had tolled time for speedy trial purposes. Even after Chapman withdrew the motions at the
hearing, it was necessary for the trial court to continue the trial to October 11, 2011, because the
court would be in trial on an older case. As the trial court’s order was journalized within the
ninety day window and specifically identified the older case which needed to be heard prior to
Chapman’s case, the trial court did not violate Chapman’s speedy trial rights. Id.{¶16} The first assignment of error is overruled.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE
STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECOR[]D SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST MR.
CHAPMAN IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTIONS 1, 10 & 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI
MR. CHAPMAN’S CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE POSSESSION IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 10 & 16 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION. (sic)
{¶17} In his fifth and sixth assignments of error, Chapman argues that his robbery
convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of
the evidence. This Court disagrees.
{¶18} Chapman combined his fifth and sixth assignments of error in his merit brief, and
advanced an argument focusing on whether he was properly identified as one of the men who
perpetuated the robberies. Specifically, Chapman argued that only one of the two victims was
able to identify Chapman, and that was only after the victim saw him across the street for a
matter of two seconds. Chapman further notes that while both victims described their assailants
as “black men and wearing black clothes,” neither victim gave a description of the assailant that
included braided hair. Chapman also asserts that while both victims identified the guns used on
them as black guns, the gun Chapman tossed as the police pursued him was chrome colored.
{¶19} Chapman was convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C.
2911.01(A)(1), which states, “No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined
in section 2913.01 or the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense,
shall * * * [h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s
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control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use
it[.]”
{¶20} A review of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence and the manifest weight of the
evidence adduced at trial are separate and legally distinct determinations. State v. Gulley, 9th
Dist. No. 19600, 2000 WL 277908 (Mar. 15, 2000). “While the test for sufficiency requires a
determination of whether the state has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight
challenge questions whether the state has met its burden of persuasion.” Id., citing State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390 (1997) (Cook J., concurring). When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to sustain a
conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279 (1991).
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind
of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶21} A determination of whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, however, does not permit this Court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State to determine whether the State has met its burden of persuasion. State v. Love, 9th Dist.
No. 21654, 2004-Ohio-1422, ¶ 11. Rather,
an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th
Dist.1986).
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Weight of the evidence concerns the tendency of a greater amount of credible
evidence to support one side of the issue more than the other. Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d at 387. Further when reversing a conviction on the basis that it was
against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court sits as a “thirteenth
juror,” and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.
Id.
State v. Tucker, 9th Dist. No. 06CA0035-M, 2006-Ohio-6914, ¶ 5.
{¶22} This discretionary power should be exercised only in exceptional cases where the
evidence presented weighs heavily in favor of the defendant and against conviction. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
Sufficiency
{¶23} The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that in the early morning hours of
June 20, 2011, Chapman and another man robbed two teenage boys at gunpoint. Steven
Thomas, who was fifteen years old at the time of the incident, and Christian Williams, who was
eighteen at the time of the incident, were walking to Thomas’ home on White Avenue in Akron
when they were confronted by two men with guns. Steven testified that the two assailants
crossed the street together and approached the boys as they walked on the sidewalk. As Steven
walked behind Christian, one of the men pulled a gun on Christian, and the other man put a gun
in Steven’s back. The man who stuck the gun in Steven’s back checked Steven’s pockets and
shoes, but found nothing. The other man stuck a gun in Christian’s stomach and removed the
contents of his pockets, which included his cell phone, his identification card, and his social
security card. At trial, Steven described the man who stuck the gun in his back as a black man
wearing black clothes, with a Bluetooth earpiece. Steven testified that he was able to see the
individual’s face when he first crossed the street. Steven further testified that he also briefly saw
the man who robbed him as he walked away after the robbery, but he was not able to see the face
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of the man who robbed his friend. Christian described the man who robbed him as a black man
wearing black clothes, but he could not give further details.
{¶24} Immediately after the incident, the boys went to Steven’s house on White Ave.
where he lived with his parents, and his mother called the police. When the police arrived, the
boys told Officer Michael Murphy that they had been robbed at gunpoint by two black males
wearing black. When Officer Murphy asked if there was anything that stood out about the
individuals, he “was told that one of the males had * * * a Bluetooth earpiece in his ear.” Officer
Murphy conveyed this information to the dispatcher so that the other police cruisers in the area
could search for the suspects.
{¶25} While Officer Murphy met with the victims, other officers began to search for the
suspects. Officer Paul Hill testified that Officers Falcone and Murphy described the suspects as
“Two black males, one in all black clothing, [] and a Bluetooth.” While riding northwest in his
cruiser on White Ave. with his partner, Officer Hill noticed two males matching the description
walking toward his vehicle. One of the suspects, Chapman, was dressed in all black clothing and
wearing a Bluetooth earpiece that was blinking. Before the officers were able to turn on their
lights and siren, the two men saw the cruiser and began to run. Officer Hill exited the cruiser
and pursued Chapman on foot. Before Officer Hill was able to ultimately catch and detain
Chapman, he noticed Chapman reach into his pocket and throw a gun into the grass. Officer Hill
recovered the firearm that Chapman had discarded, which was a chrome-colored .38 revolver.
Officer Hill’s partner, Officer John Turnure, pursued the other suspect but was unable to detain
him.
{¶26} After Chapman had been taken into custody, Officer Murphy brought the boys to
view Chapman to see if they could identify him. When Officer Murphy arrived at the location
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where Chapman had been apprehended, he assisted in removing Chapman, who was handcuffed,
from the paddy wagon. The boys were in the back of the cruiser approximately 20 feet from
Chapman at the time they observed him. Steven testified that the area was well lit, and a spot
light was shined on Chapman so that the boys could see him. Steven further testified that he
identified the man in custody, Chapman, as the individual who had robbed him. Specifically,
Steven testified that he “remembered his face [from] when he first crossed the street.” At trial,
Officer Murphy identified Chapman as the individual that Steven had identified on the night of
the incident.
{¶27} The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict Chapman of aggravated
robbery. The boys described the men who robbed them at gunpoint as black men wearing black
clothing, and Steven added that the man who stuck a gun in his back was wearing a Bluetooth
earpiece. When police began to search in the area of the robbery for the suspects, they observed
Chapman and another man take off running after they saw the police cruiser. As Officer Hill
pursued Chapman on foot, he saw Chapman discard a firearm. After Chapman was taken into
custody, Steven identified him as the individual who had robbed him. This evidence, when
construed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to establish that Chapman was
one of the individuals who robbed Steven and Christian.
Manifest Weight
{¶28} A review of the record suggests that the weight of the evidence supports
Chapman’s aggravated robbery convictions. Chapman fit the boys’ initial description of a black
male wearing black clothing and a Bluetooth earpiece. When police saw Chapman walking near
the scene of the incident shortly after it occurred, he took off running before the police could
activate their lights and siren, and subsequently discarded a firearm during the pursuit. Shortly
12
after Chapman had been detained, Steven identified Chapman as the man who had robbed him.
Though Christian was not able to identify Chapman as one the men who participated in the
robbery, Christian acknowledged during his testimony that the fact that a gun was pointed into
his stomach during the incident caused him to turn his head away, and he did not see the
suspects’ faces. Chapman correctly notes that Steven testified that he thought the gun Chapman
used during the robbery was black, when in fact the gun Chapman tossed during the chase was
chrome colored. However, Steven admitted during his testimony that he did not get a good view
of the gun because it was stuck in his back, and he acknowledged that he saw just “the top of it.”
While Chapman points to the fact that neither victim described one of the assailants as having
braided hair, Steven specifically testified that he was able to identify Chapman because he
“remembered his face [from] when he first crossed the street.” In light of Steven’s identification
of Chapman, the fact that he fit the boys’ description of the assailants which included a
Bluetooth earpiece, and the fact that Chapman was walking near the area of the incident and fled
immediately upon seeing the police cruiser, we cannot conclude that this is the exceptional case
where the jury clearly lost its way.
{¶29} Chapman’s fifth and sixth assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND VIOLATED MR.
CHAPMAN’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION
16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN IT FAILED TO SEVER THE
ATTEMPTED MURDER AND FELONIOUS ASSAULT OFFENSE[S] FROM
THE REMAINING CHARGES.
{¶30} In his second assignment of error, Chapman argues that the trial court committed
plain error by failing to sever the attempted murder and felonious assault charges from the
remaining charges. This Court disagrees.
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{¶31} Defense counsel filed a motion to sever on September 15, 2011. As noted above,
Chapman insisted that the motion be withdrawn at the pretrial conference on September 26,
2011. The trial court issued a journal entry prior to trial indicating that all of Chapman’s motions
had been withdrawn. Thus, Chapman couches his argument on appeal in terms of plain error.
{¶32} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” To constitute plain
error, the error must be obvious and have a substantial adverse impact on both the integrity of,
and the public’s confidence in, the judicial proceedings. State v. Tichon, 102 Ohio App.3d 758,
767 (9th Dist.1995). A reviewing court must take notice of plain error only with the utmost
caution, and only then to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Bray, 9th Dist. No.
03CA008241, 2004-Ohio-1067, ¶12.
{¶33} Chapman was ultimately convicted of the aggravated robbery charges in the
original indictment, which stemmed from the June 20, 2011 incident involving Steven Thomas
and Christian Williams. In the supplemental indictment, Chapman was charged with one count
of attempted murder with a firearm specification, and one count of felonious assault with a
firearm specification, in relation to a shooting that occurred on June 10, 2011. The State’s theory
of the case was that the gun Chapman discarded during the aggravated robbery on June 20, 2011,
was the same gun used during the shooting which occurred on June 10, 2011. While the charges
in both the original indictment and the supplemental indictment were tried together, Chapman
was acquitted of the charges in the supplemental indictment.
{¶34} Chapman argues in his merit brief that trying all of the counts together was highly
prejudicial and the trial court’s failure to sever the counts constituted reversible error. As noted
above, the trial judge encouraged Chapman to consult with defense counsel regarding the
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possible benefits of litigating the motion to sever. Defense counsel stated on the record that he
thought Chapman had a strong argument in support of the motion to sever. Despite these
statements by defense counsel and the trial judge, Chapman insisted that he wanted to withdraw
all of his motions pending before the court. When the trial judge specifically asked about the
motion to sever, Chapman indicated that he thought there were strategic advantages to trying the
counts together, stating “I feel like it would be better to try my cases together because some of
the evidence that’s used in one case I would be able to present it in a second case if they’re tried
together.” The trial judge warned Chapman that while such a strategy could be helpful, it could
also be harmful. Chapman responded that he understood but he thought he would “get through
it.” As Chapman made a tactical decision to withdraw his motion to sever and proceed to trial on
all of the charges, thus waiving the issue, he is now barred from asserting on appeal that the trial
court’s failure to sever the counts resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v.
Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 75, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502,
2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 23 (a waived right cannot be the basis for a claim of plain error under
Crim.R. 52(B)).
{¶35} Chapman’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW
WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL UPON LEARNING OF
OUTSIDE INFLUENCES ON THE JURY IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 10 & 16 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
{¶36} In his third assignment of error, Chapman argues that the trial court committed
plain error by not declaring a mistrial. This Court disagrees.
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{¶37} In support of his position that the trial court committed plain error by not
declaring a mistrial, Chapman argues that he was prejudiced when two jurors witnessed him in
restraints outside the courtroom. Chapman argues that this fact, coupled with the fact that
another juror overheard a conversation between a witness and a deputy, resulted in the tainting of
the jury and necessitated the declaration of a mistrial.
{¶38} The transcript reveals that prior to the third day of trial, the court reporter noticed
two jurors observe Chapman in restraints outside the courtroom. The trial judge separately
called each juror into chambers and, in the presence of counsel, asked each juror a series of
questions on the record. When Juror No. 12 indicated that she saw Chapman in restraints, the
trial court inquired as to whether that would impact her ability to be fair and impartial. Juror No.
12 responded that it would not. Defense counsel then inquired as to whether seeing Chapman in
chains would leave any impression with respect to guilt or innocence, and also whether what she
saw would impact her determination regarding identity, which was a critical issue in the case.
Juror No. 12 answered both questions in the negative. The trial judge then instructed Juror No.
12 not to disclose what she had observed to her fellow jurors. After Juror No. 12 was excused,
Juror No. 10 entered the judge’s chambers and went through a similar inquiry. In response to the
trial judge’s questions, Juror No. 10 said that observing Chapman in restraints would have no
bearing on her ability to be fair in deliberations, and that what she observed would not influence
her determination of guilt or innocence. Juror No. 10 further stated that she had not disclosed
what she had observed to any other jurors. Defense counsel then asked if what Juror No. 10 had
observed would impact her ability to make an impartial determination about the case, and
whether it would impact her ability to be fair in considering the evidence presented during trial.
Juror No. 10 answered both questions in the negative.
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{¶39} The second incident occurred on the morning of the fourth day of trial, when
Juror No. 4 was going through the metal detectors at the entrance to the courthouse. Juror No. 4
overheard a deputy ask a woman why she kept coming in and out of the courthouse. The
woman, who happened to be the mother of the victim from the June 10, 2011 incident and a
witness at trial, responded “Well, my son is the one that got shot back in June.” Juror No. 4 told
the bailiff about what she had heard, and the trial judge called her into chambers in the presence
of counsel for a discussion on the record. The trial judge asked whether the experience would
impact her ability to be fair, and Juror No. 4 stated that it would not. Defense counsel asked if
she had overheard any other conversation other than that single statement, and Juror No. 4
answered, “No.” Defense counsel further inquired as to whether the brief encounter would
impact Juror No. 4’s impressions on the case, and she answered in the negative.
{¶40} The manner in which the trial court handled the two incidents discussed above did
not constitute plain error. In considering whether to order a mistrial, the trial judge must
consider how the jury interpreted, and expectably will react to the out-of-court communication.
State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 259 (2002). Here, in each instance, the trial court
individually called the jurors into chambers in the presence of counsel, and inquired as to
whether the individual juror’s ability to render a fair verdict had been altered. All three jurors
stated that their experience did not impact their ability to be fair and impartial. The trial court
provided both parties with an opportunity to question the jurors, and in each case defense counsel
asked a series of questions. As nothing in the jurors’ answers suggested that the incidents
affected their ability to be impartial and render a fair verdict, the fact that the trial court did not
declare a mistrial did not constitute plain error pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B).
{¶41} Chapman’s third assignment of error is overruled.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
MR. CHAPMAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 10 & 16 OF THE
OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶42} In his fourth assignment of error, Chapman argues that he was denied his right to
effective assistance of counsel. This Court disagrees.
{¶43} In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Chapman must
show that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
prejudice arose from counsel’s performance.” State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 674 (1998),
citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “The benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. Thus, a two-prong test is necessary to examine such claims.
First, Chapman must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient by producing
evidence that counsel acted unreasonably. State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 534 (1997), citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Second, Chapman must demonstrate that but for counsel’s errors,
there is a reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been different. Keith, 79
Ohio St.3d at 534.
{¶44} Chapman raises two primary arguments in support of his ineffective assistance
claim. First, Chapman argues that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
properly challenge the show-up identification of Chapman by Steven Thomas. Chapman also
asserts that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by withdrawing the motion to sever
the counts in the indictment.
18
{¶45} As discussed above, defense counsel filed both a motion to suppress relating to
the show-up identification, and a motion to sever the attempted murder and felonious assault
charges from the remaining charges in the indictment. At the September 26, 2011 pretrial
conference, defense counsel stated on the record that he thought the motions had merit, and that
he was not in favor of withdrawing the motions. Chapman repeatedly stated that he never
wanted the motions filed in the first place, and that he insisted on withdrawing them. At the end
of the hearing, the following exchange then occurred on the record:
Defense Counsel: Judge, my position is I would like to explore the motion to
suppress. There was a show-up identification of my client as well as the motion
to sever the robbery charge, which is the first six charges in the indictment from
the last two which are the attempted murder for obvious prejudice it would inure
my client if they were tried together[.] *** So having said all that, I would advise
against him withdrawing all those motions, although I understand that he’s been
in custody and wants this to go forward and has his own reasons to keep these
cases together. So for the record, I’m opposed to withdrawing those, but if my
client wants to do that, I’m willing to withdraw the motions at this time.
The Court: And that is what you want to do?
The Defendant: Yes, ma’am.
{¶46} In light of Chapman’s relentless insistence that all of the motions pending before
the court be withdrawn, defense counsel’s conduct did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 534. Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress and a
motion to sever on behalf of Chapman, and emphatically advised Chapman against withdrawing
the motions. However, due to Chapman’s unremitting position before the trial court that he
wanted all of the motions withdrawn, defense counsel had no choice but to comply with his
client’s request. Thus, Chapman cannot prevail on his claim that defense counsel was
ineffective.
{¶47} Chapman’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
19
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VII
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS DEPRIVED MR.
CHAPMAN OF A FAIR TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER
THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 10 & 16 OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
{¶48} In his final assignment of error, Chapman contends that the cumulative effects of
the errors at trial resulted in a violation of his due process rights. Under the cumulative error
doctrine, a conviction may be reversed when the cumulative effect of the errors deprives a
defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial even though none of the errors, in isolation was
prejudicial. State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. In the
absence of multiple errors, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. State v. Hunter, 131
Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 132.
{¶49} In this case, Chapman has not identified errors in the trial court proceedings, so it
cannot be said that cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial. See State v. Taylor, 9th Dist.
No. 09CA009570, 2010-Ohio-962, ¶ 40. Chapman’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶50} Chapman’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
20
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, P. J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DAWN M. KING, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.